

Conference Papers

The Japan-Asia Pacific Dialogue

*International Order in the 21st Century
and the Security of Maritime Asia*

July, 12, 2016

Tokyo, Japan

*Co-Sponsored by
The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)
Meiji Institute for Global Affairs (MIGA)
Meiji Institute of International Policy Studies (MIIPS)
Western Sydney University*

*Under the Auspices of
Headquarters of International Collaboration, Meiji University*

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1. Program

日・アジア太平洋対話 Japan-Asia Pacific Dialogue

「21 世紀の国際秩序とアジアの海」

International Order in the 21st Century and the Security of Maritime Asia

2016 年 7 月 12 日 / July 12, 2016

明治大学グローバルフロント「グローバルホール」 / "Global Hall", Global Front, Meiji University

共催 / Co-sponsored by

グローバル・フォーラム / The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)

公益財団法人 日本国際フォーラム / The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)

明治大学国際総合研究所・国際政策研究所 / Meiji Institute for Global Affairs (MIGA) /

Meiji Institute of International Policy Studies (MIIPS) /

西シドニー大学 / Western Sydney University

後援 / Under the Auspice of

明治大学国際連携本部 / Headquarters of International Collaboration, Meiji University

開会セッション / Opening Session

13:00-13:30

開会挨拶 (5 分間)
Opening Remark (5 min.)

伊藤 憲一 グローバル・フォーラム代表世話人 / 日本国際フォーラム理事長
ITO Kenichi, Chairman, GFJ / President, JFIR

基調講演 (20 分間)
Keynote Speech (20 min.)

中谷 元 防衛大臣
NAKATANI Gen, Minister of Defense

セッション I / Session I

13:30-14:50

グローバルな視座からみたアジアの領土海洋問題
The Security of Maritime Asia from a Global Perspective

議長
Chairperson

伊藤 剛 グローバル・フォーラム有識者世話人 / 明治大学国際政策研究所長・教授
ITO Go, Academic Governor, GFJ / Director, MIIPS / Professor, Meiji University

報告 A (8 分間)
Lead Discussant A (8min.)

グエン・ティ・ラン・アン ベトナム外交学院南シナ海研究所副所長 (ベトナム)
NGUYEN Thi Lan Anh, Vice Dean, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam (Vietnam)

報告 B (8 分間)
Lead Discussant B (8min.)

佐藤 考一 桜美林大学リベラルアーツ学群教授
SATO Koichi, Professor, College of Liberal Arts, J. F. Oberlin University

報告 C (8 分間)
Lead Discussant C (8min.)

由 冀 澳門大学教授 (中国)
YOU Ji, Professor, University of Macau (China)

報告 D (8 分間)
Lead Discussant D (8min.)

庄司 智孝 防衛省防衛研究所地域研究部米欧ロシア研究室長
SHOJI Tomotaka, Head, America, Europe, and Russia Division, Regional Studies Dept.,
National Institute for Defence Studies

報告 E (8 分間)
Lead Discussant E (8min.)

ヒクマハント・ジュワナ インドネシア大学教授 (インドネシア)
Hikmahanto JUWANA, Professor, University of Indonesia (Indonesia)

自由討議 (40 分)
Free Discussions (40 min.)

出席者全員
All Participants

14:50-15:00

休憩 / Break

セッションⅡ／ Session II	
15:00-16:30 開かれた自由で平和なアジアの海を維持するために How to Maintain Maritime Asia Open, Free and Peaceful	
議長 Chairperson	デビッド・ウォルトン 西シドニー大学准教授（豪州） David WALTON, Senior Lecturer, Western Sydney University (Australia)
報告 A （8 分間） Lead Discussant A (8min.)	山田 吉彦 東海大学海洋学部教授 YAMADA Yoshihiko, Professor, Department of Maritime Civilizations, Tokai University
報告 B （8 分間） Lead Discussant B (8min.)	ファン・カン・ミン ハノイ国家大学人文社会科学学院院長（ベトナム） Pham Quang MINH, Rector, Univ. of Social Sciences and Humanities, Vietnam National University-Hanoi (Vietnam)
報告 C （8 分間） Lead Discussant C (8min.)	浅野 亮 同志社大学法学部教授 ASANO Ryo, Professor, Faculty of Law, Doshisha University
報告 D （8 分間） Lead Discussant D (8min.)	ヴァージニア・ワトソン アジア太平洋安全保障センター教授（米国・フィリピン） Virginia Bacay WATSON, Professor, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (USA & The Philippines)
報告 E （8 分間） Lead Discussant E (8min.)	鈴木 健人 明治大学准教授 SUZUKI Taketo, Associate Professor, Meiji University
自由討議 （50 分） Free Discussions (50 min.)	出席者全員 All Participants
総括セッション／ Wrap-up Session	
16:30-16:50	
総括 （20 分間） Wrap-up (20 min.)	デビッド・ウォルトン 西シドニー大学准教授（豪州） David WALTON, Senior Lecturer, Western Sydney University (Australia)
	伊藤 剛 グローバル・フォーラム有識者世話人／明治大学国際政策研究所長・教授 ITO Go, Academic Governor, GFJ / Director, MIIPS / Professor, Meiji University

[NOTE] 日本語・英語同時通訳付き／ English-Japanese simultaneous interpretation will be provided

2. Biographies of the Panelists

【Asia-Pacific Side】

NGUYEN Thi Lan Anh

Vice Dean, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam (Vietnam)

Received a B.A. in Law from Hanoi Law University in 1998, a B.A. in International Relations from the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam in 1999, and a LL.M. in International, European and Commercial Law from the University of Sheffield in 2004. Obtained a Ph.D. in International Law from the University of Bristol in 2008. Currently, serves as the Vice Dean of the Faculty of International Law, where she has taught since 2000. At the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam, teaches courses of Public International Law, International Law of the Sea and International Dispute Settlement. Also serves as Deputy Director General of the Institute for South China Sea Studies of the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam.

YOU Ji

Professor, University of Macau (China)

You Ji (B.A., Peking University and PhD from ANU) is professor of international relations and head of Department of Government, University of Macau. He authored four books, including *China's Military Transformation* (2015); *The Armed Forces of China* (1998) and *China's Enterprise Reform* (1997). His papers appear in journals such as *Problem of Communism*, *The International Journal of Korea Unification Studies*; *The China Journal*; *The Pacific Review*; *Comparative Strategy*; *Japanese Studies*; *Contemporary Southeast Asia*; *The Naval War College Review*; *Strategic Analysis*; *China Information*; *Journal of Contemporary China*; *Issues & Studies*; *Contemporary Security Policy*. Among his latest papers are "China's Indo-Pacific Strategy", *Asian Policy*, No. 22, July, 2016; "China's National Security Council: Evolution, Rationality and Operations", *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 25, No. 96, 2016; "China's civil-military strategy for the South China Sea dispute control", *East Asian Policy*, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2015.

Hikmahanto JUWANA

Professor, University of Indonesia (Indonesia)

Hikmahanto Juwana is a Professor of Law at the Faculty of Law and International Relations Department of Faculty of Social and Political Sciences Universitas Indonesia, where he has lectured since 1988. Hikmahanto earned his LL.B from the Faculty of Law Universitas Indonesia (1987), LL.M from Keio University, Japan (1992) and Ph.D from University of Nottingham, UK (1997). He was appointed as Dean at the Faculty of Law Universitas Indonesia (2004-2008). He has assisted the Indonesia Government as non-permanent advisors to various ministers, including Attorney General Office, Minister of Defense, Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources, Minister of Trade, Minister of Foreign Affairs. He is also a regular resource person for the House of People's Representative (DPR) and the House of Regional Representative (DPD).

David WALTON

Senior Lecturer, Western Sydney University (Australia)

Received Ph.D. from the University of Queensland. Conducted research in the field of diplomatic history, foreign policy, and Australia-Japan post-war relations. Taught at Griffith University, University of Tasmania, and Western Sydney University since 1995. Publications include *New Approaches to Human Security in the Asia Pacific: China, Japan and Australia* co-edited with William T. Tow and Rikki Kersten (Ashgate, 2013) and *Power Transition In Asia* co-edited with Emilian Kavalski (Routledge, in print). Served as a Japan Foundation Fellow, School of Law and Politics, the University of Tokyo 2014 and Visiting Professor at Meiji University in 2015.

Pham Quang MINH**Rector, Univ. of Social Sciences and Humanities,
Vietnam National University-Hanoi (Vietnam)**

Pham Quang Minh is associate professor of history and politics at the University of Social Sciences and Humanities (USSH), Vietnam National University-Hanoi. After receiving his PhD in Southeast Asian studies from Humboldt University in Berlin, Germany in 2002, he became deputy dean, and then dean of International Studies Faculty. Since 2012 he was promoted to vice rector for research affairs and post-graduated programs of USSH, VNU-Hanoi. Since 1 January 2016 Pham Quang Minh was promoted to the position of Rector of USSH, VNU-Hanoi. He was visiting professor to Pomona College (California), SciencePo (France), Waseda University (Japan), Chulalongkorn University (Thailand) and some others. His main teaching and research interests, among the other things, are world politics, international relations of Asia-Pacific, and Vietnam's foreign policy. His most recent publications appeared in Journal International Relations of the Asia-Pacific (Oxford University Press), Journal of Vietnamese Studies (The University of California Press), Asia Europe Journal, Asia-Pacific Review, H-Diplo, and East Asia Forum.

Virginia Bacay WATSON**Professor, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies
(USA & The Philippines)**

Joined the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies as Assistant Professor in July, 2004. Her areas of interest include science, technology and security in the Asia-Pacific region, water security, and Southeast Asia geopolitics. Held appointments at the University of Denver and Colorado School of Mines, and served as an exchange faculty for the University of Colorado in Beijing, China, as well as a consultant for various organizations. Taught courses of science and technology issues in Asia, renewable energy technology, Southeast Asia, and international politics and security. Currently working on "Governance in Asia: Issues in Emerging Technologies" and editing "Science, Technology and Security: Issues of Concern Now and Ahead."

【Japanese Side】**ITO Kenichi****Chairman & President, GFJ / President, JFIR**

Graduated from Hitotsubashi University and joined Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1960. Studied at GSAS of Harvard University. Served in Japanese Embassies in Moscow, Manila and Washington and also as Director of First Southeast Asian Division until 1977. Since then he served as Tokyo Representative of CSIS (1980-1987) and professor of international politics at Aoyama Gakuin University (1984-2006). He has been President of Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) since it was founded in 1987 and now concurrently serves as Chairman of Council on East Asian Community (CEAC). He is Professor Emeritus and holds Honorary Doctorate in International Relations.

NAKATANI Gen**Minister of Defense**

Graduated from National Defense Academy of Japan in 1980. Retired from the Ground Self-Defense Force in 1984. Served as Secretary to Mr. KATO Koichi, Member of the House of Representatives (Minister of State for Defense) in 1985, to Mr. IMAI Isamu, Member of the House of Representatives (Minister of Health and Welfare) in 1985, and to Mr. MIYAZAWA Kiichi, Member of the House of Representatives (Minister of Finance) in 1986. Parliamentary Secretary for Posts and Telecommunications in 1997, Senior State Secretary for Home Affairs in 2000, and Minister of State for Defense in 2001. Elected to a Member of the House of Representatives for 9 times since 1990. Concurrently serves as Minister in charge of Security Legislation.

ITO Go **Academic Governor, GFJ / Director, MIIPS / Professor, Meiji University**

Graduated from Sophia University. Received Ph.D. at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver in 1997. Served as Associate Professor at Meiji University in 1998, and assumed the current position in 2006. Also served as Visiting Professor at Beijing University, Academia Sinica (Taiwan), Bristol University(Britain), Australian National University, and Victoria University (Canada), Adjunct Professor (International Security) at Waseda University as well as Sophia University, and as Adjunct Researcher of the House of Councilors. Recipients of the Eisenhower Fellowships in 2005 and the Nakasone Yasuhiro Award in 2006. Concurrently serves as Superior Research Fellow, JFIR.

SATO Koichi **Professor, J.F.Oberlin University**

Received his Ph.D. in International Studies from Waseda University. Served as Sales Engineer of Hitachi Chemical Co. Ltd., Research Fellow of the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), and Lecturer of the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies. Concurrently serves as Lecturer of Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) Staff College, Policy Adviser to Japan Coast Guard, Lecturer of National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS).

SHOJI Tomotaka **Head, America, Europe, and Russia Division,**
Regional Studies Dept., National Institute for Defence Studies

Graduated from the University of Tokyo in 1995. Received M.S. from Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, in 2006, and Ph.D. from the University of Tokyo in 2006. His research focuses on Area Studies (Indochina, particularly Vietnam) and Security in Southeast Asia. Published some articles, such as "Japan's Security Cooperation with ASEAN: Pursuit of a Status as a 'Relevant Partner,'" NIDS Journal of Defense and Security, No.16 (December, 2015) and "The South China Sea: A View from Japan," NIDS Journal of Defense and Security, No.15 (December, 2014), etc.

YAMADA Yoshihiko **Professor, Tokai University**

Graduated from Gakushuin University. Received Ph.D. in Economics from Saitama University. Served as a Trader, Bond Market Section, Finance Securities Department, Toyo Trust and Banking Company, Limited (1989-1991), Director of Maritime Department, the Nippon Foundation (1991-2008), Associate Professor (2008) and Professor (2009-Present), Tokai University. Concurrently serves as Deputy Director, Institute of Oceanic Research and Development, Tokai University.

ASANO Ryo **Professor, Doshisha University**

Graduated from International Christian University in 1977 and received Diploma from the Chinese University of Hong Kong in 1982. Served as a part-time lecturer (2005) and a Visiting Professor (2007-2008) at the University of Tokyo. His research interests include China's security policy, foreign policy, and IR theory. His recent publications include China's Maritime Power (Sodo-sha, 2014), China's Expanding Military Power (Koyo-Shobo, 2012), History of Modern China (Minerva-Shobo, 2011), China's Military Power (Sodo-Sha, 2009) and China's National Security (Minerva-Shono, 2007).

SUZUKI Taketo **Associate Professor, Meiji University**

Graduated from Gakushuin University in 1982. Received his Ph.D. in Politics from Gakushuin University in 2002. Served as an Assistant Professor of Faculty of International Studies (2002-2007) and Assistant Professor (2005-2007) and Associate Professor (2007-2009) of Graduate School of International Studies, Hiroshima City University. His research interests include international security, the Cold War history, and IR theory. Published The Idea of "Containment" and U.S. World Strategy: Thoughts and Actions of George F. Kennan, 1931-1952 (Keisuishu, 2002) and co-authored Changes and Continuity of Contemporary Asia (Sairyusha, 2008).

(In order of appearance)

3. Presentation Papers

Session I: The Security of Maritime Asia from a Global Perspective

<p style="text-align: center;">ITO Go Academic Governor, GFJ / Director, MIIPS / Professor, Meiji University</p>

The South China Sea and the Conception of Maritime Security

1. The Security in the Maritime Area
 - (1) Freedom of Navigation
 - (2) Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ)
 - (3) Territorial Ownership
2. China says that Japan and the US are outsiders for the South China Sea.
3. The above claim cannot be sustained from the perspectives of (1), since that area is the place where a tremendous number of vessels pass every day for transport and other logistical purposes.
4. China has obstructed the passage of various vessels in the past, and these events challenge the existing foundations of maritime order globally.
5. It is not enough in terms of the maritime security only to observe the freedom of navigation. We can find issues of (2) and (3) by claimant countries. We will discuss these problems and possible solvency for the security of maritime Asia.
6. China could say:
 - (a) Guam and Hawaii for the United States.
 - (b) French Polynesia for France
 - (c) The Falkland Islands for Britain
 - (d) Antilles for the Netherlands, the United States, France and Britain

Above islands are geographically located quite far from their home countries, while China claims only the area of the South China Sea, which is in the neighborhood of China.

7. However, this claim cannot be sustained since China's claim on the nine-dotted line argues that the whole maritime area should be owned and monitored by the Chinese. The UNCLOS does not argue the ownership of maritime areas.
8. Ownership of an island in the South China Sea (which is (3).) may lead to the claim on the EEZ around the island (which is (2).), and may expand the argument of obstructing the freedom of navigation (which is (1).). This argument contends that maritime areas are like an extension of land.
9. The existing maritime order will become in turmoil!!

<p style="text-align: center;">NGUYEN Thi Lan Anh Vice Dean, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam (Vietnam)</p>
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The Security of Maritime Asia from a Global Perspective: Issues in the South China Sea

The South China Sea contains a rich diversified marine environment of a semi-enclosed sea. It has great potential of hydrocarbon resources and one of the largest fishing grounds of the world. It also possesses the second busiest sea-lane of communication. Unfortunately, these advantages of the South China Sea have been improperly exploited and managed due to a number of complicated issues concerning the territorial and maritime disputes as well as the interpretation and implementation of international law. These issues have produced negative impacts for regional and global maritime security.

The issues in the South China Sea contain at least three layers. The first and the deepest layer is the territorial disputes over the Paracels, the Spratlys and Scarborough/Huangyan. The Paracels groups are under contest of China and Vietnam. The illegal use of force was conducted here in 1974 and resulted in the current illegal occupation over the Paracels. The Scarborough/Huangyan is disputed between the Philippines and China. In 2012, an incident at the Scarborough was broken out concerning illegal fishing of endanger species and escalated into tension. The incident led to China's new control over the Scarborough and a case against China at the Arbitral Tribunal under Annex VII of UNCLOS. The Spratlys is under dispute between 5 countries, 6 parties namely Brunei, China, Malaysia, Philippines, Vietnam and Taiwan. The illegal use of force again was conducted here and resulted in the first illegal presence of China on 6 features of the Spratlys. These features, together with the Paracels, are currently used for massive construction and militarization. The uses of force in the South China Sea constitute the grave violation of basic principles of international law.

The second layer of the issues in the South China Sea is concerning the maritime disputes. The most prominent issue is the nine dashed line, covering up to 80% of the South China Sea. Albeit only based on a map without fixed coordination and lack of legal basis, the nine dashed line is used to enforce the maritime rights over fishing and hydrocarbon resources, deeply infringes with those belong to the sovereign rights and jurisdiction of coastal states recognized by UNCLOS. National laws are also unilaterally applied to restrict the freedom of navigation and overflight of other states over the maritime zones and airspace in the South China Sea. In addition, archipelagos regime is improperly applied for the Paracels and Spratlys. Under UNCLOS, archipelagic regime is only granted under strict conditions for archipelagic state. Fail to meet the requirement of archipelagic states, archipelagic regime is still intentionally miss-applied for excessive maritime claim in the South China Sea. Last but not least is the unilateral activities of massive construction and ramming at sea that cause serious consequences for the marine environment and the safety of navigation.

The third layer of the issues in the South China Sea is the dispute settlement mechanism. Bilateral negotiation is insisted as the preference and the only way to settle the difference issues in the South China Sea. All other peaceful dispute settlement measures are either refused or even considered as a hostile act. Yet, many issues in the South China Sea are of multilateral in nature, e.g. territorial dispute over the Spratlys, maritime disputes concerning the nine-dashed line, respect universal principle of freedom of navigation and overflight, etc. In addition, up to date, no mechanism has been set up for territorial and maritime dispute settlement in the South China Sea. The only document between parties in the region for dispute management is the DOC is lack of binding force and fail to prevent the escalation of tension in the South China Sea.

Three layers of issues in the South China Sea are concerning interests of claimants and other states in different ways. Claimants to the South China Sea dispute are suffer from constant tensions, the use of force and militarization. Their legitimate rights and jurisdiction in the EEZ and continental shelf are seriously infringed. And their attempts to settle the dispute are at the deadlock due to the lack of willingness and the lack of a common approach to apply peaceful dispute settlement. Meanwhile, for other states, some fundamental and universal principles, namely none-use of force, peaceful dispute settlement and freedom of navigation and overflight have been violated and triggered serious issues of the effectiveness of the current rule-based order. Marine environment and a safe navigation route of communication, the common assets of the sea, are at risk. Tension is on the rise and cooperation is on decline. All in all, currently, the South China Sea situation negatively contributes to the regional and global maritime security.

SATO Koichi
Professor, College of Liberal Arts, J. F. Oberlin University

China's Maritime Offensive: Xi Jinping's People's War

Much has been said about China's maritime offensive in the South and East China Seas. China's maritime offensive can be categorized into three sections. First, the nuclear patrol of the strategic submarines against the U.S.A (high intensity conflict). Secondly, the modern naval warfare training with the trial aircraft carrier: Liaoning, and landing ship docks: LSDs (middle intensity conflict). Thirdly, the low intensity conflict with the People's Liberation Army (PLA) navy crafts, China Coast Guard (CCG) vessels, transportation ships, and fishing boats.

The PLA navy activities in the South China Sea includes the mine sweepers' escort navigation for the oil rig Haiyang Shiyou 981 in the Paracel sea area in May-July 2014, and some rougher activities such as the intentional collisions of the Chinese landing Ship Tanks against the Vietnamese fishing boats in the Spratly sea area in July 2015. The CCG vessels rammed against the Vietnamese and Philippine's fishing boats in the sea areas of Paracel Islands and the Scarborough Shoal, too. Former State Oceanic Administration (SOA) patrol vessel also cut the Vietnamese oil detection ship's cable in May 2011.

The Chinese government decided to merge the SOA and Fishery Law Enforcement Command (FLEC) vessels into the CCG in March 2013. The relations between the PLA navy and the Chinese law enforcement agencies have been quite different from that of the western countries. A PLA navy fleet conducted patrol and training missions in the South China Sea in March 2013. The FLEC vessels join the PLA patrol surrounding Mischief Reef, and the PLA fleet commander visited the FLEC vessel 45001, and briefed by a captain on the vessel's law enforcement efforts.

The engagement of the CCG vessels, transportation ships, and the fishing boats in the low intensity conflict were also remarkable in the escort operation of the oil rig Haiyang Shiyou 981 in May-July 2014. Thirty four Chinese fishing boats joined the oil rig escort, and all of their hulls were clad with iron plates. The crew of the fishing boats that join the operation of the PLA navy and the CCG in the low intensity conflict are called Haishang Minbing: maritime militias. The duties of the maritime militias are not only the fishing, but also the information collection, reconnaissance, supply, and sabotage for the PLA navy and CCG. Their maritime demonstration with the PLA navy and CCG may include an attempt to exert a territorial claim that may not be legitimate.

The U.S. Naval War College researchers believe the sabotage incident against USNS Impeccable in March 2009, and the intentional collision of Fujianese trawler against the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) patrol vessels in September 2010 were also caused by Chinese maritime militias

(James Kraska & Michael Monti, *The Law of Naval Warfare and China's Maritime Militia*, *International Law Studies*, U.S. Naval War College, Vol. 91, 2015, 450-467). The Senkaku collision incident might be led by the Chinese political group that won't accept "*Japan-China Joint Statement: Cooperation between Japan and China in the East China Sea*" on 18 June 2008.

According to General Ryoichi Oriki, former head of the Joint Staff: Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF), there are 2,300 maritime militias in Hainan Island in 2012. President Xi Jinping stressed the importance of the collection of maritime information and the support to the reclamation of the South China Sea reefs to the fishermen of Tanmen village in Hainan Province in early 2013. It gave the motivation to the Chinese fishermen and citizens to organize maritime militia fleet and construct the new fishing vessels.

The maritime militias belong to the grey zone between the military and civilian categories. If so, what are the extreme cases, and what are the legal issues of their activities? The extreme cases may be the armed fishing boats appeared in the sea area surrounding the Senkaku Islands in April 1978, or, the North Korean spy ship which engaged in a shoot-out with the JCG patrol vessels in December 2001. These cases show that the maritime militias are the crew of the combatant crafts disguised as the fishing boats, and they may be heavily armed. It is impressive that the Vietnamese marine police delegation rushed to Yokohama exhibition museum of North Korean spy ship when they visited Japan in September 2015. It suggested the extreme case of the future maritime militia craft.

The legal issue of the maritime militias is relevant to the difference between the formal status of the PLA militias and the Chinese maritime militias. Captain Katsuya Yamamoto: Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) suggests that there is a definition of the PLA militias in China's military service law, and it defines them as part-time soldiers and they should wear uniforms when they are in charge of military duties. It is quite different from the reality of Chinese maritime militias wearing plain clothes. The militias' status is also strictly defined in the international law. When they are taken, they shall be distinct from the espionage agents and treated as prisoners of war (Soji Yamamoto, *Kokusaiho [International Law]*, Yuhikaku, 1994, 746-748).

The U.S. Naval War College researchers suggested that the case of *Paquete Habana*, and the international law defines the protection afforded to fishing vessels in time of war, and lamented that China's employment of maritime militia complicates the U.S. and allied naval operations during peacetime, in the "grey zone" between peace and war, and in periods of armed conflict at sea (Kraska & Monti, op. cit.). They told that, "As Beijing further integrates the maritime militia into its naval force structure, the line between civilian fishing ships and military vessels erodes." *Xi Jinping's People's War* suggests us the new difficulties. We, the Japanese need to strengthen and expand the power of JCG!



The changing nature of maritime dispute in Asia

Talking points for Workshop *International
Order and the Security of Maritime Asia*
Tokyo 12 July 2016
Professor You Ji, University of Macau



The changing nature of SCS* dispute: worsening Sino-US rivalry

- The SCS dispute has been structured into global geopolitics amidst power transition
- Deepening US intervention as a partial containment strategy against China
- Sino-US relations now the crux of SCS dispute management
- SCS dispute facilitates a new international coalition and regional order to emerge

*SCS: South China Sea



The changing nature of SCS dispute: worsening militarization

- **Militarization, a natural outcome of dispute**
- **Excessive use of force in law enforcement: a source of standoff**
- **Reclamation is a symptom of it and worsens it to a degree**
- **Deadly triangle: growth worsens energy shortage that highlights the value of SCS resources that drives an upward spiral of arms build-up in the region**



The changing nature of SCS dispute: toward combatization

- **Militarization is up to combatization (实战化), probably with FONOPs inside 12 NM of claimed islets**
- **FONOPs*, a test of “who is the boss of the sea” and creditability by allies**
- **Claimants are prepared for worst case combat scenarios: capture or re-seizer of the SCS islets**

*FoNOPs : Freedom of Navigation Operations



FoNOPs: more questions, less answers

- **FONOPs for purposes: pick side; name & shame; test China's bottom line, domestic politics**
- **Symbolic or routine, or both? (twice in a quarter is bearable but if more?)**
- **Innocent transit or a military challenge, or both?**



FoNOPs: more questions, less answers

- **A containment measure or psychological/media warfare, or both?**
- **Lift Sino-US diplomatic dispute to a military level?**
- **China's FONOPS in the ECS and its Indo-Pacific strategy via securing the SCS?**



Dispute control/crisis prevention

- **Uphold status quo principle: avoiding temptation of sovereignty resolution, e.g., through arbitration or international pressure – cause of confrontation**
- **Avoid zero-sum acts, i.e., 9-dotted line or EEZ demarcation: keep necessary space of ambiguity; leave sufficient room for Sino-US compromise; do not corner the other**
- **Be sensitive on SCS law enforcement**
- **Be sensitive on building military facilities after reclamation**

SHOJI Tomotaka

**Head, America, Europe, and Russia Division, Regional Studies Dept.,
National Institute for Defence Studies**

Maritime Cooperation between Japan and ASEAN: Three Approaches


The South China Sea (SCS) issue is undergoing a structural change. China, the strongest claimant in the South China Sea, continuously shows a growing assertiveness by promoting reclamation and militarization activities in the features controlled by the country. On the other hand, the United States has been deeply involved in the SCS. As countermeasures against Chinese activities, the US has conducted “freedom of navigation” operations. The issue is transforming from diplomatic disputes between ASEAN and China to a military confrontation between the US and China.

Against this backdrop, Japan is promoting maritime cooperation with ASEAN. For effective cooperation, a comprehensive and strategic approach is needed by combining military, political, and economic measures. In this regard, I will analyze three approaches mentioned below:

- Political cooperation in ASEAN-centered multilateralism
- Bilateral support to ASEAN claimants
- Reinforcing US military presence

Supporting ASEAN-centered multilateral frameworks is relevant in terms of creating an atmosphere of unanimity for protecting basic rules like freedom of navigation as well as appealing to public opinion in the international community. Bilateral cooperation with ASEAN claimants includes the

strengthening of their coastal defense capabilities. Providing a strategic alternative to respective countries of ASEAN leads to support the association's unity and centrality. Reinforcing the US military presence in the South China Sea is related to the JSDMF's enhancing cooperation with the navies of Vietnam and the Philippines, including a port call to strategically important locations like Cam Ranh Bay and the Subic Naval Base.



Maritime Cooperation between Japan and ASEAN: Three Approaches

Japan-Asia Pacific Dialogue
“International Order in the 21st Century and the Security of
Maritime Asia”
July 12, 2016

Shoji Tomotaka, PhD
National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), Japan

※The views expressed in this presentation do not reflect the
official views of NIDS nor the Ministry of Defense of Japan



South China Sea: Structural Change Taking Place

- China's Growing Assertiveness: Reclamation and Militarization
- US deeper involvement in the SCS: Protecting Freedom of Navigation
- Heightening US-China Confrontation
- Structural Change:
ASEAN-China diplomatic negotiations => US-China military confrontation

=> How Should Japan Collaborate with ASEAN?

How should Japan collaborate with ASEAN?: Three Approaches

- A comprehensive and strategic approach needed to effectively deal with SCS by combining military, political, and economic measures
- 1) Political Cooperation in ASEAN-centered Multilateralism
- 2) Bilateral Support to ASEAN claimants
- 3) Reinforcing US Military Presence

Political Cooperation in ASEAN-centered Multilateralism

- How can ASEAN-centered multilateralism be relevant?: To create an atmosphere of unanimity for protecting basic rules like freedom of navigation
- Multilateral dialogues can be used to appeal to public opinion in the int'l community: Vietnam's oil rig incident with China in May-July 2014
- Even EU's increasing interest in SCS
- For garnering a unanimous support from ASEAN, it is important to support its "centrality" and unity. ⇔ China's attempt to divide and rule ASEAN

Bilateral Support to ASEAN Claimants

- Direct contribution to strengthening the coastal defense capabilities of ASEAN claimants
- More effective support by seeking trilateralism between law-enforcement agencies and navies
- Support for PH's international arbitration
- Providing strategic alternatives: supporting ASEAN unity

Supporting US Military Presence in SCS

- Conducting more bilateral/trilateral/multilateral joint exercises
- Strengthening cooperation "between spokes"
- Attempt to increase presence in SCS
- Joint ISR operations? : A Possibility

Hikmahanto JUWANA
Professor, University of Indonesia (Indonesia)

**The Security of Maritime Asia from Global Perspective:
Post PCA Decision**

This July 12, 2016 will mark a new landscape of Maritime Security in South China Sea as on this day the Permanent Court of Arbitration (the Court) between Phillipine versus China issues its ruling. Even though there are numerous requests submitted by the Phillipine to the Court, there are three categories of issues which may have effect to the Security of Maritime.

First is on the dispute of sovereignty of features, including islands, rocks and reefs, in the South China Sea. The Court will address the issue base on interpretation in an attempt to clarify certain provisions under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

The second issue is on maritime zones, in particular with respect to China's claim of Nine Dash Line. The Phillipine has requested the Court to declare that China's maritime claims in the South China Sea based on its so-called "nine-dash line" are contrary to UNCLOS and thus invalid.

Lastly is the issue of freedom of navigation.

Ever since the Phillipine lodged the case, China has outright reject the jurisdiction of the Court. In numerous occasions China has stated that it will not recognized whatever the decisions of the Court. Furthermore, as the Court is nearing on its decision, China has been assertive in occupying effectively its presence in the South China Sea.

Chinese boats and fishermen are encouraged to fish within the Traditional Fishing Ground, a concept not known under the UNCLOS. The concept of Traditional Fishing Ground is derived from the claim of Nine Dash Line.

In addition the Chinese government has conducted military exercise from July 5 until July 11, 2016. The exercise is to show the international community the power projection of China in South China Sea as the Court will render its decision on July 12.

Against these backdrops, many countries, apart from the Phillipines, have also been anxious to hear what the Court will have to say. These include countries that have sovereignty dispute against China, that have maritime dispute and countries who have interest in the freedom of navigation in South China Sea.

Even though it is difficult to predict what will the ruling of the Court be, generally the decision may have three scenarios of outcome. First the ruling will be in favour of China's interest. Second the ruling will not be in favour of China's interest. Third the decision may be ambiguous and multi-interpretable so countries reading the decision think that is in favour to them.

If the scenario of the decision is not in favour of China's interest, the big question is what will happen to the Security of Maritime Asia?

For sure China is unlikely to accept the decision of the Court. This is an accordance with China's policy from the beginning. China is expected to be more assertive in its presence in the South

China Sea. China would want to show the international community that it has been effectively occupying the South China Sea, be it on issue of sovereignty, maritime zones or freedom of navigation. Use of force may not be excluded by China in its assertion. In doing this China may need its ally countries to go against countries that are jeopardizing China's interest based on the ruling of the PCA. ASEAN for example may not be united in issuing policy on the decision of the Court.

On the other hand, in an extreme scenario, countries who have interests against China will become more confidence as the Court decisions become its legal basis. They will insist for China to observe the award issued by the Court.

The question is in doing so will these countries enforce the award by placing economic embargo against China? Or will they go further by using force?

This would be highly unlikely. If this scenario happens then the world will be in a total chaos. In the current era of globalization and multipolar international environment it would be difficult to imagine China using force to assert its interest in the South China Sea. The same goes to countries that are against China. These countries need China, both economically and politically.

China is just too big to be subdued. At the same time China may not want to jeopardize itself if it is all out against every countries having interest in South China Sea.

The question is now, what is the likelihood scenario?

The likelihood scenario would be relations between countries that have interests in South China Sea will enter a new landscape. The new landscape will be based on the decision of the PCA.

China may not recognized the ruling, yet it may somehow accept the ruling by introducing certain concepts in its claims. This kind of policy is invoked by China in the recent dispute of maritime zone against Indonesia.

In such dispute, Indonesia has firmly not recognized China's Traditional Fishing Ground, but at the same time China is not recognizing Indonesia's Exclusive Economic Zone. However, China sees the importance of Indonesia in terms of its trade partner, market and in financing Indonesia's infrastructure projects.

Thus, China has now changed its previous policy by stating that it has dispute against Indonesia over a so-called maritime rights and interests. A concept newly introduced and unprecedented. Hence, a new equilibrium may be formed, even though it is difficult to predict what kind of equilibrium it would be.

The main thing in this near future is, peace will be preserved in the South China Sea and, importantly, force will not be used. Disputes over Security of Maritime may not be readily settled, but remain to afloat for sometime.

Session II: How to Maintain Maritime Asia Open, Free and Peaceful

David WALTON
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Australia and the South China Sea Maritime dispute

Australia's formal position

- Neutral position on territorial dispute
- Support for international law conventions such as UNCLOS and respect for decision to be handed down on July 12
- Support for Freedom of Navigation in disputed area (hugely important for Australian and international shipping routes)

Issues

1. There has been noticeably tougher stance evident in Australia since Malcolm Turnbull became Prime Minister in September 2015.
2. Australia has worked with the United States, Japan and Southeast Asian countries as part of a security web
 - Australia has criticized Beijing's massive land reclamation activities and installation of potential military bases.
 - The Australian military routinely patrols in the South China Sea, under Operation Gateway. The flights typically take place from Butterworth base in Malaysia, and are normally undertaken by P3-Orion aircraft.
 - Australian Air Marshal Davies said unlike the past, "nearly all" recent Operation Gateway surveillance flights had been challenged. But he insisted they would continue because they are in line with international law.
3. The rise of China and claims and actions in the South China Sea represents a dilemma for Australian foreign policy and relations with China and Japan as well as Australia's overall regional diplomacy.
 - Australia promotes closer ties with China to enhance commercial and economic ties and subsequent benefits to the Australian economy, yet paradoxically the South China Sea dispute has led China to be viewed as a potential security threat to regional security.
 - Finding the appropriate range of policies towards China poses a range of interrelated problems for Australia's foreign relations with Japan. At the regional level, the difficulty is finding

the balance between security and commercial interests. Both Australia and Japan have a burgeoning trade relationship with China and have made efforts to further expand commercial links in China through investment and trade opportunities. Yet as is well known, Canberra and Tokyo have substantially strengthened security links and have maintained a strong commitment to an enhanced security alliance with the United States. Australia's dual strategy of close ties with the United States and Japan and proactive foreign policy towards China becomes problematic in light of ongoing strategic competition in the South China Sea and the United States to pivot in Asia.

—The recent upgrading of bilateral relations between Australia and China highlights the challenge of maintaining a hedging strategy towards China. Australia has made the decision to develop a genuine strategic partnership with China within the next few years. The decision has led to almost unprecedented and at times fiery public debates among academics and defence specialists. In many respects, the debate is symbolic of the China question; can the current Australian hedging strategy continue to work?

YAMADA Yoshihiko
Professor, Tokai University

The East Asian waters are facing multiple issues related to maritime security. Crimes on the high seas and EEZ such as smuggling of goods or people, and IUU fishing show no sign of decline. Recently, refugees due to conflicts stemming from ethnic and religious are also became a big issue. These crimes often threaten the livelihood of coastal residents.

In the past, there were heinous incidents of piracy occurred in the South East Asian seas at a high level. In order to cope with such situation, the Regional Conference on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships was held in Tokyo in 2000. Various Asian countries worked together to establish measures against piracy. After that, 2009, the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) was launched. This agreement has been promoted based on the information sharing on piracy, the building of cooperative systems for handling piracy, and human resource training and development of patrol and information management capabilities. Currently, not only countries in Asia, but also relevant maritime-developed countries such as U.K., Norway, Netherlands, and the United States participate in the ReCAAP as the “user” of this area. There are now 20 member nations. In addition, although not contracting parties, Indonesia and Malaysia cooperate as observers.

ReCAAP has played the role of reducing incidences of piracy in Asia and encouraging cooperative actions among maritime security agencies in Asian countries. We believe that expanding the concept of the ReCAAP and further reinforcement of information sharing and cooperative actions to get rid of crimes on the high seas and EEZ are important to ensure the maritime security in Asian waters.

Moreover, complicated issues over territory and territorial sea are now arising in Asia. Actions such as exploitation of seabed resources and constructing artificial islands through the aggressive reclamation by unilateral decisions especially in the South China Sea create cross-national conflicts and have bad effects on the good relationship of Asian countries. In addition, such actions may violate international treaties such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The changing present circumstance by force is never acceptable.

In order to avoid such conflicts, taking communication is the first step and the most important thing; for example, the clear transmission and discussion of their own concepts of maritime management. The transnational information sharing and exchanges in this field such as utilization of shipping routes, actual condition of fish resources, status of maritime exploitation and environment are also essential in such international convention.

Pham Quang MINH
Rector, Univ. of Social Sciences and Humanities,
Vietnam National University-Hanoi (Vietnam)

“A Law-Based Regional Order”: The South China Sea Dispute on Trial

This conference opens on July 12, 2016 is not a contingency because today the Permanent Court of Arbitration in La Haye issues its decision on the lawsuit against China's claim in the South China Sea that the Philippines brought to PCA on 10 January 2013. Its results will influence not only on the Sino-Philippines bilateral relations but also on the dispute in the South China Sea and security of whole region. The main argument of the paper is that whatever the decision is, China's prestige will be seriously fractured, and more importantly its moral and legal status in the South China Sea dispute will be more eroded. In order to do so, the paper first provides an overview of this lawsuit. Then the paper will analyse the international opinion relating to this lawsuit. By the end it will predict some scenarios of this dispute in the time to come. The paper concludes that a law-based regional order is still a long way ahead for Southeast Asia, and to respect the decision of PCA is one of fundamental act to build such kind of order.

ASANO Ryo
Professor, Faculty of Law, Doshisha University

Mechanism of South China Sea Dispute

- (1) Change of Power Balance in Global and Regional Order
- (2) Maritime Dispute: Symbol of the Sino-US Contest

- (3) Simultaneous Pursuit of Balancing and Bandwagoning
- (4) Vision of Increasing and irreversible Asymmetry of Regional Balance
- (5) Foreign Policy: Rational or Ruled by Domestic Politics
- (6) Intertwined Dynamism of Economic Interdependence and Security
- (7) Three Types of Warfare in the South China Sea – Media (Public Opinion), Psychological, and Legal
- (8) Pursuit of Short-Term and Limited Gains under Increasing Uncertainty
- (9) China's Evolutionary Approach to the South China Sea Dispute?
- (10) South China Sea Dispute under the Condition of "New Normal"

Virginia Bacay WATSON
Professor, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies
(USA & The Philippines)

“How to Maintain Maritime Asia Open, Free and Peaceful”

PHILIPPINE STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS (Post-Hague)

- “gray zones”
- U.S.-Philippine alliance
- link between foreign and domestic interests
- Philippine-PRC relations
- Philippine role in Southeast Asia (+ASEAN)
- Relations with other [non-ASEAN] Asian nations

Opportunities and Challenges

- New leadership: Philippines (Duterte) and U.S.
- ASEAN Chairmanship (2017, short-term)
- Significance of non-traditional security issues
- Expanded regional security network
- Internal (domestic) reforms and continuities
- Implications of the Hague decision

4. Appendix: Introductions to Co-sponsoring Organizations

(1) The Global Forum of Japan

【Objectives】

In today's world, people's attention is focused not only around the ways and means to cope with the globalization, but also the rise of new states including People's Republic of China and the geopolitical evolution both inside and outside the former Soviet Union. Under these circumstances, in addition to traditional dialogue partners in Asia-Pacific region, it has become increasingly important for Japan to establish new channels of dialogue both in the first and the second tracks with countries which she has yet to hold regular meetings with, such as member countries of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (Russia, Turkey, Romania, etc.). On the basis of such understanding, The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) aims to promote the exchange of views on commonly shared interests and issues in the field ranging from politics and security to economy, trade, finance, society and culture, and to help business leaders, Diet members and opinion leaders both in Japan and in their counterpart countries to discuss about the formulation of new orders in global and regional arenas.

【History】

The 1982 Versailles Summit was widely seen as having exposed rifts within the Western alliance. Accordingly, there were expressed concerns that the summit meetings were becoming more and more stylized rituals and that Western solidarity was at risk. Within this context, it was realized that to revitalize the summit meetings there must be free and unfettered exchanges of private-sector views to be transmitted directly to the heads of the participating states. Accordingly, Japanese former Foreign Minister OKITA Saburo, U.S. Trade Representative William BROCK, E.C. Commission Vice President Etienne DAVIGNON, and Canadian Trade Minister Edward LUMLEY, as representatives of the private-sector in their respective countries, took the initiative in founding The Quadrangular Forum in Washington in September 1982. Since then, the end of the Cold War and the altered nature of the economic summits themselves had made it necessary for The Quadrangular Forum to metamorphose into The Global Forum established by the American and Japanese components of The Quadrangular Forum at the World Convention in Washington in October 1991. In line with its objectives as stated above, The Global Forum was intended as a facilitator of global consensus on the many post-Cold War issues facing the international community and reached out to open its discussions not only to participants from the quadrangular countries but also to participants from other parts of the world. Over the years, the gravity of The Global Forum's activities gradually shifted from its American component (housed in The Center for Strategic and International Studies) to its Japanese component (housed in The Japan Forum on International Relations), and, after the American component ceased to be operative, the Board of Trustees of the Japanese component resolved, on February 7, 1996, that it would thereafter act as an independent body for organizing bilateral dialogues with Japan as a hub for all countries in the world, and amended its by-laws accordingly. At the same time, The Global Forum's Japanese component was reorganized into The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) in line with the principle that the organization be self-governing, self-financing, and independent of any other organization.

【Organization】

The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) is a private, non-profit, non-partisan, and independent membership organization in Japan to engage in and promote international exchanges on policy-oriented matters of bilateral, regional and global implications. While the secretariat is housed in The Japan Forum on International Relations, GFJ itself is independent of any other organizations, including The Japan Forum on International Relations. Originally established as the Japanese component of The Quadrangular Forum at the initiative of HATTORI Ichiro, OKITA Saburo, TAKEYAMA Yasuo, TOYODA Shoichiro in 1982, GFJ is currently headed by OKAWARA Yoshio as Advisor, ITO Kenichi as Chairman & President. The membership is composed of 10 Business Members including the two Governors, MOGI Yuzaburo and TOYODA Shoichiro; 16 Political Members including the four Governors, ASAO Keiichiro, KAKIZAWA Mito, KOIKE Yuriko, and TANIGAKI Sadakazu; and 86 Academic Members including the three Governors, ITO Go, SHIMADA Haruo and MUTSUSHIKA Shigeo.

【Activities】

Since the start of The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) in 1982, GFJ has shifted its focus from the exchanges with the Quadrangular countries for the purpose of contributing to the Western Summit, to those with neighboring countries in the Asia-Pacific region including US, China, Korea, ASEAN countries, India and Australia European countries, Wider Black Sea Area, for the purposes of deepening mutual understanding and contributing to the formation of international order. GFJ has been active in collaboration with international exchange organizations in those countries in organizing policy-oriented intellectual exchanges called "Dialogue." In order to secure a substantial number of Japanese participants in the "Dialogue", GFJ in principle holds these "Dialogues" in Tokyo. A listing of topics of "Dialogues" and its overseas co-sponsors in past years given below.

Year	Month	Topic	Co-sponsor
2016	July	Japan-Asia Pacific Dialogue	Meiji University, Western Sydney University
	March	The Japan-U.S. Dialogue	Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University
2015	December	Japan-East Asia Dialogue	East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore
	September	The Japan-China Dialogue	China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations
	July	The Second Japan-GUAM Dialogue	GUAM-Organization for Democracy and Economic Development
	March	Central Asia + Japan Symposium	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, the University of Tokyo
		The Japan-U.S. Dialogue	Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University
	February	Japan-East Asia Dialogue	School of Public Affairs, Zhejiang University

(2) The Japan Forum on International Relations

【Objectives】

The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc. (JFIR or The Forum) is a private, non-profit, independent, and non-partisan organization dedicated to improved understanding of Japanese foreign policy and international relations. The Forum takes no institutional position on issues of foreign policy, though its members are encouraged not only to analyze but also to propose alternatives on matters of foreign policy. Though the Forum helps its members to formulate policy recommendations on matters of public policy, the views expressed in such recommendations represent in no way those of the Forum as an institution and the responsibility for the contents of the recommendations is that of those members of the Forum who sign them alone.

【History】

The Forum was founded on March 12, 1987 in Tokyo on the private initiative of Dr. OKITA Saburo, Mr. HATTORI Ichiro, Prof. ITO Kenichi, and 60 other independent citizens from business, academic, political, and media circles of Japan, recognizing that a policy-oriented research institution in the field of international affairs independent from the government was most urgently needed in Japan. On April 1, 2011, JFIR was reincorporated as a “public interest foundation” with the authorization granted by the Prime Minister in recognition of its achievements.

【Organization】

JFIR is a membership organization with four categories of membership, namely, (1) corporate, (2) associate corporate, (3) individual and (4) associate individual. As for the organizational structure of JFIR, the “Board of Trustees” is the highest decision making body, which is in charge of electing the “Directors” and of supervising overall activities of JFIR, while the “Board of Directors” is an executive body, which is in charge of the management of day-to-day operations of JFIR.

■ Board of Trustees		■ Board of Directors	
ARIMA Tatsuo	OHYA Eiko	IMAI Takashi	<i>Chairman</i>
HAKAMADA Shigeki	SAKAMOTO Masahiro	ITO Kenichi	<i>President</i>
HATTORI Yasuo	SATO Ken	WATANABE Mayu	<i>Executive Director</i>
HIRONAKA Wakako	WATANABE Toshio	HANDA Haruhisa	<i>Director</i>
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ISHIGAKI Yasuji		SHIMADA Haruo	<i>Director</i>
ITO Tsuyoshi		TAKUBO Tadae	<i>Director</i>
KOIKE Yuriko		■ Auditors	
KUROYANAGI Nobuo		NAITOH Masahisa	
		WATANABE Kenichi	

【Activities】

The Forum’s activities are composed of such pillars as “Policy Recommendations,” “e-Forum” “Research Programs,” “International Dialogues & Exchanges,” “Participation in International Frameworks,” “Diplomatic Roundtable,” “Foreign Policy Luncheon,” and “PR and Enlightenment.” Of these pillars of activities, one important pillar is the “e-Forum: Hyakka-Seiho” which means “Hundred Flowers in Full Bloom” (<http://www.jfir.or.jp/cgi/m-bbs/>). The “e-Forum,” which started on April 12, 2006, is open to the public, functioning as an interactive forum for discussions on foreign policy and international affairs. All articles posted on the e-Forum are sent through the bimonthly e-mail magazine “Meru-maga Nihon Kokusai Fōramu” in Japanese to about 10,000 readers in Japan. Furthermore, articles worth attention for foreigners are translated into English and posted on the English website of JFIR (<http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/index.htm>) as “JFIR Commentary.” They are also introduced in the e-mail magazine “JFIR E-Letter” in English. “JFIR E-Letter” is delivered bimonthly to about 10,000 readers worldwide.

(3) Meiji Institute for Global Affairs (MIGA)

The Organization for the Strategic Coordination of Research and Intellectual Properties (hereinafter referred as 'the Organization.') promotes internationalization of researches at Meiji University in coordination with the Organization for International Collaboration established in 2009. In order to become one of the world class universities, Meiji University needs a research base where researches which have global implications are conducted. We established MIGA as such research base under the Organization.

MIGA's researches have two axis based on which various researches will develop. One is to identify Japan's role for the world's development and also to consider how to actualize it. In doing so, we need to have a broad perspective to understand various changes, geopolitical, economical or technological, in the world. The second axis is to identify various issues which are shared globally and consider the ways to overcome them.

Through the abovementioned research studies, we aim to develop policy proposals, publicize academic papers and establish global intellectual network through cooperation with foreign researchers. In order for Japan to remain as a viable and respectable player intellectually and economically in the world, MIGA intends to serve as a basis for facilitating global intellectual interaction.

(4) Meiji Institute of International Policy Studies (MIIPS)

Director: Go Ito (Professor, Meiji University)

Tel & Fax: 03-3296-2112

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- 1) The MIIPS was established in January 2013 within Meiji University as a research unit engaging in international studies.
- 2) In collaboration with the Meiji Institute for Global Affairs (MIGA), the MIIPS held an international conference entitled "What are Big Power Relations?: Toward Peace, Prosperity, and Stability in the Asia-Pacific" with distinguished invitees such as Douglas Paal (Vice President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), Gerald Curtis (Professor, Columbia University), and Song Yanghui (Academia Sinica, Taiwan).
- 3) During 2013-2015, with funding from the US-Japan Foundation, the MIIPS conducted a joint study with the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (Honolulu, Hawaii) on the role of the US and Japan for maritime security in the East and the South China Seas.
- 4) In December 2014, the MIIPS invited Professor John Mearsheimer (Professor, University of Chicago) for his first visit to Japan. During his visit, he conducted lectures on offensive realism at the Cabinet Office, the Foreign Ministry, the Defense Forces, various universities and thinktanks, including "The Asia-Pacific in Power Transition: How Many Powers?" co-sponsored by the MIIPS and the Global Forum.
- 5) In July 2015, the MIIPS conducted an international conference entitled "Enhancing Cooperation for Peace and Stability in a Maritime Asia" with invitees from the United States, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Taiwan.
- 6) The MIIPS is currently conducting such studies as US security commitment to Asia with China's rise, the role of the self-defense forces in natural disasters, and possible agenda on the US-Japan cooperation for maritime peace and stability in the East and South China Seas.

(5) Western Sydney University

Western Sydney University (Chancellor: Prof. Peter Shergold AC) began operation on 1st January 1989, under the terms of the Western Sydney University Act, 1988 which had been passed by the New South Wales Parliament in December 1988. However, the predecessors of the University date back as far as 1891 with the establishment of the Hawkesbury Agricultural College. The Act created a federated network university, based on two existing Colleges of Advanced Education - Hawkesbury Agricultural College and Nepean College of Advanced Education.

Following incorporation into the University, the foundation network members were known as the 'Western Sydney University, Hawkesbury' and the 'Western Sydney University, Nepean.'

The Act was amended by the Western Sydney University (Amendment) Act, 1989 (Act No. 128, 1989) and the Macarthur Institute of Higher Education became the third University member on 1 November 1989. The new campus was known as the 'Western Sydney University, Macarthur.'

In 1995 a review of the structure of Western Sydney University was undertaken. The Report of the Committee to Review the Structure of the Western Sydney University (the Rogers Report) recommended restructuring the institution and a new federated University system emerged. The University became a federated university system comprising four co-operative and interrelated elements: Office of the Vice-Chancellor, Western Sydney University, Hawkesbury, Western Sydney University, Macarthur and Western Sydney University, Nepean.

This federated system ensured the University was represented at a national and international level as a single institution with common objectives and values, while giving each of its Members the autonomy needed to react quickly and flexibly to the demands and needs of its local communities. The principal advantage of the federated network structure was the opportunity to build on the individual strengths of each member university, and through the University as a whole to define and achieve objectives that the individual members might have found unattainable. Each member was largely autonomous and responsible for: the development and conduct of courses; the admission of students; the initiation and supervision of research programs; staffing; the development of consultancy and entrepreneurial activities; and the development and maintenance of campus facilities and properties.

On 26 November 1997, the Western Sydney University Act, 1997 (Act No. 116, 1997) was passed by the State Parliament. This Act which replaced the original Act came into force on 1 January 1998.

Following consultation across Western Sydney University the Vice Chancellor put proposals before the Western Sydney University Board of Trustees at the end of 1999 for a major restructure of the University. The Board approved the principles of the restructure, and the consequent detailed work to be undertaken to develop the new structure. From the beginning of 2001 the Western Sydney University operated as a single multi-campus university rather than as a federation.

The new structure of the university was outlined in the 2001 Calendar with revisions and changes outlined in the 2002 Calendar. The single multi-campus Western Sydney University has six campuses: Bankstown, Blacktown, Campbelltown, Hawkesbury, Parramatta, and Penrith.

"Western Sydney University has been named one of the world's top 400 universities, with the release of the prestigious Times Higher Education (THE) World University Rankings for 2014-2015. The University has moved into the 351-400 band for the first time, firmly placing it within the top two per cent of universities worldwide."

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[This "Dialogue" is administered by the Secretariat of The Global Forum of Japan]