
The Dialogue with the World

“Toward the Making of Shared Values in Foreign Policy”

Conference Papers

October 29-30, 2013
At the International House of Japan
Tokyo, Japan

Co-sponsored by
The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
Washington College International Studies Program
The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)

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1. Program

世界との対話
The Dialogue with the World

「価値観外交」の可能性

Toward the Making of Shared Values in Foreign Policy

2013年10月30日(水) / Wednesday, October, 30th, 2013

東京、日本 / Tokyo, Japan

共催 / Co-sponsored by

グローバル・フォーラム / The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)

ワシントン・カレッジ国際研究所 / Washington College International Studies Program

(公財)日本国際フォーラム / The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)

2013年10月29日(火) / Tuesday, 29th October, 2013

国際文化会館「SAKURA」 / International House of Japan "SAKURA"

開幕夕食会 *特別招待者のみ / Working Dinner *Invitation Only

19:00-21:00

石川 薫 日本国際フォーラム専務理事・研究本部長主催ワーキングディナー

Working Dinner hosted by ISHIKAWA Kaoru, Senior Executive Director / Director of Research, JFIR

2013年10月30日(水) / Wednesday, 30th October, 2013

【公開セッション / Open Session】 国際文化会館「講堂」 / International House of Japan "Lecture Hall"

開会挨拶 / Opening Remarks

13:30-13:40

開会挨拶(5分間)

石川 薫 日本国際フォーラム専務理事・研究本部長

Opening Remarks(5min.)

ISHIKAWA Kaoru, Senior Executive Director / Director of Research, JFIR

セッション I / Session I

13:40-15:20

「価値観外交」の今日的意義
"Value Diplomacy" and Today

議長(5分間)

伊藤 剛 日本国際フォーラム客員上席研究員・明治大学教授

Chairperson (5 min.)

ITO Go, Visiting Superior Research Fellow, JFIR, Professor, Meiji University

報告A(10分間)

アンドリュー・オロス ワシントン・カレッジ国際研究所所長

Presenter A (10 min.)

Andrew L. OROS, Director, Washington College International Studies Program

報告B(10分間)

岡垣 知子 獨協大学教授

Presenter B (10 min.)

OKAGAKI Tomoko, Professor, Dokkyo University

報告C(10分間)

時 殷弘 中国人民大学米国研究所所長

Presenter C (10 min.)

SHI Yinhong, Director, Center for American Studies, Renmin University of China

報告D(10分間)

宮岡 勲 慶應義塾大学教授

Presenter D (10 min.)

MIYAOKA Isao, Professor, Keio University

報告E(10分間)

梁 微 米国モンテレー国際研究所准教授

Presenter E (10 min.)

Wei LIANG, Associate Professor, Monterey Institute of International Studies

自由討議(45分)

出席者全員

Free Discussions (45 min.)

All Participants

15:20-15:30

休憩 / Break

セッション II / Session II

15:30-17:30

各国による「価値観外交」—普遍性と独自性
Universalism and Uniqueness in "Value Diplomacy"

議長(5分間)

石川 薫 日本国際フォーラム専務理事・研究本部長

Chairperson (5 min.)

ISHIKAWA Kaoru, Senior Executive Director / Director of Research, JFIR

報告A(10分間)

佐藤 洋一郎 立命館アジア太平洋大学教授

Presenter A (10 min.)

SATO Yoichiro, Professor, Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University

報告B(10分間)

デビッド・ワルトン 西シドニー大学上級准教授

Presenter B (10 min.)

David WALTON, Senior Lecturer, University of Western Sydney

報告C(10分間)

安野 正士 上智大学准教授

Presenter C (10 min.)

ANNO Tadashi, Associate Professor, Sophia University

報告D(10分間)

リンゼイ・ブラック オランダ/ライデン大学地域研究所講師

Presenter D (10 min.)

Lindsay BLACK, Lecturer, Leiden University Institute for Area Studies, Leiden University, the Netherlands

報告E(10分間)

伊藤 剛 日本国際フォーラム客員上席研究員・明治大学教授

Presenter E (10 min.)

ITO Go, Visiting Superior Research Fellow, JFIR, Professor, Meiji University

自由討議(45分)

出席者全員

Free Discussions (45 min.)

All Participants

[NOTE] 日本語・英語同時通訳付き / English-Japanese simultaneous interpretation will be provided

2. Biographies of the Panelists

【Foreign Panelists】

Andrew L. OROS

Director, Washington College International Studies Program

Received Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University in 2002. Served as Editor of "Millennium: Journal of International Studies" (1992-1993), Japanese government graduate Mombusho fellow (1997-1999), Visiting Northeast Asia Fellow, East-West Center(2005-2006), Visiting Scholar, Sigur Center for Asian Studies, George Washington University (2006), Invited Visiting Researcher, National Institute for Defense Studie (2009), Visiting Scholar, School of International Studies, Peking University, China (2010) and Visiting Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Keio University (2010-2011).

SHI Yinhong

Director, Center for American Studies, Renmin University of China

Received Ph.D. in International History from Nanjing University in 1988. Served as Visiting fellow at Harvard-Yenching Institute at Harvard University (1983-1984), Professor of International History at Nanjing University (1993-1998), Professor of International Relations at International Relations Academy, Nanjing (1998-2001), President of American Historical Research Association of China (1996-2002), Fulbright research visiting scholar at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (1995-1996) and Visiting Professor of Modern China Studies at Aichi University in Nagoya (2004). Concurrently serves as Chairman of Academic Committee of the School of International Studies, and Director of the Center on American Studies at Renmin University of China in Beijing and Counsellor of the State Council of People's Republic of China.

Wei LIANG

Associate Professor, Monterey Institute of International Studies

Wei Liang is associate professor in the School of International Policy and Management at the Monterrey Institute of International Studies. Her research interests include international political economy of East Asia, Asian regionalism, international trade negotiation and global governance. She is the coauthor of *China and East Asia's Post-Crisis Community: A Region in Flux?* (Lexington, 2012), co-editor of *China and Global Trade Governance* (Routledge, forthcoming), a number of journal articles and book chapters. A graduate of the Peking University, People's Republic of China, she received her Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of Southern California.

David WALTON

Senior Lecturer, University of Western Sydney

He holds a BA from Griffith University and a MA and PhD from the University of Queensland. His research interests are in diplomatic history, foreign policy and Australia - Japan post-war relations. He has taught at the University of Western Sydney since 1995 and prior to that at Griffith University and the University of Tasmania. His most recent publications are "New Approaches to Human Security in the Asia Pacific: China, Japan and Australia" William.T.Tow, David Walton and Rikki Kersten (eds.) (Ashgate; london, 2013) and "Australia, Japan and the Region, 1952 to 1965: Early Initiatives in Regional Diplomacy" (New York; Nova, 2012).

Lindsay BLACK

Lecturer, Leiden University Institute for Area Studies, Leiden University

Received Ph.D. in Sheffield University in 2006. Received Monbusho Scholarship, MEARC and LIAS research subsidy and JSPS-NWO Joint Seminar Grant. He concurrently serves as Leiden University Institute for Area Studies (LIAS), Advisory Council, MA International Studies (MAIS), Coordinator, MA International Studies (MAIS), Board of Admissions, Opleidings Commissie (OLC), MA International Studies and China Committee, Department of Chinese Studies.

【Japanese Panelists】

ISHIKAWA Kaoru *Senior Executive Director / Director of Research, The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)*
Graduated from University of Tokyo and joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1972. Studied at l'Ecole Nationale d'Administration in France. Served as Research Associate of International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), London and Minister-Counselor to France, G8 Summit foreign affairs Sous-Sherpa (1999-2001 and 2005-07), Director General of Global Affairs Department (2002-05), Director General of Economic Affairs Bureau (2005-07), Ambassador to Egypt and then to Canada. Also served as Part time lecturer at Waseda University and Visiting Professor at the University of Tokyo. In addition to serving as Senior Executive Director of JFIR, he concurrently serves as Opinion Leader Member of Global Forum of Japan (GFJ), and Executive Vice-President of Council on East Asian Community (CEAC).

ITO Go *Professor, Meiji University / Visiting Superior Research Fellow, JFIR*
Graduated from Sophia University. Received Ph.D. at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver in 1997. Served as Associate Professor at Meiji University in 1998, and assumed the current position in 2006. Also served as Visiting professor at Beijing University, Academia Sinica(Taiwan), Bristol University(Britain), Australian National University, and Victoria University (Canada), Adjunct Professor (International Security) at Waseda University as well as Sophia University, and as Adjunct Researcher of the House of Councilors. Recipients of the Eisenhower Fellowships in 2005 and the Nakasone Yasuhiro Award in 2006. Concurrently serves as Councilor of JFIR.

OKAGAKI Tomoko *Professor, Dokyo University*
She holds a doctoral degree in political science from the University of Michigan and conducts research on international politics with particular emphasis on International Relations theory. Her recent research interests include, inter alia, state socialization, Asian regionalism, and institutionalization of the post-Cold War Japanese security policy. She recently completed her monograph, *The Logic of Conformity: Japan's Entry in International Society* (University of Toronto Press, 2013) and her co-translation of Kenneth Waltz's *Man, the State, and War* (Keiso Shobo, 2013). She held an Abe Fellowship (2008-2010), spending a total of two years as a visiting scholar at Harvard University.

MIYAOKA Isao *Professor, Keio University*
Graduated from Keio University in 1990. Entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan in 1990 and retired from office in 1995. Received his MA from the University of Canterbury in 1994 and his D.Phil. in politics from the University of Oxford in 1999. Served as Associate at Harvard University in 1999-2001 and as Associate Professor at Osaka University of Foreign Studies from 2001 to 2007, at Osaka University from 2007 to 2010, and then at Keio University from 2010 to 2012. Held the current position since 2012. His research interests include international relations theory and Japanese and American security policy.

SATO Yoichiro *Professor, Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University/
Hennebach Visiting Scholar and Visiting Professor, Colorado School of Mines*
Graduated from Keio University. Received Ph.D (Political Science) from University of Hawaii. Currently resides in Golden, Colorado. Previously taught at the U.S. Department of Defense's Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Auckland University (New Zealand), Kansai Gaidai Hawaii College, and University of Hawaii. His major works include *Japan in A Dynamic Asia* (co-edited with Satu Limaye, Lexington Books, 2006), *Norms, Interests, and Power in Japanese Foreign Policy* (co-edited with Keiko Hirata, Palgrave, 2008), *The Rise of China and International Security* (co-edited with Kevin Cooney, Routledge, 2008), and *The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance: Regional Multilateralism* (co-edited with Takashi Inoguchi and G. John Ikenberry, Palgrave, 2001). Professor Sato has commented on strategic and security affairs in East Asia on such media as Time Magazine, National Public Radio, and Voice of America.

ANNO Tadashi

Associate Professor, Sophia University

He holds a B.A. from the University of Tokyo (1989), and an M.A. (1990) and a Ph.D. (1999) from the University of California, Berkeley. His research interest is in nationalism and international politics of Northeast Asia, including Russo-Japanese relations, Japan's foreign and security policy, and the political theology of nationalism. He has taught at Sophia University since 2000, and he assumed his current position since 2007. He is currently a visiting scholar at the Institute of Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies at UC Berkeley.

(In order of appearance)

3. Presentation Papers

Session I: “Value Diplomacy” and Today

Andrew L. OROS

Director, Washington College International Studies Program

“Value Diplomacy” and Today: A View from Washington

- The idea of “value diplomacy” is not a topic of much discussion in Washington from what I hear.
 - This is a big contrast to the popularity of the concept under the first Abe administration in 2006-07 – as set out by then Foreign Minister Taro Aso in November 2006.
 - Still, elements of the “value diplomacy” approach have long been successful hallmarks of Japanese foreign policy and should be embraced.
 - Moreover, the confidence that underlies an explicit “values diplomacy” approach is a welcome sign for Japan in the region – a very important regional actor that has been “punching below its weight” in recent years.
 - But, Japan must be careful not to alienate potential partners from a range of perspectives, and to focus on what’s most important for Japan’s national interest in its near-term policies.
- Why the shift away from interest in “value diplomacy” outside of Tokyo?
 - In Washington, a new President (Mr. Obama) and new foreign policy challenges globally.
 - A move to more realist-based crisis management diplomacy after largely failed interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq – two conflicts justified in part through a call to values – and new US struggles with “Arab Spring” states – Egypt, Syria, etc
 - US-Japan alliance discussions continue to stress common values – but not as actively framed in a global dimension.
 - There also has been concern that “soft” ideas like “values” also links to the very problematic “history” issues that are actively discussed in Washington today.
 - In the Asia-Pacific region, values diplomacy was seen by many as needlessly confrontational – especially since much of the underlying content was not new.
 - The notion of an “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” created an overt visual image that excluded China, for example.
- Yet Mr. Abe is back! (and so is Japan – as he has stressed!)

- Much of Mr. Abe’s largely unfulfilled agenda from his last term as Prime Minister has reappeared in his new administration – not just the “values diplomacy” idea.
- Where does values diplomacy fit into Japan’s new foreign policy agenda, 7 years after the term first gained popularity?
- Value diplomacy and Japan’s near-term foreign policy agenda – a good match?
 - The Trans-Pacific Partnership and broader focus on economic revitalization
 - Territorial disputes: China, Russia, South Korea
 - Crafting a deeper set of regional partnerships
 - Common values as one part of the picture – as it long has been for Japan.
 - But as with the United States, Japan must manage the challenges it faces and actors it must work with – not a foreign policy of “dreams”.

OKAGAKI Tomoko
Professor, Dokkyo University

Japan’s “Value-oriented Diplomacy”: Evaluating Its Utility and Effectiveness

Advocating “values” in a country’s foreign policy serves the following functions: 1) to demonstrate the country’s commitment to international society and highlight its *raison d’être*; 2) to rationalize a policy that the country intends to pursue or has already pursued; 3) to make a policy recommendation to the international community; 4) to send a message to the domestic audience and explain the government’s stance; 5) to form a network within the international community by supporting or containing a certain country or group of countries; 6) to provide a long-term perspective in forming policies; and 7) to “varnish” diplomacy that is actually based on national interests.

Up until the mid-1990s, Japan remained low-keyed in advocating its values to the international community. What changed in Japanese diplomatic style at that time was an increased awareness of the necessity to project its values in conducting foreign policy. Among the values that the Japanese political leaders have advocated since then are: “the arc of freedom and prosperity,” democracy, liberty, and fraternity. What might explain this change in the style of Japanese foreign policy? How effectively have those values been projected in promoting Japan’s national interests?

Two factors stand out in explaining Japan’s increased advocacy of values in foreign policy. The first is the end of the Cold War and the concomitant redefinition of the Japan-U.S. alliance, which has been closely tied to Japan’s national interests. With the disappearance of the common threat to the alliance, the Soviet Union, Japan started to search for its new role in global security in cooperation with the U.S. The second factor lies in the increased national confidence that Japan gradually gained in the process of its post-war efforts to return to and contribute to the international community as a pacifist economic power. The international reputation of Japan as a country of cleanliness, hospitality, technological development, environmental concern, and refined cuisine, for example, confirmed to the Japanese that it was time for the country to grow out of its post-war, subservient mentality and become more “normal” and proactive in its foreign policy behavior, in keeping with its role as a mature democracy and an advanced industrial power.

If “value-oriented diplomacy” is to remain one of the pillars of Japan’s foreign policy for the coming decades, the values that its political leaders advocate need to meet two conditions in order to be effective. First, the values must originate from Japan’s own historical experiences and diplomatic practices, shared among all the political elite and with the public. A faithful compliance with international law and a pluralist understanding of the nature of international society embodied in its modern diplomatic history would be more appropriate and persuasive values for Japan to advocate than *liberty* or *democracy* which are of Western origin. Second, values must be universal and should not be asserted in a way that can be taken as encouraging containment of a certain country or countries. As such, the values to advocate in foreign policy necessarily remain those that bind the international community only loosely. What we can expect then is *civility*: a minimal degree of compliance with the most basic principles of international relations. That is, not the kinds of values that presuppose a high degree of convergence in specific foreign policy behaviors among countries.

SHI Yinhong
Director,
Center for American Studies, Renmin University of China

Guard against Excessive Universalism, While Not Go Excessively

There are already too many "universal values or norms". If one want universal norms to be truly universal, one should decide to listen to different nations and peoples. Of course, there are developments of some important principle in this era, but still some values or norms are not really "universal". Importantly, in order to become universal, they must be sufficiently generalized. Otherwise, if one want to make very concrete laws or rules, the different nations and peoples will have considerable hesitations. Values or norms have to leave space for accommodating different understandings and requirements. In international society, "practice" is so important in the making of principles and norms. Practice can make some values or norms more universal, while make some others more particularistic.

On the other hand, the world leaders in 1945 and 1946 did a great job. From lessons learned, mainly after the experience of Nazism, fascism, and militarism, they emphasized the need for universal values and norms. But, one should not have so many universal ones--it diminishes the value and possible impact of them all.

China, before Mao Zedong in the 1930s, was a nation that very much liked to teach others. In fact, Confucianism is universalism--this means that what is best for the Chinese is best for everyone else. This was the Chinese mainstream ideology before Mao Zedong over two-thousand years. Mao changed this, and despite his many mistakes, and despite that he inflicted in his latter years so much sufferings for millions of the Chinese, he made a wonderful contribution to China, and the world. He battled against Western universalism in the 1930s, and whether issued against London, Washington, or Moscow, Mao felt that every people should decide by their own practice, according to their own

situations, in their own countries. What is best for Washington or Moscow or elsewhere is definitely not necessary best for China, or other peoples. There is no ready answer from west or east, but one should learn lessons and answer vital questions in one's own practice.

This is the particularistic perspective at its best. China has contributed by this to world history, fundamentally. Of course, maybe China in the future would forget it, or China would become too proud and would launch its own universalism. But there is no ready universal answer that can be applied to every situation. There is something like independent practice and it is more effective in solving its own problems and learning from other people's experience. These are universal values and norms, from local experience.

Having said all the above in guarding against excessive universalism, a balanced point of view and policy standing is still very much required, for avoiding the excessive particularism. This speaker would like to talk about it in terms as "international responsibility: The new key words in the issue of China's foreign policy and even grand strategy".

It is right for China to refuse and resist some quite unreasonable demands and pressure from the West. At the same time, it is also right for her to increase substantially the commitment and bearing of international responsibility in the common enterprise to address the global challenges. These two things are not at all mutually exclusive. To increase commitment and responsibility bearing are first of all bound closely to China's healthy development within and strategic security without.

MIYAOKA Isao
Professor, Keio University

Japan's Value Oriented Diplomacy toward the United States

"Value Oriented Diplomacy": Australia, India, and the member states of the EU and NATO
 "Arc of Freedom and Prosperity": emerging democracies around the Eurasian Continent

I . U.S.-Led Liberal International Order

1 . Liberal Character of the Current International Order

a. "Liberal Hegemonic Order" (Ikenberry 2011)

	Balance	Command	Consent
Sources	State sovereignty	Material power	Rule of Law
Purpose	Preservation of autonomy	Interests of dominant states	Creation of public goods
Hierarchy	No / great power co-equals	Yes / rulers and subjects	Sometimes / leaders and followers
Present	Westphalia system	U.S. hegemony	

b. Liberal International Order: "order that is open and loosely rule-based"

U.S.: Liberalism as an ideology of domestic regime / political and economic values
“people from different backgrounds can be united through their commitment to shared values”

2. Issues of the Current International Order

- a. **Emergence of Unipolarity:** + Liberal international order ⇒ revisionist state
U.S. hegemony (exceptionalism) ⇔ Liberal international order (rule of law)
- b. **Eroding of State Sovereignty:** Westphalia system ⇔ Liberal international order (human rights)
- c. **Ideology of “Universal” Values:** “transparent disguises of selfish vested interests” (E.H. Carr)
- d. **Universality of Values:** self-evident truth for U.S. / threat to illiberal states (Walt)
- e. **Promotion of Conflicts :** intolerance “struggle between good and evil” self-fulfilling prophecies
democracy promotion ⇒ instability abroad / illiberal democracies are bellicose (Layne)

3. Japan’s Strategic Response

- a. **Target of Value Oriented Policy :** states that have embraced universal values
“Arc of Freedom and Prosperity:” emerging democracies
- b. **“Friendly Advisor”:** going too far (forceful democratization) / hypocrisy (exceptionalism)
The U.S. is the most influential to liberal international order both positively and negatively.
state with strong liberal beliefs / state that is the most open to liberal discourse
It is necessary to pay attention to tension among the different logics of order.

II. Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance

1. Liberal Character of the Japan-U.S. Alliance

- a. **“Liberal Hegemonic Alliance”:** one institution for U.S.-led liberal hegemonic order
1) balance of power, 2) constraints of subjects, 3) provision of public goods
- b. **Role of Liberalism in Alliances:** shift to a security community
1) democracy/interdependence/institutions ⇒ peaceful resolution of conflicts (trust)
2) institutional cooperation, self-restraint by hegemons, consent ⇒ mutual aid (credibility)
- c. **We-Feeling (Collective Identity):** collective-self defense
1) type identity: common regime type such as liberal democracies
2) role identity: friendly states that have internalized norms of non-violence and mutual aid
- d. **U.S. Perception of Other States:** domestic regime type and values are important.
“our steady support for universal values . . . sets us apart from our enemies, adversarial governments, and many potential competitors for influence.” (NSS 2010)

2. American Variable Views of Japan

- a. **Japan was an Enemy in WWII:** the origin of the current international order
Potsdam Declaration (Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender)
justice to war criminals / strengthening of democratic tendencies
- b. **Japan as an Ally during the Cold War**
Security Treaty: “to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law”
There is no reference to common values in Mutual Defense Treaties with Philippines and ROK.
North Atlantic Treaty: “common heritage and civilisation”
- c. **Decline in a Sense of Common Values around the End of the Cold War**
1) capitalism vs. communism ⇒ a focus on different types of capitalism “revisionism”
2) In 1990, 63 % of the surveyed leaders viewed the economic power of Japan as a critical threat.
3) differentiation along trivial dimensions in a “narcissism of small differences”

3. Japan’s Strategic Response

- a. **Sharing of values with the U.S. is one of the best national security assets for Japan.**
- b. **Practice of Liberal Values at Home and Abroad**

- 1) open economy: promotion of TPP
- 2) human rights: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2012

Japan: "The leading human rights problems included lack of due process for pretrial detainees; exploitation of children; and societal discrimination against women in employment, children born out of wedlock, ethnic minority group members, persons with disabilities, and foreigners, including permanent residents."
- c. **Issue of Constitutional Amendment:** to maintain the provisions related to universal values similar to the U.S. Constitution is a national security asset for Japan.
to focus on universal values rather than the history, tradition, and culture of Japan
- d. **Historical Issues:** Historical revisionism weakens a sense of common values.
prewar militaristic Japan ⇔ postwar democratic Japan
socially constructed symbol/myth, perception rather than fact
political responsibility as a defeated nation ⇔ historical verification

Wei LIANG

Associate Professor, Monterey Institute of International Studies

Visiting Professor, Peking University

Japan's Value-Oriented Diplomacy and Its Policy Implications for China and East Asian Regional Integration

Prime Minister Abe's focus on value-orientated diplomacy represents Japan's efforts to retain and expand its regional influences and counterbalance Chinese ascendancy. It regards identity as a key variable shaping Japan's policy choices in Asian regional integration. How will this self-identity of Japan as a democratic nation and a mature market economy play a role in its strategic move toward Japan-U.S.-China trilateral economic relationship in Asia-Pacific?

China now has served as a de-facto hub of regional production network and the US continues to provide the security umbrella in the region. China is the largest trading partner of Japan, South Korea and most of the ASEAN member countries. In the meantime, the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (TPP) is a major breakthrough of US commitment to East Asia. Japan's recent decision to join the TPP negotiation has a fundamental impact on the future outlook of Asian regionalism. It entails that China may need to reconsider its role in regional integration, especially its subtle regional leadership competition with Japan.

Japan hesitated to join the TPP negotiation due to the strong political pressure from its domestic agricultural sector. In fact, most ASEAN countries would prefer a more relaxed and incremental approach to trade liberalization. Looking back to the APEC history, it clearly shows that the regional preference of Asian countries on regionalism was voluntary, pragmatic and incremental. The same principle has been embedded in most of the existing ASEAN agreements, China-ASEAN FTAs and Japan-ASEAN FTAs. Moving to the US approach and US-dominated TPP negotiation represents a major policy shift for Japan.

The recent dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in 2012 has reminded many Japanese the

importance of US-Japan military alliance, after the United States publicly asserted that the disputed islands were covered by the terms of US-Japan bilateral security treaty. the decision made by Japan will suggest the direction of its foreign policy toward Asian regionalism—to reinforce its role as Asian powers or to reconnect with US politically and economically. As China now is excluded from the TPP negotiation, the non-member anxiety has entailed more willingness for China to participate the Japan-initiated ASEAN+6 scheme (RCEP). It may provide a unique opportunity for Japan and help gain more leverage in the following TPP and RCEP negotiations if Japan can effectively manage and maneuver its strategic and economic ties with US and China.

Session II : Universalism and Uniqueness in “Value Diplomacy”

SATO Yoichiro

Professor, Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University

Hennebach Visiting Scholar and Visiting Professor, Colorado School of Mines

Industrial Policy, the East Asian Miracle, and Regional Integration after the Lehman Shock

Japan’s industrialization since the Meiji period, which “followed the Western countries,” demonstrated strong characteristics of “state capitalism” under bureaucratic guidance. The later economic growth, growth of the private capital, diversification of the industries, and political democratization gradually weakened the state control of the industries, but the start of the Japan-China War in the 1930s led to re-strengthening of state control over the economy. The cooperative approach between the state and the private sector in developing a blueprint of regional economic integration during construction of the Great East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere was succeeded in Japan’s post-WW2 economic reconstruction and the process of regional economic integration in East Asia. The cooperative model, which was featured in the World Bank report on The East Asian Miracle (1995), attracted the attention of scholars and policymakers in and out of Japan as an alternative paradigm of development to the U.S.-style liberal capitalism. Developing countries praised the role of the state in limiting the “exploitative” side of globalizing capitalism, while the United States criticized the “unfair” advantages of the “Japanese-style” capitalism in global competitions.

The 1997-98 Asian Economic Crisis and the responses of the affected countries posed a major challenge to the “East Asian model.” South Korea, which had graduated from being a recipient of the Japanese overseas development assistance (ODA), adopted drastic economic deregulation and liberalization, with the aid of the conditionalities under the IMF emergency loan. The reform exposed the Korean firms to global competition, and differentiation of the “winners” from the “losers” was carried out ahead of Japan, which had to await the “Koizumi reforms.” However, in China and other East Asian countries, close coordination between the ODA plans and the overseas investment, production transfer, and component trade by the Japanese firms continued, although the “tied aid” of the past (in which the aid money was used directly for capital goods imports from Japan) had largely been abolished.

The appreciation of yen triggered by the Plaza Accord of 1987 and the resulting large-scale transfer of manufacturing productions from Japan to Asia kept pace with the Japanese economy's shift into the service sector. The Japanese economy now earns more in financial services and intellectual properties. Japan, on one hand, shares interests with the western nations in deregulation in entering the services market and improved protection of the intellectual property rights in developing countries. The proportion of trade surplus in Japan's overall balance of payments has shrunk, and Japan in recent years even runs a trade deficit. Meanwhile, the proportion of the investment revenues has risen, which makes Japan's economic structure similar to the western countries. Japan's identity has therefore become similar to that of the mature developed countries and investors on the issue of establishing a common set of investment rules.

The Lehman Shock in 2008 exposed the lack of U.S. government supervision over the U.S. firms, which played the central role in globalization of the financial business. The event offered an opportune moment to revise the U.S.-style liberal capitalism, which almost reached the status of the global standard. Even earlier, liberalization of global trade through multilateral negotiations at the World Trade Organization (WTO) stalled, leading to the accelerated shift to bilateral and regional free trade agreements (FTAs). Making of investment rules has also failed to multilateralize and is limited to conclusion of bilateral agreements. Japan has joined the negotiations for a Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), but both removal of the trade barriers in the U.S. automobile sector and liberalization of the Japanese agriculture sector face political resistance.

Meanwhile, the development model of China, which surpassed Japan to occupy a greater part of the East Asian economy, is the very mercantilist model Japan once adopted. China makes a large trade surplus in trade with developed countries, receives their investments but restricts activities of the investors, promotes inward technology transfer, protects and promotes indigenous enterprises, restricts free movement of capital, tolerates stealing of IPRs by the indigenous enterprises, and resists opening of the services markets. China signs FTAs with only smaller developed countries, with which it forces many exemptions. In signing FTAs with developing countries, China focuses on procurement of natural resources and food and export of its own manufactured goods, neglecting "development" of its economic partners. This neglect is also common in the U.S.-style liberal capitalism. (Some technical assistance in China's third world diplomacy is welcomed in the remote areas, and China's diplomatic competition with Taiwan seeks political gains over economic ones. However, as China's entry into development of the oil fields and purchase of agricultural lands in Africa indicate, the country's economic relations with developing countries are becoming more exploitative.)

In this circumstance, can Japan offer a development paradigm like the "Japanese model" or the "East Asian Miracle" of the past and shoulder a central role in the regional economic integration process? While the old model was centered on regionalization of the production network in the manufacturing sector, can Japan offer a new comprehensive model inclusive of the services and agriculture sectors? Under what conditions, can a model Japan proposes be accepted in East Asia and broader Asia Pacific?

There are no short answers to all these questions. A combination of social and political stability without strong coercion by the state in Japan during the period of high economic growth was a remarkable accomplishment, which had a strong appeal to other countries. But, today's economic stagnation in Japan, at least partly, is attributed to the legacies of this old paradigm, and the country today is understandably going through a major political realignment. Japan does not lead the world in many areas, and a rare exception is found in terms of graying of the national population. Polarization of the income-generating generation and the pensioners is a challenge that encompasses all economic, social, and political dynamics. Japan must first reach a domestic consensus about how to cope with this challenge. The current splits along three dimensions are the sharpest. Nationalist vs. Globalist—Will the economy open up? Will the opening include the labor market (which is a social question as well)?

Liberal Capitalist vs. Welfare State—Will Japan retain a high degree of social welfare support for the “weak”? Materialist vs. Post-Materialist—Will the Japanese continue to measure their happiness in terms of material values over intangible values? These questions will not likely to yield a clear-cut answer. However, a strong national consensus on where the balancing points might be has to be achieved, if the nation is to have a coherent direction. Only then, the model can be armed with Japan’s pivotal strength in various related areas—be it environmentally friendly technology, labor-saving robotics, spiritual and cultural sophistication, and/or communal bonds.

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Universalism and Uniqueness in 'Value Diplomacy'

– Australia and Japan as natural partners

1. Australia and Japan - collaboration in foreign policy endeavours

- Key allies of the United States and supporters of Democracy, Human Rights and the Rule of Law
- Regional architecture such APEC and East Asia Summit
- UN Peace Keeping missions – Cambodia and East Timor
- 2007 Joint Declaration on Security Co-operation

The 2007 Joint Declaration for Security Co-operation offers a framework for dealing with potential failed states and natural disasters in the Pacific region. Japan and Australian can play a positive role in addressing these issues in Asia and the Pacific through bilateral cooperation and through regional architecture such the East Asian Summit approach to natural disasters.

2. Collaboration in Human Security: a new dimension in bilateral relations

Most primary and secondary sources on Japan’s human security policy, including governmental documents, tend to focus on the analysis of Japan’s financial contribution to human security (freedom from want). On the contrary, as this presentation argues that Japan has contributed to freedom from fear in its human security cooperation with Australia. Japan and Australia, for example, have collaborated in the field of post-conflict peace operations, which are preconditions for freedom from fear. Moreover, both countries contribute to nuclear disarmament, such as co-chairing the United Nations International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND) in 2008-2009, which is a significant agenda in combating freedom from fear.

Recommendation

Both governments should continue making contributions to these two fields from a perspective of human security. In other words, international peace operations and nuclear disarmament should be explicitly demarcated by Australian and Japanese officials as prioritized agendas in human security collaboration. In this context, the two countries' bilateral cooperation yields a basis for merging the two key frameworks of human security – freedom from fear and freedom from want – and to foster greater levels of collaboration to ensure enhanced levels of regional peace and

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The term “value diplomacy” was introduced to Japanese diplomatic parlance fairly recently, only in a November 2006 policy speech by the then Foreign Minister ASO Taro. But more broadly, “value diplomacy” may be defined as a state’s orientation toward values, principles, and norms that are advanced in international relations – orientations that are assumed either for the sake of advancing (or fighting against) those values, or for the sake of some extraneous goals. In this second, broader sense, “value diplomacy” is almost inevitable for any state. The traditional realist notion that diplomacy can be (and should be) conducted without (even ostensible) regard for “values” or ideologies made sense only insofar as major participants of IR shared common rules and cultures in the form of international law and diplomatic protocols. When this underlying cultural unity was broken through the global expansion of the states system and through the great ideological rivalries of the 20C, values and ideologies became unavoidable elements of IR.

Values that exert major influence on today’s IR may be classified into four categories or “layers.”

- 1) Layer I (Sovereignty values) Values upon which European states system of the 17-19th centuries was built. These include state sovereignty, non-intervention in domestic affairs, sovereign immunity, renunciation of distinction between just and unjust wars, etc. These also include “code of honor” in laws of war (such as humane treatment of POWs, distinction between combatants and civilians, etc.).
- 2) Layer II (Non-aggression values) Values which were adopted as a result of WWI and WWII, having to do mostly with de-legitimation of use of force except for self-defense or international policing action. These values include injunctions against use of force, for instance, for the purpose of gaining new territory. These are values codified in the UN Charter, and it was at least ostensibly accepted by both sides of the Cold War.
- 3) Layer III (“Western” values) These include individual liberty, democracy, free market, and basic human rights. These values go beyond traditional international law regulating relations among internally autonomous sovereign states. Some of these values are codified in documents such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. These values are “universal” in their potential reach, but they are sometimes called “Western” because their lineage can be most directly traced to Western intellectual tradition, and because during the Cold War, states in the Western camp tended to adhere to these values more than the rest of the world.
- 4) Layer IV (Postmodern values): These are values that have gained prominence on the international scene in the relatively recent past. They include environmental protection, as well as a host of new individual and group rights (gay rights, women’s reproductive rights, etc.) some of which remain controversial even in Western states.

Japan since the Meiji period absorbed “sovereignty values,” and transformed itself into an empire, but this ultimately ended in defeat in WWII. In the postwar era, Japan has shifted emphasis toward “non-aggression values” and “Western values.” Although “Western values” are regarded as at least potentially “universal,” during the Cold War, the actual extent of these values was limited to the Western camp. For this reason, during the Cold War era, few expected “Western values” to actually become universal. Instead, these values served to strengthen the solidarity within the Western camp (solidarist universalism). While emphasizing its commitment to peace (non-aggression values), postwar Japan also committed itself to the solidarity of the Western camp. To the extent that solidarist universalism was directed primarily against the Soviet camp, it was permissive of cultural and even political diversity within the “Western” camp, as long as member-states maintained a pro-American orientation.

With the end of the Cold War, the expectation arose that “Western” values may actually become universal. As a result, the “solidarist universalism” of the Cold War era was replaced by what may be called “comprehensive universalism,” which sought to actually extend “Western” values worldwide, and which cast more critical eyes toward cultural and political diversities that existed among pro-American states (cf. the debate on “Asian values”). The influence of “postmodern” values also grew. In this new environment, Japan reoriented its diplomatic rhetoric from one of solidarist universalism to comprehensive universalism, carefully skirting the issue of “Asian values,” and advancing new “universal values” such as “human security.”

The 9.11 Incident of 2001 once again infused IR with “friend-enemy” distinctions, and the policy of Bush administration revived the ideas of solidarist universalism. Also, the resurgence of historical great powers like China created new security worries in East Asia, underscoring Japan’s need for reliable allies. These circumstances prepared the background for the emergence of solidarist universalism in Japanese foreign policy in the form of “value diplomacy.”

“Value diplomacy” is sometimes criticized as unnecessarily ideological, and Japan’s recent value diplomacy is often characterized as a throwback to “Cold-War thinking.” Such criticisms are only partially valid. If pushed to the extreme, value diplomacy can become ideological and un-pragmatic, but the idea of purely pragmatic, value-less diplomacy is an illusion in the first place. Japan’s recent “value diplomacy” does reflect Japan’s search for reliable allies in the context of a deteriorating security environment. But this is only a logical response to the behavior of some states in the region that seem to point to backtracking on “non-aggression” values.

Besides, Japan’s “value diplomacy” is inspired not only by the realist attempt to seek allies and countering potential threats. Another component of value diplomacy is the effort to contribute to a more stable international order that could serve the interests of all states in the region. This is evident in a speech that Prime Minister Abe was to deliver in Jakarta in January 2013. There, the theme of spreading democracy or liberty took a back seat behind the key theme of building a stable international environment, particularly with respect to rule of law and freedom of navigation. Further, despite its barking rhetoric, Japan’s “value diplomacy” does not really bite. There is little evidence that Japan is attempting to use “value diplomacy” to undermine the stability of those states that do not conform to those “universal” values. While Japan does advocate “universal values” as ultimate goals, Japan is likely to remain flexible and modest in its attempts to advance those values. It is natural that states sometimes have disagreements with other states. But states that are committed to the basic value of non-aggression should have no reason to quarrel with Japan or its “value diplomacy.”

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Japan's Kakehashi Diplomacy

This presentation draws on a recent publication: Black, Lindsay. 2013. Bridging between Myanmar and international society – Japan's self-identity and *kakehashi* policy, *The Pacific Review* Volume 26, Number 4, 337-360. This article considers how Japanese foreign policymakers have articulated a specific identity for Japan, namely that of a *kakehashi* diplomat, based upon their perception of Japan's experience within the context of international society. This self-identity guides the decision-making processes of these foreign policymakers.

The concept of *kakehashi* is inadequately explained in the literature on Japan's IR and deserves attention. Japan's self-identity as a *kakehashi* diplomat frames the country's historical experience as first industrialized East Asian state able to bridge between East and West and speaks to long-standing debates about whether Japan is in Asia, in the West, or able to deftly maneuver between both.

Japan's *kakehashi* strategy constructs Japan's self-identity as a state able to reenter the international society after WWII through focusing on economic development rather than military and coercive action. For proponents of the *kakehashi* approach, Japan provides both a model of successful democratization through development which 'rogue states' can learn from, as well as the means through ODA to 'bridge' the divide between 'rogue' status and liberal democratic capitalism. The concept of *kakehashi* therefore speaks directly to the question of Japan's 'unique' experience and sharing of 'universal' values.

This paper argues that the four core norms of asianism, developmentalism, reassurance and democracy combine to shape Japan's distinctive *kakehashi* approach. This *kakehashi* approach comprises two key tenets, namely 'democratization as process' and 'positive linkage'.

The concept of 'democratization as process' refers to the Japanese government's commitment to maintain constant bilateral dialogue that seeks to encourage democratization over time.

The notion of 'positive linkage' refers to the financial incentives in the form of ODA granted by the Japanese government in response to political developments that may foster democratization.

Japan's *kakehashi* policy is explored in Japan's response to anti-government protests in Myanmar, Cyclone Nargis, and the democratization process. Japan's response contrasts with US and European approaches that rely on coercive pressure to democratize and impose economic sanctions, or negative linkage, on states categorized as 'rogues'.

Japan's *kakehashi* policy provides a convincing counter narrative to the assertion of existing paradigms that Japan's foreign policy relies on external pressure and merely mimics the policies of the US. Instead, Japan's *kakehashi* approach signals a proactive policy of continued engagement that is value-laden (democracy, human rights, economic development...), but is firmly rooted in the construction of Japan's self-identity.

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Just and Unjust “Value Diplomacy”?

Value with/without Power

It can be argued that “value” is added to foreign policy when a country becomes powerful enough to project its power to other countries. The same logic, however, can also be applicable when a declining power seeks to justify its international presence vis-à-vis other countries. To implement one’s value, the country should maintain a certain level of capabilities in both security and economic terms. A weaker country, while facing other countries’ projections of values, should be puzzled with a dilemma between its own value and the others’ projected values.

Value with/without Willing Partners

The weaker countries, if they could go with other countries sharing the same/similar values, can project their values to other countries. The partnership can present itself as coalitions, alliances, ad hoc cooperation, institutions, and so forth. If the institutionalization could be progressed, they can become international organizations with a certain level of bureaucracy. The more values institutionalized, more legitimacy they can have to project their ideas globally.

Value with/without attention to international stability

Projection of values to the international arena often invites nationalistic chauvinism. One country’s ideas about “justness” can be seen as “unjust” in other countries, and if various countries seek to project their own “values” to the international arena with nationalistic sentiments, it will just lead to chaotic confusion in world politics. In the anarchical nature of international relations, values which have no foundations of power, or which cannot be supported by other willing partners, will only invite relentless projections of one’s value to the others. Even if one country regards the value as “just,” any other country cannot follow the projected value.

Lessons from Taiwan’s Failure and Japan’s “Value Diplomacy”

The value projection by President Chen Shuibian and Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party was a typical example of failure in “value diplomacy.” He once thought that Taiwan’s democracy should be internationally protected, and must be strongly supported by the United States. Chen thought that various confrontations would be indispensable to widen Taiwan’s space for diplomacy. However, his emphasis on Taiwan’s democracy was gradually regarded as a breach of the Taiwan-China status quo, and the US altered its perspectives toward President Chan from the symbol of Taiwan’s democracy to the breaker of the cross-strait stability.

Japan should learn from Taiwan’s failure. “Value projection” without any of the above elements will lead Japan not to a democracy seeker but to a stability breaker. Foundations of “international order” are not necessarily the same as those of “domestic order.”

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Universalism and Universal Values of Diplomacy: ASEAN Values and UN Values

Introduction:

Diplomacy suggests tact, cordiality and grace, and all things refined, especially in language, mannerism and etiquette. But the very reason of their existence is also due to the very real possibility of violence, which can strike at any moment's notice, according to conventional theories of IR due to the systemic anarchy of the world.

Diplomacy, therefore, is there to give peace a chance, especially when war is always a plausibility. Even if one is a proponent in the English School of Thought, or, the Chinese concept of "tien-xia" (all under heaven) as purveyed through the current idea of "peaceful development," diplomacy has to exist as a buffer against the very real prospect of violence suddenly erupting between and within countries.

As a minimum, the universalism and universal values of diplomacy are based on war prevention and pre-emption, especially enshrined and circumscribed by the United Nations Charter (Chapter 7).

Only after having achieved these basic functions, in attenuating the 'high politics' of inter state nations (i.e. arms control, nuclear disarmament, military verification) can diplomacy proceed to deal with other aspects of the relations, such as trade, inter cultural development and religious exchanges.

The diplomatic niceties of diplomacy, in other words, is meant to reduce the tensions and suspicions of contentious neighbours, or, even distant powers, that are out to impose their will----lawful or otherwise----on a country.

The values practised in ASEAN diplomacy are in the main driven by 1. consensus, 2. compromise, 3. joint cooperation 4. conviviality and 5. sustainable collaboration.

Decisions cannot merely be made through consensus, but based on volitional compromise and cooperation that are in turn shaped by a convivial spirit of win-win collaboration. These are the 5 Cs that have served ASEAN well, and in allowing the region to go close and closer to being an integral part of the United Nations (UN).

The issue of values is therefore one of geography versus institutional demand. Do we encourage a region to get it right first, before we expect it to don greater responsibilities in the United Nations ? Of course the two can co exist and occur simultaneously. Allowing the two to conjoin---without any contradiction---should be the cardinal value of diplomacy.

4. An Introduction to The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)

【Objectives】 As we embrace the 21st century, international relations are becoming increasingly interdependent, and globalization and regionalism are becoming the big waves. In this global tendency, communicating with the world, especially neighboring countries in the Asia-Pacific region at both governmental and non-governmental levels, is one of the indispensable conditions for Japan to survive. On the basis of such understanding, The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) aims to promote the exchange of views on commonly shared interests and issues in the field ranging from politics and security to the economy, trade, finance, society and culture, and to help business leaders, Diet members and opinion leaders both in Japan and in their counterpart countries to discuss the formulation of new orders in global and regional arenas.

【History】 The 1982 Versailles Summit was widely seen as having exposed rifts within the Western alliance. Accordingly, there were expressed concerns that the summit meetings were becoming more and more stylized rituals and that Western solidarity was at risk. Within this context, it was realized that, to revitalize the summit meetings, there must be free and unfettered exchanges of private-sector views to be transmitted directly to the heads of the participating states. Accordingly, Japanese former Foreign Minister OKITA Saburo, U.S. Trade Representative William BROCK, E.C. Commission Vice President Etienne DAVIGNON, and Canadian Trade Minister Edward LUMLEY, as representatives of the private-sector in their respective countries, took the initiative in founding The Quadrangular Forum in Washington in September 1982. Since then, the end of the Cold War and the altered nature of the economic summits themselves had made it necessary for The Quadrangular Forum to metamorphose into The Global Forum established by the American and Japanese components of The Quadrangular Forum at the World Convention in Washington in October 1991. In line with its objectives as stated above, The Global Forum was intended as a facilitator of global consensus on the many post-Cold War issues facing the international community and reached out to open its discussions not only to participants from the quadrangular countries but also to participants from other parts of the world. Over the years, the gravity of The Global Forum's activities gradually shifted from its American component (housed in The Center for Strategic and International Studies) to its Japanese component (housed in The Japan Forum on International Relations), and, after the American component ceased to be operative, the Board of Trustees of the Japanese component resolved, on February 7, 1996, that it would thereafter act as an independent body for organizing bilateral dialogues with Japan as a hub for all countries in the world, and amended its by-laws accordingly. At the same time, The Global Forum's Japanese component was reorganized into The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) in line with the principle that the organization be self-governing, self-financing, and independent of any other organization.

【Organization】 The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) is a private, non-profit, non-partisan, and independent membership organization in Japan to engage in and promote international exchanges on policy-oriented matters of bilateral, regional and global implications. While the secretariat is housed in The Japan Forum on International Relations, GFJ itself is independent of any other organizations, including The Japan Forum on International Relations. Originally established as the Japanese component of The Quadrangular Forum at the initiative of HATTORI Ichiro, OKITA Saburo, TAKEYAMA Yasuo, and TOYODA Shoichiro in 1982, GFJ is currently headed by OKAWARA Yoshio as Chairman, ITO Kenichi as President and HIRABAYASHI Hiroshi as Vice President. The membership is composed of 10 Business Leader Members including the two Governors, MOGI Yuzaburo and TOYODA Shoichiro; 19 Diet Members including the three Governors, ASAO Keiichiro, KOIKE Yuriko, and TANIGAKI Sadakazu; and 89 Opinion Leader Members including the two Governors, SHIMADA Haruo, and WATANABE Mayu. Friends and supporters of The Global Forum of Japan are organized into the Supporters' Club of the Global Forum of Japan.

【Activities】 Since the start of The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) in 1982, GFJ has shifted its focus from the exchanges with the Quadrangular countries for the purpose of contributing to the Western Summit, to those with neighboring countries in the Asia-Pacific region including the U.S., China, Korea, ASEAN countries, India, Australia, European countries, and Wider Black Sea area, for the purposes of deepening mutual understanding and contributing to the formation of international order. GFJ has been active in collaboration with international exchange organizations in those countries in organizing policy-oriented intellectual exchanges called "Dialogue." In order to secure a substantial number of Japanese participants in the "Dialogue," GFJ in principle holds these "Dialogues" in Tokyo. A listing of topics of "Dialogues" and its overseas co-sponsors in the last five years is given below.

Year	Month	Topic	Co-sponsor
2013	October	Toward the Making of Shared Values in Foreign Policy	Washington College International Studies Program Foundation of Research on Transformation of Malaysia
	March	Future Prospect of the Japan-GUAM Partnership for Democracy and Economic Development	GUAM-Organization for Democracy and Economic Development
	February January	How to Develop Japan and Black Sea Area Cooperation Toward a Future-Oriented Japan-China Relationship	Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) School of Environment, Beijing Normal University World Resources Institute College of Public Administration, Zhejiang University
2012	September	Japan-U.S. Alliance at a New Stage: Toward a Provider of International Public Goodss	Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies
	March March	The Future of ASEAN Integration and Japan's Role The Rise of Emerging Countries and the Future of Global Governance	Fudan University Nanyang Technological University The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
	February	The Asia-Pacific Region in Transition and the Japan-U.S.-China Relations	China Association of Asia-Pacific Studies
2011	October July	The Japan-China Relations at Crossroads The Great East Japan Earthquake and Regional Cooperation on Disaster Management	China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, etc
	February February	The Japan-U.S. Relations in the Era of Smart Power East Asia in Transition and New Perspectives on Regional Cooperation	The Center for Strategic and International Studies (U.S.) International Studies Department, Vietnam National University (Vietnam)
2010	September May	East Asian Regional Architectures and Japan-India Relations Promoting Japan-U.S. Cooperation in Non-Traditional Security: the Case of Counter Piracy	The Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (India) National Bureau of Asian Research (U.S.)
	February	Promoting Japan-China Cooperation on Environmental Issues of the 21st Century: In Pursuit of Recycling Society	School of Environment, Beijing Normal University (China)
	January	Prospects of Changing Black Sea Area and Role of Japan	Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation
2009	September June	Japan-ASEAN Cooperation amid the Financial and Economic Crisis Prospect of Japan-China Relationship in the Changing World	ASEAN-ISIS China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (China)
	April	US-Japan Relations Under the New Obama Administration	National Committee on American Foreign Policy (U.S.)

5. An Introduction to Washington College International Studies Program

Washington College is the tenth oldest college in the United States, and the first college chartered in the new nation – in 1782. General George Washington contributed the largest donation for the establishment of the College, gave us permission to use his name, and served on the Board of Visitors and Governors for five years until 1789, when he became the first President of the United States.

Today, over 230 years later, approximately 1,400 undergraduate students from 35 states and 40 nations attend Washington College to study in over 40 different academic majors and programs. Although we are set in a rural location in historic Chestertown, Maryland, we are 90 minutes from Philadelphia, Baltimore and Washington, D.C. and take full advantage of the many cultural, political and business resources these cities have to offer.

The International Studies Program at Washington College – established in 1988 – draws together faculty and students from across academic disciplines to study, research, discuss, and travel to countries and regions around the world. The College's Goldstein Program in Public Affairs and Institute for Religion, Politics, and Culture work together with the International Studies program to bring to campus nationally and internationally renowned speakers, support student and faculty participation in national and international conferences, and contribute to our vibrant Model United Nations program. Our Global Education Office works with 28 academic institutions world-wide – including Meiji Gakuin University in Japan – to promote student and faculty exchanges. After graduation, our majors go on to apply their education and skills in a wide range of careers, including business, journalism, teaching, politics, and international and public service.

6. An Introduction to The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)

The Forum conducts a variety of activities hosting conferences, organizing research programs, and publishing research reports and policy recommendations, etc.

[History]

The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc. (JFIR or The Forum) was founded on March 12, 1987 in Tokyo on the private initiative of Dr. OKITA Saburo, Mr. HATTORI Ichiro, Prof. ITO Kenichi, and 60 other independent citizens from business, academic, political, and media circles of Japan, recognizing that a policy-oriented research institution in the field of international affairs independent from the government was most urgently needed in Japan. On April 1, 2011, JFIR was reincorporated as a “public interest foundation” with the authorization granted by the Prime Minister in recognition of its achievements.

[Purpose]

The Forum is a private, non-profit, independent, and non-partisan organization dedicated to improved understanding of Japanese foreign policy and international relations. The Forum takes no institutional position on issues of foreign policy, though its members are encouraged not only to analyze but to propose alternatives on matters of foreign policy. Though the Forum helps its members to formulate policy recommendations on matters of public policy, the views expressed in such recommendations represent in no way those of the Forum as an institution and the responsibility for the contents of the recommendations is that of those members of the Forum who sign them alone.

[Organization]

JFIR is a membership organization with four categories of membership, namely, (1) corporate, (2) associate corporate, (3) individual and (4) associate individual. As for the organizational structure of JFIR, the “Board of Trustees” is the highest decision making body, which is in charge of electing the “Directors” and of supervising overall activities of JFIR, while the “Board of Directors” is an executive body, which is in charge of the management of day-to-day operations of JFIR.

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[Activities]

In tandem with the core activities of the “Policy Council” in making policy recommendations, another important pillar of JFIR’s activities is the BBS “Hyakka-Seiho” which means “Hundred Flowers in Full Bloom” (<http://www.jfir.or.jp/cgi/m-bbs/>). The BBS, which started on April 12, 2006, is open to the public, functioning as an interactive forum for discussions on foreign policy and international affairs. All articles posted on the BBS are sent through the bimonthly e-mail magazine “Meru-maga Nihon Kokusai Fōramu” in Japanese to about 10,000 readers in Japan. Furthermore, articles worth attention for foreigners are translated into English and posted on the English website of JFIR (<http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/index.htm>) as “JFIR Commentary.” They are also introduced in the e-mail magazine “JFIR E-Letter” in English. “JFIR E-Letter” is delivered bimonthly to about 10,000 readers worldwide.



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