
The Japan- U.S. Dialogue

Evolving U.S.-Japan Alliance
in a Turbulent Time of Transition:
Sustaining the Open, Rules-Based Global Order

Conference Papers

March, 2, 2016

Tokyo, Japan

Co-Sponsored by

The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)

The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)

Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University (INSS)

Table of Contents

1. Program	1
2. Biographies of the Panelists	3
3. Presentation Papers.....	5
Session I: Mission of the Japan-U.S. Alliance in the Era of New Guidelines and Japan’s New Security Legislation.....	5
HOSOYA Yuichi	5
Robert MANNING	7
Session II: Where Should the Two Allies Start?.....	11
NAKANISHI Hiroshi	11
James SCHOFF	13
4. Appendix: Introductions to Co-sponsoring Organizations.....	15
(1) The Global Forum of Japan	15
(2) The Japan Forum on International Relations.....	16
(3) Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University	17

1. Program

日米対話 The Japan-U.S. Dialogue

「激動の世界と進化する日米同盟：開かれたルール基盤の国際秩序存続のために」
Evolving Japan-U.S. Alliance in a Turbulent Time of Transition:
Sustaining the Open, Rules-Based Global Order

2016年3月2日 / March 2, 2016
東京・国際文化会館「講堂」 / "Lecture Hall," International House of Japan, Tokyo, Japan

共催 / Co-sponsored by
グローバル・フォーラム / The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
公益財団法人 日本国際フォーラム / The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)
米国防大学国家戦略研究所 / Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University (INSS)

開会挨拶 / Opening Remarks

13:00-13:10

挨拶 (5分間) Opening Remark (5 min.)	伊藤 憲一 グローバル・フォーラム代表世話人 / 日本国際フォーラム理事長 ITO Kenichi, Chairman, GFJ / President, JFIR
-------------------------------------	---

セッション I / Session I

13:10-15:00

新ガイドラインと新安保法制の下での日米同盟の使命
Mission of the Japan-U.S. Alliance in the Era of New Guidelines and Japan's
New Security Legislation

議長 Chairperson	神谷 万丈 防衛大学校教授 / 日本国際フォーラム上席研究員 KAMIYA Matake, Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan / Superior Research Fellow, JFIR
報告 A (10分間) Paper Presenter A (10min.)	細谷 雄一 慶應義塾大学教授 HOSOYA Yuichi, Professor, Keio University
報告 B (10分間) Paper Presenter B (10min.)	ロバート・マニング アトランティック・カウンシル上級研究員 Robert MANNING, Senior Fellow, the Atlantic Council
コメント A (7分間) Commentator A (7 min.)	高原 明生 東京大学教授 / 日本国際フォーラム上席研究員 TAKAHARA Akio, Professor, the University of Tokyo / Superior Research Fellow, JFIR
コメント B (7分間) Commentator B (7 min.)	ジェームズ・ショフ カーネギー国際平和財団上席研究員 James SCHOFF, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
コメント C (7分間) Commentator C (7 min.)	加藤 洋一 日本再建イニシアティブ研究主幹 KATO Yoichi, Senior Research Fellow, Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation
自由討議 (60分) Free Discussions (60 min.)	出席者全員 All Participants

15:00-15:10

休憩 / Break

セッションII / Session II

15:10-16:50 何から始めるべきか Where Should the Two Allies Start?

議長 Chairperson	ラスト・デミング 元国務省首席次官補代理 Rust DEMING, former U. S. Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
報告 A (10 分間) Paper Presenter A (10 min.)	中西 寛 京都大学教授 / グローバル・フォーラム有識者メンバー NAKANISHI Hiroshi, Professor, Kyoto University / Academic Member, GFJ
報告 B (10 分間) Paper Presenter B (10 min.)	ジェームズ・ショフ カーネギー国際平和財団上席研究員 James SCHOFF, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
コメント A (7 分間) Commentator A (7 min.)	神谷 万丈 防衛大学校教授 / 日本国際フォーラム上席研究員 KAMIYA Matake, Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan / Superior Research Fellow, JFIR
コメント B (7 分間) Commentator B (7 min.)	ラスト・デミング 元国務省首席次官補代理 Rust DEMING, former U. S. Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
コメント C (7 分間) Commentator C (7 min.)	渡部 恒雄 東京財団政策研究ディレクター・上席研究員 WATANABE Tsuneo, Director for Policy Research and Senior Fellow, The Tokyo Foundation
自由討議 (60 分) Free Discussions (60 min.)	出席者全員 All Participants

総括セッション / Wrap-up Session

16:50-17:00

総括 (10 分間) Wrap-up (10 min.)	ラスト・デミング 元国務省首席次官補代理 Rust DEMING, former U. S. Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
	神谷 万丈 防衛大学校教授 / 日本国際フォーラム上席研究員 KAMIYA Matake, Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan / Superior Research Fellow, JFIR

[NOTE] 日本語・英語同時通訳付き / English-Japanese simultaneous interpretation will be provided

2. Biographies of the Panelists

【U.S. Panelists】

Robert MANNING *Senior Fellow, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security Atlantic Council*
Formerly served as Senior Strategist, DNI National Counterproliferation Center, 2010-12 and Director, Long-Range Energy and Regional/Global Affairs, U.S. National Intelligence Council, Strategic Futures Group, 2008-2010. From 2005-2008 is served as a member of the Secretary's Policy Planning Staff, Department of State and from 2001-2005 he was Senior Counselor, Energy, Technology and Science Policy, Department of State. Prior to joining Department of State in 2001, served as Director of Asian Studies and a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR).

James SCHOFF *Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*
A specialist in East Asian security issues, U.S. alliance relations in the region, and WMD nonproliferation focused on North Korea, Schoff previously served as senior adviser for East Asia policy at the U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense, and as director of Asia-Pacific Studies at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA) in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Prior to joining IFPA, served as program officer in charge of policy studies at the United States-Japan Foundation in New York.

Rust DEMING *former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State*
Received B.A. from Rollins College and M.A. in East Asian Studies from Stanford University. Has spent much of his career dealing with Japanese affairs, having served in Japan as charge d'affaires, and as deputy chief of mission. Served as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific affairs (June 1998 to August 2000), Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific affairs from December 1997, Director of the Office of Japanese Affairs in Washington from 1991 to 1993. In 2011, recalled to the State Department for six months to serve once again as Japan Director. Also served as American Ambassador to Tunisia from 2000 to 2003. Currently serves as an adjunct professor of Japan studies at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University.

【Japanese Panelists】

ITO Kenichi *Chairman & President, GFI / President, JFIR*
Graduated from Hitotsubashi University and joined Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1960. Studied at GSAS of Harvard University. Served in Japanese Embassies in Moscow, Manila and Washington and also as Director of First Southeast Asian Division until 1977. Since then he served as Tokyo Representative of CSIS (1980-1987) and professor of international politics at Aoyama Gakuin University (1984-2006). He has been President of Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) since it was founded in 1987 and now concurrently serves as Chairman of Council on East Asian Community (CEAC). He is Professor Emeritus and holds Honorary Doctorate in International Relations.

KAMIYA Mataka *Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan / Superior Research Fellow, JFIR*
Graduated from the University of Tokyo in 1985 and did graduate study at Columbia University as a Fulbright grantee. Became Research Associate at the National Defense Academy of Japan in 1992, Lecturer with tenure in 1993, Associate Professor in 1996, and became Professor in 2004. Meanwhile, served as Distinguished Research Fellow at Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand (1994-95). Concurrently serves as Adjunct Research Fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs, Editor-in-Chief of Discuss Japan: Japan Foreign Policy Forum (<http://www.japanpolicyforum.jp/en/>), and Member of the Board of Directors of Japan Association for International Security.

HOSOYA Yuichi*Professor, Keio University*

Received his M.I.S. from the University of Birmingham and Ph.D. from Keio University. He is also Senior Researcher at Institute for International Policy Studies (IIPS) and at the Tokyo Foundation (TKFD). Served as Visiting Professor and Japan Chair at Sciences-Po in Paris (2009–10), Visiting fellow at Princeton University (2008–2009). His research interests include the postwar international history, British diplomatic history, Japanese diplomacy, and contemporary international security. He is a member of Prime Minister's Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security, and a member of Prime Minister's Advisory Panel on National Security and Defense Capabilities, in which capacity he helped to draft Japan's first National Security Strategy.

TAKAHARA Akio*Professor, the University of Tokyo / Superior Research Fellow, JFIR*

Received his DPhil from the University of Sussex in 1988. Served as a visiting scholar at the Consulate-General of Japan in Hong Kong (1989-1991), the Japanese Embassy in Beijing (1996-1998), Fairbank Center for East Asian Research of Harvard University (2005-06), Peking University (2014-15), and the Mercator Institute for China Studies (2016). Holds the current position since 2005. Concurrently serves as an adjunct fellow of the Japan Institute of International Affairs and as senior fellow of the Tokyo Foundation.

KATO Yoichi*Senior Research Fellow, Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation*

Graduated from Tokyo University of Foreign Studies and joined the Asahi Shimbun. Served as Deputy Editor of both the Political and Foreign News Departments from 2002 to 2004, Bureau Chief of Asahi's American General Bureau in Washington, D.C. from 2005 to 2009, and National Security Correspondent. Meanwhile, received M.A. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, served as a visiting research fellow at both the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) of National Defense University (NDU), the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, DC, and at the School of International Studies of Peking University, and taught a course on national security strategy at Gakushuin University in Tokyo from 2011 to 2012. Holds the current position since January, 2016.

NAKANISHI Hiroshi*Professor, Kyoto University / Academic Member, GFI*

Received M.A. from Kyoto University in 1987 and studied in the doctor course of the History Department at the University of Chicago from 1988 to 1990 as Ph.D. candidate. Served as Associate Professor in Kyoto University. His major interests include rise of the global international history of the 20th century, with particular interest on Japanese foreign and security policy in the Showa Era, and current Japanese foreign and security policy. He was on the panel of several Governmental advisory committees, including the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era and the Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security.

WATANABE Tsuneo *Director of Foreign & Security Policy Research and Senior Fellow, the Tokyo Foundation*

Received D.D.S. from Tohoku University in 1988 and M.A. in political science from the New School University in New York. Joined Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. in 1995 and has served as a Visiting Research Scholar, Research Associate, Fellow, Senior Fellow, and currently an Adjunct Fellow. After serving as a Senior Fellow at the Mitsui Global Strategic Studies Institute in Tokyo since April, 2005, joined the Tokyo Foundation in October, 2008. Published *On China's Military Rise* (co-authored, Tamkang University Press, 2015) and *US-China Trading Places in 2025* [in Japanese] (PHP Research Institute, 2011), etc.

(In order of appearance)

3. Presentation Papers

Session I: Mission of the Japan-U.S. Alliance in the Era of New Guidelines and Japan's New Security Legislation

HOSOYA Yuichi
Professor, Keio University

Japan's New Security Legislation and the U.S.-Japan Alliance: Internationalizing Japan's Security Policy

The Ideological Divide in Japanese Security Debate in 2015

-During the debates on the security bills in the summer of 2015, leading newspapers, political parties and public opinion in Japan were divided into two opposing groups. While the left-wing liberals claimed that the bills are unconstitutional, the right-wing conservatives focused on the importance of enhancing the U.S.-Japan alliance at the time when China has been rapidly building up its military power.

-The debate on the security legislation had become largely politicized and those who criticized the bills intended to damage the popularity of the Abe's Cabinet which has remained in power for more than three years. At the same time, the majority of Japanese constitutional law professors still think that the Self-Defense Forces are unconstitutional, and hence should be abolished. SEALDs (Students Emergency Action for Liberal Democracy-s), a pacifist activist group which initiated anti-security bills demonstration, advocates "pacifist foreign and security policy based on dialogue and cooperation".

-However, the instability and the crises in East Asia has transformed the perception of Japanese people. According to the result of the public opinion poll of Kyodo News in February 20 and 21, 47% of the respondents support the security bills while 38.1% oppose them. The scale of the criticism has been toned down, as it seems that the security bills will probably reduce, rather than increase, the likelihood of a military conflict in East Asia.

"Further Contribution to the Peace and Stability"

-One of the reasons why the security bills were so criticized is that ordinary people do not understand why the Abe Cabinet was so eager to pass the security bills. The basic idea of Abe's security strategy is written down in Japan's National Security Strategy. It says that "surrounded by an increasingly severe security environment and confronted by complex and grave national security challenges, it has become indispensable for Japan to make more proactive efforts in line with the principle of international cooperation". Japan is now ready to provide "further contribution to the peace and stability". For this purpose, it is essential to revise the security legislation to adopt to new strategic environment.

Two Pillars of Security Legislation: PKO and Support Activities

-Two pillars of the security legislation are international peace cooperation activities and support activities including logistics support. There are several new security activities that the SDF will be able to do due to the passing of the security bills at the National Diet; such as internationally coordinated peace and security operation outside of the UN PKO framework.

-The constitutional reinterpretation to enable the exercise of the collective self-defense has been the most focused issue during the debate. The protesters singularly criticized that the security bills would destroy Japan's postwar peaceful path. By abolishing them, they argue that we can avoid every war.

-The basic philosophy of this security legislation, on the other hand, is to internationalize Japan's security activities. There still exist many hurdles to clear to exercise the collective self-defense under the new security bills. Japan has the severest conditions to exercise the right of the collective self-defense.

New Trajectory for the Alliance?

-With this new security legislation, the U.S.-Japan alliance will have a stronger Japan's support, and will be enhanced with closer cooperation.

-However, we should not overestimate the extent of the security legislation.

Robert MANNING
Senior Fellow, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security,
Atlantic Council

Global Trends, Regional Challenges and the US-Japan Alliance

Looking ahead to 2030, the world is at an inflection point. The US-Japan alliance will evolve in the larger context of a world in the midst of historic transition from the post-post Cold War world to an uncertain and future order.

The alliance will be buffeted global trends and regional challenges that will complicate efforts to sustain an open-ruled based global and regional order. Some of the global megatrends shaping the security environment:

- **A global diffusion of wealth and power** from West to East and North to South, unprecedented in the modern era. Global economic growth will be driven by emerging economies, G-7 economic share of the global GDP will continue to decline relatively. Yet the international system created after WW2 has not adapted to new economic and strategic realities;
- **Individual empowerment:** both super-empowered individuals like Bill Gates to jihadist using the ICT revolution to globalize their sick message and recruit. Complicates governance;
- **Demographics** offers one of the few reliable predictors of the future. The greying of Asia is one trend – the ROK will follow Japan, China will become the first nation to grow old before it grows rich. The Greater Middle East has a youth bulge, but is squandering its demographic dividend in a generation of internal conflicts. India has a huge opportunity to turn its youth bulge into a dynamic labor force to catch up to China;
- **Urbanization:** The world's population is now 50% urban, by 2030, it will be more than 60% urban. Cities are becoming more important global actors. China economic reform plans to increase its urban population to over 60% adding the equivalent of Japan's population to cities. The global middle class is projected to increase by more than 600 million by 2030;
- **Globalization's** dynamic and perceptions of it have changed. Globalization is not identified as Westernization, and is increasingly regionalized with growing concentrations of trade and investment in North America, European Union, Latin America and Asia-Pacific. However, view of globalization are changing and it is increasingly viewed as a source of inequality – both within and between nations;
- **Technology Revolution:** Built on a digital IT platform, a host of emerging technologies – robotics, artificial intelligence, 3D printing, new materials, big data/algorithms – are converging in a 3rd revolution with transformational, disruptive socio-economic impact on areas from the future of jobs to the future of warfare;

- **Fragmentation:** In part a local response to globalization, there is a trend toward nationalism and ethno-nationalism, regionally, toward sphere of influence geopolitical competition:
 - The future of the European idea is in question—Brexit, the rise of nationalist parties across Europe from France to Hungary, Poland; Scotland, Catalonia secessionism;
 - Russia, Putin is trying to elevate ‘Russian exceptionalism’ to a governing ideology;
 - In Asia, we see competing nationalisms, the re-emergence of China heightening territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas. Also a tension between Trans-Pacific and Pan-Asian institutions;
 - The Middle East is riven with ethno/religious nationalism threatening the Arab state system, intense Sunni-Shia proxy wars in strategic competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and engulfing the region in likely generation-long conflict.

Global Challenges

Economic:

- Slow growth in OECD nations, China and other BRICS. China’s actual growth may be closer to 3% than 7%, judging by electricity use and rail traffic. Beijing is having a difficult time implementing market reforms, suffers massive capital outflows (\$900 billion in 2015) and may be stuck in the middle income trap for several years, In Asia Thailand and Malaysia may also be in that category; as is Brazil.
- Concern that the technology revolution may threaten jobs is a factor. Unlike previous epochs of disruptive technological change, economists are debating whether this time is different, with the digital economy, robotics and big data replacing whole categories of jobs;

The global trade and financial system is at risk. The elements of this open, rules-based order include the following: market access; free movement of goods, capital, and services; open investment regimes; nondiscrimination; rule of law; protection of intellectual property rights; floating exchange rates; regulatory convergence; private sector development; effective dispute resolution mechanisms; and rules of fair competition;

- This broad consensus is increasingly being called into question in the United States, by some of its closest allies in the Asia-Pacific region, and by a rising China taking a more assertive posture in regional and global affairs;
- The failure of the Doha Round marks the end of global trade rounds. Instead sector specific global agreements and mega-regional accords (e.g. TPP, TTIP, RCEP) appear more likely trends in the trade area;
- Finance and monetary change is also underway. With the IMF addition of the RMB to the SDR basket, we are entering a world of multiple reserve currencies. Though the US dollar is likely to remain dominant to 2030, the dollar, Euro and RMB along with the UK Pound will be competing reserve currencies;
- China’s creation of the AIIB appears less disruptive than feared, and is likely to become another component of the Bretton Woods system over time. But it is emblematic of Chinese efforts to expand its global and regional role as a major power. (The chart below outlines Chinese-supported alternative institutions being pursued by Beijing as a hedging strategy in the economic, political, and security spheres);

Global Commons: all domains – air, maritime, cyber and space are increasingly contested:

- In the maritime realm, China is seeking to reinterpret the Law of the Sea Treaty to facilitate its anti-access strategy to complicate and reduce US predominance in the Asia-Pacific. This is playing out in East and South China Seas territorial disputes as well;
- Cyber: The future of the internet, a domain that is principally in the private sector risks Balkanization. Russia and China are pursuing the notion of “Internet sovereignty” to control digital information flows;
- Outer space, its peaceful use is also contested, with Russia and China building anti-satellite capabilities, and seeking to promote self-serving UN norms;
- In the cases of maritime and especially in regard to cyber and space, the US and Japan along with the EU and like-minded countries will need to work to sustain the norms critical to an open rules-based system. In the relatively new domains of cyber and space, rules remain to be written and the US and Japan will need to lead a coalition of like-minded nations shape acceptable norms;

Security

- Geopolitical competition has returned with a vengeance. Russia’s seizure of Crimea and continued efforts in eastern Ukraine to fragment that former Soviet Republic has broken the security framework in Europe since 1991 and put reintroduced security concerns and competition to Europe;
- China’s assertive behavior in the East and South China Seas, its growing military capabilities and stance against US alliances and security partnerships in the region has called into question the stability of current security arrangements in East Asia;
- North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear and ICBM capabilities, enabled by its economic support from China is heightening tensions in Northeast Asia. How the Korean Peninsula and eventual unification is managed is likely to shape the future geopolitical contours of Northeast Asia.

China-supported or initiated alternative institutions

Financial and Monetary Policy		
BRICS New Development Bank (NDB)	Development bank with a focus on infrastructure, founded in July 2014 with headquarters in Shanghai; Indian presidency for the first five years.	World Bank, regional development banks
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)	ADB members were invited to join in; fifty-seven founding countries (as of May 2015).	ADB
BRICS Contingency Reserve Arrangement (CRA)	Reserve pool (100 billion USD) for crisis liquidity (signed in July 2014).	IMF
Mechanisms for internationalizing the RMB	Twenty-eight agreements on direct exchange of RMB with other currencies; treaties on clearing banks in nine countries; seven country-specific Renminbi Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (RQFII) quotas; twenty-eight swap agreements with central banks.	Established currency market mechanisms

Shanghai as global financial center with RMB-denominated futures markets	State Council decision (2012) to turn Shanghai into a global financial center; approval of Shanghai Free-Trade Zone (August 2013). RMB-denominated futures markets for crude oil, natural gas, petrochemicals (August 2014); gold trading platform (fall 2014); six other international commodities futures markets are in the planning stage.	Established centers for financial, commodities, and futures markets
China International Payment System (CIPS)	CIPS for international RMB transactions (April 2012); Sino-Russian negotiations on alternatives to SWIFT (fall 2014).	Established payment systems (CHIPS, etc.)
Transregional Infrastructure Projects		
One Road, One Belt	Large-scale infrastructural and geostrategic projects (announced by President Xi Jinping in November 2013) that aim at opening up new land and maritime trading corridors across Eurasia.	New Silk Road (United States, 2011), Eurasian Economic Union (Russia)
Security		
Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA)	A security forum originally initiated by Kazakhstan (1999); China serves as chair 2014-16.	ARF
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)	An international organization (established in 2001) by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan with a security focus. In 2014, India, Iran, and Pakistan applied for membership.	CSTO, ARF
Diplomatic Forums		
Boao Forum for Asia (BFA)	An annual forum founded in 2001 for decision-makers from politics, business, and academia with a regional focus on Asia.	WEF/Davos
Pan-Asian Trade, Finance, Monetary Policy		
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM); ASEAN Plus Three; Asian Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO)	A free trade agreement planned to be concluded by the end of 2015 and to encompass three billion people and 40 percent of world trade. Reserve pool (increase to 240 billion USD in effect since July 2014) for crisis liquidity (“Multilateralization” started in March 2010; AMRO established in April 2011, status as international organization since October 2014).	TPP, TTIP IMF

China supported alternative Institutions

Session II: Where Should the Two Allies Start?

NAKANISHI Hiroshi
Professor, Kyoto University

Agenda for Operationalizing the US-Japan Alliance

2015 saw the two landmark developments of the US-Japan alliance in the form of the new Defense Cooperation Guideline and the Security Law in Japan. They capped the transformation of the alliance into the post-Cold War world started around 1995.

Though the changes took too long, they are still relevant not in the least because the threats and challenges emerged in 1990s are still live and kicking, and getting much more complicated: North Korea, Chinese military rise, terrorism, and so on. Having achieved legal and policy framework update, the two countries can lose no time implanting operational planning and preparation against various types of concrete situations.

Starting point must be the refurbishment of the bilateral alliance coordination. How to implement the Alliance Coordinating Mechanism (ACM) is not easy. US Forces in Japan (USFJ) operates as part of the Pacific Command (PACOM), so the USFJ-SDF coordination won't be self-sufficient. Difference of priorities between two countries, which is natural, and the elements of crisis management make it difficult to decide who within the government is involved.

Given the recent cycle of escalating brinkmanship by North Korea, reaction against North Korean situation is most pressing. This involves wider missile defense capability including coordinating US-Japan SM-3 and Patriot on the one hand and US-Korea THAAD system. Since the China-centered six-party talk is virtually dead, the revitalization of the trilateral security coordination is highly needed, which means the US required in mediating Japan and South Korea.

Another high priority issue is to respond to the ever-increasing encroachment of the Freedom of Navigation by China in the South China Sea area. This requires a very subtle operation to balance rejecting Chinese establishing fait-accomplis and avoiding provocation leading to outright military confrontation. Whether Japanese SDFs should join the Freedom of Navigation Operations is the matter

to be examined carefully. Japan's participation to the operation may have dual effect of sending the message of its willingness to take responsibility of maritime freedom and provoking Chinese military response. The matter needs to be consulted closely between Japan and the US and possibly with the ASEAN members, Australia, and India.

Third issue is the stealthy area of cyber-security filed, which seems moving out of non-state challenges to state-sponsored challenges. Controlling the free flow of global information balancing security needs and private information is the core of the free world, the US-Japan alliance forming the lynchpin in the Asia-Pacific. Japanese NSC and the Special Secrets Law in 2013 allow much wider room for cooperation in this field.

Fourth area of immediate concern is global peace-building and wider security area including anti-terrorism, anti-piracy, and emerging infectious diseases. Japan still lacks depth of resources (facilities, equipment, and training), but finding best way to maximize the limited resources will have long-term impact.

Fifth area is the information exchange of future arms procurement with multilateral implications. Given the trend of ammunition price-tags skyrocketing, the US and Japan needs to coordinate optimal arms equipment procurement. For example, deploying more land-to-surface and land-to-air missiles in and around Southwest Japan area may have added deterrent effect to the American Air-Sea Battle strategy. Or Japan and the US can jointly develop form weapon procurement network among the friendly powers like South Korea, the ASEAN countries, Australia and India.

Lastly, coordination between diplomatic-strategic thinking with economic-social thinking is one area the Western countries tend to disregard. While the US and China having the annual S&ED meeting, Japan and the US lacks similar type of framework. Partly this is because free world has so many regular contacts, but given the fact that the looming fear and anger on the economic future has the decisive influence on the future of politics in major countries including Japan and the US, coordinating grand strategy covering both diplomatic-military and economic-social spheres are both desirable and effective.

James SCHOFF
Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Next Steps for Closer Alliance Integration in 2016 and Beyond

- Last year when I spoke about the potential challenges for the Alliance in the future, I talked about those challenges in the context of two main/broad purposes or functions for the U.S.-Japan Alliance.
 1. To protect our shared physical security interests through the Grand Bargain of Japan hosting U.S. bases in exchange for a U.S. commitment (and the means) to help protect Japan's sovereignty and independence. I call this the security role.
 2. To be partners in shaping and helping to build a global rules-based order that is peaceful, stable, productive, open, respectful, and environmentally sustainable. I call this the partnership role.
- The new U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines should have a profound impact on both of these roles over the long term, and the process of implementing these guidelines has already begun (albeit incrementally). They should enable more integrated alliance activity for certain missions such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), missile defense (MD), asset protection (such as naval ships at sea), logistic support, and interdiction of illegal and dangerous shipments on the high seas, among others.
- Starting with the Security Role: More integrated alliance activity increases the need for efficient and accountable decision making for both political and operational issues, and the new Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM) should help in this regard.
- The ACM approach borrows heavily from our experience with Operation Tomodachi and the U.S. support for Japan's response to crisis in 2011, with a structure that utilizes the existing 2+2 framework, but with added coordination w/ NSC officials & key political figures (for political accountability). The ACM will be small and hard to notice during peacetime, but it can expand and reach up the chain of command during a crisis (and could also involve bilateral operations centers and component coordination centers in the field, as in 2011).
- But we are not creating the ACM for its own sake or to simply "strengthen the alliance." The whole purpose is to enable a wider range of alliance activity that brings together our combined skills and resources to address the security challenges we face.
- Similarly, the Alliance also has opportunities to leverage closer defense cooperation to strengthen its partnership role. Part of this stems directly from the work related to the security role, in the form of

joint planning and exercises with other partner nations (like South Korea and Australia) to bolster our ability to manage threats from North Korea (direct or indirect, such as in the form of nuclear proliferation). But a lot of it will be collaborative activity focused specifically on partnership missions in areas of disaster relief, maritime security, search and rescue (in the near term) and possibly also defense equipment and technology cooperation over the longer term.

- Specific partnership missions allow for the United States and Japan to engage a much wider range of countries (including ASEAN, India, Canada, NATO members, Mongolia, and the United Nations) and can produce a variety of direct and indirect benefits. Joint exercises in Thailand for Cobra Gold is one example, as is Khan Quest in Mongolia or the RimPac exercises off Hawaii. These exercises (and accompanying efforts to standardize certain procedures relevant to multilateral coalition actions) improve our ability to respond jointly to natural disasters or some kind of refugee crisis, to support UN peacekeeping operations, prevent illegal trade and support maritime security.
- In addition to bilateral and multilateral exercises, the United States, Japan, and Australia in particular have been making concerted efforts to support capacity building among many Southeast Asian nations to improve their ability to protect their own maritime security interests. Japan has provided surveillance ships to the Philippines and Vietnam, among other activities, and the United States is launching a two-year \$250 million maritime capacity building initiative in the region. Effectively coordinating this activity has been the subject of discussion at U.S.-Japan-Australia trilateral meetings, but the three still have a long way to go to make this coordination truly efficient.
- Part of the challenge stems from the fact that “partnership role” cooperation often involves many different parts of the government (and sometimes non-governmental organizations) of not only the allies but also the host country.
- The U.S.-Japan-Australia trilateral coordination structure is fairly well developed (with the diplomat-led Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD), with associated issue-oriented sub-committees, and the Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF) that focuses on defense policy issues, primarily), but it is not designed to work collaboratively on specific issues. This is the next challenge for trilateral security cooperation, which is to leverage the investments we’ve made in developing working-level relationships in various disciplines and apply them to specific missions or challenges in a whole-of-government manner.

4. Appendix: Introductions to Co-sponsoring Organizations

(1) The Global Forum of Japan

【Objectives】

In today's world, people's attention is focused not only around the ways and means to cope with the globalization, but also the rise of new states including People's Republic of China and the geopolitical evolution both inside and outside the former Soviet Union. Under these circumstances, in addition to traditional dialogue partners in Asia-Pacific region, it has become increasingly important for Japan to establish new channels of dialogue both in the first and the second tracks with countries which she has yet to hold regular meetings with, such as member countries of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (Russia, Turkey, Romania, etc.). On the basis of such understanding, The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) aims to promote the exchange of views on commonly shared interests and issues in the field ranging from politics and security to economy, trade, finance, society and culture, and to help business leaders, Diet members and opinion leaders both in Japan and in their counterpart countries to discuss about the formulation of new orders in global and regional arenas.

【History】

The 1982 Versailles Summit was widely seen as having exposed rifts within the Western alliance. Accordingly, there were expressed concerns that the summit meetings were becoming more and more stylized rituals and that Western solidarity was at risk. Within this context, it was realized that to revitalize the summit meetings there must be free and unfettered exchanges of private-sector views to be transmitted directly to the heads of the participating states. Accordingly, Japanese former Foreign Minister OKITA Saburo, U.S. Trade Representative William BROCK, E.C. Commission Vice President Etienne DAVINGNON, and Canadian Trade Minister Edward LUMLEY, as representatives of the private-sector in their respective countries, took the initiative in founding The Quadrangular Forum in Washington in September 1982. Since then, the end of the Cold War and the altered nature of the economic summits themselves had made it necessary for The Quadrangular Forum to metamorphose into The Global Forum established by the American and Japanese components of The Quadrangular Forum at the World Convention in Washington in October 1991. In line with its objectives as stated above, The Global Forum was intended as a facilitator of global consensus on the many post-Cold War issues facing the international community and reached out to open its discussions not only to participants from the quadrangular countries but also to participants from other parts of the world. Over the years, the gravity of The Global Forum's activities gradually shifted from its American component (housed in The Center for Strategic and International Studies) to its Japanese component (housed in The Japan Forum on International Relations), and, after the American component ceased to be operative, the Board of Trustees of the Japanese component resolved, on February 7, 1996, that it would thereafter act as an independent body for organizing bilateral dialogues with Japan as a hub for all countries in the world, and amended its by-laws accordingly. At the same time, The Global Forum's Japanese component was reorganized into The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) in line with the principle that the organization be self-governing, self-financing, and independent of any other organization.

【Organization】

The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) is a private, non-profit, non-partisan, and independent membership organization in Japan to engage in and promote international exchanges on policy-oriented matters of bilateral, regional and global implications. While the secretariat is housed in The Japan Forum on International Relations, GFJ itself is independent of any other organizations, including The Japan Forum on International Relations. Originally established as the Japanese component of The Quadrangular Forum at the initiative of HATTORI Ichiro, OKITA Saburo, TAKEYAMA Yasuo, TOYODA Shoichiro in 1982, GFJ is currently headed by OKAWARA Yoshio as Advisor, ITO Kenichi as Chairman & President. The membership is composed of 10 Business Members including the two Governors, MOGI Yuzaburo and TOYODA Shoichiro; 18 Political Members including the four Governors, ASAO Keiichiro, KAKIZAWA Mito, KOIKE Yuriko, and TANIGAKI Sadakazu; and 87 Academic Members including the three Governors, ITO Go, SHIMADA Haruo and MUTSUSHIKA Shigeo.

【Activities】

Since the start of The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) in 1982, GFJ has shifted its focus from the exchanges with the Quadrangular countries for the purpose of contributing to the Western Summit, to those with neighboring countries in the Asia-Pacific region including US, China, Korea, ASEAN countries, India and Australia European countries, Wider Black Sea Area, for the purposes of deepening mutual understanding and contributing to the formation of international order. GFJ has been active in collaboration with international exchange organizations in those countries in organizing policy-oriented intellectual exchanges called "Dialogue." In order to secure a substantial number of Japanese participants in the "Dialogue", GFJ in principle holds these "Dialogues" in Tokyo.

(2) The Japan Forum on International Relations

【Objectives】

The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc. (JFIR or The Forum) is a private, non-profit, independent, and non-partisan organization dedicated to improved understanding of Japanese foreign policy and international relations. The Forum takes no institutional position on issues of foreign policy, though its members are encouraged not only to analyze but also to propose alternatives on matters of foreign policy. Though the Forum helps its members to formulate policy recommendations on matters of public policy, the views expressed in such recommendations represent in no way those of the Forum as an institution and the responsibility for the contents of the recommendations is that of those members of the Forum who sign them alone.

【History】

The Forum was founded on March 12, 1987 in Tokyo on the private initiative of Dr. OKITA Saburo, Mr. HATTORI Ichiro, Prof. ITO Kenichi, and 60 other independent citizens from business, academic, political, and media circles of Japan, recognizing that a policy-oriented research institution in the field of international affairs independent from the government was most urgently needed in Japan. On April 1, 2011, JFIR was reincorporated as a “public interest foundation” with the authorization granted by the Prime Minister in recognition of its achievements.

【Organization】

JFIR is a membership organization with four categories of membership, namely, (1) corporate, (2) associate corporate, (3) individual and (4) associate individual. As for the organizational structure of JFIR, the “Board of Trustees” is the highest decision making body, which is in charge of electing the “Directors” and of supervising overall activities of JFIR, while the “Board of Directors” is an executive body, which is in charge of the management of day-to-day operations of JFIR.

■ Board of Trustees ARIMA Tatsuo OHYA Eiko HAKAMADA Shigeki SAKAMOTO Masahiro HATTORI Yasuo SATO Ken HIRONAKA Wakako WATANABE Toshio HIRONO Ryokichi YAMAGUCHI Norio INOUE Akiyoshi ISHIGAKI Yasuji ITO Tsuyoshi KOIKE Yuriko KUROYANAGI Nobuo		■ Board of Directors IMAI Takashi <i>Chairman</i> ITO Kenichi <i>President</i> WATANABE Mayu <i>Executive Director</i> HANDA Haruhisa <i>Director</i> KAMIYA Mataka <i>Director</i> KIYOHARA Takehiko <i>Director</i> MORIMOTO Satoshi <i>Director</i> TAKUBO Tadae <i>Director</i>	
		■ Auditors NAITOH Masahisa SHIMADA Haruo	

【Activities】

The Forum’s activities are composed of such pillars as “Policy Recommendations,” “e-Forum” “Research Programs,” “International Dialogues & Exchanges,” “Participation in International Frameworks,” “Diplomatic Roundtable,” “Foreign Policy Luncheon,” and “PR and Enlightenment.” Of these pillars of activities, one important pillar is the “e-Forum: Hyakka-Seiho” which means “Hundred Flowers in Full Bloom” (<http://www.jfir.or.jp/cgi/m-bbs/>). The “e-Forum,” which started on April 12, 2006, is open to the public, functioning as an interactive forum for discussions on foreign policy and international affairs. All articles posted on the e-Forum are sent through the bimonthly e-mail magazine “Meru-maga Nihon Kokusai Fōramu” in Japanese to about 10,000 readers in Japan. Furthermore, articles worth attention for foreigners are translated into English and posted on the English website of JFIR (<http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/index.htm>) as “JFIR Commentary.” They are also introduced in the e-mail magazine “JFIR E-Letter” in English. “JFIR E-Letter” is delivered bimonthly to about 10,000 readers worldwide.

(3) Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University

The mission of Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is to conduct strategic studies for the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Unified Combatant Commands to support the national strategic components of the academic programs at National Defense University (NDU) and to provide outreach to other US governmental agencies and to the broader national security community.

INSS includes the following Centers: Center for Strategic Research (CSR), Center for Technology and National Security Policy (CTNSP), Center for Complex Operations (CCO), the Center for Strategic Conferencing (CSC), the Conflict Records Research Center (CRRC), the Center for Transatlantic Security Studies (CTSS), and the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs (CSMA).

The military and civilian analysts and staff who comprise INSS and its subcomponents execute their mission by performing the following functions: research and analysis, publication, conferences, policy support, and outreach.

[Contact]

Institute for National Strategic Studies

Lincoln Hall, Building 64

National Defense University

Ft. Lesley J. McNair

260 5th Avenue

Washington, DC 20319

(202) 685-2335



The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)

17-12-1301, Akasaka 2-chome Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052, Japan

[Tel] +81-3-3584-2193

[Fax] +81-3-3505-4406

[E-mail] gfj@gfj.jp

[URL] <http://www.gfj.jp/>