

# **Report of**

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## **The Second “Japan-US Dialogue”**

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**on**

### **"US-Japan Relations Under the New Obama Administration"**

**April 24, 2009**

**The Japan Forum on International Relations “Conference Room”**

**Tokyo, Japan**

**Co-Sponsored by**

**The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)**

**National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP)**

# Preface

The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) aims to promote a policy-oriented exchange of views between business, opinion and political leaders of Japan and their counterparts in the rest of the world, and to contribute to the deepening of mutual understanding and the formation of the consensus. For this purpose, GFJ has been actively engaged for the past 27 years in organizing policy-oriented bilateral and/or multilateral “Dialogues” every year between Japan and the international community.

It is for this reason that GFJ held The Second “Japan-US Dialogue” on the topic of “US-JAPAN Relations Under the New Obama Administration” in Tokyo on April 24, 2009. This report intends to summarize the achievements of these discussions between Japanese and U.S. counterparts. Although the printed version of the report will be made available to only a limited number of people such as members and friends of GFJ and their counterparts from the United States, the full text of the report will be available at <http://www.gfj.jp/>.

The Second “Japan-US Dialogue” on the topic of “US-JAPAN Relations Under the New Obama Administration” was co-sponsored by GFJ and National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP), and was attended by 29 participants including 13 panelists. Participants exchanged opinions on matters of significant importance related to the future of Japan-US relations.

June 1, 2009  
ITO Kenichi  
President  
The Global Forum of Japan

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# **I Programs of The Second “Japan-US Dialogue”**

# 1. Program

## The Second "Japan-US Dialogue"

### " US-Japan Relations Under the New Obama Administration "

April 24, 2009 / Tokyo, Japan

Co-Sponsored by  
The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)  
National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP)

Friday, April 24, 2009

The Japan Forum on International Relations "Conference Room"

<b>Opening Remarks</b>	
10:00-10:05	Amb. OKAWARA Yoshio, Chairman, GFJ
<b>Morning Session</b>	
10:05-12:00	<b>"Overall Assessment of the Foreign Policies of the Obama Administration in Face of the Global Challenges"</b>
Chairperson	Dr. George D. SCHWAB, President, NCAFP
Lead Discussant A (10min.)	Amb. Winston LORD, Chairman Emeritus, The International Rescue Committee
Lead Discussant B (10min.)	Prof. TAKUBO Tadae, Guest Professor, Kyorin University
Lead Discussant C (10min.)	Prof. Donald S. ZAGORIA, Senior Vice President & Project Director of the Northeast Asia Projects, NCAFP
Lead Discussant D (10min.)	Prof. MORIMOTO Satoshi, Professor, Takushoku University
Free Discussions (75min.)	All Participants
<b>Lunch</b>	
12:00-13:00	<b>Lunch hosted by Prof. ITO Kenichi, President, GFJ</b>
<b>Afternoon Session</b>	
13:00-15:00	<b>"The Role of the Alliance in the Making of a Regional Order "</b>
Chairperson	Prof. ITO Kenichi, President, GFJ
Lead Discussant A (10min.)	Mr. Evans REVERE, President & CEO, The Korea Society
Lead Discussant B (10min.)	Prof. TAKAHARA Akio, Professor, The University of Tokyo
Lead Discussant C (10min.)	Mr. Robert DUJARRIC, Director, Institute of Contemporary Japanese Studies at Temple University Japan Campus
Lead Discussant D (10min.)	Amb. HIRABAYASHI Hiroshi, Councilor, JFIR
Free Discussions (80min.)	All Participants

## 2. Participants List

**The Second "Japan-US Dialogue"**  
**on**  
**“US-Japan Relations Under the New Obama Administration”**

April 24, 2009

The Japan Forum on International Relations, Conference Room

**[US Panelists]**

George D. SCHWAB	President, NCAFP
Winston LORD	Chairman Emeritus, The International Rescue Committee
Donald S. ZAGORIA	Senior Vice President & Project Director of the Northeast Asia Projects, NCAFP
Evans REVERE	President & CEO, The Korea Society
Robert DUJARRIC	Director, Institute of Contemporary Japanese Studies, Temple University Japan Campus
Gerald CURTIS	Burgess Professor, Department of Political Science, Columbia University
A. Greer PRITCHETT	Assistant Project Director, Northeast Asia Projects, NCAFP

**[Japanese Panelists]**

OKAWARA Yoshio	Chairman, GFJ
TAKUBO Tadae	Guest Professor, Kyorin University
MORIMOTO Satoshi	Professor, Takushoku University
ITO Kenichi	Professor, President, GFJ
TAKAHARA Akio	Professor, The University of Tokyo
HIRABAYASHI Hiroshi	Councilor, Japan Forum on International Relations

(In order of appearance)

**[Participants]**

AKIYAMA Masahiro	Chairman, Ocean Policy Research Foundation
IYAMA Masashi	Senior Research Fellow, Yomiuri Research Institute, Yomiuri Shimbun
INA Hisayoshi	Foreign Policy Columnist, Nikkei Shimbun
ITO Go	Professor, Meiji University
KAMIYA Mataka	Professor, National Defense Academy
MAGOSAKI Ukeru	former Professor, National Defense Academy, former Ambassador to Iran
MIYOSHI Masaya	former Director General, Keidanren
MURAKAMI Masayasu	Opinion Leader Governor, GFJ
MURATA Koji	Professor, Doshisha University
NAKABE Yuzuru	Counselor & Director, Maruha Nichiro Holdings
NUMATA Sadaaki	Executive Director, The Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership
OGASAWARA Toshiaki	Honorary Chairman, The Japan Times Nifco Group
ONO Hikariko	Director for Policy Planning Division, Foreign Policy Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
SUZUKI Yoshikatsu	Commentator, Jiji Press
WAKABAYASHI Hideki	Executive Governor, GFJ

YAMANO Yoichi

Senior Manager for the U.S. and Europe External Affairs Dept., Global Business Div.,

(In alphabetical order)

**[The Secretariat of GFJ]**

WATANABE Mayu	Executive Secretary
KIKUCHI Yona	Officer in Charge
TAKAHATA Yohei	Officer in Charge
YANO Takuya	Officer in Charge
NAKAMURA Yumi	Secretarial Staff
AKIYAMA Hiromi	Secretarial Assistant

### 3. Biographies of the Panelists

#### [US Panelists]

**George D. SCHWAB** President, NCAFP

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Received his Ph.D. from Columbia University and taught there until joining the Department of History at the City College of City University of New York in 1960. He co-founded the NCAFP in 1974, along with the late Hans Morgenthau, and has served as its president since 1993. For the past thirty years he has been editor of *American Foreign Policy Interests*, its bimonthly journal. He is currently Professor Emeritus of history at the City College and the Graduate Center. He received the Ellis Island Medal of Honor in 1998 and the Order of the Three Stars, Latvia's highest honor, in 2002.

**Winston LORD** Chairman Emeritus, The International Rescue Committee

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Received B.A. from Yale (Magna Cum Laude) and finished first in his class at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy for M.A. For over three decades Ambassador Lord has been at the center of U.S.-China relations. He accompanied Henry Kissinger and President Nixon on their groundbreaking trips to China in the early 1970s. He also served as Ambassador to China (1985-1989), Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian policy (1993 to 1997) and President of the Council of Foreign Relations (1977-1985).

**Donald S. ZAGORIA** Senior Vice President & Project Director of the Northeast Asia Projects, NCAFP

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Received B.A. from Rutgers University, and M.A. and Ph.D. from Columbia University. Served as a consultant to both the National Security Council and East Asian Bureau at the U.S. State Department during the Carter Administration. He has frequently been called as an expert witness on Asia by the United States Congress. He has written and edited numerous articles and books on U.S.-China, U.S.-Soviet, and Sino-Soviet relations. Dr. Zagoria was Professor of Government at Hunter College for many years and is actively associated with the East Asian Institute of Columbia University.

**Evans J.R. REVERE** President and CEO, The Korea Society

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Graduated from Princeton University. He came to The Korea Society after a 35-year career in government service. He served as Acting Assistant Secretary and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Director for Japanese Affairs, Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Seoul, Korea (2000-2003), Director for Korean Affairs and Principal Officer of the U.S. Consulate in Fukuoka, Japan, and the U.S. Embassies in Tokyo and Beijing.

**Robert DUJARRIC** Director, Institute of Contemporary Japanese Studies, Temple University

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Graduated from Harvard College and received an MBA from Yale University. He is a frequent contributor to the public debate on Japanese affairs and international political and economic issues. Mr. Dujarric took his current position at Temple University Japan in 2007 after having worked closely with the university for several years organizing events. He served as visiting fellow of the Japan Institute of International Affairs in Tokyo (2005-2007) and from 2004-05, he was a Council on Foreign Relations Hitachi Fellow in Japan.

**GERALD L. CURTIS** Burgess Professor, Department of Political Science, Columbia University

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Received his Ph.D. from Columbia University in 1969 and has been on the Columbia University faculty since 1968. He is concurrently Visiting Professor at Waseda University and Senior Research Fellow at the International Institute for Economic Studies, Tokyo, and the Tokyo Foundation. He is a specialist on politics in Japan and U.S.-East Asian relations, with particular research interests in parties, interest groups, and state-society relations. In 2004, Professor Curtis was awarded the Order of the Rising Sun, Gold and Silver Star by the Emperor of Japan.

## **[Japanese Panelists]**

**OKAWARA Yoshio** Chairman, GFJ

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Graduated from University of Tokyo. Entered Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1942. Served various positions including Director-General of the American Affairs Bureau, Deputy Vice Minister for Administration, Japanese Ambassador to Australia and Japanese Ambassador to the United States (1980-1985). Concurrently serving as President of Institute for International Policy Studies and President of America-Japan Society, Inc.

**TAKUBO Tadae** Guest Professor, Kyorin University

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Graduated from Waseda University and received Ph.D. from Keio University. Served as Hamburg, Naha and Washington correspondent and foreign news editor of Jiji Press before becoming deputy managing editor in 1983. Visiting Fellow at Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (1979-1980). Joined the faculty of social sciences at Kyorin University in 1984 and served as Dean (1992-2002).

**MORIMOTO Satoshi** Professor, Takushoku University

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Graduated from National Defense Academy of Japan and entered Defense Agency in 1965. From 1979 served various positions at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including First Secretary at Japanese Embassy in Washington D.C. and Director of Security Policy Division in Bureau of Information Analysis, Research Planning (1987-1989). Senior Researcher at Nomura Research Institute, Ltd (1992-2000). Concurrently, a member of advisory committee to strengthen the function of Prime Minister's Office for national security.

**ITO Kenichi** President, GFJ

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Graduated from Hitotsubashi University and Studied at Harvard University. Entered Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1960. Served various positions, including Director of First Southeast Asian Division until 1977. Served as Professor at Aoyama Gakuin University (1980-2006). Concurrently, President of Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), President of Council on East Asian Community (CEAC), and Professor Emeritus at Aoyama Gakuin University.

**TAKAHARA Akio** Professor, The University of Tokyo

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Graduated from Faculty of Law, The University of Tokyo in 1981 and received M.Ph. (Development Studies) in 1983 and Ph.D. in 1988 from Sussex University. Served as Researcher at Sasagawa Peace Foundation in 1988, Researcher at Consulate-General of Japan in Hong Kong (1989 -1991), full-time lecturer and Associate Professor at Oberlin University (1991-1995), Associate Professor and Professor at Rikkyo University (1995-2005), and Professor, The University of Tokyo from 2005.

**HIRABAYASHI Hiroshi** Councilor, Japan Forum on International Relations

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Graduated from The University of Tokyo. Entered Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1963. Served as Director-General of Economic Cooperation Bureau, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1993, Director for Cabinet Councilor's office on External Affairs in 1995, Ambassador to India and Ambassador to France. Concurrently serving as Executive President of Indo-Japan Association, Visiting Professor of Graduate school of Waseda University, Outside Director of Toshiba Corporation, Director of MITSUI & Co., Advisor of NHK Promotions.

(In order of appearance)



## **II Outline of Discussions of The Second “Japan-US Dialogue”**

# Outline of Discussions

The Second "Japan-US Dialogue" on the topic of "US-JAPAN Relations under the New Obama Administration" was convened in two sessions with lunch break in between. In the Morning Session on the theme "Overall Assessment of the Foreign Policies of the Obama Administration in Face of the Global Challenges," and in the Afternoon Session on the theme "The Role of the Alliance in the Making of a Regional Order," heated discussion was held among panelists and participants, the outline of which is as follows.

Before the two sessions, Amb. OKAWARA Yoshio, Chairman of GFJ, made opening remarks representing GFJ, in which he stated, "We welcome the fact that US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton chose Japan for the first country to visit on her official trip abroad, which signifies the Obama administration's emphasis on its closer relations with Japan. According to the recent public survey, Japanese feel, as before, intimacy to US.

Japan-US-China relations, important as they are, could not be a regular triangle but must be a triangle, with two legs of Japan-US alliance as its cornerstone. Next year marks the 50th Anniversary of the conclusion of Japan-US Security Treaty, and this offers a good opportunity for us to redefine the significance thereof."

## **Morning Session: Overall Assessment of the Foreign Policies of the Obama Administration in Face of the Global Challenges**

In the Morning Session, which was chaired by Dr. George D. SCHWAB, President of NCAFP, two Lead Discussants from each of Japan and US made following opening statements.

(i) Amb. Winston LORD, Chairman Emeritus, The International Rescue Committee :

Although I am a registered Republican, I consider myself a centrist. I have also worked for Democratic presidents. As a centrist, I would say Obama has a chance to be a "great" president not just a "good" president, who is a good listener to his opponents, and aims to become a president that would go down in history. Based on reflection on his predecessor, Obama emphasizes multilateral approach in coordination with other countries in the world and deals with a variety of issues in a pragmatic way. I think he is off to a good start.

(ii) Prof. TAKUBO Tadae, Guest Professor, Kyorin University:

The biggest challenge that Japan faces is the question of how to respond to the rising China.

China has different faces, and a hegemonic China which is rapidly expanding its military is nothing less than a threat. Japan has three options for the future; a) to further strengthen the Japan-US alliance, b) to seek closer relationships with China, and c) to pursue an independent defense policy. US, in pre-war era, chose pro-China and anti-Japan policy advocated by Stanley Hornbeck and rejected pro-Japan policy advocated by John Antwerp MacMurray. Even today, in US there is a tension between 'strong Japan' faction and 'weak Japan' faction.

(iii) Prof. Donald S. ZAGORIA, Senior Vice President & Project Director of the Northeast Asia Projects, NCAFP:

I think Japan needs better public relations with the rest of Asia. While being confronted with such serious problems as demographic one, i.e., increase in average life expectancy and low birthrate, Japan has some enormous inherent strength and therefore needs to have more confidence in itself. US and Japan have some common interests in such areas as a) recovery from the current economic crisis, b) Af-Pak problem, c) clean energy, d) better relationship with the Muslim world, e) regional security challenges like North Korea, etc. US and Japan should work out some common action program to address such challenges facing both of us.

(iv) Prof. MORIMOTO Satoshi, Professor, Takushoku University:

I have some concern about President Obama's idea of nuclear disarmament or a "nuclear-free world." Should US and Russia sign to extend START I and set out to reduce their respective nuclear arsenals down to no more than 1000, China's nuclear capability rises accordingly. This move could risk destroying the current military balance in East Asia. Should it be the case, we must question the efficacy of US nuclear deterrence which is supposed to provide Japan with the nuclear umbrella.

(v) In the following Free-Discussions, both US and Japanese panelists and participants exchanged frank views, such as;

"Although the Obama administration, in principle, is likely to inherit its North Korean foreign policy from its predecessor, North Korea must, first of all, be determined to be denuclearized and to walk back to the Six-Party talks before US - North Korea relations are normalized. Obama administration, unlike its predecessors, will, for sure, emphasize closer cooperative ties with Japan based on bilateral talks in dealing with North Korean issue."(US side)

"While Japan endorses the nuclear disarmament policy launched by Obama administration, it is imperative that China in addition to US and Russia be involved in the reduction process of nuclear arsenals. Japan is aiming for two seemingly contradictory objectives of nuclear disarmament and protection under the nuclear umbrella. With respect to the latter, we should reconsider the validity of one of Japan's three non-nuclear principles (not to produce, not to possess and not to allow the entry of nuclear

weapons into the country), namely, not to allow the entry of nuclear weapons into the country.”(Japan side)

## **Afternoon Session: The Role of the Alliance in the Making of a Regional Order**

In the Afternoon Session, which was chaired by Prof. ITO Kenichi, President of GFJ, two Lead Discussants from each of Japan and US made following opening statements.

(i) Mr. Evans REVERE, President & CEO, The Korea Society:

Although there have been some hard feelings and misunderstandings between Washington and Tokyo over the policy towards North Korea, President Obama will listen more carefully to Japanese voices and will put the relation in a much better track. Japan and US have to work closely to engage China in the international community as a "responsible stakeholder." While Obama needs to understand Japan's vision of a regional order in East Asia, Japan needs to be vocal enough to express and elaborate that vision.

(ii) Prof. TAKAHARA Akio, Professor, The University of Tokyo:

When it comes to Japan's relations with China, taking into account its outstanding features in terms of population and area, we should seek a democratic regional regime in East Asia, which is conducive to the sustainable peace and development of the region. While Hu Jintao attributes China's military modernization to national defense purposes, he claims Senkaku Islands, which belongs to Japan, as part of Chinese territory. Although we need to build good relations with China, the Japan-US alliance needs to play a role as public good in the region.

(iii) Mr. Robert DUJARRIC, Director, Institute of Contemporary Japanese Studies at Temple University  
Japan

Campus:

Japan-US alliance is not an alliance based on shared values, as is often claimed. It is easy to prove this by looking at the conflict of views between US and Japan over the question of "comfort women." Another threat to the alliance is Japan's demographic death spiral or dwindling birthrate and an aging population. The gap between Japan and US in the underemployment rate of women in the professional labor force is expanding. If these demographic trends, which are real threats to Japan's national security, are to be left unsolved, Japan's stand in the international community would increasingly be marginalized and the significance of Japan-US Alliance would be downplayed.

(iv) Amb. HIRABAYASHI Hiroshi, Councilor, JFIR:

In order for the Japan-US Alliance to be strengthened, three things have to be considered respectively by Japan and US; for the Japan side, a) to transfer smoothly the Hutenma Airbase, b) to enact a permanent law which allows the dispatch of Self Defense Forces overseas, c) to reinterpret our constitution so that we can exercise the right to collective self-defense, and for the US side, a) to cooperate with Japan to transfer Hutenma Airbase, b) to take appropriate policy towards China and North Korea, c) to regain the credibility of the extended nuclear deterrence of the US vis-à-vis Japan.

(v) In the following Free-Discussions, frank opinions were raised, such as;

“Even though Japan and US in 2005 jointly formulated "Common Strategic Objectives" and thereby agreed upon further developing defense cooperation between the two countries, Hutenma Airbase issue has not been resolved yet. This is the breach and neglect of duty on the part of Japan, which I am afraid would hinder the prospects of future-oriented Japan-US alliance.”(US side)

“In order to formulate a regional order in East Asia, reinforcement of Japan-US alliance based upon our ‘common values’ is indispensable. But on the other hand, with the rise of China, we have to take into account Chinese point of view in dealing with a variety of issues in the region. How to cope with this situation is the challenge that the alliance will face in the future.”(Japan side)

## **III Minutes of Discussions of The Second “Japan-US Dialogue”**

# Minutes of Discussions

## 1. Opening Remarks

*ITO Kenichi, President, GFJ*

As I read the Report of the last "Japan-US Dialogue" held in June 2007, I noticed that it began and ended with pausing questions from two sides without reaching any conclusion. For instance, while the US side stressed the importance of future US-Japan relations aimed at closer partnership with China, and stated that the US wanted Japan to be strong both politically and economically but not militarily, the Japan side raised such questions as, while the US seemed to oppose Japan going nuclear, how reliable the Japan-US Alliance was, and whether the nuclearization of North Korea was the only result of the eight-year diplomacy of Bush Administration. The last "Dialogue" ended with such comments and questions. Therefore, it is highly appropriate and necessary for us to continue to have dialogue with each other this time.

*OKAWARA Yoshio, Chairman, GFJ*

I'd like to start with recent developments with regard to the Japan-US relations under the new Obama Administration. Earlier this month, the Mansfield Foundation held a symposium in Tokyo in commemoration of the 25th anniversary of the Foundation. Amb. Mondale made a keynote in which he emphasized the very close and friendly relationship between our two countries and mentioned that Secretary of State Clinton made Japan the first country to visit in her regional tour in East Asia. Following this very welcome visit, our Prime Minister was received at the White House by President Obama as the first foreign guest for the new president.

These two events suggest that the US under the new administration has given very careful considerations to uphold the already close relations between the two nations. In that Symposium, the American panelists seemed to be taking positive and optimistic views about the current state of affairs between our two countries, while the Japanese counterpart panelists seemed to be a little more cautious in that context in reflecting on the recent developments. Another point I would like to mention in this connection is a public survey conducted by the Japanese government on the relationship between Japan and other countries. In it a question was raised whether Japanese have a sense of intimacy towards the US. The reply was that 73.3% of the answers were "yes" and only 24.8% of them were "no." In the case of China, 31.6% said "yes" but 66% said "no." This is the general attitude of the Japanese people.

A question coming here now is how about our relations with China and the relations between the US and China. Naturally the relations between the US and China are definitely very important for us to consider. In some quarters in Japan there is an argument that Japan, the US and China formulate a regular triangle. I don't agree with this idea, because we have an alliance with the US while Japan and the US have no such treaty relation with China. The US termed it merely "a responsible stakeholder."

Having said all these things, I'd like to mention that next year we will observe the 50 years anniversary of the conclusion of the current security treaty between our two nations. Some opinion has been expressed that in consideration of that anniversary we should consider issuing a joint statement or declaration, emphasizing the significance of the relationship between the two nations. Those arguments are endorsed by the fact that in 1996 Prime Minister Hashimoto issued a joint statement with President Clinton after the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War, emphasizing a renewed significance of the security treaty. Some doubts are present as to why we need to pronounce a new definition of the alliance with the US, it would be useful to consider something positive to remind us of the significant role played by the alliance relation.

Looking ahead at our relationship in the coming years, I think there are two important aspects. One is how Japan should cooperate with the US transformation policy. We have to cooperate with that policy so that the base issues are taken care of to the satisfaction of both sides. The recent agreement to exercise the move-out of the US Marines from Okinawa to Guam is welcomed as one example of our joint efforts. The base issues in Okinawa are very sensitive and should be handled with utmost care, and yet we should make every possible effort to cooperate with the US in conjunction with the transformation policy.

Another point is that we should work closely with the US for the reconstruction and recovery of Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Recently our Diet passed a bill allowing Japanese Self Defense Forces to engage in anti-piracy operations off Somalia. These are the things we have to work out and cooperate with the US on in order to participate in the international cooperation.

One final point is that in recent times, there has been a strong drive to organize some kind of regional architecture in Asia. More specifically, we have observed some effort or argument that Asia should have an East Asian Community and that APT and APS are specific moves to proceed with a regional integration as a long term objective. The important point to be considered is that in terms of geography the US cannot be a part of that community. At the same time, it is clear that without the US, Asian integration cannot properly be managed in realistic term. Therefore, we should work for the building of an Asian community by asking the US to continue to be engaged in Asia as it has been. This is one specific aspect I'd like to mention. Having said all this, I look forward to lively and positive discussions.



## **2. Morning Session:**

### **"Overall Assessment of the Foreign Policies of the Obama Administration in Face of the Global Challenges"**

*Chairperson: George D. SCHWAB, President, NCAFP*

The theme chosen here is very appropriate. The challenges Obama faces are global, not only here in Northeast Asia, but also in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran. Things are beginning to happen on the African continent, in South America and of course in a resurgent Russia. But today we will focus our discussion on our relations concerning Northeast Asia.

*Lead Discussant A: Winston LORD, Chairman Emeritus, The International Rescue Committee*

First, I will give a broad perspective on Obama's foreign policy, touching a little bit on Asia at the end, and will go more in depth with the US, Japan and Asia as we go along. But let me first make clear my own political perspective. I'm a centrist. I'm a registered Republican, actually. But, I worked for Republicans and Democrats. When you hear my enthusiasm about our new president, it is not coming from my nature as a "Liberal" or "Democrat" but is out of my support for someone who is admired by both Republicans and Democrats. People wondered a couple of years ago when Obama declared he was running for president, a man with a relatively thin resume, only 45 years old, why he was moving now? He has a great future and perhaps is needed to be more experienced. The answer from someone who knows him well is that he wants to be a "great president" not just "president."

He had a sense that there were going to be huge challenges for the next president. As he looked at history, people like Roosevelt and Lincoln and others in our history are considered great presidents not just because they were good but also because they had big issues to deal with. As the old saying goes, "Be careful what you wish for." He has, of course, inherited incredible amounts of problems both domestic and foreign. But I do believe that Obama has a chance to be a "great president" not just a "good president." His various qualities suggest this. I think he is off to a good start.

His general guiding principles, when applied in East Asia, are in contrast to those of his predecessors: to engage enemies rather than isolate them to pursue multilateral approaches not just unilateral ones; to be pragmatic, not ideological; to display examples of American values and not to lecture about them, beginning at home, for example, with abolishing torture, closing Guantanamo,

and admitting to past US mistakes. He is inspirational as the first African American president and is a fantastic speaker. But he is a centrist. One should not mistake his forward leaning policy for being naïve or soft. He has strong principles, believes in mutual respect, moves and is responsive to initiatives. He believes the US is the indispensable leader, even as he believes that it is indispensable to work with others in dealing with problems. He believes in sticks as well as carrots. He has indicated specific policies, as a centrist, in Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, etc.

There are some troublesome areas potentially; particularly in the trade area, because the Democrats generally have the support of the trade unions and therefore can tend to be rather protectionist. Obama is still balancing constituencies. The automobile industry is a good example. He has a huge problem in front of him. In the short-term, at least for the next couple of years, the economy is a crisis every country is going to have to face. He will also have to seriously address the Afghanistan/Pakistan problem. Moreover, he is facing some conservative attacks for being naïve or soft, trying to be popular rather than getting results, being too apologetic for America. This is not a major problem for him yet. But if he doesn't show achievement over time, this could begin to be a political problem for him at home. In the longer run, it's going to require some positive responses from other countries and some coordination and help from countries and strong allies, like Japan.

He has been already bold in his foreign policy, such as at the G20, at NATO, during his speech on nuclear disarmament, and eliminating nuclear arms, his approach to Islamic world, etc. These are significant activities for his first 100 days. Along with his wide spectrum of support, he is ready to listen to his opponents. Talking about Asia, this region is top of our agenda. I think that the Secretary of State coming to this region first is very significant. The other significance, particularly relevant today, is that she visited Japan first not just as allies but as two countries who share values, unlike China. She handled herself extremely well in other countries in the region. Especially in China, she elevated the strategic dialogue, treating China as a major partner not only for bilateral issues but to move on to regional and global ones. Two big traditional problems remain here in the region, however, the cross-Strait issue which is the best we have seen in decades, and the North Korean issue which is the worst we've seen in more than a decade.

There are going to be challenges. I am not naïve about the challenges Obama faces. But I believe he is off to a good start, and I am very optimistic about US foreign policy, both with respect to Asia and with respect to Japan.

***Lead Discussant B: TAKUBO Tadae, Guest Professor, Kyorin University***

Let me express my views from the standpoint of the Japanese. Now the biggest challenge that faces the Japanese is the question of how best to respond to the rising China. The way in which we respond, after all, will seriously affect Japan's future. On the one hand, the mutual dependence between China and Japan will basically continue to grow, as the flow of the people, goods and money expands in an increasingly borderless world. The same will be true for the relationship between China and the US, and China and Taiwan.

The most pressing question, however, is how we should regard the essential nature, the fundamental realities of China--the fact that it is a single-party dictatorship, that it suppresses human rights, that it is engaged in an unrelenting buildup of its military. This last issue is a particularly grave concern for Japan. For Japan, the buildup of China's military is nothing less than a threat.

We have no wish to cause unnecessary discord with China, nor do we intend to take an aggressive stance with our neighboring country. I believe every Japanese long for establishing a friendly, normal relationship with a democratic and peace-loving China. We cannot help, however, but to take a strong stance against a hegemonic China.

For Japan, China's relationship with the US is also a matter of concern. Robert Zoellick stated that the US was prepared to play a role in helping to ease any frictions that might arise between Japan and China. He also called upon China to become a "responsible stakeholder." As the US administration increasingly leans towards China, I cannot help but feel that the Washington-Beijing relationship differs from the relationship between Washington and Tokyo.

Japan is faced with three choices for its future. First, Japan could further strengthen the Japan-US alliance, and in addition, Japan could work to strengthen its own role within this alliance. Second, Japan could move to establish closer relationships with China, diluting the alliance with the US. Third, Japan could choose to dissolve the Japan-US alliance, and decide to pursue an independent defense policy on its own. Most Japanese will definitely pursue the first option

Having said that, let me introduce my article from the Sankei Shimbun dated March 6, which the US Embassy was kind enough to have translated into English, and which has been partly revised by myself for today.

John Antwerp MacMurray, who was at one time the most knowledgeable expert on Asia at the US Department of State, served as minister (ambassador now) to China, like Amb. Lord, for five years from 1925 to 1929. MacMurray, as is well known, wrote a memorandum titled 'How the Peace Was Lost.' In those days, the US was lenient toward China's drawbacks, having strong exclusive expectations of that country's potential. But this helped turn Japan against the US. In his memo, MacMurray sharply pointed out that mistake and made a policy proposal to his home government. However, his rival, the then director for Far Eastern affairs at the State Department, Stanley Hornbeck, quashed the report. Later on, the US, joining hands with China, drove Japan into a corner. In the end, a tragedy developed.

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton chose Tokyo for the first official visit abroad. To her meeting with Foreign Minister Hirofumi Nakasone, Secretary Clinton brought a big souvenir, an invitation for a Japan-US summit meeting in Washington. This is unusual. The meeting took place at the White House on Feb. 24. Short as the summit meeting was, it became an occasion for Japan to show the solidarity of the alliance with the US to the world. I can see the Obama administration's policy of attaching importance to Japan. Even so, I don't know why, but I cannot be wild with joy.

In point of fact, the reason is because former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, who has been supposed to play a role of sorts of behind the scenes as Secretary Clinton's advisor on foreign affairs, wrote something curious in her book that was published last year and titled 'The

Memorandum to the President Elect.' She says the new president---though he may first want to think of China when he is going to make his first visit to East Asia---should first set foot in Tokyo, an ally of long standing. Her recommendation goes: 'When visiting Japan, I hope he will remember to have a smile on his face, have a souvenir in his hand, and a fork in his pocket.' Secretary Clinton was smiling all the time during her stay and she actually brought a big present with her for Prime Minister Aso.

What the 'fork' in Albright's words means is something like this. In her book, Albright sets forth her cutting sarcasm, quoting a diplomat as saying: 'Japanese politicians are sophisticated, but what they say is too boring, so I will fall asleep in the dinner party unless I think that I'm sitting on a fork.' Secretary Clinton, wherever she went, stressed the Obama administration's stance of regarding Japan as important, and the Japanese politicians she met must have all alike emphasized to her how important the Japan-US alliance is. I wonder if she did not become sleepy.

What is clearly shown in 'The Memorandum to the President Elect' is a deep-seated sense of distrust toward Japan. Albright writes that Japan is respected in a way, but she also says China, which is 'a victim of the massacre' Japan carried out during the war, has a grudge against Japan. That is why Japan still does not have a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council even though it should already qualify for it. That is why she says in a roundabout way, Japan has no choice but to be allied with the US. As seen from the wording, she nonchalantly has written something shocking to those who would otherwise feel elated by the reaffirmation of the Japan-US alliance. Her view of history---when it comes to Japan's pre-war conduct---has something in common with China's.

When Japan was under the Occupation, GHQ had the Government Section, headed by Gen. Whitney, and the Intelligence Section, headed by Gen. Willoughby. The former was a member of the 'keep Japan weak' faction, or those who basically would never allow Japan to again have military power. As is well known, Col. Kades, who was under Gen. Whitney, took part in the work of drafting the Constitution of Japan. Gen. Willoughby can be classified as a member of the 'keep Japan strong' faction, insisting Japan should retain its military power to a certain extent.

Albright writes that the US has a military presence in Asia for which even China is no match. She clearly states that US military presence in the region has two objectives; defending Japan and preventing Japan from having an independent military capability.

Former Ambassador to Japan Thomas Schieffer, a close friend of former President Bush, said frankly that he did not know why only Japan has cut its defense spending, while the US, South Korea, China and Russia had substantially increased their military spending over the past decade. Schieffer made remarks similar to the 'strong Japan' faction, when he addressed the Japan National Press Club in January. In answering a question, Schieffer stated: 'I was disappointed at what Mr. Tamogami (former Air Self-Defence Force Chief) said.' Tamogami wrote for a prize-competition essay for a private company to the effect that Japan had not necessarily been aggressive in pre-war days. He was dismissed at once. Schieffer has the same view of history as Albright, who belongs to the 'weak Japan' faction.

As far as the view of history is concerned, individual perception cannot be unified. But if

someone on the U.S. side would stand in Japan's position and admit that what Tamogami wrote had make sense, then what Schieffer said would fit together. The Japan-U.S. alliance would become a real thing. The late MacMurray also should be satisfied.

***Lead Discussant C: Donald S. ZAGORIA, Senior Vice President & Project Director of the Northeast Asia Projects, NCAFP***

I'd like to associate myself with option 1 of Prof. Takubo and with all of Amb. Okawara's points. The US-Japan alliance remains the key to peace and stability in this region for a variety of reasons, including shared values, democracies, rule of law, our common economic interests, and our common interest in stability in Asia. One of the conclusions I have come to recently is that Japan needs a better public relations agent.

On the one hand this country seems to face many serious problems, such as the demographic problem... the average age of the population is increasing, and there aren't enough babies...this is one of the serious challenges. There is a lot of nervousness that we detect in this country, with regard to Japan's relationships with the US and China, and the US relationships with China. Gerald Curtis made a very eloquent speech in China, in which he said that Japan has many problems as we do, and as China does, and that Japan has some enormous inherent strengths, and once this economic crisis is finished Japan will come out in a much better condition than many other countries. Some of Japan's strengths include: your egalitarian capitalist model; your banks are in better shape than ours; your savings rate is much better than ours; you still have soft power; you are still the third largest economy, the quality of life is still high; and when asked where in Asia they'd most like to live, Tokyo is the first or second city to be named where Foreigners want to live. Part of the problem is that Japan needs to have more confidence in itself and in its alliance with the US.

Talking about the Japan-US alliance, I'd like to stress, also as a centrist American, that I am enormously proud of the fact that an African American was elected president in the US. I was skeptical about that. I knew Obama was extraordinarily brilliant, talented and thoughtful. But I did not have enough confidence in the American people. I think Obama will be a great president. He has a strong base of core values that Japan and the US share. I don't think he would mistake Japan for China. He is clear on the difference. The Obama administration currently has four priorities.

I'd like to see Japan work closely with the US in accomplishing things in all four of these priorities; one is economics, how to restore the global economy, how we could all come out of this economic crisis for a healthier economy. Clearly we have a common interest in this. Japan, as the third largest economy, and the US, as the first, must work together to come out of this without getting into protectionism. Secondly, we have a common interest in what is called the Af/Pak problem. You can certainly help with this problem. Japan is already helping with development assistance in Afghanistan. The third area where we can work together is in clean energy. In Beijing and Shanghai, it is hard to get fresh air. You have great experience with clean energy. The fourth area

that you can help with, which is the highest priority in the Obama administration, is our relationship with the Muslim world. You have strong relations with Iran, for example. This is another area where you can help us.

You can also help us with the regional security challenges like North Korea. I think some common action program can work, between the US and Japan on major challenges facing us and you. Now, let me turn to North Korea. No one can be optimistic about North Korea. But the great historical value of Kim Jong-Il is that he brought the US and Japan closer together. He brought South Korea and Japan closer together. He's made Chinese sufficiently nervous so that the people in China are thinking about post-Kim Jong-Il scenarios, along with some of us. He has made Aso more popular than he was in the past. He has shown that Obama's America is reasonable and North Korea is unreasonable. So, I'd venture to joke that I want to congratulate Kim Jong-Il.

***Lead Discussant D: MORIMOTO Satoshi, Professor, Takushoku University***

I think the new US leader is very pragmatic, less ideological, a very good listener, capable of flexible thinking, more of a manager than a strict commander. But as I understand it, the whole policy guideline of the new administration has not been set out yet, except some parts of the economic and financial policy, nuclear arms control initiative, policy guideline for Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, but there is no comprehensive policy guideline that covers not only for Iran and the Middle East but also for climate change, Africa development and other global issues. We are pleased that the new administration placed a high priority on some areas of the agenda, which have been our top priority for many years, such as disarmament (nuclear and non-nuclear), climate change, African development, and some United Nations issues. We can cooperate with the US on such common agenda items, thereby taking the initiative in the international community.

Here, I wish to raise a question on nuclear disarmament, which President Obama referred to in his Prague speech several hours after North Korea launched missiles. As I said, Japan has been making the utmost effort to foster nuclear disarmament, and arms-control for many years, so we are pleased that President Obama takes a strong initiative in nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. But I have some concern about this, because I do not support nuclear disarmament. Some circles in Japan striving for disarmament are pleased with the move of the US toward nuclear disarmament and they are talking about inviting President Obama to Hiroshima or Nagasaki.

But I have some concern about his idea of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation as expressed in his speech, in terms of national security and defense. Recently, even the roles and the mission of nuclear weapons have been reduced and the US will be successful in taking drastic measures to reduce nuclear arsenals in the US and Russia. Those kinds of initiatives, I'm afraid, would have a serious impact on, or implications for the alliance, extended deterrence and the nuclear umbrella. Personally, I am a little pessimistic about the possibility of the US and Russia signing a new nuclear arms control agreement in order to extend START I by the end of this year.

Besides, even if Russia would agree to hold this kind of nuclear negotiation, China is not likely to join a new framework for nuclear reductions.

Hypothetically speaking, if the two super powers reduce nuclear arsenals to try to reach a point when there are no more than 1000, as nuclear warheads, if the US has already designated specific potential uses and targets for those weapons, the US will not be able to allocate additional nuclear weapons in order to protect the US allies, especially Japan, which faces a serious nuclear menace not only from Russia but also from China and North Korea. Also, if the role of nuclear weapons should shrink and be reduced, I wonder what kind of impact the changed new nuclear balance is expected to have upon the conventional military balance in East Asia. As the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) development budget has already been frozen, we are seriously concerned about the efficacy of the US nuclear deterrence to protect the US allies under such initiatives for nuclear disarmament.

While US President and Secretary of State reaffirmed the commitment of your nuclear umbrella to the US allies, I wonder how the US could imagine such thing as “nuclear-free world” in the future. I am a little bit pessimistic about the idea of nuclear disarmament. My recommendation is that the US and Japan hold frank dialogues on the use of nuclear weapon so that we are more confident that we may be consulted by the US on their use. Anyway, in dealing with Obama’s long cherished idea of nuclear disarmament, we should be mindful of the impact and implications it has not only on arms control but also on national security. That is the point.

### *Free Discussions:*

#### ***MAGOSAKI Ukeru, former Professor, National Defense Academy, former Ambassador to Iran***

Prof. Zagoria mentioned the possible Japanese involvement in US-Iran relations. But in general, if we take actions, the US is reluctant about it. For example, I was ambassador to Iran in 2001, and was asked by the Iranian government, which was endeavoring to establish relations with the US, to pass messages to the US. But the US was reluctant about the Japanese role in this. Amb. Lord said that President Obama wants to be a great president and wants to achieve something historical. I think he can achieve something on the Korean peninsula. He can establish bilateral relations with North Korea and work out an end to the Korean War. And the media reports say President Obama is willing to do so. I wonder how serious the President Obama’s administration is about this. And what is the real motive on the part of North Korea not to come forward to establish bilateral relations with the US?

#### ***Evans REVERE, President & CEO, The Korea Society***

I have a high degree of confidence that the team that has been assembled in and around the

Obama administration is a group of people who are very experienced in the region, understand the history of the region and the various issues we are confronting in the region, in particular the peninsula question. On the two specific questions Amb. Magosaki asked, I don't think the administration has developed a specific position on either of these issues yet. But, I see a certain measure of continuity between the current administration and the previous administration on these issues in terms of discussions that I had so far. The essence of what I see evolving is that there is no objection, and will be no objection in the Obama administration, to the eventual discussion and eventual conclusion of a peace treaty that will put an end to the Korean War. But this is an issue that is not ready for prime time yet. The Administration has more urgent issues to deal with such as the recent moves of North Korea. I would say the normalization issue is in a similar place. In principle, the Administration will probably adopt a position very similar to that of the Bush administration.

When we resolve the question of North Korea's nuclear ambitions, when we complete the final verification that they have no nuclear weapons and no nuclear programs, we will normalize relations with North Korea. The point is that denuclearization of North Korea must come first and normalization, second, and not the other way around. This is the essential approach of the Obama administration. What is driving North Korea's external behavior now is, to a large degree, a manifestation of changing internal political dynamics, including the health of Kim Jong-Il, and the delicate succession process which has not had enough time to complete yet. Even in an authoritarian regime like North Korea, they have politics, too, over the question such as who the likely successor may well be. Support of the key elements of the North Korean system is required to settle this question.

### ***LORD***

One addition -- this administration will be much more careful and meticulous about consulting Japan and South Korea than its predecessor -- whether on short time tactics or on large goals.

### ***ZAGORIA***

North Koreans have been the world's leading blackmailers. Now we have to figure out how not to reward that this time, while still keeping the door open.

### ***OKAWARA***

Amb. Boswell is reported to have stated that the US is considering bilateral talks with North Korea. But I wonder if the official position of the US is that the resumption of the Six-Party Talks is a more proper step in the face of the recent developments.

### ***REVERE***

Secretary Clinton made a definitive statement on this. The US no.1 priority is to get North Korea back to the table for the Six-Party Talks. In that overall process, the dialogue between the US



and North Korea is the key component. The North Korean position is the opposite; to focus solely on bilateral talks with the US. But our position is to resume the Six-Party Talks, which is the best forum for the resolution of the North Korea issue.

***KAMIYA Mataka, Professor, National Defense Academy***

I'd like to question the very purpose of dialogue between the US and North Korea or Japan and North Korea. For the past 20 years, Japan and the US, in their efforts to have dialogue with North Korea, have obtained virtually nothing, while North Korea gained a lot from us. I don't think dialogue is the best way to deal with the North Korea problem.

***REVERE***

While admitting that North Korea is very unlikely to give up its nuclear weapons for almost anything we might offer, to get it back to the table, I would question the approach that avoids dialogue. During the Six-Party Talks, we have accomplished a moratorium on the flight-testing of medium- and long-range ballistic missiles and have frozen, and put under international control, North Korea's ability to produce nuclear weapon materials. There are things that can be done with North Korea through dialogue. We should not throw negotiations out the window.

***NUMATA Sadaaki, Executive Director, the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership***

I do believe what we need is a reliable core of intellectuals and intellectual discourse, like this. We should look at power capability of these. But what we lack is contextual intelligence, in the sense of a capacity to discern trends while trying to shape events. I think that the context defines our role. Now about the Af-Pak problem, I feel as if the situation in Pakistan is getting very serious.

***LORD***

I think one of the fundamental problems we have in Pakistan is that the army and ISI consider India the major problem and not the Taliban or Afghanistan. Unless they understand that the Taliban is more of a threat than India, we are not going to solve this problem. It is our shared goal to defeat Al Qaida and the Taliban for the good of Pakistani people as well as ours.

***ZAGORIA***

Contextual intelligence is very difficult, even for specialists on Asia to keep up with, when one considers the variety of developments in Japan, China, Korea, North Korea, etc. Those who know Japan don't know China, and those who know China don't know Korea so well. It is difficult to know all these countries. That's why the National Committee has been organizing Track II dialogues and has been visiting all these countries every year. We always learn something from them. We need more public discourse.

## **LORD**

The source of the Obama speech on nuclear disarmament is tough-minded, security-type people. Therefore you should take some solace in this idea, which is not a naïve, pacifist initiative. If you read the speech carefully, it is very realistically put forward, and there is no illusion about the difficulty to accomplish it.

## ***OGASAWARA Toshiaki, Honorary Chairman, The Japan Times Nifco Group***

I would like to emphasize the Japanese sentiment on North Korea, especially on the abduction issue which is the greatest concern for Japan, probably more so than the issue of nuclear weapons in which we do not have much faith. From the Japanese point of view, the abduction issue should be given more priority. In order to establish good relations between the US and Japan, the economic issues is also very important. Although Obama is a democrat, it is somewhat hard on the automobile industry. “Engineered bankruptcy” is not a good way of solving this industry’s economic problems. Rising unemployment is an urgent issue to be addressed which, after all, may also affect our relations.

## **REVERE**

About the abduction issue, I understand the emotional power of this issue. I have been following this issue for many years and have felt very strongly about it. In my discussions with North Korea, I have said that this was one of the many issues that will ultimately need to be resolved. This is a very long-standing and sensitive issue. But it should not be a barrier to negotiations with North Korea over the question of its nuclear and missile capabilities.

## ***IYAMA Masashi, Senior Research Fellow, Yomiuri Research Institute, Yomiuri Shimbun***

Japanese are always nervous about whether the US loves China or Japan more. The strategic relationship between the US and Japan and China and Russia is a very important factor in the balance of power in Asia. When I interviewed Mr. Armitage, he said in the transition team of the Regan administration there was a big discussion about Asian policy. Dr. Kissinger said a China-first policy is the best one. Mr. Armitage demanded a Japan-first policy. Is there a similar kind of strategic discussion about positioning or relationships with Japan, China, the US and Russia in East Asia in the transition team of Obama administration? What kind of orientation does the Obama administration have on this kind of relationship?

## **LORD**

We will continue to treat China as very important, in view of its strategic importance in the region. But the limit of our relationship with China is that we only share interests, but not values. In addition to the military alliance with Japan, we share common values with Japan. I think China’s repressive political system will form a ceiling on further development of US-China relations, which

would not be equalized with US-Japan relations. However, it is up to China to decide its own internal politics, but we'll never be as warm with China as Japan while it has a repressive regime. It is not a zero sum game though.

***AKIYAMA Masahiro, Chairman, Ocean Policy Research Foundation***

With regard to Japan, the US and China relationships, I think the US will promote bilateral dialogues with China and other countries in East Asia and of course Japan. But, I think many Japanese and even Chinese and Americans are very interested in a possibility of official trilateral dialogue on security matters among those three countries. My understanding is that not only people within those three countries, but also within other Asian countries, are very interested in this trilateral dialogue. So far China seemed reluctant to have such kind of official trilateral dialogue. But I think now the Chinese government is interested in this official trilateral dialogue. I wonder what the Obama administration thinks about the possibility of this official trilateral dialogue.

***HIRABAYASHI Hiroshi, Councilor, Japan Forum on International Relations***

I come back to the nuclear issue. About nuclear disarmament between the US and Russia, the first thing to be considered is that China should be engaged. If nuclear disarmament is conducted only by the US and Russia, leaving China with a free hand, that will pose some kind of dilemma for the Japanese. One of the possible suggestions, which would be considered by both countries' policy-makers and intellectual leaders to cope with that eventuality and at the same time to prevent Japan from going nuclear, is to re-examine the third principle of "the three non-nuclear principles", namely the policy 'not to produce, not to possess, not to introduce'. I refer to a report paper published by the Matsushita Institute of Government and Management which was created by Mr. MATSUSHITA Konosuke and which has produced so many policy makers. One of the recommendations of the paper is to re-think the possibility of dropping the third principle of the "three non nuclear principles". While keeping intact the first two first principles- 'not to produce, not to possess', we may think about dilution of the third principle. This is a suggestion which should be discussed.

***TAKAHARA Akio, Professor, The University of Tokyo***

Professor Zagoria mentioned four areas in which he wanted Japan to work with the US: economy; Af-Pak; clean energy; and the relations with Muslim countries. And then he added another, which was regional security. I also want the US to work with Japan in all of these areas, but how big a problem is it that our priorities are rather different?

### **3. Afternoon Session:**

#### **"The Role of the Alliance in the Making of a Regional Order"**

*Chairperson: ITO Kenichi, President, GFJ*

In the Morning Session, we have already referred several times to the concept of an East Asian Community, but in this Afternoon Session more reference will be made to this concept and to what the role of the alliance in that architecture is.

*Lead Discussant A: Evans REVERE, President & CEO, The Korea Society*

In the morning session, we talked about many challenges that face the Obama administration. And Obama is approaching these challenges with a great degree of energy and vision. And there is a great degree of risk also attached to that approach, as well as opportunity for reward as a result of this approach. I'm reminded of the phrase "transformational diplomacy" used often during the last 8 years of the Bush administration. I understand the seriousness of their intention behind using that phrase and using that sort of approach. But in my assessment, their efforts largely failed. They didn't transform anything, and transformed America's reputation in a rather negative direction. Confidence in America, by our allies declined during this period.

But the Obama administration has an opportunity to transform American diplomacy in a fundamental way. And this is already happening and the reaction to it thus far from inside and outside of the country is quite positive. Looking back on the last 8 years, the management of US-Japan relations in Washington took a severe turn for the worse for the last 4 years of the Bush administration. There are several reasons for this, partly because of the partnership of some of the key figures, and partly because of the reversal of US policy towards the Korean peninsula and towards North Korea in particular, that resulted in some hard feelings and some misunderstandings between Washington and Tokyo. I would say Japan's approach to put the abduction issue as its No.1 priority in terms of dealing with North Korea ran foul of the Bush administration. But we are on a much better track right now.

As I look at the Obama administration's approach to Asia and its approach to foreign policy in general, it is clear there is going to be a tremendous emphasis on Asia. Secretary Clinton was the first Secretary of State to choose to visit Asia before going to other areas. Many of us have made exactly this suggestion for the Secretary of State to come out to this region first, which has been warmly received by the White House and the State Department. And it is also clear that in this administration, the US-Japan alliance will play a prominent role. Japan is our major ally in the region after all. It was a necessary thing for a number of reasons, most important of which was to

send a clear message to China, that we attach importance to this traditional ally in the region.

Another reason is that this alliance became most problematic in the last couple of years of the Bush administration. There is some damage to be repaired. Also the bilateral and trilateral coordination between the US, Japan and Korea has suffered from a lack of attention in the previous administration. This is one of the central elements of Obama's approach to dealing with issues in the region. US relations with Asia, in general, are going to be taken to a new level by the president's visit here which is expected later this year.

Another key element of the US policy approach in the region is going to be the maintenance of a strong deterrent capability, both nuclear and in other areas as well. In the aftermath of the North Korean missile launch and other actions of North Korea, there is going to be reaffirmation of a strategic US deterrent and the recognition of the need to demonstrate to our allies that they can indeed rely on us in this particular challenge in Northeast Asia.

But there is also going to be a focus on the need to develop a positive, cooperative and comprehensive relationship with China. We will be working with China and others to ensure that China becomes a responsible stakeholder. But the bottom line is that that China needs to be more than that as we expand our stake in the region. It is pretty hard to imagine a peaceful, stable and cooperative region without a peaceful, stable and cooperative US-China relationship. There is going to be a tremendous opportunity for the US and Japan to work together as two legs of this triangle to figure out how to do that with China. All triangles are not equilateral. The important legs will remain the US and Japan. In this context, US-Japan relations are central.

In the past, we have done good work on putting together declarations and visions etc., but we have not done enough work on developing action plans together. This is the defect in our cooperation. In 2005, the US and Japan put together a set of common strategic objectives to deal cooperatively with each other in the region and beyond. This document is a powerful foundation for the US and Japan to work together in the region and beyond. We need go back to that foundation. Not just to pay lip service, but to implement it is important.

The US needs to understand Japan's vision for our relationship in this region and beyond. Japan needs to be more than just a silent partner. Japan needs to be a vocal partner in this relationship. Japan needs to exercise greater leadership as an alliance partner. President Obama listens to the voices of our allies more than any president in my memory. I hope Japan's leaders make more effort to speak to him.

***Lead Discussant B: TAKAHARA Akio, Professor, The University of Tokyo***

Some people say my view on China is tougher than before. If that is the case it is not because I changed but because China changed. Some of its behaviors are problematic. China is still an ambiguous factor when you think about the future regional order. Let me explain what I think is the regional order Japan would like to make. In a nutshell, we want a regional order that is conducive to the sustainable peace and development of our country and the region. We benefited

economically from the rise of China. We all benefited from our cooperation in various areas including security. But nobody really knows what China is going to be like in the future.

In order to achieve this target of having a regional order that will be conducive to stable peace and development, we should aim for a democratic regional regime. The reason why we need this regime is that in East Asia China is geographically outstandingly large, that is in terms of population and area. With the rise of China, therefore, there is always fear among the neighboring nations that it will be dominant, and become hegemonic. So we need a regional architecture that is democratic, in the sense that the operation and decision making of this architecture will be conducted in a democratic way. Such democratic principles as freedom, equality and fraternity should be the basic principle on which any action be taken in that architecture. I don't mean that China should domestically become a democracy, but regionally, it has to base its act on the democratic principles.

Whatever we aim for, East Asian regional integration is proceeding day by day. Globalization is one of the main reasons, which goes along with the rise of China. Globalization has promoted China and China's rise has promoted globalization particularly in this part of the world. Economic integration or regional cooperation in such areas as non-traditional security is proceeding. But the link is weak when it comes to traditional security issues. Yesterday Hu Jintao made a speech, in which he claimed as always that China's military modernization is only for the defense of its own country. But when they say so, it is problematic because China includes the Senkaku Islands and islands in the South China Sea as part of its territory. This is a matter of concern for all the countries that have territorial disputes with China.

In this context the Japan-US alliance should serve as a public good for the region. Another important factor in achieving a democratic regional regime is further improvement of the relationship between Japan and China. We have to develop trust with China, which is a very important condition for such a regime. The relationship between Japan and China since 2006 has been a favorable one. Security issues remain, though the situation is much better than before. There has been a regular exchange of visits of high ranking officers in the defense area.

But more has to be done to enhance trust between the two countries in the area of security. One notable incident is that, last December, two Chinese patrol boats made a very provocative move off the Senkaku Islands, which we claim to be our own territory. This came as a surprise to many Japanese because the Chinese government had jointly and repeatedly pledged with the Japanese government that they would make the East China Sea a sea of peace, friendship and cooperation. The Chinese navy has been active for the past several months around the borders with the neighboring countries. Certainly we don't want an arms race with China.

In order to avoid an arms race, we have to have dialogues. In order to have effective dialogues about security issues, it is not enough to hold them bilaterally, and we would like to involve the US. I hope this kind of trilateral discussion will be held sooner rather than later.

*Lead Discussant C: Robert DUJARRIC, Director, Institute of Contemporary Japanese Studies, Temple University, Japan Campus*

The Alliance's primary role is not to be a "cork in the bottle." Japan is not a volcano about to erupt. In fact it is characterized by low levels of nationalism, an unwillingness to press strongly its territorial claims (Northern Territories, Dokdo / Takeshima), declining amounts of ODA, a flat defense budget despite the DPRK's increased capabilities to strike Japan and China's rising military expenditures and a very soft approach to diplomacy. For example it asked for a permanent seat on the UNSC but took no "hard" action to press its case, such as threatening to cut or terminate its financial contributions to the UN and its agencies; it doesn't actively push the UN to increase the percentage of Japanese among the staff.

It is true that if the US totally vanished from the region, Japan might take a much more proactive defense posture but only if its neighbors became clearly threatening.

It is not an alliance based on shared values. In Japan, the left likes US values, such as the US-drafted Japanese constitution, but is not supportive of the military alliance with America. On the other hand, the right likes US foreign policy, but dislikes mainstream US ideology. It would like to revise the constitution which it sees as an alien transplant, is reluctant to acknowledge crimes against humanity and has been opposed to compensation for victims of Imperial Japan, including former American POW slave workers. Ambassador Okazaki's remarks that "the real tragedy is that Japan lost World War II" (at Temple University in a public forum) and Prime Minister Abe's courtesy calls to the relatives of Chandra Bose and Judge Pal in India are other indicators of a very ambivalent attitude towards what most Americans consider to be their core values.

Moreover, at this stage an "alliance of values" and an emphasis on democracy is a veiled attempt to encourage regime change in China, or to portray China as a foe, neither of which is in the interest of the Alliance. China may well emerge to be a menace, but at this time, there is no reason to publicly act as if it were, though there is obviously a need to maintain the military capabilities of the US and Japan to deter Beijing.

The real threat to the alliance is Japan's demographic death spiral which, unless reversed, will further increase the gap between the US and Japan. The main challenges are a rapidly aging population, a shrinking labor force (in 1990 there were approximately two working-age Americans per Japanese, by 2030 the ratio might be 3:1), a very low fertility rate, the underemployment of women in the professional labor force (about 10% of Japanese managers are female, vs. 30-50% in the West; Hong Kong and Singapore have done much better at feminization, showing that this is not an Asia vs. West issue), and low immigration. If the Alliance is to be the bedrock of the Asian regional order Japan must be strong. If these demographic trends are not treated as a vital threat to the country, a far more dangerous one than North Korea or China, Japan will become an increasingly marginal actor and the Japan-US Alliance will degenerate into irrelevancy.

Looking forward the Alliance can contribute to regional stability by (a) joining forces with the ROK, and if possible, China, to plan for Korean unification, (b) see if the Six Party Talks can be

transformed into some sort of Northeast Asian OSCE.

The military aspects of the Alliance are obviously vital, but though these may require adjustment, there is no need to completely rethink them. Without the Alliance, the US could not be a regional Asian power, making the Japan-US relationship critical to the continued ability of the US to remain a military hegemony in Asia.

***Lead Discussant D: HIRABAYASHI Hiroshi, Councilor, JFIR***

The existence of the Japan-US alliance could be a good public good in the Asia Pacific. But when we talk about the role of the Japan-US alliance in the making of a regional order in Asia, we have to prove the effectiveness of this alliance. I think this alliance has been a little bit diluted in the sense that Japan's confidence in the alliance has been slightly lowered and maybe vice-versa, because of the enlarged divergences of views in US foreign policy priorities.

For the alliance to be strengthened, three things have to be considered respectively by both Japan and the US. For the Japan side, the first and foremost, the solution of Futenma Air base should be attacked in earnest, namely the relocation of the base from the current Ginowan city to Nago city, a northern part of the main land Okinawa. Should some minor concessions and compromises be made among the parties concerned from both the Japan and US governments as well as the local governments, this question could be put behind us forever. Then there would be no more serious "base issues" between the US and Japan. Secondly, a permanent act should be legislated so that Japan can dispatch its Self Defense forces overseas whenever warranted, wherever solicited, without the government of Japan being obliged to resort to a piecemeal legislation on each and every occasion. Thirdly, Japan should more seriously discuss the need to reinterpret our constitution so that we will be able to change our concept of "collective self defense". If we will succeed, we can improve our alliance.

Firstly, the US should take more flexible attitudes towards the Futenma base issue. Slight concessions by the US and the central government of Japan will make possible the breakthrough on this issue. Secondly, the US is required to handle its approach to China and North Korea very carefully. We are happy about the commitments of the Obama administration to the established policy lines to China and North Korea, which are not in contradiction to Japanese expectations. Thirdly, if necessary, we should think how to regain the credibility of the "extended nuclear deterrence" of the US vis-a-vis Japan.

Let me make one more additional hope. If Mr. Obama comes to Japan, Japanese people would like to see him visiting Hiroshima. Obama's visit there will surely contribute enormously not only to overall Japanese feelings towards the US but also to the Japan-US Alliance. On the other hand, of course, Japanese PM should visit Pearl Harbor and the sanctuary of "Arizona" there.

Having said this, if we can strengthen the alliance, it will be able to contribute more to the regional order in East Asia. In this sense, I am pleased that the Obama administration is willing to improve its relations with ASEAN countries, especially the Islamic countries in Asia. The Islamic



population in Asia is the highest in the world. Even if we exclude Pakistan and India, still the numbers are considerable. The Obama administration can better manage its relations with the Islamic world. If, for example, the US takes fairer attitudes towards the Palestine problem which in my view is a most serious root cause of Islamist terrorism, that will help not only US relations with the Islamic world but also the fight against international Islamic fundamentalism.

I think the US can play a more positive role in the making of a regional order, albeit in an indirect manner. Many countries in the region are pursuing the concept of an East Asian Community, which I think is still a remote possibility because of two reasons. Firstly, Japan has many problems with China and two Koreas, and the other countries in the region have also problems among themselves and with China. Secondly, the levels of development, economic and others, or the way to think about the fundamental values are so different among the countries in the region. And yet, the peoples are moving in that direction, though only slowly. In this process, some East Asian countries want to see the US more engaged in this region. The others are not. The US is expected to be more trustworthy, friendlier not only to Japan but to Islamic Asia.

*Chairperson: ITO K.*

I'd like to make a short comment on the last point Amb. Hirabayashi raised, i.e., the goal of an East Asian Community. Though it is a remote possibility, the common consciousness shared by East Asian countries is deeper than Americans might imagine. I can say so from my own experience as a member of NEAT. In engaging myself in NEAT, I don't think the goal of an East Asian Community can be realized soon. However, the simple fact that the people in this region share the common goal, however remote it may be, could make our thinking positive and different. For instance, when we have bilateral discussions with Chinese or Koreans, we tend to criticize each other. But when we meet multilaterally our exchange of views turn positive towards the common goal of an East Asian Community, thereby reducing, if not eliminating, sources of conflict. That is why I value this concept.

*Free Discussions:*

**MAGOSAKI**

We are talking about common values between the United States and Japan. If it is about democracy, it is fine. But when it comes to security issues such as Afghanistan, for example, Japanese values are different from US values. In the case of Iran, also, we have a different policy orientation; we prefer the soft-power oriented policy rather than the hard-power-oriented policy. Do you think these differences in the approach in Afghanistan and Iran, which can be the major policies of

President Obama, will affect the course of regional cooperation between the United States and Japan in East Asia?

**LORD**

The point is how you define the differences. The point you made is not a question of values. It is about tactics, methods and the assessment of possibilities. Also, the overall viability of the military approach is being questioned in the Obama administration. Obama has reduced US goals. The major outcome of his strategic review on Af/Pak is to lower our objectives. It is no longer a talk of cohesive government or democracy. It is now only about US security against terrorist attacks. Plus, he has increased non-military ingredients in the US strategy such as economic development and reducing the trade. I think Japan can help us in Afghanistan in those areas.

***YAMANO Yoichi, Senior Manager for the U.S. and Europe External Affairs Dept., Global Business Div., Hitachi, Ltd.***

The priority on the issue of North Korea is different between Japan and the US. Also the overall approach to the issue is different between the two countries. In my observation, North Korea seems to have taken advantage of our different approaches of the US and Japan to this issue. I believe that we should have common approach to tackle North Korean issue. What does the US side think of this?

**REVERE**

Of course we will not always agree. But the reconstitution of a bilateral and trilateral consultative and coordinated mechanism, which was once effective during the Bush administration, will be the key element of our approach to North Korean issues.

**ZAGORIA**

The Bush administration mismanaged our relations with North Korea. As a result, Japan-US relations suffered. One of the reasons for the Bush administration's mismanagement is that it was divided between the hard-liners and engagers.

**REVERE**

Our position on the abduction issue has changed several times. Even though the US once gave support to Japan on the solution of this issue, the US reversed that position. Some Japanese felt betrayed at that time. And Japanese were right to have felt betrayed.

**OKAWARA**

I heard the US is trying to dispatch President Carter to Pyongyang but this approach was rejected by Pyongyang. I wonder what the US objective of exploring this bilateral approach was.

## **ZAGORIA**

I would be against that idea. I am in favor of sending Kissinger along with Perry to Pyongyang, but not now. Maybe six months from now, after we have a cooling-off period. I don't think we should be in a hurry. Kissinger recently wrote an article in which he said that North Koreans have to be prepared before we are prepared to get back to the Six-Party talks. They have to bring back in US inspectors, etc.

## ***A Greer PRITCHET, Assistant Project Director, Northeast Asia Projects, NCAFP***

We have talked about "democratic regional regimes" and freedom, equality and fraternity, but I wonder what the current mood is in Japan about "values diplomacy"? Where is the idea of "Arc of freedom and prosperity" now?

## ***ONO Hikariko, Director for Policy Planning Division, Foreign Policy Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs***

Japan has been actively engaged in dialogues and cooperation with countries promoting democracy and the shift to a market economy. Two years ago, then Foreign Minister Aso made a famous speech titled "Arc of Freedom and Democracy," in which he stated that this is to attempt to put a name to Japan's diplomatic achievements. In fact, his successors FM Machimura and FM Komura, who themselves did not specifically emphasize the arc, continued to support the efforts of young democratic nations. Thus, I can say that there exists a certain level of continuity in this regard.

## **HIRABAYASHI**

Two footnotes - Firstly, I wish to see Japanese top leaders have well-conceived ideas upon which to promote his or her own agenda. Japanese diplomacy has lacked in such ideas or ideals. I have sympathy for Mr. Aso's concept of the "Arc of freedom and prosperity." Secondly, however, this idea won't work well for two reasons, although a word "democracy" was carefully avoided. First, Russia and China feel targeted. Thirdly, a most important country in the "arc", India, carefully avoids to be engaged.

## ***Gerald CURTIS, Burgess Professor, Department of Political Science, Columbia University***

My impression is that this idea is very close to that of Neo-Cons in Washington. Mr. Aso could advocate this idea when he was Foreign Minister but now he is Prime Minister and has to take responsibility for Japan's relations with China, and Obama was elected and Neo-Con was gone, so was this idea.

### ***ITO K.***

I also have personal feelings that Mr. Aso tends to use “catch words” but is quite forgetful of what he said.

### ***AKIYAMA***

Within a year both the Japanese and the US government will reach a very critical stage on the Futenma issue. Although we have been discussing this issue for more than 15 years, it has not been resolved yet. Environmental assessments are being conducted and are to be completed within a year. Then, the Japanese central government will have to face opponents like the Governor of Okinawa and local mayor. The US will have to face strong opponents from the Congress to the reconsideration of the relocation site. Both governments must tackle these challenges next year.

### ***REVERE***

One of the problems that continues to hang over our relationship is that we spend incredible amounts of time in US-Japan security dialogues, talking about real estate and housekeeping issues rather than major security challenges. A lot of energy was spent on discussing issues which Americans thought were already fixed. This is the frank impression of the US Defense Department and State Department. This prevents us from talking about more important issues in our relationship, such as what these bases are used for.

### ***ZAGORIA***

The US and China are having a real strategic dialogue at a high-level. Do the US and Japan have such dialogue now?

### ***CURTIS***

Before making a recommendation to the government, if there is a change of party in power in the next election in Tokyo, this problem is going to be worse. You are going to spend more time in dealing with these real estate issues. There is no way to avoid it because there is no consensus in Japan on what to do.

### ***HIRABAYASHI***

On dealing with this US base issue of Futenma, Japan needs a stronger government with the powerful ministers dedicated to it. We should pay attention to the next general elections and a new administration after them. Things could go for better or worse depending on the outcome of these political events.

### ***REVERE***

Some time between now and next year, Secretary of State Clinton and her Treasury counterpart will sit down with their Chinese counterparts to discuss major strategic issues between

the US and China. They will be talking about regional and global security issues. However, the US and Japan are still talking about the Futenma issue. Here is a contrast of grave concern and it presents some bad optics with regard to the U.S. and Japan alliance.

### ***AKIYAMA***

I have a different impression on this matter. Japan-US security talks have developed over the past ten years. Until the 1990s, we were talking only about "Jinkanpo", but now we are talking about more important issues including Japan's role in the security of the region. So 2+2 should be quite different from that in the 1990s. The situation has changed.

### ***REVERE***

I'd like to remind you that where we are today is not the same as where we were four years ago.

### ***KAMIYA***

Many in this room have talked about whether the Japan-US alliance is an alliance based on values or not, and to what extent American values and Japanese values overlap. Many in this room have also talked about the making of a regional order as the most significant challenge for us. I think that the Japan-US alliance has to be recognized at least partially as an alliance based on values, in order to make a regional order which is favorable both for Japan and the United States. Here, I have China in mind. The rise of China is an unavoidable reality. For a long time, we have been accustomed to talk about an East Asian security order based on the Japan-US alliance. Now, such a way of thinking is gradually becoming unrealistic. In the future, when we talk about a regional order, we will have to take China into account, we will have to build a regional order which will be beneficial for Japan, the United States, and China. But China does not share many values that are shared between Japan and the United States. And Japan and the United States want a regional order which are build on our shared basic values. For that purpose, we will have to face China as an alliance of the values. This is the challenge we face.

### ***TAKAHARA***

When we envisage the future of the region, our relations with China have both the element of cooperation and that of competition. These two elements co-exist in the whole process. I think it is good in a way to make use of a rising China in the formation of a new regional order. But we have to make sure that certain values are maintained. This is the point of my idea of a "regional democratic regime." In this context, the December 8 incident in the South China Sea is of serious concern. I wonder if this incident was discussed during your visit to China.

### ***LORD***

We raised this issue in a general sense but not as a specific topic. We said the weakest point

in the US-China relationship is in the military dimension.

### ***CURTIS***

I'm very uncomfortable with the idea of an alliance based on values. This is a very dangerous way of thinking. Alliances are based on interests. If we don't have interests, we are not going to have an alliance. The language of "alliance based on values" is a source of self deception and leads to so many easy assumptions about the health of the relationship. So we should stay away from this language.

### ***LORD***

I think the way you phrased it is a phony way to put it. Of course alliances are based on interests. But how do we distinguish our relationship with Japan, Korea or Australia, from our relationship with China? I think it is a big mistake to go way from that language of values. This is an alliance of interests and values.

### ***CURTIS***

This is a phony argument. I am cautious our leaders underestimate the importance of getting our interests in line. Values reinforce interests; they are not a substitute for it.

### ***DUJARRIC***

We must think of the dangers of focusing only on democratic values.

### ***ITO Go, Professor, Meiji University***

Two points - First, China has national borders with 14 neighboring countries, with most of which China has unique problems about history, territories, and so forth. Also, China has become quite influential toward ASEAN countries. In this situation, I can say that China holds "veto power" when countries in Asia make some decision. Unless China says "yes", nothing can be done. Second, given this concern, I would like to say that even if the US has strategic dialogues with China, the US-China discussions might resemble what Japan and China have been done in the past.

## **IV Appendix**

# 1. An Introduction to GFJ

## (1) Introduction

**[Objectives]** As we embrace the 21st century, international relations are becoming increasingly interdependent, and globalization and regionalism are becoming the big waves. In this global tendency, communicating with the world, especially neighboring countries in the Asia-Pacific region at both governmental and non-governmental level, is one of the indispensable conditions for Japan to survive. On the basis of such understanding, The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) aims to promote the exchange of views on commonly shared interests and issues in the field ranging from politics and security to economy, trade, finance, society and culture, and to help business leaders, Diet members and opinion leaders both in Japan and in their counterpart countries to discuss the formulation of new orders in global and regional arenas.

**[History]** The 1982 Versailles Summit was widely seen as having exposed rifts within the Western alliance. Accordingly, there were expressed concerns that the summit meetings were becoming more and more stylized rituals and that Western solidarity was at risk. Within this context, it was realized that to revitalize the summit meetings there must be free and unfettered exchanges of private-sector views to be transmitted directly to the heads of the participating states. Accordingly, Japanese former Foreign Minister OKITA Saburo, U.S. Trade Representative William BROCK, E.C. Commission Vice President Etienne DAVIGNON, and Canadian Trade Minister Edward LUMLEY, as representatives of the private-sector in their respective countries, took the initiative in founding The Quadrangular Forum in Washington in September 1982. Since then, the end of the Cold War and the altered nature of the economic summits themselves had made it necessary for The Quadrangular Forum to metamorphose into The Global Forum established by the American and Japanese components of The Quadrangular Forum at the World Convention in Washington in October 1991. In line with its objectives as stated above, The Global Forum was intended as a facilitator of global consensus on the many post-Cold War issues facing the international community and reached out to open its discussions not only to participants from the quadrangular countries but also to participants from other parts of the world. Over the years, the gravity of The Global Forum's activities gradually shifted from its American component (housed in The Center for Strategic and International Studies) to its Japanese component (housed in The Japan Forum on International Relations), and, after the American component ceased to be operative, the Board of Trustees of the Japanese component resolved, on February 7, 1996, that it would thereafter act as an independent body for organizing bilateral dialogues with Japan as a hub for all countries in the world, and amended its by-laws accordingly. At the same time, The Global Forum's Japanese component was reorganized into The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) in line with the principle that the organization be self-governing, self-financing, and independent of any other organization.

**[Organization]** The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) is a private, non-profit, non-partisan, and independent membership organization in Japan to engage in and promote international exchanges on policy-oriented matters of bilateral, regional and global implications. While the secretariat is housed in The Japan Forum on International Relations, GFJ itself is independent of any other organizations, including The Japan Forum on International Relations. Originally established as the Japanese component of The Quadrangular Forum at the initiative of HATTORI Ichiro, OKITA Saburo, TAKEYAMA Yasuo, TOYODA Shoichiro in 1982, GFJ is currently headed by OKAWARA Yoshio as Chairman and ITO Kenichi as President. The membership is composed of 13 Business Leader Members including the two Governors, MOGI Yuzaburo and TOYODA Shoichiro; 21 Diet Members including the three Governors, KOIKE Yuriko, HATOYAMA Yukio, and TANIGAKI Sadakazu; and 83 Opinion Leader Members including the four Governors, SHIMADA Haruo, OKAWARA Yoshio, ITO Kenichi, and MURAKAMI Masayasu. Friends and supporters of The Global Forum of the Japan are organized into the Supporters' Club of the Global Forum of Japan. Financially the activities of GFJ have been supported by the annual membership fees paid by 13 leading Japanese corporations (Toyota Motor Corporation and Kikkoman Corporation contributing 5 shares each, and the other 11 corporations contributing 1 or 2 shares each) as well as by the grants provided by The Japan Foundation, Japan-ASEAN Exchange Projects, The Tokyo Club, The Japan-Korea Cultural Foundation, etc. WATANABE Mayu serves as Executive Secretary.

**[Activities]** Since the start of The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) in 1982, GFJ has shifted its focus from the exchanges with the Quadrangular countries for the purpose of contributing to the Western Summit, to those with neighboring countries in the Asia-Pacific region including US, China, Korea, ASEAN countries, India, Australia, European countries, and Wider Black Sea area, for the purposes of deepening mutual understanding and contributing to the formation of international order. GFJ has been active in collaboration with international exchange organizations in those countries in organizing policy-oriented intellectual exchanges called "Dialogue." In order to secure a substantial number of Japanese participants in the "Dialogue," GFJ in principle holds these "Dialogues" in Tokyo. A listing of topics of "Dialogues" and its overseas co-sponsors in last five years is given below.

Year	Month	Topic	Co-sponsor
2005	April	The Prospect of East Asian Community and Japan-Korea Cooperation	Presidential Committee on Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative (Korea)
	June November	The Prospect for East Asian Community and Regional Cooperation Peace and Prosperity in the Wider Black Sea Area and the Role of Japan	ASEAN-ISIS University of Shizuoka, The Black Sea University Foundation (Romania), The International Center for Black Sea Studies (Turkey)
2006	February	Review and Perspective of the Japan-Taiwan Relationship	Taiwan International Studies Association (Taiwan)
	June September	An East Asian Community and the United States Prospect for Japan-ASEAN Strategic Partnership after the First East Asia Summit	The Pacific Forum CSIS (US), The Council on East Asian Community ASEAN-ISIS
2007	January	The China-Japan Relationship and Energy and Environmental Issues	China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (China), Energy Research Institute, National Development and Reform Commission (China), The Japan Forum on International Relations
	June	The US-Japan Alliance in the 21st Century	National Committee on American Foreign Policy (US)
	July November	The Challenges Facing Japan and ASEAN in the New Era Japan and Black Sea Area in the Rapidly Changing World	ASEAN-ISIS Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), Embassy of Turkey, University of Shizuoka
2008	January	An East Asian Community and the US	The Council on East Asia Community, The Pacific Forum CSIS (US)
	June	Cooperation in Environment and Energy	The Council on East Asian Community, The East Asian Institute of National University of Singapore(Singapore)
	July September	Japan -China Relations Entering A New Stage Prospect of Japan-ASEAN Partnership after the Second Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation	Institute of Japanese Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (China) ASEAN-ISIS
2009	April	US-Japan Relations Under the New Obama Administration	National Committee on American Foreign Policy (US)



## (2) Membership List of GFJ

As of June 1, 2009  
In alphabetical order

### 【Chairman】

OKAWARA Yoshio, President, Institute for International Policy Studies

### 【President】

ITO Kenichi, President and CEO, The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.

### 【Business Leader Governors】

MOGI Yuzaburo, Chairman and CEO, Kikkoman Corporation  
TOYODA Shoichiro, Honorary Chairman, Toyota Motor Corporation

### 【Diet Member Governors】

HATOYAMA Yukio, Member of the House of Representatives (DPJ)  
KOIKE Yuriko, M.H.R. (LDP)  
TANIGAKI Sadakazu, M.H.R. (LDP)

### 【Opinion Leader Governors】

ITO Kenichi, President and CEO, The Japan Forum on International Relations Inc.  
MURAKAMI Masayasu, Executive Director, The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.  
OKAWARA Yoshio, President, Institute for International Policy Studies  
SHIMADA Haruo, President, Chiba University of Commerce

### 【Business Leader Members】 (13 Members)

HANDA Haruhisa, Chairman, Worldwide Support for Development  
IMAI Takashi, Honorary Chairman, Nippon Steel Corporation  
ISHIKAWA Hiroshi, Director, Kajima Corporation  
KATSUMATA Tsunehisa, Chairman, Tokyo Electric Power Company.  
KUSAKARI Takao, Chairman, Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha  
MATSUNO Haruki, Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation  
MOGI Yuzaburo, Chairman and CEO, Kikkoman Corporation  
OKAYAMA Norio, Chairman, Sumitomo Electric Industries, Ltd.  
SEYA Hiromichi, Senior Corporate Adviser, Asahi Glass Co., Ltd.  
TAKAGAKI Tasuku, Senior Advisor, The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Ltd.  
YAGUCHI Toshikazu, President, Biru Daiko Co., Ltd.  
YAMAMOTO Tadahito, President and Representative Director, Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd.  
TOYODA Shoichiro, Honorary Chairman, Toyota Motor Corporation  
(T B D), Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation

### 【Diet Member Members】 (21 Members)

AICHI Kazuo, Member of the House of Representatives (LDP)  
HATOYAMA Yukio, M.H.R. (DPJ)  
HOSODA Hiroyuki, M.H.R. (LDP)  
IWAKUNI Tetsundo, M.H.R. (DPJ)  
KITAGAMI Keiro, M.H.R. (DPJ)  
KOIKE Yuriko, M.H.R. (LDP)  
NAGASHIMA Akihisa, M.H.R. (DPJ)  
NAKAGAWA Masaharu, M.H.R. (DPJ)  
OGUSHI Hiroshi, M.H.R. (DPJ)  
SHIOZAKI Yasuhisa, M.H.R. (LDP)  
SUZUKI Keisuke, M.H.R. (LDP)  
TANIGAKI Sadakazu, M.H.R. (LDP)  
UEDA Isamu, M.H.R. (NK)  
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YAMANAKA Akiko, M.H.R. (LDP)  
ASAO Keiichiro, Member of the House of Councillors (DPJ)  
FUJITA Yukihisa, M.H.C. (DPJ)  
HAYASHI Yoshimasa, M.H.C. (LDP)  
HIRONAKA Wakako, M.H.C. (DPJ)  
NAITO Masamitsu, M.H.C. (DPJ)  
SEKOU Hironari, M.H.C. (LDP)

### 【Opinion Leader Members】 (83 Members)

AKASHI Yasushi, Chairman, The Japan Center for Conflict Prevention  
AOKI Tamotsu, Commissioner, Agency for Cultural Affairs  
AMAKO Satoshi, Professor, Waseda University  
ASOMURA Kuniaki, Professor, North Asia University  
CHINO Keiko, Columnist, The Sankai Shimbun  
EBATA Kensuke, Defense Commentator  
FUKUSHIMA Teruhiko, J.F. Oberlin University  
GYOHTEN Toyoo, President, Institute for International Monetary Affairs  
HAKAMADA Shigeki, Professor, Aoyama Gakuin University  
HARUNA Mikio, Professor, Graduate School of Nagoya University  
HASEGAWA Kazutoshi, Deputy Chairman, Japan-Korea Cooperation Committee  
HATA Kei, Vice Principal, Sakushin Gakuin  
HATTORI Kenji, Foreign News Editor, Jiji Press  
HIRABAYASHI Hiroshi, Vice President, The Japan Forum on International Relations Inc.  
HIRONO Ryokichi, Professor Emeritus, Seikei University  
HONDA Masaru, Senior Staff Writer Political News Department, The Asahi Shimbun  
ICHIKAWA Isao, Executive Director, Tokyo Gakugei University

IKEO Aiko, Professor, Waseda University  
IMAGAWA Yukio, former Ambassador to Cambodia  
INA Hisayoshi, Columnist, The Nikkei Newspaper  
INOUCHI Takashi, President, University of Niigata Prefecture  
ITO Eisei, former Member of the House of Representatives  
ITO Kenichi, President and CEO, The Japan Forum on International Relations Inc.  
ITO Tsuyoshi, Professor, Meiji University  
IWAMA Yoko, Associate Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies  
IZUMI Hajime, Professor, University of Shizuoka  
JIMBO Ken, Associate Professor, Keio University  
KAMIYA Mataka, Professor, National Defense Academy  
KAWAI Masao, Guest Professor, Hakuo University  
KIMURA Takayuki, Guest Professor, International Christian University  
KINOSHITA Hiroo, Advisor, National Small Business & Information Promotion Center  
KOGURE Masayoshi, former Professor, Toyo University  
KOKUBUN Ryosei, Professor, Keio University  
KONDO Tetsuo, President, Institute for New Era Strategy (INES)  
KUBO Fumiaki, Professor, Keio University  
MANO Teruhiko  
MIYAMOTO Nobuo, Diplomatic Commentator  
MIYAZAKI Isamu, Honorary Advisor, Daiwa Institute of Research  
MIYOSHI Masaya, Chairman and CEO, Miyoshi Networks Co., Ltd.  
MORI Toshimitsu, former Ambassador to Kazakhstan  
MORIMOTO Satoshi, Professor, Takushoku University  
MURAKAMI Masayasu, Executive Director, The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.  
MURATA Koji, Professor, Doshisha University  
MUTSUSHIKA Shigeo, Professor, The University of Shizuoka  
NAKAGANE Katsuji, Professor, Aoyama Gakuin University  
NAKAHARA Nobuyuki, President, The American Studies Foundation  
NAKANISHI Terumasa, Professor, Kyoto University  
NISHIKAWA Megumi, Foreign News Editor, Mainichi Newspapers  
OGASAWARA Takayuki, Professor, Yamanashi Gakuin University  
OKAWARA Yoshio, President, Institute for International Policy Studies  
OKONOGI Masao, Professor, Keio University  
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TAJIMA Takashi, Guest Professor, Toyo Eiwa Women's University  
TAKAHARA Akio, Professor, The University of Tokyo  
TAKAHASHI Kazuo, Guest Professor, International Christian University  
TAKASHIMA Hatsuhisa, President and CEO, Japan International Broadcasting  
TAKEUCHI Yukio, Justice, Supreme Court of Japan  
TAKEMI Keizo, Professor, Tokai University  
TAKUBO Tadae, Guest Professor, Kyorin University  
TANAKA Akihiko, Professor, The University of Tokyo  
TANAKA Toshiro, Professor, Keio University  
TANINO Sakutarō, former Ambassador to China  
URATA Shujiro, Professor, Waseda University  
UTSUMI Yoshio, former Secretary General, International Telecommunication Union  
YAMAUCHI Masayuki, Professor, The University of Tokyo  
YAMAZAWA Ippei, Professor Emeritus, Hitotsubashi University  
YOSHITOMI Masaru, Special Advisor, Research Institute of Economy, Trade & Industry  
YUSHITA Hiroyuki, Guest Professor, Kyorin University  
WAKABAYASHI Hideki, Senior Research Fellow, The Japan Forum on International Relations Inc.

### 【Supporters' Club Members】 (18 Members)

【Executive Secretary】  
WATANABE Mayu

[Note] DPJ: Democratic Party of Japan  
LDP: Liberal Democratic Party  
NK: New Komeito

### (3) Acknowledgment

## ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) is grateful to its “Business Leader” members listed below for their generous contributions. Their support is making the activities of the Forum financially sustainable.

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(In the order of enlistment)

## 2. An Introduction to NCAFP

The National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP) was founded in 1974 by Professor Hans J. Morgenthau and Dr. George Schwab, its current president. It is a nonprofit, activist organization dedicated to the resolution of conflicts that threaten U.S. interests. Toward that end, the NCAFP identifies, articulates, and helps advance American foreign policy interests from a nonpartisan perspective within the framework of political realism.

American foreign policy interests include: preserving and strengthening national security; supporting countries committed to the values and the practice of political, religious, and cultural pluralism; improving U.S. relations with the developed and developing worlds; advancing human rights; encouraging realistic arms-control agreements; curbing the proliferation of nuclear and other unconventional weapons; and promoting an open and global economy.

Believing that an informed public is vital to a democratic society, the NCAFP offers educational programs that address security challenges facing the United States and publishes a variety of publications, including its bimonthly journal, *American Foreign Policy Interests*, which present keen analyses of all aspects of American foreign policy.

The NCAFP has been running Track II projects for over 15 years and specifically on Northeast Asian security issues for a decade. It has organized three ongoing Track II projects on Northeast Asian security – one on U.S.-China relations with a particular emphasis on the Taiwan issue, a second on the North Korea nuclear challenge, and a third on the future of the U.S. alliances with Japan and South Korea. NCAFP pursues each of its Track II projects by holding closed-door, off-the-record meetings between officials, former officials and leaders in academia and business. The meetings fill a niche between official dialogues by providing a forum where direct discussions can take place. The NCAFP believes the alignment of many transnational security concerns calls for multilateral dialogue.

The Northeast Asian region is of paramount importance in the minds of those in power in the United States; it is in this region that the interests of three of the world's principal nuclear powers (the United States, China and Russia) intersect; it is home to approximately 100,000 U.S. troops; and it contains three of the world's five largest economies (the United States, China and Japan). It is against this backdrop that the NCAFP strives to defuse potential areas of tension while seeking to maximize areas of common interest.

<The location of the office>

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