
THE JAPAN-CHINA DIALOGUE

Toward a Future-Oriented Japan-China Relationship

Conference Papers

January 23-24, 2013
Tokyo, Japan

Co-sponsored by

The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)

School of Environment, Beijing Normal University

World Resources Institute

College of Public Administration, Zhejiang University

The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)

Table of Contents

1. Program.....	1
2. Biographies of the Panelists.....	3
3. Presentation Papers.....	6
<i>Session I: New Perspective for Japan · China Cooperation in Environment and Energy Issues</i>	6
QIAN Yi.....	6
ASUKA Jusen.....	8
NI Yifei.....	9
KURAMOCHI Takeshi.....	10
XING Youkai.....	11
JIN Zhen.....	12
ZHAO Yinzhen.....	13
<i>Session II: New Perspective for Japan · China Cooperation in Non-Traditional Security Issues</i>	14
YU Xunda.....	14
Gregory J. MOORE.....	15
KUNIMI Masahiro.....	16
CUI Shunji.....	18
ITO Kazuyori.....	20
SONG Yann-huei.....	21
KOTANI Tetsuo.....	22
DUAN Fengjun.....	23
4. An Introduction to The Global Forum of Japan.....	24
5. An Introduction to School of Environment, Beijing Normal University.....	25
6. An Introduction to World Resources Institute.....	26
7. An Introduction to College of Public Administration, Zhejiang University	27
8. An Introduction to The Japan Forum on International Relations.....	28

1. Program

The Japan-China Dialogue Toward a Future-Oriented Japan-China Relationship

Wednesday, 23 January, 2013 "Room 2," International House of Japan

Welcome Dinner *Invitation Only

18:00-20:00 Hosted by ITO Kenichi, President, GFJ

Thursday, 24 January, 2013 "Lecture Hall," International House of Japan

Opening Remarks

13:00-13:10

Remarks (10 min.) HIRABAYASHI Hiroshi, Vice President, GFJ

Session I

13:10-15:10 **New Perspective for Japan - China Cooperation in Environment and Energy Issues**

Co-Chairperson
HIRONO Ryokichi, Professor Emeritus, Seikei University / Visiting Superior Research Fellow, JFIR
HU Tao, Visiting Professor, Beijing Normal University / Senior Associate, World Resources Institute

Paper Presenter A (7 min.) QIAN Yi, Dean of School of Environment and Safety, Qingdao University of Science and Technology

Paper Presenter B (7 min.) ASUKA Jusen, Professor, Tohoku University

Paper Presenter C (7 min.) NI Yifei, Senior Expert, Xinjiang Environmental Protection Department

Paper Presenter D (7 min.) KURAMOCHI Takeshi, Research Fellow, Institute for Global Environmental Strategies

Paper Presenter E (7 min.) XING Youkai, Assistant Director of Beijing Asia-Pacific Consulting Center for Environment and Development

Paper Presenter F (7 min.) JIN Zhen, Associate Researcher, Institute for Global Environmental Strategies

Paper Presenter G (7 min.) ZHAO Yinzhen, Researcher, World Resources Institute

Free Discussions (60 min.) All Participants

Summarization by Chairperson(10min.)
HIRONO Ryokichi, Professor Emeritus, Seikei University / Visiting Superior Research Fellow, JFIR
HU Tao, Visiting Professor, Beijing Normal University / Senior Associate, World Resources Institute

15:10-15:20 **Break**

Session II**15:20-17:20****New Perspective for Japan - China Cooperation in Non-Traditional Security Issues**

Co-Chairperson	ITO Go, Professor, Meiji University / Visiting Senior Research Fellow, JFIR
	YU Xunda, Professor, College of Public Administration, Zhejiang University
Paper Presenter A (7 min.)	Gregory J. MOORE, Associate Professor, College of Public Administration, Zhejiang University
Paper Presenter B (7 min.)	KUNIMI Masahiro, former Director General, The Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center, Cabinet Office
Paper Presenter C (7 min.)	CUI Shunji, Associate Professor, College of Public Administration, Zhejiang University
Paper Presenter D (7 min.)	ITO Kazuyori, Lecturer, University of Shizuoka
Paper Presenter E (7 min.)	SONG Yann-huei, Research Fellow, Institute of European and American Studies, Academia Sinica
Paper Presenter F (7 min.)	KOTANI Tetsuo, Fellow, The Japan Institute of International Affairs
Paper Presenter G (7 min.)	DUAN Fengjun , Senior Research Fellow, the Canon Institute for Global Studies
Free Discussions (60 min.)	All Participants
Summarization by Chairperson(10min.)	ITO Go, Professor, Meiji University / Visiting Senior Research Fellow, JFIR
	YU Xunda, Professor, College of Public Administration, Zhejiang University
Closing Remarks	
17:20-17:30	
Remarks (10 min.)	ITO Kenichi, President, GFJ

[NOTE] Chinese-Japanese simultaneous interpretation will be provided

2. Biographies of the Panelists

【Chinese Panelists】

HU Tao *Visiting Professor, Beijing Normal University / Senior Associate, World Resources Institute*
Graduated from Dept. of Ecology, Xinjiang Agricultural University in 1984. Received MSc in Agriculture Economics, Graduate School of Chinese Academy of Agriculture Sciences (CAAS) in 1987 and Ph.D. in Ecological Economics, Graduate School of Chinese Academy of Science (CAS) in 1991. Served as Coordinator, UN-China Climate Change Framework Program (CCPF), Senior Environmental Economist, Policy Research Center for Environment and Economy (PRCEE) of Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) of China, Chief Expert of Trade and Environment Expert Group of WTO Doha Round Negotiation, MEP of China, and Professor at University of Oregon.

QIAN Yi *Dean of School of Environment and Safety, Qingdao University of Science and Technology*
Received BSc in Agriculture Ecology of Xinjiang Agriculture University in 1984 and MSc in Agriculture Ecology from Xinjiang Agriculture University in 1989. Served as Main Researcher, General Methodology for Co-control (2010) and Charge-in-Chief, Research on synergy of city air pollution control Policy and Planning in Urumuqi (2012) : The Energy Foundation (EF), US.

NI Yifei *Senior Expert, Xinjiang Environmental Protection Department*
Graduated from Xinjiang Bayi Agricultural College in 1981. Worked in Xinjiang Department of Locus and Rat Disaster control (1981-2002), Served as deputy magistrate of Wushi county (2003-2006). Concurrently serves as Assistant Director of Xinjiang Department of Locus and Rat Disaster control, executive director of the Zoological Society of Xinjiang, and executive director of Grassland Institute of Xinjiang.

XING Youkai *Assistant Director of Beijing Asia-Pacific Consulting Center for Environment and Development*
Received B.A. in Environmental Engineering from Beijing Normal University in 2004. Received M.A. in Environmental Science from Beijing Normal University in 2007. Entered Asia-Pacific Consulting Center for Environment and Development in 2007.

ZHAO Yingzhen *Researcher, World Resources Institute*
Graduated from the Peking University in 2009. Received M.A. in International Development from the George Washington University of Elliott School of International Affairs in 2011. Served as a Financial Policy Analyst, Center for Conservation and Government, Conservation International (2010-2011). Entered World Resources Institute in 2011.

YU Xunda *Professor, College of Public Administration, Zhejiang University*
Received Ph.D. in Comparative politics and International Relations from College of Public Administration, Zhejiang University. Received Ph.D. in history from Zhejiang University. Served as Visiting scholar in University of Motana (1987-1988), Visiting scholar in Indian University (1996-1997). Concurrently serves as Dean of Social Science Academy of Zhejiang University.

Gregory J. MOORE *Associate Professor, College of Public Administration, Zhejiang University*
Received M.A. in Government and Foreign Affairs from University of Virginia. Received Ph.D. in International Studies from University of Denver in 2004. Served as Visiting Lecture, Renmin University (1998), Assistant Director, the Center for China-United States Relations at the University of Denver (2000-2002), and Assistant Professor, Eckerd College (2003-2010).

CUI Shunji

Associate Professor, College of Public Administration, Zhejiang University

Received Ph.D. in International Relations from London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) in 2008. Served as Post-Doctoral Research Fellow, Asia Research Centre, LSE. Concurrently, serves as Research Fellow, Centre for Non-Traditional Security & Peaceful Development Studies of Zhejiang University.

SONG Yann-huei

Research Fellow, Institute of European and American Studies, Academia Sinica

Received Ph.D. in International Relations from Kent State University. Received L.L.M. from the School of Law (Boalt Hall), University of California, Berkeley. Concurrently serves as the Convener of Academia Sinica's South China Sea Interdisciplinary Study Group, and Joint Research Fellow at the Centre for Asia-Pacific Area Studies, Academia Sinica.

DUAN Fengjun

Senior Research Fellow, the Canon Institute for Global Studies

Received Ph.D. at Department of Urban and Environmental Sciences, Peking University in 1995. Served as Research Fellow at Japan Science and Technology Corporation, Research Fellow at Disaster Prevention Research Institute of Kyoto University, Research Associate and Assistant Professor at Faculty of Engineering of the University of Tokyo, Research Fellow at Ocean Policy Research Foundation, and assumed the current position in 2009. Also serving as Project Research Fellow at Graduate School of Frontier Sciences of the University of Tokyo.

【Japanese Panelists】**HIRABAYASHI Hiroshi**

Vice President, GFI

Graduated from the University of Tokyo. Entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1963. From 1991 to 2006, served successively as Deputy Chief of Mission in Washington, D.C., Director-General of Economic Cooperation Bureau at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chief Cabinet Councilor on External Affairs at Prime Minister's Cabinet, Ambassador to India and Ambassador to France. Actually, Vice-President of The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), Executive Vice-President of The Council on East Asian Community (CEAC), President of the Japan-India Association.

HIRONO Ryokichi

Professor Emeritus, Seikei University / Visiting Superior Research Fellow, JFIR

Graduated from the University of Chicago and completed research program in 1958. Served as Assistant Professor, Associate Professor and Professor at Seikei University. Currenty Professor Emeritus, Seikei University, and concurrently serving as Director, Japan Committee for UNICEF, Senior Advisor, Japan Evaluation Society (JES), Senior Program Advisor, United Nations University (UNU) and Trustee of JFIR.

KUNIMI Masahiro

former Director General, The Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center, Cabinet Office

Graduated from the National Defense Academy of Japan in 1965, and then joined Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF). Served as the First Director General of The Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center. After retirement, he served as Director of YAMATO Transport Co., Advisor of Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance Company, Limited, Special Advisor of Ocean Policy Research Foundation.

ASUKA Jusen

Professor, Tohoku University

Received M.A. in Agricultural Chemistry from the University of Tokyo in 1986, M.B.A from INSEAD in 1990, and Ph.D. from the University of Tokyo in 1996. Served as Researcher at Laboratory for Experimental Surgery in Switzerland, Senior Researcher for Energy System Group of the Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry. He is also working for the Institute for Global Environmental Strategies (IGES) in Hayama, Japan as the director of the Climate change division. His primary areas of interest are about Energy policy and climate policy and international environmental/energy cooperation. He is regularly involved in expert networks as well as policy making on energy/climate policy issues.

ITO Go*Professor, Meiji University / Visiting Senior Research Fellow, JFIR*

Graduated from Sophia University. Received Ph.D. at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver in 1997. Served as Associate Professor at Meiji University in 1998, and assumed the current position in 2006. Also served as Visiting professor at Beijing University, Academia Sinica(Taiwan), Bristol University(Britain), Australian National University, and Victoria University (Canada), Adjunct Professor (International Security) at Waseda University as well as Sophia University, and as Adjunct Researcher of the House of Councilors. Recipients of the Eisenhower Fellowships in 2005 and the Nakasone Yasuhiro Award in 2006. Concurrently serves as Councilor of JFIR

ITO Kazuyori*Lecturer, University of Shizuoka*

Received master's degree from the University of Tokyo in 2003. In 2005, he joined the University of Shizuoka. His speciality is International Economic Law. He has published several papers on the legal issues of international trade and investment. He is the co-author of International Investment Agreement and International Economic Law I: Trade, Investment and Competition (both in Japanese).

KOTANI Tetsuo*Research Fellow, Japan Institute of International Affairs*

Served as Visiting Fellow at the Center for U.S. -Japan Studies and Cooperation at Vanderbilt University. Concurrently serves as Senior research fellow at the Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS) in Tokyo, and a Member of the International Advisory Board at the Project 2049 Institute in Washington. His research focus is the US-Japan alliance and maritime security. He received a security studies fellowship from the RIPS in 2006-2008. He won the 2003 Japanese Defense Minister Prize.

KURAMOCHI Takeshi*Research Fellow, Institute for Global Environmental Strategies*

Received M.Sc. and Ph.D. degrees from Utrecht University, the Netherlands. He Joined a Climate Policy Researcher in the Climate Change Group at the Institute for Global Environmental Strategies (IGES) in 2011. Prior to joining IGES, he worked as a Researcher and Teaching Assistant at Copernicus Institute, Utrecht University in the Netherlands between 2006 and 2011.

JIN Zhen*Associate Researcher, Institute for Global Environmental Strategies*

Received Ph.D. in Administrative Law from Kyoto University in 2009, and currently an Associate Researcher in the Climate Change Group at IGES. He holds a M.A. in Administrative Law from Kyoto University, M.A. in Education from Osaka Kyoiku University, and B.A. in Literary education from Northeast Normal University (China).

ITO Kenichi*President, GFI*

Graduated from Hitotsubashi University. Entered Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1960. Studied at Harvard University (1961-1963). Served various positions, including Director of First Southeast Asian Division until 1977. Served as Professor at Aoyama Gakuin University (1984-2006). Concurrently serving as President of the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), President of Council on East Asian Community (CEAC), and Professor Emeritus at Aoyama Gakuin University. Received an Honorary Doctorate from the University of Cambodia (2011).

(In order of appearance)

3. Presentation Papers

Session I: New Perspective for Japan - China Cooperation in Environment and Energy Issues

QIAN Yi

Dean of School of Environment and Safety,
Qingdao University of Science and Technology

中国废旧塑料资源再生利用的管理现状及问题

中国 2010 年塑料消费总量为 8000 万吨，约占世界总量的 1/4，是第一大塑料消费国。巨大的塑料消费量在给人们日常生活提供方便的同时，也带来了大量的废弃塑料和严重的环境污染。与开发原生资源相比，废旧塑料的回收成本较低，所以废旧塑料的回收具有十分广阔的市场和投资潜力。同时废旧塑料的再生利用若管理不善，也将面临巨大的环境风险。

1. 中国废旧塑料资源再生利用产业现状

一是规模大、从业人数多，有 30 多个废塑料回收和加工处理聚集地，在城乡结合处及周边分布有 2 万余家废塑料回收和加工利用的企业，每年回收利用废旧塑料约 2000 万吨，是全球最大的再生回收行业。废塑料行业的市场规模已经达到了 1200 到 1800 亿人民币，并且每年的增长速度超过 15%。

二是高进入门槛、大规模投资、大环保投入、高技术含量、技工贸一体的产业模式尚未形成。企业普遍投资规模小，工艺落后，环境污染比较严重。

三是废弃废塑料总量大，但由于回收体系不健全，导致资源利用率偏低。

2. 中国废旧塑料再生利用管理政策

(1) 法律法规

2007 年 5 月 1 日中国颁布实施了《再生资源回收管理办法》，国家鼓励以环境无害化方式回收处理包括废旧塑料在内的再生资源，鼓励开展有关再生资源回收处理的科学研究、技术开发和推广。2007 年 12 月 1 日起实施了《废塑料回收与再生利用污染控制技术规范（试行）》，该标准就废塑料的回收、贮存、运输、预处理、再生利用等过程中的环境保护相关事项提出了要求。2007 年 12 月 31 日发布了《国务院办公厅关于限制生产销售使用塑料购物袋的通知》。2009 年 1 月 1 日实施了《中华人民共和国循环经济促进法》。2011 年 8 月 1 日起施行了《固体废物进口管理办法》，该法规是我国监管进口固体废物的最重要的法律依据，“许可证管理、就近口岸报关、圈区管理”是三大原则。2011 年 10 月 31 日，国务院办公厅下发的《关于建立完整的先进的废旧商品回收体系的意见》，2012 年 10 月 1 日实施了《废塑料加工利用污染防治管理规定》，该法规一是鼓励废塑料加工利用集散地对废塑料加工利用散户实行集中园区化管理，集中处理废塑料加工利用产生的废水、废气和固体废物；二是鼓励有条件的废塑料加工利用集散地申请开展国家“城市矿产”示范基地建设，申请开展废旧商品回收体系建设试点工作。应该说为有效利用废旧塑料和防治废旧塑料再生利用产生的环境污染，我国已经建立了相对完善的法律法规体系。

（2）经济激励政策

2008年1月1日起颁布了包括废旧塑料在内的《资源综合利用企业所得税优惠目录》(2008年版)。2011年11月21日发布了《关于调整完善资源综合利用产品及劳务增值税政策的通知》，废旧塑料再生利用可以获得50%退税优惠。2011年8月，我国已将再生资源回收利用工作列入十二五规划纲要，这在我国历史上是第一次，也彰显出再生资源行业的重要性。2012年9月，财政部、国家发改委制定的《循环经济发展专项资金管理暂行办法》正式实施，办法对专项资金的设立、使用、监管等作出详细的规定。

3. 废旧塑料再生利用管理存在的问题

（1）废旧塑料行业的发展缺乏政策的顶层设计，导致产业聚集度偏低、企业规模过小、回收利用技术落后、环境污染严重

目前中国废塑料回收再生行业存在分散无序、污染和资源浪费的严重问题，归根到底是该行业的发展缺乏宏观政策的顶层设计，表现在，既缺乏废旧塑料行业发展的产业发展规划和系统的配套政策，也缺乏有效的技术支持和环境管理标准。具体反映在：缺少专职研究人员、缺少行业数据积累、缺乏基础研究和技术创新投入；缺乏行业的准入标准；进口废塑料与国内环境保护管理的不协调，洋垃圾污染严重；废塑料行业基础标准与行业实际运营严重脱节；对废塑料等非标准化产品采用标准化产品的管理思路；行业违法成本很低、守法成本很高等。

（2）环境行政管理体制不顺畅，政策的执行力不高

1. 政策实施的政府责任部门不明确

2007年12月31日发布了《国务院办公厅关于限制生产销售使用塑料购物袋的通知》只规定了相关部委局的职责，未明确政策的整体实施应由哪个政府部门负责，导致“限塑令”实施效果差强人意。NGO组织“限塑小组”2011年对北京、广州等多个大城市所作的调查显示，90%菜市场免费送塑料袋，且大部分是不达标的超薄塑料袋。而国际食品包装协会2012年5月从广东多个市场抽查发现，80%以上使用的是价格低廉的超薄塑料袋，市场内的塑料袋专营店售卖的塑料袋70%是无证产品。

2012年10月1日起执行《废塑料加工利用污染防治管理规定》，除了明确“省级环保、商务主管部门应当组织核查并公布合格的废塑料加工利用企业名单”之外，其余的条文都没有表示任何的实施部门，这很难实现政策的预期效果。

2. 多头共管、缺乏部门间的有效协调机制、管理效率低下

按照《再生资源回收管理办法》的规定，商务主管部门是再生资源回收的行业主管部门，负责制定和实施再生资源回收产业政策、回收标准和回收行业发展规划。发展改革部门负责研究提出促进再生资源发展的政策，组织实施再生资源利用新技术、新设备的推广应用和产业化示范。工商行政管理部门负责再生资源回收经营者的登记管理和再生资源交易市场内的监督管理。环境保护行政主管部门负责对再生资源回收过程中污染防治的工作实施监督管理，依法对违反污染防治法律法规的行为进行处罚。建设、城乡规划行政主管部门负责将再生资源回收网点纳入城市规划，依法对违反城市规划、建设管理有关法律法规的行为进行查处和清理整顿。这种多头共管的管理体制造成政府部门间有利就管，无利就躲，难于实现对废旧塑料再生利用的有效管理和保护健康的生态环境。

4. 废旧塑料再生利用要解决的核心问题

中国废塑料回收处理要解决的四个问题：一是完善的法规政策和执行顺畅的行政管理体制是发展的保障；二是无害化处理是发展的前提；三是高效的回收循环体系是发展的基础；四是先进的技术是发展的关键。今后，只有具有完善的网络、拥有核心技术、富有环保理念、执行行业标准、形成产业规模的优势企业才能在未来发展中赢得先机。

ASUKA Jusen
Professor, Tohoku University

Air Pollution in Japan: Global Warming and Black Carbon

The climate change policy, a reduction of using fossil fuel in order to lower carbon dioxide emissions, has a great benefit for controlling climate change and reducing air pollution as well as cultivating farm products and keeping to live our healthy life. The policy practices that are aware of both air pollution and climate change bring about various co-benefits with improving the efficiency of operating policy.

Recently, the Short-Lived Climate Forcers (SLCF) has been attention in the context of both co-benefits and global warming countermeasures. The SLCF is a general term of black carbon, ozone, and methane. Currently, the Swedish and the U.S. government are grappling with reduction of the SLCF. Reducing the emission of the SLCF internationally, the Climate and Clean Air Coalition (CCAC), in which Bangladesh, Canada, Ghana, Mexico, and Japan participated, has been started.

Holistically, the effects of reduction of the SLCF and global warming are complicated and uncertain; thus, it is better to argue the reduction of the SLCF as a countermeasure of global warming in the specific geographical region—the Arctic zone and glaciations—to inhibit rising in temperature. Since the Arctic zone rises the temperature twofold compared to other region on earth, the melting of ice sheet and the frozen soil cause sea level rise and exhaust gas-methane. Needless to say, there is also a positive side to alleviate the health hazard to tackle with the reduction of the SLCF.

Overall, the significance of the reduction of the SLCF for global warming is three foci; 1) the effectiveness for global warming on entire earth is uncertain; 2) the effectiveness for the region of temperature elevation such as the Arctic zone and glaciations is a favorable method; and 3) delaying the rise of temperature in Arctic zone keep a stable environment in Arctic with preventing sea level rise and exhaust gas-methane, and eventually deferring the “Tipping Point.”

Finally, there is a still political problem to reduction of the SLCF between developed countries and developing countries. On the one hand, developed countries are less emission of the SLCF, but on the other, developing countries are much more emission of it. In this situation, developed countries are reluctant to bear the burden on developing countries. Therefore, developed countries, developing countries, and even Asian countries have a different stance toward international cooperation.

NI Yifei
Senior Expert, Xinjiang Environmental Protection Department

乌鲁木齐 协同控制空气污染物与温室气体

乌鲁木齐市空气污染十分严重，特别是在冬季采暖季。这已经对居民的健康及社会稳定产生了一定的影响。目前该市的空气质量在全国省会城市中居于后列。新疆维吾尔自治区及乌鲁木齐市政府都将改善乌鲁木齐的大气质量作为首要的民生工程之一，计划在 5 年内投资 180 亿元人民币用于改善大气质量，以降低 SO₂、NO_x 及颗粒物的排放量。与此同时，也希望在实现低硫、低氮、低颗粒物的同时也实现低碳。为此，市政府下决心开展“创模”、“创文明城市”等行动。

由此同时，温室气体减排的任务也十分艰巨。由国家及自治区下达到乌鲁木齐市的“十二五”节能减排任务十分艰巨。要想在原有基础上继续节能减排，必须得有新政策、新手段。

环保部正在开展“大气污染的区域联防联控”计划，乌鲁木齐是 12 个试点城市之一。其中，开展多污染物协同控制是其中的重点内容之一。但是，如何开展多污染物协同控制是需要克服的技术攻关难题，这不仅对乌鲁木齐有意义，且对全国其它试点城市也都很有示范作用。

鉴于此，我们在乌鲁木齐进行协同控制空气污染物与温室气体研究，针对乌鲁木齐的基本状况，制定协同控制试点城市建议，对乌鲁木齐协同控制进行技术方案的筛选与行业部门的规划设计及政策实施手段。

结合乌鲁木齐市“十二五”的节能减排目标，选取重点行业深入分析，进行协同控制的整体规划设计。具体包括以下内容：

- ✓ 热电行业的协同控制规划
- ✓ 钢铁行业的协同控制规划
- ✓ 水泥行业的协同控制规划
- ✓ 交通的协同控制规划
- ✓ 采掘业的协同控制规划
- ✓ 建筑节能行业的协同控制规划
- ✓ 建材行业的协同控制规划
- ✓ 氯碱化工行业的协同控制规划

与此同时，对宏观经济体系及污染行业节能减排的协同控制规划及目标

- 分析宏观经济结构与规模及效率对协同控制的影响
- 分析污染行业的结构与规模及效率对协同控制的影响
- 分析污染行业的效率、减排潜力对协同控制的影响
- 分析污染行业的工业布局对协同控制的影响

在此基础上，提出建设《乌鲁木齐协同控制试点城市方案》的建议

The Prospects for Japan-China Research Cooperation on Climate Change Mitigation, Considering a Possible Reduction Nuclear Energy Dependency in the Long Term

Introduction

Overcoming various challenges, Japan takes on important tasks of not only transforming its society into a low-carbon sustainable one swiftly, but also devoting continuous efforts around the world never to repeat nuclear disasters like the Fukushima Daiichi power plant ever again. While the efforts to further improve the safety of nuclear power plant is a matter of course, it is very difficult to make nuclear energy perfectly risk-free. We therefore also need to consider long term low-carbon scenarios in which dependency on nuclear power would be limited in the future.

China and Japan have been the leaders in developing policies to realize low-carbon societies in Asia. In this perspective, Japan-China cooperation toward climate change mitigation will become further important not in the arena of politics and business, but also in the academic and policy research arena. This paper explains our recent work and its results, and explores the possibilities of Japan-China research cooperation in building low-carbon societies in Asia.

1. Long-Term Energy and CO₂ Scenario Analyses by IGES

In our research report published last year, we performed series of long term energy scenario analyses using the TIMES Integrated Assessment Model, a bottom-up energy system assessment model.

The report investigates the future energy mix to achieve an 80% reduction in CO₂ emissions by 2050 with and without a gradual phase-out of nuclear power. One scenario (NPO-LC) assumes the gradual phase-out of nuclear power by 2050. The other scenario (REF-LC) assumes the continued dependence on nuclear power as in the REF scenario. The indicators used for the comparison are: (1) total energy supply system cost, (2) amount of fossil fuel imports, and (3) CO₂ emissions.

The results show that for the NPO-LC Scenario, wind and solar power plants are installed up to almost their capacity limits set in our study (90GW and 180GW respectively). On the other hand, in the REF-LC Scenario, wind power is installed up to 59GW but the installation of solar plants are limited to 38 GW. Under this scenario, nuclear power plants are estimated to generate electricity about 63 GW in 2050. Our study also shows that large-scale deployment of CCS (Carbon Capture and Storage) is essential to achieve the 80% target without the use of nuclear power; the results show that the additional need for CCS will be 170 million tonnes (Mt)/yr compared to the REF-LC scenario, and the total requirement will be 350 Mt/yr in 2050 with zero nuclear power. Furthermore, the study presents the increase in discounted total energy system costs for 2010-2050 for the NPO-LC scenario compared to the REF-LC scenario was found to be 1 %. In annual terms, the average energy system cost increase was found to be about 0.13% of national GDP.

2. Implications and Policy Recommendations

• If the use of nuclear power will be limited in the long term, the study shows that the importance of renewable energy as well as CCS will increase considerably. Since the potential for CO₂ underground storage in Japan is limited, we may suggest cooperation with China, which has a large geologic CO₂ storage potential,

in the long term. It is also important for us to analyze the performance of an entire CCS chain over Japan and China.

• It is noteworthy that all low-carbon energy supply technologies has its limits with regard to deployment capacity. This is why energy saving is vitally important especially in the case of limited use of nuclear power plants. Japan is a leading country in the field of energy saving technologies in the world, our contribution to China in her promotion of energy saving and CO₂ mitigation is highly effective and more useful than what we imagine currently. In this lines of Japan-China cooperation, sharing some of the key information such as institutional arrangements and academic works for cost & benefits analyses are also crucial.

• Moving away from mass consumption of coal with high CO₂ emission factors is also very important in the field of industrial sector as well as power generation sector, which can lead to a Japan-China cooperation in this field. For example, China and Japan boasts their crude steel production of the world share thought, both of the countries are also facing a problem that steel industries produce a significant level of CO₂ emissions. In order to resolve the CO₂ emissions, we suggest that steel industries from Japan and China can cooperate and make a join-proposal for effective reducing CO₂ emissions and so on.

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中国电力行业硫、氮、碳协同减排的环境经济路径分析

1. 电力行业概况

电力行业一直是我国能源消耗、大气污染物和温室气体排放的重点行业。“十一五”期间中国电力行业得到了快速发展，2010年中国电力行业总装机容量为96219万kW，总发电量42280.15亿kWh。“十一五”期间，中国电力行业采取了大量的节能减排措施，并取得了一定的成效，主要表现在供电标准煤耗的下降和SO₂排放量的大幅度减少。

2. 在电力行业开展协同控制的必要性

“十二五”期间，在继续减排SO₂的同时，还面临着NO_x减排任务，同时电力行业也是温室气体减排的重点行业。从电力行业“十一五”期间节能减排工作经验来看，单纯以末端治理为主的减排措施将面临边际减排成本递增、减排难度加大的困境。而强化大气污染物与温室气体的“协同控制”，则提供了统筹协调节能与减排，综合控制多污染物，提高污染控制成效和经济性的重要思路。

3. 电力行业协同控制措施分类

电力行业协同控制措施大致可分为工程减排和结构减排两方面。其中，工程减排可根据生产环节分为3类：前端控制措施（洁净煤技术）、过程控制措施和末端治理措施。而“结构减排”包括火电内部的“上大压小”措施，以及在建设新电厂时以新型燃煤火电技术、天然气发电、水电、核电，以及风电、生物质能、太阳能等新能源发电替代传统燃煤火电，实现电力结构的优化。

4. 结论

末端治理措施在削减某一特定污染物的同时，由于耗能将增加其它污染物的排放；以节能增效为主的技术措施，以及上大压小和以水电、核电、新能源发电、燃气发电、新型燃煤火电技术、虚拟电厂等替代传统燃煤火电的结构性减排措施也可以实现多种污染物的协同减排。

“十二五”期间，在电力行业开展技术减排和结构减排仍具有较大的减排潜力，结合电力行业总量减排目标、减排总成本控制目标等因素，绘制单污染物或多污染减排路径图可以协助决策者制定适宜的减排规划方案。

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Analysis of Effectiveness of “Reporting System of Environment-conscious Building” in the Local Governments

To reduce GHG emission, improving energy efficiency of buildings is should be promoted. Also, along with the tendency of decentralization, local governments are expected to play leading roles in architecture and city planning toward low carbon cities. The purpose of this study is to draw lessons for policy on energy efficient building by analyzing the effectiveness of “Reporting system of Environment-conscious building” which has been diffused among many local governments in recent years. With a perspective of administrative jurisprudence, we conducted a legal structural analysis of the ordinances in 15 local governments, and surveys of the operation by interviews to the officers of 6 local governments and a questionnaire survey distributed to 21 local governments, of which 20 were responded. Main results are as follows.

1. A characteristic common to all the systems is that it obliges the owners of new building above a certain size to report the status of their environment-consciousness, and local governments disclose the evaluation results of those reports while the details of the system such as the building of subject are different in each system. The legal binding force of the system is not effective enough because owners' obligations to be fulfilled is not fully clear except for notification and moreover the sanction in default of notification is limited to “administrative advice and breach declaration”
2. As induction measures, increasing the ratio of notification and the preparation of incentives to the owners to address improving energy efficiency of buildings are essential. Nonetheless, as for the ratio of notifications, only one local government answered 100% while 13 local governments answered less than 90% or not figured out. Also, 8 local governments prepare no effective measures to give owners incentives to improve energy efficiency of their buildings.
3. Some local governments have introduced a measure linking the reporting system to the procedure of building certification application under the Building Standards Act, and a labeling scheme. The system could be effective to some extent if it would involve these measures.

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Trends and Drivers of China's Overseas Solar and Wind Investment

This paper aims to help policymakers, investors, and researchers better understand the trends in China's overseas investments in the wind and solar industries, and the factors behind those trends. It examines the scale, nature, and types of China's overseas investments in the wind and solar industries, and identifies the policy and market factors that drive these investments.

According to our data collection, China has made at least 124 investments in the solar and wind industries in 33 countries over the last decade. Of these, for investments where data was available, the cumulative value amounted to nearly \$40 billion in 54 investments, and the cumulative installed capacity added was nearly 6,000 MW in 53 investments. Of the 124 investments, 41 were in the wind industry, 81 in the solar industry, and two in both the wind and solar industries. The majority of investments were in electricity generation. Twenty-seven of the wind investments were in wind farms predominantly carried out through joint ventures, as were most of the 41 solar investments. Several investments were also made in manufacturing facilities, and to establish sales and marketing offices. Most of the investments were concentrated in a few developed countries: the United States, Germany, Italy and Australia. A small handful of developing countries, including South Africa, Pakistan and Ethiopia, also attracted investments.

China is emerging as an important overseas investor in the wind and solar industries. Over the past decade, it has steadily increased its investments in these industries, driven by policy 'push' and 'pull' factors, domestic and overseas market conditions, and a supportive financial sector. While China's investments have been concentrated in the United States, Germany, Italy, Australia, and other developed countries, its investments in developing countries such as South Africa, Pakistan and Ethiopia are increasing and appear likely to continue to increase in the coming years.

China's strong manufacturing capacity in the solar and wind industries, along with a saturated domestic market, appears to be the underlying factor driving the industry to seek markets overseas. While increasing exports can partially address this problem, it is not alone a solution; industries face import restrictions in some major markets, particularly the United States. As a result, investments are seen as a way of retaining and expanding market share, strategically acquiring new technologies, filling the financing gap and acquiring undervalued assets in the wake of the financial crisis, and even creating demand for the export of products as has been seen particularly in the case of Goldwind.

The Chinese government's policy support and financial support mainly from the country's state-owned banks, which are also responsive to government policy, have encouraged this overseas investment trend. China's policies linked to its policy of 'going global' and the focus on strategically developing 'emerging industries' which includes the wind and solar industries have had the effect of 'pushing' Chinese companies to invest overseas. This has been aided by financial support, particularly by the China Development Bank, in some cases specifically for overseas investments but in most cases for these companies to grow their business, which may include overseas investments.

Host countries policies have also attracted investments from China's solar and wind industries, whether explicitly through tax breaks and feed-in tariffs, through bilateral cooperation agreements or as a 'side-effect' of policies discouraging imports. While such policies have been dominant in developed country markets, they are increasingly being put in place in developing country markets. This appears set to increase China's investments in developing countries as their solar and wind industries continue to expand their markets, and as incentives are scaled back in developed country markets.

*Session II : New Perspective for Japan - China Cooperation
in Non-Traditional Security Issues*

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China's Grand Strategy and Sino-Japanese Relations

1. Promoting the Rise of China is the goal of the China's ruling party now, it also is the main cause initiated by the Party which can be identified by Chinese people. The Rise of China usually means three progresses of China: Economic development, as a result, people's living standard can reach to the level that developed countries have reached, national security can be guaranteed by China's own capacity; Social transformation, a society based on industry, information and knowledge can be established instead of a traditional society based on agriculture; Cultural renaissance, China will establish a new civilization.
2. Rise of China needs Chinese government make a grand strategy. I think this grand strategy should compose five parts: firstly, we need to do everything to establish a peaceful international environment, so that China can realise peaceful development. Secondly, we need to develop a limited but effective military forces to guarantee the national core interests. Thirdly, we need to establish common-shared values, or globally identified values. Fourthly, we need to take part in the global governance positively, and undertake some international responsibilities. Fifthly, we need to integrate internal development and external development and let them complement each other.
3. To realise this grand strategy, China should make great efforts both domestically and internationally. From the international perspective, China has maintained a peaceful environment since the early 1980s, China also has made some contributions to global governance in some respects. But China faces many challenges either: how to handle the relations with other great powers which have some interest or even strategic contradictions or conflicts with China such as United States, Japan and India , how to prevent security dilemma, how to let other countries such as Philippines to defuse the afraid of so called China threat, how to establish a inclusive regime so that both China and the other countries can have a good expectation for future, how to respect the plural cultures and plural values of the people of other countries.
4. Sino-Japanese relations are an ambivalent relationships which include both bright and dark spots. But history has told us: A good relations with Japan remain a very important component in China's foreign policy. In 1970s Japan's endorsement of China's anti-hegemony position contributed significantly to China's security and Sino-Japanese economic ties, which then has strongly supported China's development strategy. As two asia's countries, Japan and China together make the great contributions to the achievement of Asia Rise, which fundamentally changes the world's situation and offers a very important background for China's peaceful rise. A long term vision still calls for China to develop good relations with Japanese .
5. Today the main obstacle for the development of Sino- Japanese relations is the issue of Diaoyu/Senkaku islands. The disputes over Diaoyu/Senkaku islands relate to the sovereignty of each side, so it is

unrealistic to hope which side to offer a concession in sovereignty. In this case, how do we develop the relations between China and Japanese? From China's side, I think four points should be emphasized on here: A. If we set up a criteria with the grand strategy, we can find the nature of the disputes over Diaoyu/Senkaku islands is a partial issue, we can not let this dispute influence the overall situation and the implement of the grand strategy. B. We should hold on the promotion of economic relations, specifically the negotiation on FTA now. It is obvious that the circumstance of politically cold and economically hot is better than the circumstance of double cold. C. The dialogues between nongovernment sections, particularly at scholars level, can increase mutual understanding and confidence among people of two countries, which can influence the policy-makers. D. Even in the issue of Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, we still can find some ways to moderate the tension, for example, each sides should avoid direct touching between both official law enforcements, each sides can agree Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in the environment protection area of the UN, etc.

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Face, Nationalism and Domestic Politics in Recent Sino-Japanese Maritime Dispute Behavior

Prevailing narrative on why the Diaoyu/Senkaku issue has surfaced now: China's rise, China's power growing, Japan feeling it is on the defensive, moving to balance by strengthening claim to isles (Realist)

Presented here is an alternative narrative: Domestic politics and the East Asian notion of face (面子) are better explanatory variables in explaining both 1. Why 国有化 now in Japan, and 2. Why China's response so strong.

Explanatory Angle: Putnam's "Two Level Games" – Face at 1. domestic level between state and people, and face at 2. face at foreign policy level between two states.

Face = "the self revealed to others," socially necessary for "in-group cohesion" (Gries, 2005)
Related is Wendt's notion that "interests are beliefs about how to meet needs (1999: 129), that there are two kinds of needs (1. Identity needs and 2. Material needs), and collective self-esteem is a national interest of states (1999: 236). Face, while not the same as self-esteem, overlaps with it. Realists like Niebuhr, too, spoke of "collective pride."

1. Face in Domestic Politics

A. Japan: 国有化 = Ishihara/right vs. Noda/center, a question of domestic political contention, not a matter of central government/policy. Then-impending election raised stakes, limiting gov't flexibility.

B. China: Growing national power brings calls by some for a more assertive national posture, face of China's central leadership challenged by netizens/nationalists for alleged soft response to external challenges, internal Party divisions over national direction and 18th Party Congress in November means less room for maneuver by center. Nationalism as part organic and part "Frankenstein's monster."

2. Face in Bilateral (Sino-Japanese) Politics

A. Japan: Leaders must preserve “national face,” cannot appear soft/weak vs. China. Weakness on islands would appear to threaten “in-group cohesion” and “collective self-esteem.” So, while seeking to dislodge a right-wing (Ishihara) take-over of Japanese policy on the islands, leaders nationalize islands and follow on with a strong, uncompromising stand on islands. Japanese leaders apparently try to save some face for China by disallowing Ishihara’s moves, but in the process the nationalization of isles by the central government is still a blow to China’s “face,” particularly since Hu Jintao directly asked Prime Minister Noda in a “standing summit” at the September APEC meeting not to nationalize the islands.

B. China: Leaders are under great pressure to preserve “national face” and to improve China’s “face status” as China’s power position improves. Chinese people believe China’s international status is insufficient (e.g., insufficient respect) and that China should not have to suffer the indignity of loss of face over the Diaoyu/Senkaku. China allows/coordinates September anti-Japanese protests, while pursuing a robust, proactive, forward presence in the waters surrounding the islands to reify its claims to them, and presses Japan to admit a dispute over their ownership, and to come to the negotiating table. Chinese government tries to reign in more radical anti-Japanese activities in China, but the protests and its more robust East China Sea maritime policies end up posing challenge to Japan’s “face needs.” Underlying factor: Japan’s lack (other than 1995) of seriously addressing WW2 issues with China, and continuing Yasukuni visits by top Japanese leaders, leads Chinese to feel slap in “collective face.”

Result: Apparent zero-sum situation – reconciliation increasingly difficult. Problems: 1. Rhetoric of both (Japan not admitting there is a dispute, China missing and/or misreporting nuances in Japanese situation, position). 2. China’s domestic media portrayal of muscular maritime presence, as driving away Japanese vessels, etc. – can’t be maintained for long, doesn’t allow for loosening of Chinese forward positioning of ships/planes/claims.

Needed: Way for both sides to come away with “national face” intact, to meet “face needs” of both sides in light of domestic pressure both face. What are minimum “face needs” of both sides? What are essentials? What is way both sides can come away with “face needs” met, domestic constituencies satisfied?

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The Present Conditions and the Future of the Japanese-Chinese Opposition and Crisis Control Mechanism Construction around East China Sea particularly Senkaku Islands

Summary

1. The present conditions of the Japanese-Chinese opposition around East China Sea particularly Senkaku Islands

A) Japan controls Senkaku Islands effectively, but China insists on dominium. China lets ships and planes of the law enforcement agency dispatch and repeat territorial waters and encroachment of air space around Senkaku Islands.

B) People's Liberation Army receives the aggravation of the feelings of the Chinese nation to Japan and, depending on the correspondence of the Japanese side, mentions possibility of the dispatch of the military unit.

C) The United States and the U. K., the existence paper for wiping of Australia are concerned about the possibility that the strain around Senkaku Islands develops into Japan and a military dispute in China in 2013.

2. The need to build crisis control mechanism for the accidental occurrence situation evasion around East China Sea particularly Senkaku Islands between Japan and China is submitted in the daytime by both sides, and therefore some discussions were held, but, by the relations aggravation by the Senkaku Islands problem in the daytime, do not watch all result.

I am extremely sorry that the time of the crisis control mechanism construction that I piled up between the two countries stops it until now when I regard the Chinese strain situation as Japan around Senkaku Islands. This mechanism should be originally set for the situation like the present.

3. The U.S. Government described Senkaku Islands until now with "coverage of U.S.-Japan Security Treaty Article 5". Senkaku Islands specified the U.S. assembly in National Defense Authorization Act with coverage of U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in December, 2012. The United States is going to in this way prevent the use of armed force (including the possibility) around Senkaku Islands by China.

4. Problems of the Japanese-Chinese crisis control mechanism discussion and future directionality

A) When master of less than Prime Minister Abe pivot minister expects rebuilding of the Japan-China relations in the new cabinet which started newly in December, 2012, the Japanese side makes a remark. Relatively low-level the Chinese side spokesperson for diplomatic service or an ambassador to Japan speak about normalization of the Japan-China relations.

However, the active remark of nation, government leader and the Communist Party leader is not yet confirmed.

Japan cannot but watch a change of the recognition after the change of the Chinese nation, government leader of this March for the time being.

B) When an affirmative remark is seen about Japan-China relations from the Chinese Communist Party and high government official, after the change of the Chinese nation, government leader of this March, the two countries leaders reconfirm 4 Japan-China relations documents and general situation of "the strategic two-way street", and it is necessary to reset two countries relations again.

Japan and China are based on mutual trust about crisis control mechanism construction in the East China Sea (including Senkaku Islands), and hurry; of the past result pile it up, and plan raising, and it is important to bring about result.

C) On the other hand, the Chinese side does not change strong posture about the activity around East China Sea particularly Senkaku Islands at present. Therefore, in the Coast Guard and the Air Self-Defense Force coping with territorial waters, encroachment of air space on the site in Japan, it is necessary to continue the effort of caution, monitoring and the invasion check calmly and patiently carefulness at the risk of coping for the next dozens of years. The careful leadership of the Japanese politician is necessary likewise.

The small trouble with the ship and plane in the daytime must avoid developing into an accidental occurrence situation by mistake.

At this chance make a stance, thus, to stand of Japan clear for the global community at the same time that the Japanese Government restores strong economic power and strengthens competitiveness to China; and appropriate for it national; should make preparations.

It is important to Japan other than the United States which is an ally it follows it, and to cooperate with Australia and the ASEAN countries of the friendly nation, India and Russia about this matter closely to make stable order in East Asia.

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Non-Traditional Security Cooperation: A Way through Desecuritisation to Reconciliation?

Throughout the world, it is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain that non-traditional security (NTS) issues are unimportant and this is especially true of Sino-Japanese relations. Of course, NTS issues could increase tensions between states – for example in competition for scarce resources – but the real significance of these challenges could well lie in their potential for collaboration between states, even between those with long histories of rivalry and antagonism.¹ The premise of this paper is that the enhancement of NTS cooperation is particularly important against the background of longstanding and deep rooted-distrust that has characterised Sino-Japanese relations and sensitivities in traditional security areas. First, NTS cooperation could provide a desecuritisng mechanism to reduce and calm currently heightened tensions over territorial issues. Secondly, it has great potential to turn people-to-people relations into a more conciliatory and friendly direction. This paper discusses these potentials in terms of developing a future-oriented relationship between China and Japan.

NTS Cooperation as a Way to Desecuritisation

Recent developments in Sino-Japanese relations especially disputes in the East China Sea – essentially a series of negative actions and reactions – exemplify the typical downward spiral of the security dilemma. These developments appear to represent a serious setback to Northeast Asia’s attempts – so striking since 2008 – to move towards full-fledged regional cooperation and integration. They also threaten the success of constructing a ‘strategically mutual beneficial relationship’ between China and Japan. It would appear, therefore, that there is an urgent need for mechanisms that would allow the two countries to move out of their current securitizing mode of relations. Desecuritisation means ‘the shifting of issues out of emergency mode and into the normal bargaining processes of the political sphere’.² The underlying logic and aim is to divert security concerns into other areas, such as economic development and functional cooperation, while generating security as a side effect.

NTS cooperation is well placed to provide the tools and mechanisms of desecuritisation. In comparison to traditional security, or even human security, the concept of NTS impinges far less directly on such sensitive issues as sovereignty and intervention. Indeed, this was one of the main reasons why NTS issues have figured so prominently and been accorded such high priority in East Asian regional cooperation. In Sino-Japanese relations, too, there has been important cooperation, especially in areas of environmental protection and disaster management. In fact, environmental cooperation between China and Japan began as early as in 1977, when the first Japanese environmental delegations visited China. Since then cooperation has expanded and deepened and has generally been regarded as one of the most successful areas in Sino-Japanese relations, a good example to others of effective bilateral environmental cooperation between developed and developing countries. More importantly, as Zhang Haibin, one of China’s leading scholars on environmental issues argues, environmental cooperation has become an important ‘shock absorber’ in

¹ See, Shunji Cui, ‘Peace and Reconciliation through Environmental Cooperation: Changing the Image of Japan in China’, *Peace and Conflict Review*, 5,2(2011), pp. 41-53.

² Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998, p.4.

Sino-Japanese relations over the years, especially when those relations have been under strain.³ In other words, environmental collaboration has reduced the shocks and tensions that have arisen in other areas, thus keeping overall bilateral relations at a controllable level. Thus, in the early and mid 2000s, when political relations between them were fairly icy, with few significant high-level contacts, the environment remained a rare and important area where ties and cooperation continued.

NTS Cooperation as a Way to Enhance People-to-People Relations

More positively, NTS cooperation can serve to steer people-to-people relations in a more conciliatory and friendly direction. First, NTS threats – such as climate change, financial crises, transnational crime and nuclear pollution – are increasingly acute, transnational, and have ever greater implications for states and human security. No single country is able to address these threats on its own and hence greater cooperation is necessary for effective security governance.⁴ In the past, the state more or less monopolised the provision of security, now however, it is becoming vital for states to work hand in hand with non-state actors – including non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil societies – to tackle NTS challenges. In some particular areas, notably natural disasters and humanitarian crises, NGOs are playing increasingly important roles in rescue and relief efforts.

Secondly, although NTS and human security are conceptually different, NTS cooperation can enhance human security. When faced with challenges such as climate change, pandemics, food shortages and natural disaster, it is individuals, groups and communities who become the centre of security concerns – in other words they are the very referent object of security. Thus, people can transcend national boundaries to care for and help vulnerable groups and people who are suffering as a result of NTS threats. Such efforts are vividly exemplified in the handling of China's Wenchuan Earthquake in 2008, and of the Earthquake in Eastern Japan in 2011. In both cases, Rescue and medical teams and other volunteer groups from the other country played major roles. The support was sincere and given without delay. There are many touching stories that exemplify the way in which national boundaries can be transcended. Thus in March 2011 survivors of the Wenchuan Earthquake raised about 170,000 yen (\$2,070), along with a thousand paper cranes (折鶴) which they donated to the Teizan High School in Miyagi Prefecture of Japan (one of the worst affected areas), to express their appreciation for the help they had received from Japan three years earlier.⁵ In fact, there can be no doubt that the dedication and professionalism of the Japanese rescue and medical teams in China made a very positive impression and was a significant factor in the improvement of the image of Japan in China. According to a survey taken shortly after the Wenchuan earthquake, 83.6 per cent of Chinese liked Japan, a remarkable 73.6 per cent increase compared to the previous survey.⁶ Thus, although we cannot prevent natural disasters from occurring, faced with common challenges, China and Japan have demonstrated their ability to cooperate, to work together and to put human security considerations above other things.

³ 张海滨,《中日关系中的环境合作:减震器还是引擎》,原载《亚非纵横》,2008年,第2期,第7-11,18页(Haibin Zhang, 'Environment Cooperation in Sino-Japanese Relations: an Absorber or an Engine', *Asia & Africa Review*, (2) 2008, pp.7-11,18).

⁴ 崔顺姬、余潇枫:《安全治理:非传统安全能力建设的新范式》,载《世界经济与政治》,2010年第1期,第84-96页(Shunji Cui and Xiaofeng Yu, 'Security Governance: From Non-traditional Security Management Perspectives', *World Economics and Politics*, 1 (2010), pp.84-96).

⁵ 'Sichuan quake victims reciprocate for Japanese disaster aid', *The Asahi Shimbun*, May 26, 2011, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/life_and_death/AJ201105264639, accessed on 5 January 2013.

⁶ '四川汶川大地震,改善中国民间对日认识',《中文导报》,2009年01月1期, accessed at <http://www.chubun.com/modules/article/view.article.php/c28/92926>, access date, 12 June 2011.

Conclusion

In Conclusion, it is argued that the great potential of NTS cooperation does not mean that cooperation and its ensuing benefits will occur automatically. Indeed, NTS challenges can give rise to negative zero-sum competition, for example over limited resources. Thus, it is important to appreciate that there are both positive and negative potentials and hence endeavour to maximise positive outcomes. It must also be stressed that the importance of NTS cooperation does not mean NTS should be placed in opposition to traditional security concerns. Although the importance of NTS in national, regional and global levels is rising, it should be seen as complementing traditional security and human security considerations. In short we must work towards a more comprehensive understanding of security, one that encompasses and balances the state's freedom from external threats and the individual's freedom from fear and want. To achieve such an understanding, we must move on from the old way of approaching security in terms of the zero-sum game and to recognise the roles of security interdependence and cooperation.

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Production Networks in East Asia Call for Japan-China Economic Partnership

When examining what kind of cooperation could be sought between Japan and China, we should note that their economies have already formed a close tie, sometimes even described as a “de facto economic integration.” Since 1990s, Japanese companies began to fragment their production process into different sub-processes and locate each of them in the neighboring countries. Such a strategy has generated a network of intra-industry trade in parts and components within East Asia. As a result, a large part of exports from Japan to China is made up of trade in intermediate goods. Given this situation, the militarization of East China Sea would have a catastrophic effect by disrupting the network of production of goods. Therefore, with respect to the economic security, Japan and China share basic interests in maintaining free movement of goods, and thereby preventing domestic social unrest.

In this context, policy co-ordinations are particularly needed in the following areas. First, the entrenchment of current de facto economic integration should be pursued by means of supplying it with institutional underpinnings. For this purpose, it is a welcome advance that China, Japan and South Korea agreed to open negotiations on a free trade agreement on November 20, 2012. Setting aside tensions over territorial issues, Japan and China have successfully sent a signal to the business sector that they have no intentions of harming basic trade relations. In addition, a free trade agreement can be a basis for setting up a fixed mechanism of dialogue which can serve as a dispute avoidance instrument.

Second, it should be recognized that having recourse to trade sanctions in order to achieve some diplomatic goals would be in most cases ineffective. In September 2010, China was reported to have banned exports to Japan rare-earth materials in retaliation for the “boat collision incident.” While it forced the Japanese high-tech industries reliant on rare earths from China to reduce production, many Chinese manufacturers reliant on such high-tech components made in Japan also suffered from it. The economic interdependence between Japan and China is so sophisticated that any trade sanctions placed by either state would necessarily involve negative repercussions on its own economy.

Finally, Japan and China should jointly take steps to respect the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Because they are perhaps the largest beneficiaries from liberal and stable trade order, it would not be wise for them to undermine the credibility of the WTO by their own conducts. A better policy would be to increase their voice in the WTO by showing greater adherence to the free trade principles. In this respect, meaningful cooperation could be achieved if they launch together an expert forum for discussion and research on the WTO-related matters.

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The escalation of the existing dispute over who owns the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands affect negatively the economic and political relationships between China-Japan and Japan-Taiwan and has a potential to disrupt peace and stability in the region. The further escalation of the dispute will also have a profound negative impact on the future development of U.S.-China, U.S.-Japan, U.S.-Taiwan relations.

In September 2012, concerned about the rising tensions in the East Asian seas, Assistant Secretary Kurt Campbell of the U.S. Department of State urged that the claimants should address their differences peacefully. The United States "has an interest in peaceful relations among all of its Northeast Asian partners and allies, and has nothing to gain from seeing the situation escalate," he said. To help prevent the disputes from being further escalated, the assistant secretary encouraged relevant parties to the disputes to explore new cooperative arrangements for managing the exploitation of resources in the East Asian seas. He believed, joint exploration and exploitation of living and non-living resources "would not only allow claimants to reap material benefits, but could also help to build the habits of cooperation and collaboration that will ultimately be needed to resolve these disputes."

Maritime cooperation between China, Japan, and Taiwan is possible in the areas of conservation and management of fisheries resources as well as exploration and exploitation of oil and gas resources in the East China Sea. Possible non-government organizations for fisheries cooperation include China Fisheries Association, Japan Fisheries Association, and Taiwan's National Fishermen's Association. Possible non-government organizations for oil and gas exploration and exploitation include China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation (JOGMEC), and Taiwan's CPC Corporation. There exist precedents of state practices for the promotion of maritime cooperation in the East China Sea in the field of non-traditional security issues. It is considered easier by beginning with non-government organizations.

The purpose of my presentation is to explore the possible role that can be played by non-government organizations in China, Japan, and Taiwan to help promote maritime cooperation in the field of non-traditional security issues in the East China Sea. My talk will be divided into the following parts: (1) The Shared View of making the East China Sea a "Sea of Peace, Cooperation and Friendship"; (2) The 6 Initiatives of the Noda Administration and the Possible Policy of the Newly Established Abe Administration; (3) The East China Sea Peace Initiative of the Ma Administration and Its Implementation; (4) The Idea of Adopting A Regional Code of Conduct for the East China Sea; (5) Can NGO Play A Role to Promote Maritime Cooperation in the East China Sea? ;and (7) What are Challenges and opportunities ahead?

KOTANI Tetsuo
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Joint Management of the East China Sea: Opportunities and Challenges

Over the past few years, Japan and China have made great efforts to turn the East China Sea a sea of “peace, cooperation, and friendship.” There are already several agreements and frameworks in place between Japan and China, including the Agreements on fishing (2000) and on prior notification on maritime scientific survey (2001). In addition, agreement was essentially reached on the joint development of gas fields along the medium line (2008), on maritime search and rescue (2011), as well as on a maritime communication mechanism (2012). The first meeting of the Japan-China High-level Consultation on Maritime Affairs was held in Hangzhou in May 2012, where all the principle maritime-related organizations on both sides got together for the first time.

The existence of those bilateral frameworks indicates both countries’ willingness to promote cooperation in the East China Sea. However, these frameworks are far from perfect. For example, the fishing agreement does not cover waters around the Senkaku Islands because Japan and China could not agree on its ownership. It is not clear where the prior notification system should be applied, and China sometimes notifies Japan of maritime scientific surveys in ways that confuse the Japanese side. In short, implementation of existing agreements is not easy. Moreover, China unilaterally rejected the negotiation on the details of the gas field joint development after September 2010. The second meeting of high-level consultation is supposed to be held in Japan in late 2012, but given the high tension that have developed after the nationalization of the Senkakus, it is not clear whether these consultations can be held as planned. The implementation of SAR agreement and maritime communication mechanism is also difficult under the current situation.

Despite those challenges, Japan and China should review and, if necessary, revise and expand on the existing frameworks to promote cooperation on joint management of the East China Sea. It is important not only for Japan-China bilateral relations but also for peace and stability in the region as a whole. If Japan and China succeed in promoting the peaceful joint management of the East China Sea, this will set a good example for the South China Sea as well as other areas.

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The issues such as resources development, environmental preservation and sea lane security, might be distinguished as the non-traditional issues in the ocean security field. The cooperation on individual issues are important and necessary in order to improve mutual trust and interdependence thereby to establish the strategic partnership. However, it is indispensable to deal with the essential cause for the solution of these issues.

1. *Predicted crisis*

Future environment and energy crisis in Asia is predicted.

- Tightness of energy resources caused by the balance between supply and demand
- Local environmental pollution
- Global warming
- Conflict on resources development

2. *Issues for avoiding crisis*

Sustainable economic development and mitigation of global warming

- Security of resources and energy
- Realization of low carbon society and conversion to energy saving industrial structure

3. *Common target and issues between Japan and China*

To sever the crisis of resources and energy supply, to avoid the conflict on ocean resources

- To share an equitable GHG emission target against global warming
- To promote the deployment of low carbon technologies and energy saving system
- To improve the self-sufficiency by substantial introduction of renewable and nuclear energy
- To establish an Asian Energy Network (DC transmission grid, Natural Gas pipeline network, shared storage base, multiple sea lane network)
- To develop an Asian resources recycle mechanism

4. An Introduction to The Global Forum of Japan

【Objectives】 As we embrace the 21st century, international relations are becoming increasingly interdependent, and globalization and regionalism are becoming the big waves. In this global tendency, communicating with the world, especially neighboring countries in the Asia-Pacific region at both governmental and non-governmental levels, is one of the indispensable conditions for Japan to survive. On the basis of such understanding, The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) aims to promote the exchange of views on commonly shared interests and issues in the field ranging from politics and security to the economy, trade, finance, society and culture, and to help business leaders, Diet members and opinion leaders both in Japan and in their counterpart countries to discuss the formulation of new orders in global and regional arenas.

【History】 The 1982 Versailles Summit was widely seen as having exposed rifts within the Western alliance. Accordingly, there were expressed concerns that the summit meetings were becoming more and more stylized rituals and that Western solidarity was at risk. Within this context, it was realized that, to revitalize the summit meetings, there must be free and unfettered exchanges of private-sector views to be transmitted directly to the heads of the participating states. Accordingly, Japanese former Foreign Minister OKITA Saburo, U.S. Trade Representative William BROCK, E.C. Commission Vice President Etienne DAVIGNON, and Canadian Trade Minister Edward LUMLEY, as representatives of the private-sector in their respective countries, took the initiative in founding The Quadrangular Forum in Washington in September 1982. Since then, the end of the Cold War and the altered nature of the economic summits themselves had made it necessary for The Quadrangular Forum to metamorphose into The Global Forum established by the American and Japanese components of The Quadrangular Forum at the World Convention in Washington in October 1991. In line with its objectives as stated above, The Global Forum was intended as a facilitator of global consensus on the many post-Cold War issues facing the international community and reached out to open its discussions not only to participants from the quadrangular countries but also to participants from other parts of the world. Over the years, the gravity of The Global Forum's activities gradually shifted from its American component (housed in The Center for Strategic and International Studies) to its Japanese component (housed in The Japan Forum on International Relations), and, after the American component ceased to be operative, the Board of Trustees of the Japanese component resolved, on February 7, 1996, that it would thereafter act as an independent body for organizing bilateral dialogues with Japan as a hub for all countries in the world, and amended its by-laws accordingly. At the same time, The Global Forum's Japanese component was reorganized into The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) in line with the principle that the organization be self-governing, self-financing, and independent of any other organization.

【Organization】 The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) is a private, non-profit, non-partisan, and independent membership organization in Japan to engage in and promote international exchanges on policy-oriented matters of bilateral, regional and global implications. While the secretariat is housed in The Japan Forum on International Relations, GFJ itself is independent of any other organizations, including The Japan Forum on International Relations. Originally established as the Japanese component of The Quadrangular Forum at the initiative of HATTORI Ichiro, OKITA Saburo, TAKEYAMA Yasuo, and TOYODA Shoichiro in 1982, GFJ is currently headed by OKAWARA Yoshio as Chairman, ITO Kenichi as President and HIRABAYASHI Hiroshi as Vice President. The membership is composed of 10 Business Leader Members including the two Governors, MOGI Yuzaburo and TOYODA Shoichiro; 19 Diet Members including the three Governors, ASAO Keiichiro, KOIKE Yuriko, and TANIGAKI Sadakazu; and 89 Opinion Leader Members including the two Governors, SHIMADA Haruo, and WATANABE Mayu. Friends and supporters of The Global Forum of Japan are organized into the Supporters' Club of the Global Forum of Japan.

【Activities】 Since the start of The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) in 1982, GFJ has shifted its focus from the exchanges with the Quadrangular countries for the purpose of contributing to the Western Summit, to those with neighboring countries in the Asia-Pacific region including the U.S., China, Korea, ASEAN countries, India, Australia, European countries, and Wider Black Sea area, for the purposes of deepening mutual understanding and contributing to the formation of international order. GFJ has been active in collaboration with international exchange organizations in those countries in organizing policy-oriented intellectual exchanges called "Dialogue." In order to secure a substantial number of Japanese participants in the "Dialogue," GFJ in principle holds these "Dialogues" in Tokyo. A listing of topics of "Dialogues" and its overseas co-sponsors in the last five years is given below.

Year	Month	Topic	Co-sponsor
2013	January	Toward a Future-Oriented Japan-China Relationship	School of Environment, Beijing Normal University World Resources Institute College of Public Administration, Zhejiang University
2012	September	Japan-U.S. Alliance at a New Stage: Toward a Provider of International Public Goodss	Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies
	March	The Future of ASEAN Integration and Japan's Role	Fudan University
	March	The Rise of Emerging Countries and the Future of Global Governance	Nanyang Technological University The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
	February	The Asia-Pacific Region in Transition and the Japan-U.S.-China Relations	China Association of Asia-Pacific Studies
2011	October	The Japan-China Relations at Crossroads	China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR)
	July	The Great East Japan Earthquake and Regional Cooperation and Disaster Management	National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, etc
	February	The Japan-U.S. Relations in the Era of Smart Power	The Center for Strategic and International Studies (U.S.)
	February	East Asia in Transition and New Perspectives on Regional Cooperation	International Studies Department, Vietnam National University (Vietnam)
2010	September	East Asian Regional Architectures and Japan-India Relations	The Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (India)
	May	Promoting Japan-U.S. Cooperation in Non-Traditional Security: the Case of Counter Piracy	National Bureau of Asian Research (U.S.)
	February	Promoting Japan-China Cooperation on Environmental Issues of the 21st Century: In Pursuit of Recycling Society	School of Environment, Beijing Normal University (China)
	January	Prospects of Changing Black Sea Area and Role of Japan	Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation
2009	September	Japan-ASEAN Cooperation amid the Financial and Economic Crisis	ASEAN-ISIS
	June	Prospect of Japan-China Relationship in the Changing World	China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (China)
	April	US-Japan Relations Under the New Obama Administration	National Committee on American Foreign Policy (U.S.)

5. An Introduction to School of Environment, Beijing Normal University

Under an authorization from China's Ministry of Education, the Institute of Environmental Sciences (IES) was founded in 1983. IES was one of the first established institution of its kind in China with the responsibility of providing educational programs and conducting research in the field of environmental sciences. In 2002, IES officially became the School of Environment with augmented ability of educating students and conducting research.

As a pioneer academic institution, the school has responsibility for educating undergraduate and postgraduate students as well as initiating academic exchanges with other institutions of higher education. The school has excelled by carrying out these responsibilities over nearly two decades. From 1983 to 2000, the school offered only M.S and Ph.D degrees in Environmental Sciences. The Department of Environmental Science and Engineering was inaugurated in 2001 and has offered baccalaureate programs in environmental science and engineering since then. Today, our school offers Ph.D degrees in 4 fields, which are Environmental Sciences, Environmental Engineering, Ecology as well as Population, Resources and Environmental Economics. There are over 60 faculty members, including 24 full time (FT) professors. Meanwhile, the school has 164 FT undergraduates and 245 FT graduates.

IES members have wide-ranging research interests. Some research highlights include: (1) Aquatic ecology with focus on environmental flow; (2) Ecological modeling based on system ecology, system dynamics and thermodynamics; (3) Formation, development and evolution of wetland; (4) Physical, chemical and biological processes of inorganic and organic contaminants in water, soil and sediment; (5) Environmental engineering such as wastewater and solidwaste treatment and atmospheric pollution control; and (6) Environmental assessment, management and economics.

This School brings in over 3 million Dollars per year in grant funds. The school's top grant and contract sponsors are Ministry of Science and Technology of PRC (National Basic Research Program of China (973), National High-tech R&D Program (863 Program), Mega-projects of Science Research for the 10th and 11th Five-Year Plan), National Natural Science Foundation of China, Environmental Protection Agency of China, and local governments etc. In the sense of carrying out these research projects, the school is recognized to represent the high caliber of researchers garnering nationwide acclaim for its work.

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6. An Introduction to World Resources Institute

The founders of the World Resources Institute (WRI) were aware of the urgent need for research and solutions to the many serious global environmental, resource, population and development problems around the world. The most serious of the world's environmental threats—deforestation, desertification, and global climate change must head any list—are not the problems to which the United States and other industrial countries turned priority attention when environmental concerns emerged forcefully in the 1960s and 1970s. While these serious threats have been recognized for some time, they represent new policy and political challenges for the United States and many other countries, challenges that are more global in scope and international in implication. In this sense they are, indeed, a new agenda.

To address these issues, WRI's founders saw the need for an institution that would be independent and broadly credible, not as an activist environmental membership organization, and that would carry out policy research and analysis on global environmental and resource issues and their relationship to population and development goals. That research and analysis had to be both scientifically sound and politically practical. It had to command the respect of the scientific community and the attention of the key decision-makers in both the public and private sectors, in this country and abroad. The institution would not duplicate, but draw on the expertise already in place in academic and other centers here and abroad. Yet it would produce work that policy-makers would find useful and realistic, and it would lead the way in trying to build the constituencies—both public and private—required to act on its analyses and recommendations.

The Institute was launched June 3, 1982 when the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation of Chicago announced it “will provide \$15 million to help finance the first five years of operation of a newly created not-for-profit organization,” ...the World Resources Institute, will be “a major center for policy research and analysis addressed to global resource and environmental issues.” It was organized as a nonprofit Delaware corporation that could receive tax-deductible gifts and contributions under the U.S. Internal Revenue Code.

WRI focuses on the intersection of the environment and socio-economic development. We go beyond research to put ideas into action, working globally with governments, business, and civil society to build transformative solutions that protect the earth and improve people's lives.

WRI's mission is to move human society to live in ways that protect Earth's environment and its capacity to provide for the needs and aspirations of current and future generations.

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7. An Introduction to College of Public Administration, Zhejiang University

The College of Public Administration of Zhejiang University (CPA-ZJU in short) was founded in the July of 2005. With the belief of 'Truth as Faith and World Affair as Responsibility', the CPA-ZJU keeps the education principle to cultivate future leaders with international vision and public spirit. The CPA-ZJU provides good facilities for teaching, research, management and service.

Presently, the CPA-ZJU consists of seven departments, which respectively are Department of Public Governance, Department of Land Resource Management, Department of Public Policy and Public Economics, Department of Social Security and Risk Management, Department of Information Resource Management, Department of Political Science, and Department of Sociology. Under its administration, there are 1 strategic research base of Ministry of Education, 2 key research bases of philosophy and social sciences of Zhejiang province, 9 university-level research institutes, 10 university-level inter-discipline research centers, 4 school-level research centers, as well as the MPA Education Center. Additionally, Management Training Center of Zhejiang University is our international training center jointly with the Ministry of Education of China and Hans Seidel Foundation of Germany.

The CPA-ZJU has 130 faculties and staffs, including 32 professors, 50 associate professors. Currently, there are 23 PhD supervisors, 60 master supervisors and 44 post-doctor fellows. The college now has 489 full-time undergraduates, 453 graduates including 192 PhD candidates and 261 master students, and 985 MPA students.

Aiming at excellence and innovation, we are headed for a world-class public administration college with a global vision. The college will go on integrating our high quality educational resources and working better inter-disciplinary advantages to cultivate public administration talents meeting social needs, to promote roles of Zhejiang University in the field of public administration, and to improve our social services. In a word, the College of Public Administration of Zhejiang University will make efforts to become one of most important education institutions of public administration talents, one of important theories pools of public administration theories, and one of key think-tanks for the government and other public departments in China.

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8. An Introduction to The Japan Forum on International Relations

The Forum conducts a variety of activities hosting conferences, organizing research programs, and publishing research reports and policy recommendations, etc.

[History]

The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc. (JFIR or The Forum) was founded on March 12, 1987 in Tokyo on the private initiative of Dr. OKITA Saburo, Mr. HATTORI Ichiro, Prof. ITO Kenichi, and 60 other independent citizens from business, academic, political, and media circles of Japan, recognizing that a policy-oriented research institution in the field of international affairs independent from the government was most urgently needed in Japan. On April 1, 2011, JFIR was reincorporated as a “public interest foundation” with the authorization granted by the Prime Minister in recognition of its achievements.

[Purpose]

The Forum is a private, non-profit, independent, and non-partisan organization dedicated to improved understanding of Japanese foreign policy and international relations. The Forum takes no institutional position on issues of foreign policy, though its members are encouraged not only to analyze but to propose alternatives on matters of foreign policy. Though the Forum helps its members to formulate policy recommendations on matters of public policy, the views expressed in such recommendations represent in no way those of the Forum as an institution and the responsibility for the contents of the recommendations is that of those members of the Forum who sign them alone.

[Organization]

JFIR is a membership organization with four categories of membership, namely, (1) corporate, (2) associate corporate, (3) individual and (4) associate individual. As for the organizational structure of JFIR, the “Board of Trustees” is the highest decision making body, which is in charge of electing the “Directors” and of supervising overall activities of JFIR, while the “Board of Directors” is an executive body, which is in charge of the management of day-to-day operations of JFIR.

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[Activities]

In tandem with the core activities of the “Policy Council” in making policy recommendations, another important pillar of JFIR’s activities is the BBS “Hyakka-Seiho” which means “Hundred Flowers in Full Bloom” (<http://www.jfir.or.jp/cgi/m-bbs/>). The BBS, which started on April 12, 2006, is open to the public, functioning as an interactive forum for discussions on foreign policy and international affairs. All articles posted on the BBS are sent through the bimonthly e-mail magazine “Meru-maga Nihon Kokusai Fōramu” in Japanese to about 10,000 readers in Japan. Furthermore, articles worth attention for foreigners are translated into English and posted on the English website of JFIR (<http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/index.htm>) as “JFIR Commentary.” They are also introduced in the e-mail magazine “JFIR E-Letter” in English. “JFIR E-Letter” is delivered bimonthly to about 10,000 readers worldwide.



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