
The Dialogue with the World

The Rise of Emerging Countries and the Future of Global Governance

Conference Papers

May 1-2, 2012
at the International House of Japan
Tokyo, Japan

Co-sponsored by
The Global Forum of Japan
Fudan University
Nanyang Technological University
The Japan Forum on International Relations

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1.Program

世界との対話

The Dialogue with the World

「新興国の台頭とグローバル・ガバナンスの将来」

"The Rise of Emerging Countries and the Future of Global Governance"

2012年3月2日(金) / Friday, March 2, 2012

於 国際文化会館「講堂」、東京、日本 / at Lecture Hall, International House of Japan, Tokyo, Japan

共催 / Co-sponsored by グローバル・フォーラム / The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)

復旦大学 / Fudan University

南洋理工大学 / Nanyang Technological University

日本国際フォーラム / Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)

2012年3月1日(木) / Thursday, 1 March, 2012

International House of Japan "SAKURA" / 国際文化会館「SAKURA」

閉幕夕食会 *特別招待者のみ / Welcome Dinner *Invitation Only

18:00-20:00

平林 博 日本国際フォーラム副理事長主催閉幕夕食会

Welcome Dinner hosted by HIRABAYASHI Hiroshi, Vice President, JFIR

2012年3月2日(金) / Friday, 2 March, 2012

国際文化会館「講堂」 / International House of Japan "Lecture Hall"

開会挨拶 / Opening Remarks

13:30-13:35

開会挨拶(5分間)

Opening Remarks(5min.)

平林 博 日本国際フォーラム副理事長

HIRABAYASHI Hiroshi, Vice President, JFIR

セッション / Session I

13:35-15:15

スマート・パワー時代におけるグローバル・ガバナンス Global Governance in the "Era of Smart Power"

議長(5分間)

Chairperson (5 min.)

神谷 万丈 防衛大学校教授

KAMIYA Mataka, Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan

報告A(10分間)

Presenter A (10 min.)

中西 寛 京都大学教授

NAKANISHI Hiroshi, Professor, Kyoto University

報告B(10分間)

Presenter B (10 min.)

ジョン・カートン トロント大学教授

John KIRTON, Professor, University of Tronto, Canada

報告C(10分間)

Presenter C (10 min.)

宮岡 勲 慶應義塾大学准教授

MIYAOKA Isao, Associate Professor, Keio University

報告D(10分間)

Presenter D (10 min.)

トーマス・ヘイル ロンドン・スクール・オブ・エコノミクス客員研究員

Thomas HALE, Visiting Fellow, London School of Economics, U.K.

報告E(10分間)

Presenter E (10 min.)

石川 卓 防衛大学校准教授

ISHIKAWA Taku, Associate Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan

自由討議(45分)

Free Discussions (45 min.)

出席者全員

All Participants

15:15-15:25

休憩 / Break

セッション / Session

15:25-17:05

新興国からみたグローバル・ガバナンス Global Governance from the Point of View of The Rise of Emerging Countries

議長(5分間)

Chairperson (5 min.)

平林 博 日本国際フォーラム副理事長

HIRABAYASHI Hiroshi, Vice President, JFIR

報告A(10分間)

Presenter A (10 min.)

川島 真 東京大学准教授

KAWASHIMA Shin, Associate Professor, the University of Tokyo

報告B(10分間)

Presenter B (10 min.)

潘 忠岐 復旦大学教授

PAN Zhongqi, Professor, Fudan University, China

報告C(10分間)

Presenter C (10 min.)

大庭 三枝 東京理科大学准教授

OBA Mie, Associate Professor, Tokyo University of Science

報告D(10分間)

Presenter D (10 min.)

タン・シーセン 南洋理工大学准教授

TAN See Seng, Associate Professor, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

報告E(10分間)

Presenter E (10 min.)

細谷 雄一 慶應義塾大学教授

HOSOYA Yuichi, Professor, Keio University

自由討議(45分)

Free Discussions (45 min.)

出席者全員

All Participants

閉幕挨拶 / Closing Remarks

17:05-17:10

閉幕挨拶(5分間)

Remarks(5min.)

大河原良雄 グローバル・フォーラム代表世話人

OKAWARA Yoshio, Chairman, GFJ

[NOTE] 日本語・英語同時通訳付き / English-Japanese simultaneous interpretation will be provided

2 . Biographies of the Panelists

[Foreign Panelists]

John KIRTON *Professor, University of Toronto, Canada (Canada)*
Received his PhD in international relations from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. Concurrently serving as director of the G8 Research Group and co-director of the G20 Research Group, the Global Health Diplomacy Program and the BRICS Research Group at Trinity College at the Munk School of Global Affairs at the University of Toronto.

Thomas HALE *Visiting Fellow, London School of Economics (U.K.)*
He is a PhD candidate in the Department of Politics at Princeton University. His research focuses on the governance of transnational problems such as climate change and commercial dispute resolution. He has studied and worked in Argentina, China, and Europe, and currently lives in London.

PAN Zhongqi *Professor, Fudan University (China)*
Received his Ph.D. of international relations in 1999 from Fudan University. Served as First Secretary at Mission of the People's Republic of China to the European Communities of China's Foreign Ministry (2008-09).

TAN See Seng *Associate Professor, Nanyang Technological University (Singapore)*
Received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the Arizona State University. Served as Research Fellow at Singapore Institute of International Affairs (1996-1997), and Visiting Research Associate of International Institute for Strategic Studies (2008). Concurrently serving as the Deputy Head of Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, at the Nanyang Technological University in Singapore.

[Japanese Panelists]

HIRABAYASHI Hiroshi *Vice President, The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)*
Graduated from the University of Tokyo. Entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1963. From 1991 to 2006, served successively as Deputy Chief of Mission in Washington, D.C., Director-General of Economic Cooperation Bureau at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chief Cabinet Councilor on External Affairs at Prime Minister's Cabinet, Ambassador to India and Ambassador to France. Concurrently, Executive Vice-President of The Council on East Asian Community (CEAC), President of the Japan-India Association, Visiting Professor of the Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies of Waseda University, Opinion Leader Governor, The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ), and so forth.

KAMIYA Mataka *Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan*
Graduated from the University of Tokyo in 1985 and did graduate study at Columbia University as a Fulbright grantee. Became Research Associate at the National Defense Academy of Japan in 1992, Lecturer with tenure in 1993, Associate Professor in 1996, and became Professor in 2004. Meanwhile, served as Distinguished Research Fellow at Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand (1994-95), and Visiting Research Fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs (2004-2005). Concurrently serves as Councilor of The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) and Member of the Board of Directors of Japan Association for International Security.

NAKANISHI Hiroshi*Professor, Kyoto University*

Received MA from Kyoto University in 1987 and studied in the doctor course of the History Department at the University of Chicago from 1988 to 1990 as Ph.D candidate. Served as Associate Professor in Koto University. His major interests include rise of the global international history of the 20th century, with partiular interest on Japanese foreign and security policy in the Showa Era, and current Japanese foreign and security policy. He has been on the panel of several Governmental advisory committees, such as the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era, which issued the final report in August 2010.

MIYAOKA Isao*Associate Professor, Keio University*

Graduated from Keio University in 1990. Entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan in 1990 and retired from office in 1995. Received his MA in Political Science from the University of Canterbury in 1994. Received his D.Phil. from the University of Oxford in 1999. Served as Associate at Harvard University in 1999-2001, Visiting Fellow at the Sigur Center for Asian Studies, The George Washington University in 2006. Served as Associate Professor at Osaka University of Foreign Studies from 2001 and then at Osaka University from 2007. Held the current position since 2010.

ISHIKAWA Taku*Associate Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan*

Received his M.A. from the George Washington University in 1994 and Ph. D from Hitotsubashi University in 1998. Served as a research fellow of the Research Institute for Peace and Security (1996-98), Assistant Professor and then Associate Professor of Toyo Eiwa University (1998-09).

KAWASHIMA Shin*Associate Professor, the University of Tokyo*

Received M.A. from the University of Tokyo in 1994 and Ph.D. in 2007. Served as Associate Professor of Faculty of Law at Hokkaido University (1998 - 2006), and Visiting Associate Professor of International Research Center for Japanese Studies(2002-2005). Held the current position since 2006. Concurrently serving as Senior Researcher of the Institute for International Policy Studies.

OBA Mie*Associate Professor, Tokyo University of Science*

Received M.A. in 1994 and Ph.D in 2002 from the University of Tokyo. Served as Visiting Research Fellow, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, Academic Associate of Program on US-Japan Relations at Harvard University (2006-2007). Her major is International Relations and the politics in Asia-Pacific. Her current research interests include the development of regionalism in this region as well as theories of regional integration and regionalism.

HOSOYA Yuichi*Professor, Keio University*

Received his Ph.D from Keio University. Served as Visiting Professor and Japan Chair at Sciences-Po in Paris (2009-10), Visiting fellow at Princeton University (2008-2009). His research interests include the postwar international history, British diplomatic history, Japanese diplomacy, and contemporary international security.

OKAWARA Yoshio*Chairman, GFI*

Graduated from The University of Tokyo. Entered Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1942. Served various positions including Director-General of the American Affairs Bureau, Deputy Vice Minister for Administration, Japanese Ambassador to Australia and Japanese Ambassador to the United States (1980-1985). Concurrently serving as Special Adviser of Institute for International Policy Studies and President of America-Japan Society, Inc.

3. Presentation Papers

Session I: Global Governance in the "Era of Smart Power"

NAKANISHI Hiroshi
Professor, Kyoto University

The notion of global governance (GG), broadly defined as efforts to solve problems identified as common internationally by both state and non-state actors, has posed theoretical and practical questions. Governance, or the normative search for order, presupposes that specific notion of norm is shared by the parties. But who decides what notion of norm and how? And The issue of actors have also been questioned. It is generally agreed that international institutions and non-state actors play roles in global governance along with states. But it has not been resolved that states have special roles, privileges and powers in global governance or they are just similar actors as international institutions and non-state actors. The idea of global governance has been around and generally hailed by the parties who utter those words with these ambiguities never clarified.

Historically, in the last twenty years, the GG has been shifted from the tendency emphasizing international institutions such as the UN and the NGOs to the one which puts more importance to the state relations. Case in point is the global warming issue, one of the typical GG agenda. The issue was initially addressed in the UN and the UN-sponsored conference at Rio de Janeiro in 1992. The concern on climate change resulted in the establishment of the IPCC, ratification of the Treaty on Climate Change by vast majority of countries in the world, and signing the Kyoto Protocol. Then the matter moved to the implementation by states in 2000s. The US and Australia bowed out from the Kyoto protocol, and the debate became more and more between the developed countries and the developing countries. Of course this is just one case, but as the market oriented, enlightenment-type globalization lost its persuasiveness, the GG came to be played out in the sphere of international politics.

The notion of "smart power" advocated by Joseph Nye seems one reaction to this trend. Global Governance is no doubt multi-faceted, and non-state actors are legitimate players. But the basic framework of the GG must be played out by state players. It does not mean the GG reflects balance of power in the typical realist mold. The state needs to play different power resources, and within the confinement of common interest among the states to avoid general breakdown of global interdependence. So far the developed countries seem to hold edge against the emerging powers in terms of military power, economic institutions, and universal norm. They hold power to intervene any part of the world if they desires and given legitimate authorization. They secure major voices in the IMF and the World Bank, and large companies. They hold the only universal value system of liberalism which fits in the globalization era.

However, the emerging powers are showing more power in this game. They accumulate military forces in strides so that they have more denial capability against the outside intervention. Their high rate of economic growth in global market attracts more power and gradually increases their voices. The universal norm of liberalism to some extent justifies their norm of independence of sovereignty, economic justice, or multiplicity of culture.

Japan is in a unique position in this GG scheme. Japan is now losing a “great power” status by default it arguably had in 1970s to 2000s (even then Japan was called military pigmy). But Japan has relatively larger resources to be put in the middle powers, and uniqueness of Japan’s resources can count against the Great Powers. Much depends on Japan coming up with a “smart” strategy in mobilizing its available resources and invest them wisely.

Japan’s natural conditions require Japanese SDFs to be more prepared to the denial capability in and around territory as well as agile operations against the hard natural disasters. These characters make Japanese SDFs as good resources in contributing GG such as peace-building or international disaster response.

Japan’s poor endowment with natural resources tends to direct Japanese life style and economy towards higher technology and energy conservation, which can be used as source of international influence. At the same time, the gift of diverse natural conditions can enhance more innovation in Japanese agriculture, fishery or forestry, which is hindered by various institutional barriers. With proper institutional arrangements, these industries can be sources of international cooperation and investment. Japan’s aging society gives opportunity for new medical and nursing industry, as well as more unmanned robotics.

Japan’s culture is known to be receptive to almost any type of cultures and civilizations. This cultural flexibility is source of soft power. The current Japanese cultural icons such as cartoons, cuisine, or novels etc., reflects this character. The problem of Japanese soft power is, though it’s received well by many parts of the world, the fact that it tends to lack clear message to the world as social values. Admitting the difficulty of the task, Japanese culture needs to be more outward-looking and try to explain what it is to other cultures and civilizations.

John KIRTON
Professor, University of Toronto, Canada

The demand for global governance is great and growing, as old state-to-state and new non-state threats compound and combine to spread swiftly, widely and intrusively in an intensely interconnected, complex, uncertain world.

Given these “problems without passports,” the Bretton Woods–United Nations galaxy remains an incomplete, siloed, uncoordinated system with no dedicated multilateral organizations for the environment, energy, crime and terrorism, and nothing to foster co-ordination at the top.

Despite the adoption of the responsibility to protect (R2P) principle in 2005 and its successful application over Libya in 2011, the UN remains confined by a legal charter that prohibits international interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states, that ignores the natural environment, that declares the world’s third-ranked power to be an enemy, alien-aggressor state, and that excludes it from a permanent veto on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), which now consists exclusively of states with nuclear weapons state.

Global governance, defined as the provision of public goods and the protection of people against problems that spread widely to cause death and destruction, now requires international institutions that are comprehensive and integrated (to address linked problems such as natural and nuclear disasters or climate change and health), flexible enough to act swiftly and authoritatively, and innovative enough to produce solutions to solve or even prevent problems in the right way.

The G8 major market democracies, centred in an annual summit, has served as such an institutions since its start in 1975. Created to intrusively protect and promote globally the values of “open democracy, individual liberty and social advance,” its all-democratic members, doubling in member since 1975, embraced Japan, Germany and Italy as equal founding members and addressed energy, the environment, terrorism and crime as well as economics and security.

At Tokyo in 1979, the then G7 leaders stopped serious Middle East oil shocks for good and created the world’s first, its most ambitious and its most effective regime to control climate change. In 1999, under German leadership, with a deadlocked UNSC, the G8 — now with Russia — authorized the military action delivered by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that protected innocent civilians in Kosovo and had Yugoslav dictator Slobodan Milosevic tried for war crimes in the Hague. The G7/8 also led the peaceful transformation from the Soviet Union bloc, empire and ideology to a democratic Russia and the global spread of democratic ideals, most recently in North Africa.

The G20 systemically significant states, created in 1999 in response to the Asian-turned-global financial crisis, then succeeded where the G8 failed, in embracing as full founding members all emerging and established powers needed to prevent global financial crises or contain them if they emerged. Elevated to the summit level in 2008 in response to the American-turned-global crisis erupting then, it successfully stopped the greatest recession since the Great Depression of the 1930s, contained the subsequent euro-crisis and finally reformed the International Monetary Fund to give the rapidly rising, largely Asian powers — and Japan — the voice and vote they deserved.

Japan has done much to support the G20, as an institution with more Asian than European powers, and far more non-nuclear and democratic members than nuclear and non-democratic ones. As Japan is one of the few members that was a provider rather than a consumer of financial security in both 1997–2001 and 2008–12, Japan should broaden the G20 agenda to embrace more political-security issues and deepen the G20’s democratic value as a new leadership in China arrives.

The Concept and Theories of Global Governance

1. *Theories of Governance in the Cold War Period*

2. *Analytical Theories of Governance in the Post-Cold War Period*

- James N. Rosenau, "Governance in the Twenty-first Century," 1995, p. 13.
global governance is conceived to include systems of rule at all levels of human activity – from the family to the international organization – in which the pursuit of goals through the exercise of control has transnational repercussions.

3. *Normative Theories of Governance in the Post-Cold War Period*

- Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighbourhood*, 1995, p. 4
Governance is the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and co-operative action may be taken. It includes formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements that people and institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest.

Table 1: Theories of Governance in World Affairs

		Analytical	Normative
1970s 1980s	Traditional	Hegemonic Stability Theory (Realism) International Society (English School)	
	Semi-traditional	Complex Interdependence (Liberalism)	Historical Materialism (Marxism)
1990s 2000s	Semi-traditional	Regime Theory (institutional interplay)	Regime Theory (institutional design)
	Non-traditional	Post-International Theory	Global Civil Society World Government Critical Theories

Theories of Global Governance

4. *Critical Review of Global Governance Theories*

- **Non-traditional aspects:** 1) Multiactor perspective, multi-level
 2) New issues, and 3) Plurality of mechanisms and methods
- These aspects are too **complex** to theorize world politics.
- **Traditional approaches** are more suitable for examining the rise of emerging powers in the context of governance in world affairs.
- **Three principles of major power concert** (Rosecrance 1992)
 - involvement of all powers; ideological agreement; and renunciation of war

“ The Rise of Emerging Countries and the Future of Global Governance ”

1. *Argument*

Multilateral governance is increasingly gridlocked, and increasing multipolarity is a significant cause. But new kinds of international institutions offer a partial solution to pressing transnational problems.

2. *The success of the postwar order*

- a. The globalization of “embedded liberalism”
- b. A liberal, institutionalized order allowed the world to achieve unprecedented interdependence
- c. Endogenous interdependence: self-reinforcing process between interdependence and institutionalizations.
 - i. Firms to organize multinationally
 - ii. Shift in division of labor
 - iii. Application of technology to supply chain management and outsourcing

3. *Gridlock*

- a. The very success of the postwar order, by allowing interdependence to deepen to such a high degree, has now created conditions that threaten it going forward
- b. Pathways to gridlock (second-order cooperation problems)
 - i. Institutional inertia
 - ii. Deeper, harder problems
 - iii. Institutional complexity
 - iv. Increasing multipolarity: arguably the most important
 1. Increased transaction costs
 2. More centralization entails less legitimacy
 3. More diverse domestic conditions / interests need to be accommodated

4. *The partial transnational solution*

- a. Global governance has evolved
 - i. Transgovernmental networks
 - ii. Private regulation
 - iii. multi-stakeholder initiatives
 - iv. Dispute settlement functions
 - v. Innovative financing
- b. New Forms of global governance offer a possible way to move ahead, but also face limitations
 - i. increase flexibility
 - ii. lower transaction costs of multilateral fora
 - iii. allow different coalitions to be built and broader capacities to be deployed
- c. Examples
 - i. Economic governance
 - ii. Climate governance

5. *The Role of Japan*

The Rise of Emerging Powers and “ Nuclear Order ” Some Implications for the Japan-US Alliance

1. *William Walker’s Concept of “Nuclear Order”*

Composed of two linked systems:

- a. The “managed system of deterrence” with the ABM Treaty as a pillar
- b. The “managed system of abstinence” with the NPT as a pillar

2. *The Decline of the Order after the Cold War*

- a. Actual cases of proliferation
- b. US counterproliferation and “coercive nonproliferation” policy

Reconfirmed the link between the two systems and the importance of NPT Article VI

3. *Power Transition and the Nuclear Order*

- a. Obama’s effort to revive the order, and its increasing limitations
- b. China’s nuclear modernization in search of “assured retaliation”
- c. Russia’s emerging “hard balancing”
- d. Legitimation of nuclear India, and its complications
- e. Continuation of “nuclear renaissance”

Need to reconsider the US formula of “nuclear reduction + conventional buildup”

Need to stabilize the deterrence system including some emerging powers, while keeping nuclear disarmament momentum

4. *Prospects and Recommendations*

If the current power transition continues:

- a. Japan should prepare for US acceptance of China’s “assured retaliation”
 May be essential for a peaceful transition to a Concert of Power system
- b. Japan should contribute to US effort to enhance “regional deterrence” in Northeast Asia, while trying not to provoke a regional arms race
- c. Some restrictions on missile defense may become inevitable

*Session II: Global Governance from the Point of View of
The Rise of Emerging Countries*

KAWASHIMA Shin
Associate Professor, the University of Tokyo

**Four Key Points on Observations of
Chinese Behaviors on Global/Regional Governance**

About Chinese Perceptions and Diplomacy toward Global Governance, we have argued some typical topics; (1) challenger and/or participants? ; (2) Engagement and/or containment, etc.. Thorough such arguments, now that scholars share complexity of this issue and variety of Chinese attitude on this field.

1 . *Global Governance for China*

Under the financial and economic globalization, China has kept rapid development. China is basically 'beneficiary' of so-called globalization, and also participants of global governance with some extents. China has been cautious about global governance which had made by Western countries, however this does not mean that China plays negative role on global governance completely. China gradually accepted global rules and norms, as China joined WTO in 2001, and distinguished whether it was acceptable or not deliberately, according as her own national interest. Some norms and rules, as NPT regime, are acceptable for China, because they protect or increase Chinese national interests, others are critical and harmful for Chinese development and sovereignty, and the other fields are mostly so irrelevant to Chinese national interests that China makes it good instrument to negotiate on other issues.

2. *Mosaic Fields*

For China, global governance is not recognized as a systematic and consistent norm. China doesn't have any stout thought and principle about global governance, so that China can cope with each concrete issue, case by case. Sets of issues on governance in global society look like a kind of mosaic field for China.

Probably, other newly emerging powers share such a stance toward global governance. And the each country has different mosaics which don't overlap each other. So, Newly emerging powers cannot cooperate at all cases.

3. *Mutual Communications*

Advanced powers, if they expect Chinese and other newly emerging powers' cooperation with forming governance, have to pay attentions to several points; (1) persuading China's advantage to cooperate with governance and bringing out Chinese intention to commit making it; (2) observing China and other countries carefully in detail, in order to prevent them from cooperating each other against advanced countries; (3) keeping open-mindedness to China and other countries, and compromising/adjusting the contents of regulations with flexibility.

4. *Regional Governance - Chinese Order? -*

On understanding Chinese attitude global governance, it's efficient to distinguish the case of global governance from regional governance. China sometimes adopts more assertive policy towards surrounding regions, with which China has some specific issues relating sovereignty and other crucial issues. However, at present, China has not been successful in creating new order which is shared by surrounding countries.

PAN Zhongqi
Professor, Fudan University, China

China's Perceptions of Global Governance

The concept of global governance (GG) gained prominence with the end of bipolarity, the emergence of globalization and the increasing economic interdependence. Various global challenges necessitated a search for appropriate format and approach to GG, which becomes a new important concept that diverging perceptions of it cast shadows on relations between developed and developing countries in general, and relations between existent great powers and emerging countries including China in particular.

China's conception and its approach towards GG differs significantly from that of the EU, for example, be it on a normative, institutional or policy level, because of different historical starting points and different conceptions of China's place in the international system. A comparative perspective, with the EU as an example, may help us to have a better understanding of China's position.

GG – understood both as strengthening existing multilateral institutions and as managing global challenges – resonates with the EU more than with China. When comparing European and Chinese approaches to GG, it becomes apparent that these approaches differ considerably. Among others, climate change, financial crisis, and nuclear proliferation, are three major issues most suitable for GG.

Both China and the EU argue that those issues could not be solved by any single player, a collective action is a necessity other than a choice. Both China and the EU should and have made great efforts in improving global environmental, economic, and security situation. Both emphasize the significant role of international institutions in GG, be they the UN, IMF, WB, G20, as well as regional ones. A globally concerted effort is in need and should be encouraged.

But China and the EU do not find much common language on GG in general. For example, their frictions on climate change were made more than remarkable in the 2009 Copenhagen conference.

Generally speaking, China aims to build a harmonious world, harmonization, while the EU tries to spread its values and norms, normalization. While Europe is an insider of the international society, China sees itself as an outsider. Europe has been the maker of many important international norms, but China has been the taker of various Western political concepts.

China wants to shoulder international responsibilities, to promote its benign and constructive image to the rest of the world, while the EU wishes to strengthen its identity, build its global actorness, presents itself as a leader in GG.

The EU frequently cites “effective multilateralism” as the right mechanism to build global order and governance. China, to a less extent, also advocates multilateralism and emphasizes the central position of the UN in it. But China, by contrast, quite insists on the principle of sovereignty and non-interference. China is very careful and hesitant in participating in GG in order to avoid the difficult questions regarding state sovereignty. The genuine acceptance of the need to trade national

sovereignty for a better grip on transnational issues that lies at the foundation of the European Union is clearly not shared by China. The EU and China will in all likelihood not be able to completely avoid conflicts based on different interpretations of sovereignty and particularly the right to interfere in domestic issues of a sovereign state.

China and the EU are two very different types of players in international politics today. China is writing its story of peaceful rise and building itself as a consolidated sovereign state. The EU on the other hand is seeking for further regional integration and building itself as a unitary post-sovereign polity. While China sticks to modern norms and values, the EU is moving towards a post-modern normative actor. A sovereignty-retaining China is definitely at variance with a sovereignty-pooling EU in their understandings of such concept as GG. For China, sovereignty and independence take precedence over normative principles and constraints of GG in international relations, while for the EU, national sovereignty is a futile notion, impeding regional integration and GG. Despite China's acceptance of many other international norms that have been championed by Europe, such as human rights and democracy, China generally rejects any single and absolute mode being alleged universally applicable. When China talks about those concepts, it is not simply repeating the European ideas, but has made them Chinanized.

Since China is not as committed to multilateralism and a rule-based international system as the EU and China is preoccupied with internal instability, so its emphasis on sovereignty can be expected to continue to trump considerations over collective international approaches to common challenges. The conceptual gap poses a challenge to the formulation of joint approaches to GG between China and the EU. These differences have led to concrete and divergent political positions. The EU's emphasis on dealing with failed states, or international intervention and the emerging doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) more generally, is at variance with China's obsession with equality, sovereignty, and the principle of non-intervention. Different perspectives thus block a meeting of minds.

The Change of global governance system and Southeast Asia

The global financial crisis (2007-2009) revealed that a shift in the global balance of power that had already begun years before. Emerging countries were able to extend their political leverage in the aftermath of the crisis, because the developed economies of the United States, Europe, and Japan were in severe decline while evaluations of the potential for developing economies rose substantially. Among these emerging countries, the rise of China and India in the international sphere and their enhanced political leverage was particularly remarkable. Some analysts point out that the power shift would reshape the structure of the global governance. The upgrade of the G20 from ministerial to summit level after the global financial crisis showed that global governance system without emerging powers would not function in order to resolve economic and financial issues.

The role of Southeast Asian countries is limited compared with those of China and India. However, it should be considered that Southeast Asian countries are involved in the development and change of global governance system with three ways. The first way is to promote regional cooperation and integration in the ASEAN. The ASEAN, a regional institution embracing Southeast Asia, can be regarded as a part of the global governance system, because it demonstrates the stance to promote global norms and values such as human rights, democracy, and role of law in this region. Besides, the ASEAN is attempt to deepen regional integration with various measures, which basically are consist with the principles of the WTO, in order to realize regional prosperity in the development of the economic globalization. It should be considered that the development of regional cooperation in ASEAN in these manners might split the members of the ASEAN into two camps: the supporters for the “new ASEAN” and those for the “old ASEAN”.

The second way is to enhance the special channels between the ASEAN and major external powers like China, Japan, India, and the United States, all of which are global players that affect the structure and activities of the global governance. Southeast Asian countries constructed “ASEAN+X” relationships with the FTA and the TAC. Besides, they attempt to keep the position of the ASEAN to be the institutional “core” of broader regional frameworks like the ARF, the ASEAN+3 and the EAS, all of which embracing those external powers.

The third way is to directly participate in the framework of global governance system. Indonesia is the only member of the G20 among Southeast Asian countries and then can voice its opinions as well as the opinions of Southeast Asian countries in this framework. However, it is vague whether Indonesia has a new vision for a new structure of global governance and what it specifically tries to do in the global sphere.

TAN See Seng
Associate Professor, Nanyang Technological University

Global Governance: The View from Emerging Countries

As a P5 member armed with veto rights, China regards the UN (UNSC included) as the most important institution for global security governance. China's growing contribution to UN peacekeeping missions (7,500 peacekeepers since 1990) is the biggest among P5 members, but considerably less than Bangladesh's or Pakistan's contributions. But China's contribution to the general UN and UNPKO budget (at 2.67%) is lowest among the P5.¹ Beijing's veto of UNSC resolution backing the Arab League's plan for ending the violence in Syria (the Chinese have since indicated support for the plan) suggests China practises strategic rather than normative multilateralism in order to avoid legitimating a Libya-type "humanitarian intervention" and the implications that holds for international responses to its own crackdowns in Tibet and Xinjiang.²

As relatively small and/or weak states, ASEAN countries are generally supportive of global institutions and multilateral arrangements as platforms whereby they can, individually as well as corporately as the ASEAN collective, press for a bigger say on issues important to their national and regional interests. In that respect, the UN remains a highly important global security provider for the ASEAN region, not least through peacekeeping (e.g. UNTAC in Cambodia, UNTAET in East Timor). At least since *An Agenda for Peace* (1992), the UN has sought to enhance collaboration with regional organizations, ASEAN included, in international security management. The cooperative effort between the UN and ASEAN in encouraging the Burmese military junta to receive foreign humanitarian assistance in the wake of Cyclone Nargis in 2008 is a good example.

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the WTO have become considerably more important to ASEAN countries in their increasing turn to these institutions to adjudicate and settle territorial and trade disputes among themselves. Persistent mutual distrust among ASEAN states prevents them from relying on ASEAN's own dispute mechanisms (e.g. High Council). However, ASEAN's institutional articles permit members' reliance on third-party arbitration and adjudication.

China increasingly regards the G20 as the most important institution for global economic cum financial governance. Two reasons for this: (1) China believes the G20 will eventually supplant and sideline the G7/G8. (2) China views the G20 as an expression of greater and fairer representation and devolution of decision-making power to emerging countries. This is on contrast to other major global economic/financial institutions such as the World Bank, IMF and WTO, which are still dominated by Western powers. Those institutions still suffer from "input" legitimacy and a persistent exclusivity.³ China will continue to press for greater representation

¹ Ian Taylor, "The Future of China's Overseas Peacekeeping Operations," *China Brief* (Jamestown Foundation), Vol. 8, Issue 6 (March 14, 2008),

http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=4792

² In the same way, the U.S. refused to join the International Criminal Court (ICC), which could have had repercussions on its war effort in Iraq and potential prosecution of U.S. soldiers for alleged war crimes, etc.

³ Pradumna Rana, "Cannes Summit: Make G20 Plus Transparent," *RSIS Commentaries* 152/2011 (19

and transparency at these institutions but will likely focus on the G20 as the arrangement through which China can play a more significant role in global economic governance.

How much of a role China is prepared to take on in the G20, and more generally as a leader among emerging countries/economies to play public-goods provider and help stabilize the global economic cum financial system, remains to be seen. For example, the present euro-zone troubles underscore the pressing need for emerging countries, the BRICs in particular, to assist Europe via bond purchasing and direct investment. The BRICs are fully aware ensuring euro-zone stability is in their national interests. Yet Europe's incrementalism (doing enough to stave off collapse but not to restore investor confidence and change market sentiments) and readiness to engage in a trade conflict with China sends mixed signals. At the same time, Chinese dithering despite having given verbal assurances to assist Europe doesn't help either.

There is some evidence to suggest China is keen to use the BRICs arrangement to press for more power sharing with the Western powers.

While important for big emerging countries, the G20 remains a concern for ASEAN members, except Indonesia, the only Southeast Asian country in the G20. From their perspective, the G20 remains a "high council" of big established and emerging powers, from which the majority of nations are still excluded. Greater transparency is required; the G20 members (19 states and EU) were selected in 1999 without objective criteria (other than the assumption that they collectively produce/manage 80% of world's wealth),⁴ while Europe is overrepresented. Its imbalanced representation mirrors the composition of IMF and World Bank boards. While the G20 Seoul summit drew needed attention to development issues and the Asian region, ASEAN states worry whether Asia will be further marginalized as a consequence of the G20+5 model, which guarantees 2 invitations to African regional organizations based on the G20's discretionary practice of inviting regional organizations and loose groupings.⁵ Granted, should the G20 halt its past practice of inviting ASEAN to attend its summits,⁶ ASEAN's concerns could be conceivably be addressed by Indonesia and possibly by Singapore, assuming the hosts of future G20 summits will continue to invite the Global Governance Group (3G) of which Singapore is a leading advocate. But those are big "ifs"!

October 2011), <http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS1522011.pdf>

⁴ Moises Naim, "Minilateralism: The Magic Number to Get Real International Action," *Foreign Policy* (July/August 2009), <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/06/18/minilateralism?page=full>

⁵ UK invited ASEAN and New Partnership for Africa's Development, Canada added African Union, ROK roped in the Global Governance Group (3G), France brought in the Gulf Cooperation Council.

⁶ The matter of whether to invite the ASEAN chair or the ASEAN secretary-general needs to be addressed.

HOSOYA Yuichi
Professor, Keio University

The West, China and Japan in the “ Pacific Century ” : Defending Liberal International Order

Summary

We are now seeing the rise of China, and the increasing importance of Asian economies. Responding to these challenges and opportunities, the US President Barack Obama said in 2009 that he was the “First Pacific President,” while his Secretary of State Hilary Clinton wrote in 2011 that we are entering into “America’s Pacific Century.” It is necessary for Japan to reexamine its own role in this “Pacific Century.”

First, we need to understand that the basic foundation of international order is now being challenged by the emerging countries, particularly China. China’s Gross National Product is now the second biggest after the US, and the rapid expansion of Chinese maritime activities in the South and East China Seas threaten surrounding countries including Japan. The foundation of the current international order based upon liberal values such as democracy, freedom of navigation, and the rule of law has been constructed and defended by the Western Powers. After the Second World War, Japan has been also an important defender of these values, as codified by the Constitution of Japan and the US-Japan security treaty. An important question is whether the Western countries and Japan can maintain and reinforce these values and institutions in the era of the rise of emerging countries.

The US-Japan alliance as well as the G7/8 Summit meeting is an important device for Japan to do this. However, Prime Minister Hatoyama seriously damaged the alliance after he had won the general election in August 2009. Japan’s diplomacy in the “Pacific Century” has to deal with the task of rebuilding and reinforcing the current international order for the purpose of adapting to the challenge of the rise of emerging countries.

Related Articles

Yuichi Hosoya, “The Atlantic Community and the Restoration of the Global Balance of Power: The Western Alliance, Japan, and the Cold War, 1947-1951”, in Marco Mariano (ed.), *Defining the Atlantic Community: Culture, Intellectuals, and Policies in the Mid-Twentieth Century* (New York: Routledge, 2010).

Yuichi Hosoya, “The Rise and Fall of Japan’s Grand Strategy: The “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” and the Future Asian Order”, *Asia-Pacific Review*, Vol. 18, No.1, May 2011.

Yuichi Hosoya, “Japan’s National Identity in Postwar Diplomacy The Three Basic Principles”, in Gilbert Rozman (ed.), *East Asian National Identities: Common Roots and Chinese Exceptionalism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012).

4. An Introduction to The Global Forum of Japan

【Objectives】 As we embrace the 21st century, international relations are becoming increasingly interdependent, and globalization and regionalism are becoming the big waves. In this global tendency, communicating with the world, especially neighboring countries in the Asia-Pacific region at both governmental and non-governmental levels, is one of the indispensable conditions for Japan to survive. On the basis of such understanding, The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) aims to promote the exchange of views on commonly shared interests and issues in the field ranging from politics and security to the economy, trade, finance, society and culture, and to help business leaders, Diet members and opinion leaders both in Japan and in their counterpart countries to discuss the formulation of new orders in global and regional arenas.

【History】 The 1982 Versailles Summit was widely seen as having exposed rifts within the Western alliance. Accordingly, there were expressed concerns that the summit meetings were becoming more and more stylized rituals and that Western solidarity was at risk. Within this context, it was realized that, to revitalize the summit meetings, there must be free and unfettered exchanges of private-sector views to be transmitted directly to the heads of the participating states. Accordingly, Japanese former Foreign Minister OKITA Saburo, U.S. Trade Representative William BROCK, E.C. Commission Vice President Etienne DAVIGNON, and Canadian Trade Minister Edward LUMLEY, as representatives of the private-sector in their respective countries, took the initiative in founding The Quadrangular Forum in Washington in September 1982. Since then, the end of the Cold War and the altered nature of the economic summits themselves had made it necessary for The Quadrangular Forum to metamorphose into The Global Forum established by the American and Japanese components of The Quadrangular Forum at the World Convention in Washington in October 1991. In line with its objectives as stated above, The Global Forum was intended as a facilitator of global consensus on the many post-Cold War issues facing the international community and reached out to open its discussions not only to participants from the quadrangular countries but also to participants from other parts of the world. Over the years, the gravity of The Global Forum's activities gradually shifted from its American component (housed in The Center for Strategic and International Studies) to its Japanese component (housed in The Japan Forum on International Relations), and, after the American component ceased to be operative, the Board of Trustees of the Japanese component resolved, on February 7, 1996, that it would thereafter act as an independent body for organizing bilateral dialogues with Japan as a hub for all countries in the world, and amended its by-laws accordingly. At the same time, The Global Forum's Japanese component was reorganized into The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) in line with the principle that the organization be self-governing, self-financing, and independent of any other organization.

【Organization】 The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) is a private, non-profit, non-partisan, and independent membership organization in Japan to engage in and promote international exchanges on policy-oriented matters of bilateral, regional and global implications. While the secretariat is housed in The Japan Forum on International Relations, GFJ itself is independent of any other organizations, including The Japan Forum on International Relations. Originally established as the Japanese component of The Quadrangular Forum at the initiative of HATTORI Ichiro, OKITA Saburo, TAKEYAMA Yasuo, and TOYODA Shoichiro in 1982, GFJ is currently headed by OKAWARA Yoshio as Chairman and ITO Kenichi as President. The membership is composed of 10 Business Leader Members including the two Governors, MOGI Yuzaburo and TOYODA Shoichiro; 25 Diet Members including the five Governors, ASAO Keiichiro, HATOYAMA Yukio, KOIKE Yuriko, SUEMATSU Yoshinori, and TANIGAKI Sadakazu; and 84 Opinion Leader Members including the three Governors, HIRABAYASHI Hiroshi, SHIMADA Haruo, and WATANABE Mayu. Friends and supporters of The Global Forum of Japan are organized into the Supporters' Club of the Global Forum of Japan. Financially the activities of GFJ have been supported by the annual membership fees paid by 11 leading Japanese corporations (Toyota Motor Corporation and Kikkoman Corporation contributing 5 shares each, and the other 9 corporations contributing 1 or 2 shares each) as well as by the grants provided by The Japan Foundation, Japan-ASEAN Exchange Projects, Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund, The Tokyo Club, The Japan-Korea Cultural Foundation, etc. KIKUCHI Yona serves as Acting Executive Secretary.

【Activities】 Since the start of The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) in 1982, GFJ has shifted its focus from the exchanges with the Quadrangular countries for the purpose of contributing to the Western Summit, to those with neighboring countries in the Asia-Pacific region including the U.S., China, Korea, ASEAN countries, India, Australia, European countries, and Wider Black Sea area, for the purposes of deepening mutual understanding and contributing to the formation of international order. GFJ has been active in collaboration with international exchange organizations in those countries in organizing policy-oriented intellectual exchanges called "Dialogue." In order to secure a substantial number of Japanese participants in the "Dialogue," GFJ in principle holds these "Dialogues" in Tokyo. A listing of topics of "Dialogues" and its overseas co-sponsors in the last five years is given below.

Year	Month	Topic	Co-sponsor
2012	March	The Future of ASEAN Integration and Japan's Role	ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies
	March	The Rise of Emerging Countries and the Future of Global Governance	Fudan University
	February	The Asia-Pacific Region in Transition and the Japan-U.S.-China Relations	Nanyang Technological University The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace China Association of Asia-Pacific Studies
2011	October	The Japan-China Relations at Crossroads	China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR)
	July	The Great East Japan Earthquake and Regional Cooperation on Disaster Management	National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, etc
	February February	The Japan-U.S. Relations in the Era of Smart Power East Asia in Transition and New Perspectives on Regional Cooperation	The Center for Strategic and International Studies (U.S.) International Studies Department, Vietnam National University (Vietnam)
2010	September	East Asian Regional Architectures and Japan-India Relations	The Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (India)
	May	Promoting Japan-U.S. Cooperation in Non-Traditional Security: the Case of Counter Piracy	National Bureau of Asian Research (U.S.)
	February January	Promoting Japan-China Cooperation on Environmental Issues of the 21st Century: In Pursuit of Recycling Society Prospects of Changing Black Sea Area and Role of Japan	School of Environment, Beijing Normal University (China) Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation
2009	September	Japan-ASEAN Cooperation amid the Financial and Economic Crisis	ASEAN-ISIS
	June	Prospect of Japan-China Relationship in the Changing World	China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (China)
	April	US-Japan Relations Under the New Obama Administration	National Committee on American Foreign Policy (U.S.)
2008	September	Prospect of Japan-ASEAN Partnership after the Second Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation	ASEAN-ISIS
	July	Japan-China Relations Entering A New Stage	Institute of Japanese Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (China)
	June January	Cooperation in Environment and Energy An East Asian Community and the US	The Council on East Asian Community, The East Asian Institute of National University of Singapore (Singapore) The Council on East Asia Community, The Pacific Forum CSIS (U.S.)

5. An Introduction to Fudan University

The Department of Political Science at Fudan University was founded in 1923. Then, in 1964, the Department of International Politics was established to take its place. Most recently, the School of International Relations and Public Affairs (SIRPA) was founded in the year 2000. Having established a wide range of exchanges and cooperative relations with many distinguished schools and institutions, SIRPA enjoys academic fame domestically and abroad.

SIRPA is staffed with a distinguished faculty, whose unrelenting efforts to improve research and teaching have resulted in several accomplishments. SIRPA has two National Priority programs, one State Education Ministry Designated Research program, two postdoctoral programs, six doctoral degree programs and seven master's degree programs. Everyone at SIRPA works together to advocate the pursuit of excellence.

SIRPA is committed to educating its students in order to become the leaders of tomorrow. SIRPA makes great efforts to teach our youth to become responsible citizens with diverse abilities, to acquire wide and profound knowledge, to foster communication skills, and nurture a sense of cooperation with others. Students are required to develop the ability to think broadly when analyzing issues, to be professional administrators. SIRPA helps to instill the pioneering, innovating and problem-solving spirit in all of our students.

Meeting the increasing demands of globalization, the spread of market economies, and the rise of the information age, SIRPA educates professionals of all classes to contribute to the glorious revival of our nation.

The School of International Relations and Public Affairs has four departments: the Department of International Politics, the Department of Political Science, the Department of Public Administration, and the Department of Diplomacy.

[The location of the office]

220 Handan Road, Shanghai 200433, China

Tel 86-21-65117628, 86-21-65642258

Fax 86-21-65117298

Homepage: <http://www.sirpa.fudan.edu.cn/>

<http://www.sirpa.fudan.edu.cn/english/>

6. An Introduction to Nanyang Technological University

The S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) is an autonomous professional school cum think tank of international affairs located at Nanyang Technological University (NTU) in Singapore. Ranked 47 in the list of Top 50 think tanks worldwide (non-US) by the University of Pennsylvania's 2011 Global Go to Think Tanks report, the RSIS is one of Asia's leading academic and research institutions. RSIS began life as the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) on 30 July 1996. On 1 January 2007, ten years after its establishment, IDSS was formally inaugurated to become the RSIS, named after the first foreign minister of Singapore, S. Rajaratnam.

Today, RSIS boasts not only the IDSS but five other distinct centers, all doing cutting-edge research and capacity-building in their respective functional specializations. Through its 6 Master degree tracks, a small but vibrant PhD program as well as a wide array of executive courses, RSIS offers its students a rigorous professional graduate education in international affairs with a strong practical and area emphasis. Its diverse team of internationally-renowned faculty members and researchers conduct both academic and policy-relevant research in national security, defence and strategic studies, diplomacy and international relations. RSIS also has a vibrant outreach orientation, collaborating with like-minded schools and think tanks of international affairs from Asia and beyond to form a global network of excellence.

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Nanyang Technological University
Blk S4, Level B4,
Nanyang Avenue,
Singapore 639798
Tel: (65) 6790 6982
Fax: (65) 6793 2991
Email: wwwrsis@ntu.edu.sg

7. An Introduction to the Japan Forum on International Relations

The Forum conducts a variety of activities hosting conferences, organizing research programs, and publishing research reports and policy recommendations, etc.

[History]

The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc. (JFIR or The Forum) was founded on March 12, 1987 in Tokyo on the private initiative of Dr. OKITA Saburo, Mr. HATTORI Ichiro, Mr. ITO Kenichi, and 60 other independent citizens from business, academic, political, and media circles of Japan, recognizing that a policy-oriented research institution in the field of international affairs independent from the government was most urgently needed in Japan. JFIR celebrated its 20th anniversary on March 12, 2007. And on April 1, 2011, JFIR was reincorporated as a “public interest foundation” with the authorization granted by the Prime Minister in recognition of its achievements.

[Purpose]

The Forum is a private, non-profit, independent, and non-partisan organization dedicated to improved understanding of Japanese foreign policy and international relations. The Forum takes no institutional position on issues of foreign policy, though its members are encouraged not only to analyze but to propose alternatives on matters of foreign policy. Though the Forum helps its members to formulate policy recommendations on matters of public policy, the views expressed in such recommendations represent in no way those of the Forum as an institution and the responsibility for the contents of the recommendations is that of those members of the Forum who sign them alone.

[Organization]

JFIR is a membership organization with four categories of membership, namely, (1) corporate, (2) associate corporate, (3) individual and (4) associate individual. As for the organizational structure of JFIR, the “Board of Trustees” is the highest decision making body, which is in charge of electing the “Directors” and of supervising overall activities of JFIR, while the “Board of Directors” is an executive body, which is in charge of the management of day-to-day operations of JFIR.

[Activities]

In tandem with the core activities of the “Policy Council” in making policy recommendations, another important pillar of JFIR’s activities is the BBS “Hyakka-Seiho” which means “Hundred Flowers in Full Bloom” (<http://www.jfir.or.jp/cgi/m-bbs/>). The BBS, which started on April 12, 2006, is open to the public, functioning as an interactive forum for discussions on foreign policy and international affairs. All articles posted on the BBS are sent through the bimonthly e-mail magazine “Meru-maga Nihon Kokusai Fōramu” in Japanese to about 10,000 readers in Japan. Furthermore, articles worth attention for foreigners are translated into English and posted on the English website of JFIR (<http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/index.htm>) as “JFIR Commentary.” They are also introduced in the e-mail magazine “JFIR E-Letter” in English. “JFIR E-Letter” is delivered bimonthly to about 10,000 readers worldwide.



The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)

17-12-1301, Akasaka 2-chome Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052, Japan

[Tel] +81-3-3584-2193 [Fax] +81-3-3505-4406

[E-mail] gfj@gfj.jp [URL] <http://www.gfj.jp/>