
THE JAPAN-U.S. DIALOGUE

The Japan- U.S. Alliance in Changing International and Domestic Environments

Conference Papers

March 5, 2014
Tokyo, Japan

Supported by

The Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership (CGP)

Co-sponsored by

The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)

Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University (INSS)

The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)

Table of Contents

<u>1. Program</u>	1
<u>2. Biographies of the Panelists</u>	2
3. Presentation Papers.....	5
<i>Session I: U.S. Factors and Japan Factors</i>	5
<u>HOSOYA Yuichi</u>	5
<u>Robert MANNING</u>	6
<u>INA Hisayoshi</u>	12
<u>Nicholas SZECHENYI</u>	12
<u>KAMIYA Mataka</u>	14
<u>James SCHOFF</u>	15
<i>Session II: Security Environment in the Asia Pacific</i>	18
<u>NAKANISHI Hiroshi</u>	18
<u>Rust DEMING</u>	19
<u>KATO Yoichi</u>	23
<u>James J. PRZYSTUP</u>	25
<u>IZUMIKAWA Yasuhiro</u>	27
<u>MIYAOKA Isao</u>	28
<u>4. An Introduction to The Global Forum of Japan</u>	30
<u>5. An Introduction to the Institute for National Strategic Studies,</u> <u>National Defense University</u>	31
<u>6. An Introduction to The Japan Forum on International Relations</u>	32

プログラム／Program

<div>日米対話</div> <div>The Japan-U.S. Dialogue</div> <div>「変容する国際・国内情勢の下での日米同盟」</div> <div>"The Japan-U.S. Alliance in Changing International and Domestic Environments"</div> <div>2014年3月5-6日／5-6 March, 2014</div> <div>国際文化会館「講堂」、東京、日本／"Lecture Hall," International House of Japan,Tokyo, Japan</div> <div>共催／Co-sponsored by</div> <div>グローバル・フォーラム／The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)</div> <div>米国防大学国家戦略研究所／Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University (INSS)</div> <div>公益財団法人 日本国際フォーラム／The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)</div>	
2014 年 3 月 5 日 (水)／Wednesday, 5th March, 2014 国際文化会館「講堂」／International House of Japan "Lecture Hall"	
開会挨拶／Opening Remarks	
13:30-13:40	
挨拶 (10分間) Remarks (10min.)	石川 薫 グローバル・フォーラム執行世話人／日本国際フォーラム専務理事 ISHIKAWA Kaoru, President, GFJ / Senior Executive Director, JFIR
セッション I／Session I	
13:40-15:30	
「米国要因と日本要因」 "U.S. Factors and Japan Factors"	
議長 Chairperson	ジェームズ・プリスタップ 米国防大学国家戦略研究所上席研究員 James J. PRZYSTUP, Senior Research Fellow, INSS
報告A (10分間) Paper Presenter A (10 min.)	細谷 雄一 慶應義塾大学教授 HOSOYA Yuichi, Professor, Keio University
報告B (10分間) Paper Presenter B (10 min.)	ロバート・マニング アトランティック・カウンシル上級研究員 Robert MANNING, Senior Fellow, the Atlantic Council
報告C(10分間) Paper Presenter C (10 min.)	伊奈 久喜 日本経済新聞特別編集委員 INA Hisayoshi, Foreign Policy Columnist, The Nikkei
報告D (10分間) Paper Presenter D (10 min.)	ニコラス・セーチェーニ 米戦略国際問題研究所日本部副部長・主任研究員 Nicholas SZECHENYI, Deputy Director and Senior Fellow, Office of the Japan Chair, CSIS
報告E(10分間) Paper Presenter E (10 min.)	神谷 万丈 日本国際フォーラム上席研究員／防衛大学校教授 KAMIYA Mataka, Superior Research Fellow, JFIR / Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan
報告F (10分間) Paper Presenter F (10 min.)	ジェームズ・ショフ カーネギー国際平和財団上級研究員 James SCHOFF, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
自由討議 (50分) Free Discussions (50 min.)	出席者全員 All Participants
15:30-15:50	
Break / 休憩	
セッション II／Session II	
15:50-17:40	
「アジア太平洋の安全保障環境」 "Security Environment in the Asia Pacific"	
議長 Chairperson	神谷 万丈 日本国際フォーラム上席研究員／防衛大学校教授 KAMIYA Mataka, Superior Research Fellow, JFIR / Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan
報告A (10分間) Paper Presenter A (10 min.)	中西 寛 京都大学教授 NAKANISHI Hiroshi, Professor, Kyoto University
報告B (10分間) Paper Presenter B (10 min.)	ラスト・デミング 元国務省首席次官補代理 Rust DEMING, former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
報告C(10分間) Paper Presenter C (10 min.)	加藤 洋一 朝日新聞編集委員 KATO Yoichi, National Security Correspondent, Asahi Shimbun
報告D (10分間) Paper Presenter D (10 min.)	ジェームズ・プリスタップ 米国防大学国家戦略研究所上席研究員 James J. PRZYSTUP, Senior Research Fellow, INSS
報告E(10分間) Paper Presenter E (10 min.)	泉川 泰博 中央大学准教授 IZUMIKAWA Yasuhiro, Associate Professor, Chuo University
報告F (10分間) Paper Presenter F (10 min.)	宮岡 勲 慶應義塾大学教授 MIYAOKA Isao, Professor, Keio University
自由討議 (50分) Free Discussions (50 min.)	出席者全員 All Participants
総括セッション／Wrap-up Session	
17:40-18:00	
総括 (20分間) Wrap-up (20 min.)	ジェームズ・プリスタップ 米国防大学国家戦略研究所上席研究員 James J. PRZYSTUP, Senior Research Fellow, INSS
	神谷 万丈 日本国際フォーラム上席研究員／防衛大学校教授 KAMIYA Mataka, Superior Research Fellow, JFIR / Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan

[NOTE] English-Japanese simultaneous interpretation will be provided／日本語・英語同時通訳付き

2. Biographies of the Panelists

【U.S. Panelists】

James J. PRZYSTUP

Senior Research Fellow, INSS

Holds BA Summa Cum Laude from the University of Detroit and MA and Ph.D. from the University of Chicago. Has worked on issues related to East Asia for close to thirty years on Capitol Hill, on the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, as the Deputy Director of the Presidential Commission on U.S.-Japan Relations, as Senior member for Asia-Pacific on the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State, and Director of Regional Security Strategy, Asia-Pacific, on the Policy Planning Staff in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Director of the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation.

Robert MANNING

Senior Fellow, the Atlantic Council

Formerly served as Senior Strategist, DNI National Counterproliferation Center, 2010-12 and Director, Long-Range Energy and Regional/Global Affairs, U.S. National Intelligence Council, Strategic Futures Group, 2008-2010. From 2005-2008 is served as a member of the Secretary's Policy Planning Staff, Department of State and from 2001-2005 he was Senior Counselor, Energy, Technology and Science Policy, Department of State. Prior to joining Department of State in 2001, served as Director of Asian Studies and a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR).

Nicholas SZECHENYI

Deputy Director and Senior Fellow, Office of the Japan Chair, CSIS

Received MA in international economics and Japan studies from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a B.A. in Asian studies from Connecticut College. Prior to joining CSIS in 2005, served as news producer for Fuji Television in Washington, D.C., where he covered U.S. policy in Asia and domestic politics. In 2009, selected as an inaugural fellow of the Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation's "U.S.-Japan Network for the Future" program.

James SCHOFF

Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

A specialist in East Asian security issues, U.S. alliance relations in the region, and WMD nonproliferation focused on North Korea, Schoff previously served as senior adviser for East Asia policy at the U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense, and as director of Asia-Pacific Studies at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA) in Cambridge, Massachusetts. . Prior to joining IFPA, served as program officer in charge of policy studies at the United States-Japan Foundation in New York.

Rust DEMING

former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State

Received BA from Rollins College and MA in East Asian Studies from Stanford University. Has spent much of his career dealing with Japanese affairs, having served in Japan as charge d'affaires, and as deputy chief of mission. Served as principal deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs (June 1998 to August 2000), senior advisor to the assistant secretary for East Asian and Pacific affairs from December 1997. Also, served as director of the Office of Japanese Affairs in Washington from 1991 to 1993. In 2011 he was recalled to the State Department for six months to serve once again as Japan Director. Concurrently serves as an adjunct professor of Japan studies at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University.

【Japanese Panelists】

ISHIKAWA Kaoru

President, GFJ

Graduated from the University of Tokyo and joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1972. Studied at l'Ecole Nationale d'Administration in France. Served as Research Associate of International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), London and Minister-Counselor to France, G8 Summit foreign affairs Sous-Sherpa (1999-2001 and 2005-07), Director General of Global Affairs Department (2002-05), Director General of Economic Affairs Bureau (2005-07), Private Secretary to Minister for Foreign Affairs Tsutomu Hata (1993-94), Liaison officer to Former Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto (1999-2006), Ambassador to Egypt and then to Canada. Also served as Part time lecturer at Waseda University, Visiting Professor at the University of Tokyo and Akita International University. He concurrently serves as Senior Executive Director of JFIR and Executive Vice-President of Council on East Asian Community (CEAC).

HOSOYA Yuichi

Professor, Keio University

Received his MIA from the University of Birmingham and Ph.D from Keio University. He is also Senior Researcher at Institute for International Policy Studies (IIPS) and at the Tokyo Foundation (TKFD). Served as Visiting Professor and Japan Chair at Sciences-Po in Paris (2009–10), Visiting fellow at Princeton University (2008–2009). His research interests include the postwar international history, British diplomatic history, Japanese diplomacy, and contemporary international security. He is a member of Prime Minister's Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security, and a member of Prime Minister's Advisory Panel on National Security and Defense Capabilities, in which capacity he helped to draft Japan's first National Security Strategy.

INA Hisayoshi

Foreign Policy Columnist, The Nikkei

Graduated from Waseda University and joined Nihon Keizai Shimbun (The Nikkei Newspapers) in 1976. His journalistic career includes four years in the Nikkei's Washington, DC. bureau as chief political correspondent and, subsequently, as a fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute of the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University. Has also been an editorial writer and vice-chair of the editorial board of Nikkei. He lectures at Aoyama Gakuin University, the University of the Sacred Heart, and Doshisha University Graduate School.

KAMIYA Mataka

Superior Research Fellow, JFIR / Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan

Graduated from the University of Tokyo in 1985 and did graduate study at Columbia University as a Fulbright grantee. Became Research Associate at the National Defense Academy of Japan in 1992, Lecturer with tenure in 1993, Associate Professor in 1996, and became Professor in 2004. Meanwhile, served as Distinguished Research Fellow at Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand (1994-95), and Visiting Research Fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs (2004-2005). Concurrently serves as Superior Research Fellow of The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), Editor-in-Chief of Discuss Japan—Japan Foreign Policy Forum (<http://www.japanpolicyforum.jp/en/>), and Member of the Board of Directors of Japan Association for International Security.

NAKANISHI Hiroshi*Professor, Kyoto University*

Received MA from Kyoto University in 1987 and studied in the doctor course of the History Department at the University of Chicago from 1988 to 1990 as Ph.D candidate. Served as Associate Professor in Kyoto University. His major interests include rise of the global international history of the 20th century, with particular interest on Japanese foreign and security policy in the Showa Era, and current Japanese foreign and security policy. He has been on the panel of several Governmental advisory committees, such as the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era, which issued the final report in August 2010.

KATO Yoichi*National Security Correspondent, Asahi Shimbun*

Graduated from Tokyo University of Foreign Studies and joined the Asahi Shimbun. Received MA from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. From 2001 to 2002 he was a visiting research fellow at both the Institute for National Strategic Studies of National Defense University (INSS/NDU) and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Served as deputy editor of both the political and foreign news departments from 2002 to 2004 in Tokyo and became Bureau Chief of Asahi's American General Bureau in Washington D.C. He taught a course on national security strategy at Gakushuin University in Tokyo from 2011 to 2012.

IZUMIKAWA Yasuhiro*Associate Professor, Chuo University*

Graduated from Kyoto University in 1990. Entered Osaka Gas Co. in 1990 and retired from office in 1994. Received his M.A. from School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), the Johns Hopkins University in 1996. Received his Ph.D. from Georgetown University in 2002. Served as Associate Professor at Miyazaki International College from 2002 and then at Kobe College from 2005. Held the current position since 2009. His research interests include international relations theory, alliance politics, and East Asian security.

MIYAOKA Isao*Professor, Keio University*

Graduated from Keio University in 1990. Entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan in 1990 and retired from office in 1995. Received MA from the University of Canterbury in 1994 and D.Phil. in politics from the University of Oxford in 1999. Served as Associate at Harvard University in 1999-2001 and then as Associate Professor at Osaka University of Foreign Studies from 2001 to 2007, at Osaka University from 2007 to 2010, and at Keio University from 2010 to 2012. Held the current position since 2012. His research interests include international relations theory and Japanese and American security policy.

(In order of appearance)

3. Presentation Papers

Session I: U.S. Factors and Japan Factors

<p>HOSOYA Yuichi Professor, Keio University</p>

Japan's National Security Strategy and the Japan-U.S. Alliance

On December 17, 2013, Japan's first National Security Strategy (NSS) was adopted by the Cabinet. The NSS sets the basic orientation of Japan's diplomatic and defense policies related to national security issues. Japanese government has never before adopted such a comprehensive national strategy. As Japan's inter-departmental rivalries have been an impediment to have a comprehensive and coherent national policy, this national security strategy paper together with the establishment of Japan's National Security Council (NSC) is widely welcomed by both Japanese media and security experts.

There are four important goals in Japan's NSS. The most important goals of Japan's NSS is "proactive contribution to peace based upon international cooperation". What this means is that Japanese government decides to take an internationalist approach in its security strategy. It is written in the NSS that "it has become indispensable for Japan to make more proactive efforts in line with the principle of international cooperation". This is because "Japan cannot secure its own peace and security by itself, and the international community expects Japan to play a more proactive role for peace and stability in the world, in a way commensurate with its national capabilities". Japan clearly denies such ways as isolationism, unilateralism and militarism.

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe who initiated the NSS clearly declared at Advisory Panel on National Security and Defense Capabilities on December 11, 2013, that "the NSS and then new NDPG are the cornerstones of these policies, and I am convinced that these instruments we have been reviewing together will become historical documents that will shape the national security of Japan".

The concept of "proactive contribution to peace based upon international cooperation" derives from Preamble of the Constitution of Japan. The Constitution said that "we believe that no nation is responsible to itself alone, but that laws of political morality are universal". It also said that "we desire to occupy an honored place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace". It should be noted that the basic idea of the NSS is a natural evolution of internationalist philosophy stipulated in the Constitution, while the NSS is at the same time a result of the rapid change in international security environment of the last decade. In this sense, the publication of the NSS is both necessary and timely. Therefore, J. Berkshire Miller wrote that "the United States should be happy about these changes."

The second important goal of the NSS is to remain Japan as "a first-tier nation". In the NSS, it is written that "Japan has contributed to peace, stability and prosperity in the region and the world." "In a world where globalization continues", the NSS argues, "Japan should play an even more

proactive role as a major global player in the international community.” Regarding with this, Dan Twining wrote that “American leaders should more forthrightly support their Japanese ally’s attempt to restore its geopolitical and economic competitiveness”.

The third important goal of the NSS is to defend liberal international order and its values. The NSS argues that “the maintenance and protection of international order based on rule and universal values, such as freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights, and the rule of law, are likewise in Japan’s national interests”. This stance resonates with the tradition of American national security strategy. Sharing this tradition, the Japan-U.S. alliance can be the center of Japanese national security strategy.

Based upon its alliance with the U.S., Japanese government aims to enhance its security cooperation with the other likeminded powers such as Australia, India and the Republic of Korea. Prime Minister Abe wrote in 27 December, 2012, in his article “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond”, that “I envisage a strategy whereby Australia, India, Japan, and the US state of Hawaii form a diamond to safeguard the maritime commons stretching from the Indian Ocean region to the western Pacific”.

The fourth important goal is to defend “open and stable sea” by regarding Japan as “a maritime state”. It is written in the NSS that “surrounded by the sea on all sides and blessed with an immense exclusive economic zone and an extensive coastline, Japan as a maritime stage has achieved economic growth through maritime trade and development of maritime resources, and has pursued “Open and Stable Seas””.

It is scheduled that by the end of 2014 Japanese and U.S. governments will revise the defense guidelines which was adopted in 17 years before. Both governments are fully aware that the stronger Japan-U.S. alliance will undoubtedly contribute to the peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, when China is growing its economy and military might rapidly. At the same time, the both governments can enhance the rule-based international order in this region. If one can long to have a peace and stable order based upon values such as democracy, freedom, the rule of law and human rights, the years 2013 and 2014 would be a good starting point to consolidate such an order. For the purpose of this, Japan’s government needs to change its traditional Constitutional interpretation of the collective self-defense right and Japan’s role in the United Nations’ collective security. Prime Minister’s advisory panel on the legal basis for security is expected to publish its report in April this year. By doing it, Japan can fully implement its “proactive contribution to peace”.

Robert MANNING
Senior Fellow, the Atlantic Council

The U.S. “Rebalance” to Asia and the US-Japan Alliance to 2025

The US “rebalance” toward Asia faces an array of challenges and persistent questions about its durability. It is buffeted by at home by US budget constraints and political dysfunction, inconsistent and uncertain foreign policy behavior, and a war weary American public on the one hand, and internationally by an assertive China with capabilities challenging the US naval access in the Pacific, an

unpredictable North Korea, and a region rife with tensions over territorial and historical disputes.

The recent US response to China's assertive behavior in the East and South China Seas, rejecting the legitimacy Beijing's imposition of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) overlapping Japanese and South Korean disputed territories, and also rejecting the legal basis of the "nine-dash line" in the South China Sea reinforced the Obama administration's posture in the Indo-Pacific region.

Is it a shift?

To understand and assess the "pivot" to Asia it needs to be considered in its political and historic context. It should also be viewed as part of a larger effort to define a US role in the world in a post-9/11 era. Despite Hillary Clinton's triumphal "we're back" rhetoric in 2010-11, what initially was dubbed the "pivot to Asia," was more a marketing device and dramatic shift in emphasis than it was a marked departure on actual policy. In many respects, the "rebalance" is a continuation and expansion of on-going policies.

Since WWII, the US has been the principal provider of public goods to East Asia and a critical part of the region's remarkable economic success over the past half century. The U.S. security presence and bilateral network of alliances, anchored in the US-Japan alliance, the US-ROK alliance, and alliances with Australia, the Philippines and Thailand are enduring, dynamic realities. Moreover, the US has steadily built up security partnerships with key ASEAN states, particularly Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam and Indonesia. Of late, US leadership and early recognition of and support for the political and economic reforms in a transitioning Burma helped catalyze that nation's economic and political transformation.

Since the end of the Cold War, however, the Asia-Pacific security environment has become increasingly problematic. There has been a bifurcation of economic and security dynamics in the Indo-Pacific region, each pulling in opposite directions, which I have called "the Two Asias."¹ In 2012, Asian defense spending surpassed that of Europe for the first time in the modern era, reaching 287 billion.² China, whose defense spending is roughly \$166 billion, accounts for the vast majority of Asian military investments.

Beijing's re-emergence and growing assertiveness is a major driver of tension and apprehension in the region. Underlying Chinese assertiveness is its strategy of moving from a principally continental power, to a major maritime actor in an effort to counter, if not diminish, US naval access to the first island chain, stretching from the Kuril islands to Okinawa to the Philippines, Malaysia and the straits of Malacca (see map below). This appears part of a PLA doctrinal shift from "coastal defense" to "Offshore Defense,"

¹ See Evan Feigenbaum and Robert A. Manning, "A Tale of Two Asias," *Foreign Policy*, October 31, 2012 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/10/30/a_tale_of_two_asias#sthash.klghmskz.dpbs

² See Myra McDonald, "Asia's Defense Spending Overtakes Europe's," *Reuters*, March 14, 2013 <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/14/us-security-military-iiss-idUSBRE92D0EL20130314>



Source: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/plan-doctrine-offshore.htm>

to permit the PLA Navy to operate in maritime areas out to 1800 kilometers beyond the Chinese mainland to “defend the nation’s sovereignty.”³

Origins of the Rebalance

Indeed, the US “rebalance” unveiled in November 2011 was in part animated by an upsurge of Chinese assertiveness in 2009-10. It was an effort to reassure US allies (particularly Japan and several ASEAN states) after a 2010 incident near the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyutai islands where Chinese fishing boats confronted the Japanese coast guard, and a similar spat between China and the Philippines over Scarborough Reef in the disputed Spratly islands raised concerns about US reliability and commitment to regional security.

President Obama formally proclaimed the policy shift in a speech to the Australian Parliament shortly thereafter. With no ambiguity, Obama decreed, “I have, therefore, made a deliberate and strategic decision—as a Pacific nation, the United States will play a larger and long-term role in shaping this region and its future, by upholding core principles and in close partnership with our allies and friends...we are here to stay.”⁴

That key speech, codifying the rebalance was followed by the release of a new Department of Defense Strategic Guidance document in January 2012. DOD stressed that US economic and security interests “are inextricably linked to developments in the arc extending from the Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and South Asia.” Thus, “we will of necessity,” DOD explained, “rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region.” This shift would entail the US Navy deploying 60% of its assets to the region, including four new Littoral Combat ships to be rotationally ported in Singapore,

³See GlobalSecurity.org: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/plan-doctrine-offshore.htm>

⁴ “Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament,” The White House, November 17, 2011.

and an increase in visits and exchanges in the region.⁵

While the military foundation of this policy has garnered the most attention, that is only one component of it. The diplomatic element was also evident. The US joined the East Asian Summit (EAS) which President Obama attended in 2011 and 2012, along with senior US officials spending a quantifiable more amount of time in the region, a deepening of engagement with ASEAN, and a reinforcement of US alliances with Japan and the ROK. Equally important importance, the administration brought new momentum to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) a regional trade agreement, now in the final stages of negotiation.

The most comprehensive and concise exposition of the rebalance was given by then National Security Advisor Tom Donilon in a speech earlier this year to the Asia Society. Donilon outlined five pillars which he said “harnesses all elements of US power – military, political, trade and investment, development, and our values”:

- Strengthening alliances;
- Deepening partnerships with emerging powers;
- Building a stable, productive and constructive relationship with China;
- Empowering regional institutions, and;
- Helping to build a regional economic architecture that can sustain shared prosperity.⁶

While the “rebalance” is clearly a multidimensional phenomenon, and has been admirably and vigorously promoted and underscores the US role in Asia in bright neon lights, the policy is one that largely represents continuity. Half of US aircraft carriers, and a similar proportion of the US Navy’s ships and submarines were positioned in the region prior to the policy shift. Thus in military terms it is a welcome, if modest expansion. Similarly, deepening partnership with ASEAN as an institution and with its members bilateral is a cumulative process. Serving in the Department of State from 2001-2008, I can attest that this process was well underway. And the TPP began its negotiating efforts well before Obama took office.

Renewing the Pivot

Most recently, when President Obama cancelled his planned visit to Asia in October during the Government shutdown, doubts in Asia over the durability of the US “pivot” to Asia reached a crescendo. But a cascade of recent events, highlighted by B-52s defying a Chinese air defense identification zone have demonstrated US resolve and a sense of assurance about the US rebalance.

It began with the remarkable US response to the horrendous disaster that typhoon Haiyan caused in the Philippines: more than 50 ships and planes, 9500 troops and \$37 million in humanitarian assistance. If there was any doubt about who answers Asia’s 911 calls (not China, not ASEAN, not the ARF), they were swiftly erased. Moreover the US effort contrasted with what was seen as a puny and mean-spirited Chinese initial response of \$100,000.

Renewing the Pivot

The B-52 flyover was part of a US-Japan military exercise in the East China Sea that served as a huge rebuff to an ill-conceived Chinese action. There is nothing unusual about Air Identification Zones (ADIZs) per se – the US and some 20 others nations have created ADIZs, which can require foreign aircraft entering the airspace to identify itself. But China unveiled its ADIZ on Nov.23rd with no consultation or warning in areas overlapping Japanese, Korean and Taiwanese airspace, triggering an

⁵ US Department of Defense, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” Washington, DC, January 2012

⁶ Tom Donilon, “The United States and the Asia-Pacific 2013,” speech to the Asia Society, New York, March 11, 2013.

on-going international game of chicken. Not coincidentally, China's ADIZ overlaps Japanese airspace over the Senkaku islands (called Diaoyu by China), tiny uninhabited rocks administered by Japan but claimed by China. It also overlaps a South Korean underwater reef, the Socotra rocks (also claimed by China), which falls with Seoul's ADIZ and on which it has built a research platform.

China's ADIZ action was swiftly denounced in a statement by Secretary of Defense Hagel and Secretary of State Kerry, saying, "We view this development as a destabilizing attempt to alter the status quo in the region. This unilateral action increases the risk of misunderstanding and miscalculations." Kerry added that the US "does not apply its ADIZ procedures to foreign aircraft not intending to enter US national airspace. Hagel emphasized that the US would not change how it conducts military operations in the region. The B-52 flyover underscored both statements.

Renewing the Pivot

In the aftermath of the impressive US response to the Philippines disaster, National Security Advisor Susan Rice gave a major Asia speech on Nov.20th at Georgetown University designed to restore confidence in the administration's Asia Pivot. Rice emphasized, "rebalancing toward the Asia Pacific remains a cornerstone of the Obama administration foreign policy. No matter how many hotspots emerge elsewhere."

Rice stressed the importance of alliances, outlining US efforts to bolster those with Japan and South Korea, as evidenced during the October "2+2 Security Consultative meetings between the US Secretaries of State and Defense and their respective Japanese and Korean counterparts.. Rice stressed that "our foremost economic goal in the region is concluding negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and achieving Congressional approval." And in one of the few explicit references to the adhesive nature of TPP, Rice added that the US welcomes, "any nation that is willing to live up the high standards of this (TPP) agreement, *and that includes China* (my italics).

The China Challenge

While Rice amply depicted the complexity and ambiguity of US policy toward China, the one new direction she pointed to undoubtedly gave pause to US allies in Asia. She explained that Obama seeks to "operationalize a new model of major power relations." (NMMPR) To be fair, Rice's description of it sounds a lot like current policy: "managing inevitable competition while forging deeper cooperation on issues where our interests converge..."

But Beijing appears to have in mind something rather different, and this is the long-term challenge to the Pivot. Chinese President Xi Jinping put NMMPR forward in 2012, and both leaders endorsed it in aspirational terms at the October Sunnylands Summit. But beyond a considerable economic interdependence and global issues such as climate change, it is a vacuous concept, depicted by Chinese analysts in the fuzziest generalities: win-win, mutual understanding and respect, strategic trust, etc.

The punchline in Chinese depictions of NMMPR is "respect for each other's 'core interests.'" To China this appears to mean stop selling arms to Taiwan, don't meet with the Dalai Lama, stop aerial surveillance near our borders, don't interfere with bilateral Chinese territorial disputes, and perhaps an implicit acceptance of a Chinese sphere of influence in the region. In many conversations with Chinese intellectuals and officials, when I ask, "if we had this new relationship, what would China do differently, I have gotten only silence in reply.

If the vague NMMPR is more than a rhetorical device by which Beijing seeks to maneuver the US into accommodating its regional and global ambitions, it has to involve Beijing respecting a rules-based order – the opposite of its recent actions. Over time, the success or failure of the rebalance

will rest on three key things:

- the state of US-China relations and;
- the effectiveness of the US-Japan alliance and the ability to construct a network of US alliances and partnerships that can evolve into an operationalized counter-balancing force with counter-A2AD capabilities .
- A dynamic Japan acting as a more normal nation, and not undermining its strategic goals by seeking to revise history, but building strategic trilateral cooperation between the US, Japan and the ROK.

In the decade ahead, the US-China relationship will likely be pulled toward one predominant direction or the other. This reality is implicit in Xi Jinping's statement at the October Sunnylands, California Summit that, "China and the United States must find a new path, one that is different from the inevitable confrontation and conflict between the major countries of the past."

Framework for Strategic Stability

The foundation for a long term US-China relationship that is decidedly more cooperative than competitive requires a decided PRC choice to pursue a foreign policy largely adhering to international norms and constructively working to shape and update them and also in fashioning a framework for strategic stability. It is worth noting that it took nearly two decades, and two near-nuclear catastrophes (the Berlin and Cuban Missile crises) before the US and USSR reached the conclusion that neither could win a nuclear war and began a process to manage competition. While China is not necessarily an adversary, its capabilities require reaching understandings that reinforce strategic stability.

As a nuclear weapons power, one with growing ballistic missile capabilities and advanced anti-space weapons, and a fledgling blue water navy, China's capabilities – regardless of its intentions—pose challenges to the U.S. and the region.

Though US-Russian relations are problematic, there is a strategic framework, transparency and predictability in regard to each other's strategic forces. For more than a decade, the US has sought to engage Beijing in a strategic dialogue to address these issues.

There is no framework with Beijing on any strategic issues, creating fears of crisis instability. China has viewed transparency as a weapon of the strong against the weak, and prefers uncertainty to crisis management as to its strategic advantage.

Over the coming decade, the fate of U.S. Asia policy will likely depend on the resilience of the US and Japanese economies as the foundations of sustained US military capabilities and Japan's ability to implement a robust collective defense posture.

To the extent the US is able to deepen its presence in the economic component of the policy, that will enhance perceptions and reality in the region of the US as a Pacific power. The real prospect of exports of natural gas to the region, enhancing the energy security of allies and partners would add a new dimension to US economic engagement in the region. Finally, the character of US-China relations and Japan's relations with both China and the ROK will be a key driver of the success of the rebalance.

INA Hisayoshi
Foreign Policy Columnist, The Nikkei

The alliance in less warm atmosphere –Abe Crisis vs Obama Crisis

- April, 2014 President Obama's visit: "No failure in summits" Press may point out indifference between the leaders.
- May to June, 2014 New interpretation about collective defense right
- Autumn, 2014 Negotiation about new defense guidelines
- Calendar journalism or diplomacy about 2015: 70th anniversary of the end of WW2, 50th anniversary of Japan-ROK treaty, 55th anniversary of the revision of US-Japan Security Treaty
- Structural reason of the indifference of US-Japan relations: Japanese lawmakers, bureaucrats and even journalists tend to have a soft spot for the Republican Party.
- Background :
 - (1) geographical "Japan is another Alaska," as a very frontline state to the Cold war.
 - (2) historical. Woodrow Wilson rejected Japan's proposal for racial equality at the Versailles meeting in 1919. Franklin Roosevelt forced Japanese-Americans into internment camps during World War II. Harry Truman authorized the use of atomic bombs against Japan. Dwight Eisenhower agreed to revise the Japan-U.S. security treaty, Richard Nixon authorized the return of Okinawa to Japan and Ronald Reagan apologized to Japanese-Americans who were forcibly relocated during the war.
 - (3) psychological. Affinity between The L D P and the Republican Party. In foreign policy community there is no "Armitage" in Democrats. Amrmitage and Green know "naniwabushi" but Campbell does not.

Counterargument from the US side

- "Nixon shock", trade friction in Reagan era etc.

No counterargument to geographic and psychological reason so far

Nicholas SZECHENYI
Deputy Director and Senior Fellow, Office of the Japan Chair, CSIS

For over six decades the U.S.-Japan alliance has been the cornerstone of security and stability in the Asia Pacific and should continue to play an important role in shaping the regional order. Five months ago the U.S. and Japanese governments convened a Security Consultative Committee or "2+2" meeting here in Tokyo to outline a strategic vision for the alliance based on shared values and interests and detail the parameters for defense cooperation going forward. A review of the bilateral guidelines for defense cooperation is taking place in parallel with dialogues on a range of security issues including space, cyber, and extended deterrence. Initiatives in a host of other areas including humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, trade liberalization, and development assistance also speak to the breadth

and depth of the bilateral agenda. President Obama's expected visit to Japan later this spring therefore presents an opportunity to showcase the dynamism in the relationship and further develop a strategic framework for the future that will, as stated in the recent 2+2 statement, "effectively promote peace, security, stability, and economic prosperity in the Asia Pacific region."

The alliance has evolved in response to changes in the international security environment and political developments in both countries and continues to flourish because of a mutual willingness to adapt to changing circumstances. Today's event will address a broad range of issues currently animating the U.S.-Japan relationship and factors that could help determine how the relationship will advance in the coming years. Here are three themes for consideration:

Energy

Japan is devising a post-3/11 growth strategy that will depend fundamentally on a stable supply of energy but has yet to reach consensus on an energy mix to support a path towards sustainable growth. The shutdown of Japan's nuclear power plants has increased dependency on fossil fuels for power generation in the near term as the government attempts to finalize a new basic energy plan as prelude to a detailed strategy for energy security. Meanwhile, the shale gas revolution in the United States has sparked an energy policy debate over the best means to use this abundant resource including the implications of increased gas exports to countries such as Japan. The United States and Japan have established a bilateral dialogue on energy cooperation including clean energy, civil nuclear cooperation, nonproliferation, and climate change, but there is room to place energy cooperation in a broader strategic context and develop an alliance framework for energy security that would support Japan's long-term energy needs.

The Politics of Trade

Japan's entry into the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations and the initiation of bilateral trade talks in parallel have served to reinforce the economic pillar of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Japan's sensitivities toward liberalizing trade in agricultural products and ongoing disagreements over market access issues for US automobiles have animated the bilateral discussions, and the failure of the 12 TPP countries to reach an agreement by the end of last year, as well as the weakening prospects for congressional approval of Trade Promotion Authority for the president, raise questions about the timeline for implementing the signature economic component of the U.S. rebalance to the Asia Pacific. The politics of trade in Tokyo and Washington continue to complicate economic relations but political leaders in both countries should not lose sight of the economic and strategic significance of Japan's participation in TPP and joint leadership in establishing rules and norms for trans-Pacific economic integration.

Interoperability

Despite budgetary pressures the United States and Japan have embarked on an ambitious plan for security cooperation in the years ahead. Efforts at joint training and increased interoperability between the Japan Self Defense Forces and the U.S. military can counter downward pressure on defense spending in both countries, as well as initiatives to network with other partners in the region. In addition, the relaxation of Japan's three arms export principles to allow the joint development and production of defense equipment raises the potential for Japan to increase defense industrial collaboration with the United States and other countries as a means of enhancing capabilities and efficiency. Fiscal constraints will place a premium on doing more with less as the two governments work to align their respective defense strategies.

KAMIYA Mataka
Superior Research Fellow, JFIR /
Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan

Obama Administration's Incoherent Foreign Policy
As Factor That Could Damage the U.S.-Japan Alliance

1. *'Shaking' of U.S. policy on East Asia*

- Concern of being "entangled" into a "Japan's conflict" with China over the Senkaku Islands has risen in the United States.
- There seems to be an increasing attempts in the United States to "dilute" the security aspect ("to put a brake on China's assertiveness" aspect) of the "rebalance" to Asia.
 - The Obama administration initially hoped that the U.S. could induce China to become a more responsible supporter of the existing international order. -Disappointed to see a series of Chinese actions from the end of 2009 to 2010, however, the administration decided to put more emphasis on the hedge side of the "engagement and hedging" policy toward China (without giving up engagement).
 - However, without witnessing any improvement in Chinese behavior (on the contrary it worsened from the Japanese view point), the Obama administration appears to be shifting back to an engagement-centric policy toward China. This could invite Japanese distrust toward the United States.
 - In her first "Asia speech" at Georgetown University on November 20, 2013, National Security Advisor Susan E. Rice said that the United States would "seek to operationalize a new model of major power relations" with China:
- Is the U.S. policy on Japan also "shaking"?
 - The Obama administration expressed "disappointment" over Prime Minister Abe's visit to Yasukuni Shrine, but Abe seems to have been disappointed at Obama's not-very-warm attitude toward him.

2. *Influence of the Obama Administration's "vacillation" on the Syrian crisis*

- Negative "messages" that Obama administration's zig-zag on the Syrian crisis sent to the countries in the Asia-Pacific region.
- President Obama's reputation as an international leader was severely damaged as a result of this series of events, and the United States, as world leader, lost significant credibility: such a view is spreading throughout the international community.
 - At one point, President Obama labeled the use of chemical weapons as a red line, threatening Assad by indicating his stance that he is prepared to use military force if chemical weapons were used.
 - His administration however did not do anything against Assad, who crossed a red line and used a weapon of mass destruction (according to the administration's assertion).
 - If comments by the president were in fact this callous and lightweight, how can the world trust the promises and commitments made by the United States in the future? This is the kind of skepticism that has been emerging.
- President Obama's reputation as an international leader was severely damaged as a result of this series of events, and the United States, as world leader, lost significant credibility: such a view is spreading throughout the international community.
- Japan, whose security policy is based on the principle of an exclusively defense-oriented defense (*senshu-boei*) and on the reliance on its alliance with the United States, is most seriously

worried about the possibility that President Obama's vacillation on Syria has damaged the credibility of the United States.

- President Obama's comment in a speech at the White House on September 10 that "America is not the world's policeman," further heightened concerns and suspicions among the Japanese.
"As several people wrote to me, 'We should not be the world's policeman.' I agree . . . The United States is not the world's policeman. Terrible things happen across the globe, and it is beyond our means to right every wrong."
- *The Economist* published an article entitled "Global cop, like it or not" in its August 31. The president of the United States, however, said that his country is no longer burdened with this role.
- Would the United States, which is not the world's policeman, keep the promises and commitments it has made to its allies, including Japan? For now, while feeling an increasing sense of insecurity, the Japanese people have not lost trust in the United States. That said, the Japanese people will likely keep a closer watch on President Obama's statements and actions from here on forward.

James SCHOFF

Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

U.S. View of Japan's Evolving Security Role under PM Abe and Beyond

- Overall, the US government is pleased that Abe was elected and it supports the direction he is taking on the economy and on security issues.
 - Not that Washington disliked the DPJ. In fact, contrary to what Abe and the LDP sometimes say, the Obama administration felt that it had a very good partner in the DPJ (especially when Kan and Noda were in charge). The US was proud of the fact that the alliance was earning "bipartisan support" in Japan, and Washington saw this as a long-term asset for the alliance.
 - Still, the Abe administration is more proactive and decisive vis-à-vis the economy and defense issues, and it is more politically stable...which is positive from US perspective.
 - The US (and the Obama administration) is rooting for Japan and Abe to succeed. Even though there are some competitive aspects to our relationship in areas like negotiating the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) and some concern that PM Abe might push historical revisionism too much, overall the US understands that our values and interests align closely, and a stronger Japan is good for the United States.
- On the security front, we all know that Japan could play a more significant security role in Asia and the world, but it faces many limitations (some self-imposed and some external):
 - 7th largest defense budget in the world
 - Budget and personnel increase in FY2013
 - One of the world's most modern Navy and Air Force
- But in Yen terms, Japan's defense budget in 2013 merely back to where it was in 2000, and the recent personnel increase is less than 300. China's defense budget has more than doubled during that

timeframe (now about 3x the size of Japan's defense budget and supports a military 9x the size of Japan's).

- Also, Japan's current policy is for real defense spending decline (given inflation target);
- And, Japan doesn't get as much as most others for its defense budget...high personnel and procurement costs. For example, spending roughly \$500m in 2013 for four F-35s. That's about 10% of the procurement budget and 1/5 of the aircraft acquisition budget.
- Japan does have high-level capabilities (mid-air refueling, JDAMs, 5th gen fighters, AWACs, Hyuga-class (helo) destroyers and Atago-class Aegis (BMD) destroyers), but laws restrict when and how these capabilities can be used.
- Japan has a lot of CH-47s, but no way of getting them overseas other than by ship (it's new transport aircraft was designed to carry Patriot batteries but not CH-47 helicopters).
- Japan is great security cooperation partner with the US (not only for defense of Japan, but also in counter-proliferation, counter-piracy, and special missions like the Indian Ocean refueling experience, etc.). Still, Japan generally requires special exceptions and restrictive rules of engagement for anything beyond defense-of-Japan. There has been some added flexibility in recent years, but only on the margin, and the region would benefit from more.
- Holding Japan back has been a combination of history, politics, and strategic choice (i.e., Constitution, voter sentiment, and preferred focus on econ/trade).
 - Leadership in Japan now wants to make different strategic choices in response to the worsening security environment.
 - There is some voter shift (though not as much as the US newspapers believe), but legal foundation hard to change (and budget limitation is a big obstacle).⁷
- Abe and LDP trying to change this via legal and policy means:
 - State Secrets Law
 - Establish NSC and National Security Strategy
 - Updated NDPG and MTDP
 - Expand Right of Collective Self-Defense
 - New Defense Guidelines with US
 - Long-term goal of revising Constitution, establish National Defense Force, and enact Fundamental Law on National Security
- At the operational level, the focus is on enhancing the following capabilities:
 - Strengthening intelligence gathering and information security (drones, info protection law, satellites, cyber)
 - Strengthening island defense (including amphibious landing and Osprey procurement)
 - Improved defense against nuclear/missile attack (BMD and possible retaliatory strike)
 - Expanding weapons export and defense industry development opportunities

⁷ Debt service is almost 1/4 of the general account budget (23% of expenditures, compared to 6% in US). Bond dependency ratio 46% (compared to 34% in US).

- This is all very ambitious, and though I expect Japan will make progress in some of these areas, it is politically difficult to change Japan's security role so fundamentally. In the end, Japan will likely make the most progress in the areas of national defense (outer island, cyber, and missile), and its ability to project force as part of broader multilateral security cooperation activities will remain limited (from both a legal and capabilities perspectives).
- The key issue for Japan (and what I notice most about the new National Defense Program Guidelines) is thinking beyond deterrence as the only role for the military and understanding that it might actually become necessary to use force for self-defense (either around the Senkaku Islands or vis-à-vis North Korea). Moreover, it needs to be able to project force in a flexible manner to adapt to different possible situations and to give Japan's leaders different options for controlling escalation. This is a whole new era for Japan's Self-Defense Forces, and it is the backdrop for the bilateral initiative to revise Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation.
- Washington supports Japan's efforts to improve its self-defense capability (especially in the East China Sea), because this takes some of the pressure off the United States in the so-called gray zone conflict scenarios. Japan is able to take the lead in these situations and make its own political decisions, with the US providing logistical (and diplomatic) support.
- But Washington also hopes that Japan will expand its interpretation to exercise collective self-defense, which could apply to UN-approved international security cooperation activities and to a situation involving North Korea. This would allow for more integrated alliance defense cooperation, particularly in the areas of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (including space and cyber domains), logistical support, and maritime force protection.⁸ The purpose of this stepped-up security cooperation would be two-fold:
 - To complement the US rebalance to Asia as a response to a more demanding regional security environment (e.g., Asia is the only region of the world where defense spending increased last year compared to the year before); and
 - To combine with other allies and partners w/ democratic governance (e.g., Australia, South Korea, and some SE Asian countries) to build habits of regional security cooperation and a regional security architecture that can eventually involve China and help dampen security competition in East Asia.
- North Korea is a particular concern for the United States, because it is unpredictable and could involve an all-out conflict. Also, the North's nuclear and missile capability means that it is able to strike Japan (or US bases in Japan) without warning, which is a good reason why Japan would be justified to allow collective self-defense to apply to a North Korea scenario if the Diet approves. Supporting the neutralization of North Korea's military during a large-scale crisis is important for Japan's self-defense, and it could involve cooperation with other countries besides the US, like South Korea and Australia.
- A concern in Washington is the possible agenda PM Abe and his circle have for historical revisionism. One PM visit to Yasukuni Shrine can be managed, but the larger problem would be a sustained high-level campaign to rationalize or even dismiss some uncomfortable aspects of Japan's history in the first half of the 20th Century. This would make it harder for the US and Japan to strengthen their alliance and could do disservice to Japan's democracy.

⁸ For more on how the United States and Japan could use the Defense Guideline revision process to develop a more integrated "front office/back office" alliance posture, see James L. Schoff, "How to Upgrade U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Policy Outlook, January 16, 2014 available at <http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/01/16/how-to-upgrade-u.s.-japan-defense-cooperation/gykq>

Session II: Security Environment in the Asia Pacific

NAKANISHI Hiroshi
Professor, Kyoto University

Japan-ROK relations

There is no doubt that Japan-ROK relations get very low at this stage, arguably the worst situation since the conclusion of the Basic Relations Treaty of 1965. Even though there are conspicuous issues of contention between the two countries on history and territory such as Takeshima/Dokdo, comfort women, compulsory wartime labor, textbook issues, it would be a mistake to single out any specific factors or individuals to bring about this situation. The root cause of the current state of affairs is irresponsible anti-Japanese and anti-Korean sentiment in both societies. “Irresponsible” means two things. First, there is no considered restraint in claims and criticisms against the other. They are voiced to denounce the other, rather than resolving differences. Second, both sides well know that this separation with the other does not jeopardize their own interest. Both countries have strong stake with others: For Japan, the alliance with the US, competition and conflict with China, and rebuilding relationship with Russia. For ROK, the alliance with the US, cooperation with China on economy and DPRK affairs, and North-South relationship are important. But for Japan and ROK, it gets more and more difficult to define precisely what is at stake to have good relationship with each other, which has led to this “irresponsible” mutual disrespect. It is safe domestically and internationally for the public in both countries to say “I hate the Japanese/Koreans.”

Apparently, the public’s perception towards the other is bad. The Genron NPO and East Asia Institute survey in May 2013 is particularly informative.ⁱ 37.3% of Japanese has unfavorable view on Korea (as relative to 31.1% favorable) and 76.6% of Koreans has unfavorable view towards Japan (12.2% favorable). The recent survey by Nikkei newspaper shows that 57% of Japanese oppose to hold the summit meeting with ROK and China if Japan needs to make concessions.ⁱⁱ But it is doubtful that these sentiments are deep-seated in both societies. Except for small number of activists who advocate anti-Japanese/ anti-Korean sentiment, the majority of public takes sides on specific issues such as comfort women, forced labor compensation, Takeshima/Tokdo, or Yasukuni visit, but they are never high on the list of important affairs. So there is reasonable chance that if there is a bold move for both governments to improve relationship coupled with compromise on some prominent issues such as comfort women issue or forced labor issue, the public mood changes significantly.

But it has to be noted that the quasi-alliance of US-Japan-ROK, which appeared possible in late 1990s and during much of the Lee Myung-pak’s era, has lost much of foundations internationally and domestically. Getting back to those periods appear nostalgic. The chief reason is divergent interest of Japan and ROK in terms of East Asian international relations. As China rises in maritime policy and conflict between Japan and China escalates in East China Sea zone, Japan attaches more importance to the alliance with the US. At the same time, the abduction issue by DPRK virtually suffocated Japanese polity options toward North Korea and thereby diminished Japanese influence towards the peninsula. ROK sees more and more as balancing among the surrounding powers: the US, China, Japan, and

Russia important, and balancing alliance with the US and closeness with PRC seems most important to control DPRK as well as economic and security interest. Japan fears risk of abandonment with the US, while ROK

So what shall be done? Of course, the effort to hold the summitry and find reasonable compromise on outstanding issues such as comfort women issue and forced laborers issue need to be pursued. Still, some of the prominent issues are very difficult to find compromise. Takeshima/Dokdo issue is case in point. There is no chance for Japan to stop claiming the island and the trend is more domestic coverage on the issue such as longer textbook description or the memorial event such as the "Day of Takeshima (Feb. 22)" currently sponsored by Shimane prefecture. Korean government has openly laid claims against these domestic public relations

It is important to redefine the roles and stakes of the Japan-ROK relationship within the framework of the trilateral relationship with the US and even larger framework of East Asia. In what area and in what way the Japan-ROK cooperation as well as tripartite US-Japan-ROK is effective? The episode of Japan's SDF temporarily provided ammunitions to the ROK troops in the Southern Sudan peace keeping operations suggest there is potential need and willingness for the cooperation. Japan and ROK also needs to find areas of deeper cooperation for mutual interest. Possible agenda may include cooperation in energy, global peace-building efforts, exchanges of policy ideas on rapidly-aging society, low fertility, and women's role in society.

At the same time, the US needs to share its interests and policies on each bilateral relationship to the third country. The US has to make clear to the ROK why the US-Japan alliance is important and supports Japan's increased security roles, while the US needs to explain its stake at the alliance with the ROK, particularly after the return of the wartime operational command in 2015, and its stance on the protracted nuclear power agreement expected to be revised in 2016.

Rust DEMING
former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State

Challenges for the U.S.-Japan Alliance over the next Decade

The Evolving Strategic Setting

Over the next decade, there is likely to be a continuing shift of economic influence away from the U.S., EU, and Japan to China, India, the ROK and the other BRICS. Moreover, the technology gap between the three traditional leaders and the rising economies will continue to narrow. This shift of economic influence will see a corresponding change in political power and strategic weight. Pax Americana will continue to fade, as will the effectiveness of the UN in addressing regional and sub-national disputes.

In this setting, rising powers, particularly China and India, will increasingly challenge international norms, including in the global commons, and demand a greater say in international and regional political institutions. There is likely to be continuing chaos in the Middle East, Africa, Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Balkans, and Caucuses which will increase regional tensions and tensions between Russia, on the one hand, and the U.S. and EU on the other. These disputes will also distract the

U.S. from its “pivot” to East Asia.

In East Asia, China is likely to increase its assertive behavior in bordering maritime areas. Its anti-access/area denial (A2AD) capability will become more formidable, and the PRC will become more aggressive in responding to U.S. and Japanese naval activity within the first island chain, including around the Senkaku Islands. North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs are likely to advance and give the DPRK a rudimentary strategic nuclear capability that can reach population centers in the continental U.S. The ROK will continue its economic and technological growth. As its self-confidence grows, the ROK may become more assertive about its territorial and history agenda. It will continue to try to balance its relations with China and the U.S., but as Seoul takes over the leadership of Combined Command, the U.S.-ROK alliance may weaken.

The U.S. will remain the preeminent military power in East Asia and the world and the only one with global reach. At the same time, budgetary pressure will reduce the size of American armed forces, particularly the Army, and slow down Navy and Air Force modernization programs. Because of technological changes and the growing capabilities of regional powers, the U.S. Navy and Air Force will adopt more “stand-off” strategies for applying military force, and there are likely to be major adjustments in U.S. forward deployment.

Implications for the U.S.-Japan Alliance

In this shifting strategic environment, the U.S.-Japan will face fundamental challenges that will require dedicated leadership in both countries to manage. These challenges include:

1. Loss of Mutual Confidence

The U.S. Japan alliance represents an implicit grand bargain, based on American ability and willingness to guarantee Japan’s strategic security (the nuclear umbrella) and provide regional stability, in return for Japan’s agreement to host American forces, align its strategic interests to those of the United States, steadily take on greater defense responsibilities within the framework of the alliance, and use its economic power and political influence to advance common objectives, as defined largely by the U.S. With the tectonic shifts in global and regional power now underway, the long-term viability of this “grand bargain” is now in question.

From the Japanese perspective, there is growing concern about the reliability of the U.S. as a strategic guarantor. Despite the U.S. rhetorical commitment to East Asia, as symbolized by the “pivot,” Japanese strategic thinkers have a number of concerns:

- 1) **Increased U.S. strategic vulnerability** in the form of Chinese nuclear forces and North Korean efforts to develop a first strike capability that raise fears of “decoupling” U.S. strategic interests from those of Japan. This is coupled by the nagging fear of “atamagoshi gaikoo” rooted in the Nixon shocks and Chris Hill’s uncoordinated negotiations with Pyongyang but recently reinforced by the perceived inconsistency of Obama Administration toward China.
- 2) **The increased vulnerability of U.S. maritime forces in East Asia** to “asymmetric” A2AD capabilities, including Chinese precision guided munitions and submarines, something that is already causing the U.S. to consider a more of “standoff” doctrine that would bring into question the viability of a forward deployed strategy, including American bases in Japan. This again threatens to decouple Japan from the U.S.
- 3) **Increasing doubts about the strength, vision, and commitment to internationalism of American political leadership** of both parties, symbolized by Washington gridlock, looming cuts in the defense budget, and the Syria debacle.

From the U.S. side, American leaders broadly welcome the leadership displayed by Prime Minister Abe, particularly his renewed commitment to the U.S.-Japan alliance, the restructuring and revitalization of Japan's national security policy, and his efforts to reinvigorate the Japanese economy. At the same time there is a degree of distrust among American elites about certain aspects of the Prime Minister's agenda:

1) **Abe's perceived "historical revisionism"**, particularly the comfort women issue. Abe's early statements about revisiting both the Murayama Statement and Konno Statements, his December 26 visit to Yasukuni Shrine, and his evasive response in Diet interpellations on the definition of "aggression" all caught the attention of American elites, particularly because of the intense Chinese and Korean reaction. American reaction to the Abe government's subsequent actions on defense policy is influenced by these lingering suspicions about his views of history.

2) **Japan's long term strategic agenda**. The majority of American defense strategists appear to understand and support Japan's efforts to reinterpret the constitution to allow collective self-defense and to reorient its defense structure forces to defense of the southwestern islands and maritime control. At the same time, the flurry of initiatives in the last year, including the legislation to create a National Security Council and establish an official secrets act, the reconstitution of the "Yanai Commission" on collective self-defense, the revision of the NDPG to include consideration of acquiring missile "strike capability", and the modest increase in Japan's defense budget have been interpreted by some in the U.S. as signaling a major departure from Japan's post-war defense policy. The National Security Strategy put forward in December did a great deal to put these evolutionary defense policy changes into the broader context of Japan's foreign policy, but it is important that Japan continue its efforts to explain its policies to East Asian and American leaders and publics.

2. Differing Threat Perceptions and Strategic Priorities

Alliances are generally based on common threat perceptions. The Cold War and the threat of Soviet direct or indirect aggression was the original glue of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Since the 1990s, the North Korean nuclear and missile threat and growing Chinese maritime military capabilities and territorial challenges have been the major unifying factors. However, there appear to be potential gaps between the U.S. and Japan with respect to both China and North Korea.

China: While we share similar long-term strategic concerns and objectives, the U.S. and Japan risk being out of sync at any given time with respect to right balance between engagement and hedging. This is particularly true because the issues that cause tension in our respective relations with China are not always the same. Japan-China relations are heavily influenced by periodic history and territorial clashes, while U.S.-China ties resonate more to human rights disputes and politically charged finance and trade disagreements. The Senkaku Islands issue is particularly allergic in this regard. While the Obama administration has been forthright about reaffirming that the islands fall under Art. V of the MST, there is little desire in the U.S. to get into a confrontation with the PRC over these islands. There is also wariness of provocations by either side that could entangle the U.S. Managing potential divergences on China policy will a major challenge for the alliance.

North Korea: There is no policy gap at the moment because neither Japan nor the U.S. is engaged with North Korea, but should substantial negotiations resume, differences are likely to reemerge. There is continued U.S. frustration with Japan's preoccupation with the abductee issue, while Japan is concerned that if and when there are end game negotiations with Pyongyang, the U.S. may well be willing to settle for something short of a fully denuclearized

DPRK. Such an eventuality could fundamentally undermine Japanese confidence in the credibility of the U.S. commitment to Japan's security. Korean reunification, when and if it occurs, will also challenge the U.S.-Japan alliance, particularly if a unified Korea is nuclear-armed and moves to remove the American military base structure.

Russia: Differing perceptions of Russia may also prove a challenge for U.S. -Japan alliance management. There are signs that both Tokyo and Moscow see it in their strategic and economic advantage to make a serious effort to reach agreement on the issues that have stood in the way of a peace treaty. This would be a welcome development, ending one of the few remaining issues from WWII. However, a Japan-Russia rapprochement, coming at a time of increasing tension between Russia, on the one hand, and the U.S. and EU on the other, over Syria, Ukraine, and Iran, could risk putting Japan out of sync with the West on relations with Moscow.

3. Okinawa

Prime Minister Abe has renewed Japan's commitment to resolving the Futenma issue and taken a major step in that direction by creating the conditions that allowed Governor Nakaima to approve the land fill permit. However, there remain serious obstacles to implementing the agreement. If the FRF fails, the Marines are virtually certain to stay at Futenma, risking growing local pressure against the U.S. base presence. The disconnect between alliance solidarity at the top and the growing fragility of Okinawan support for American bases remains an Achilles heel of the alliance.

Conclusion

The above indicates a difficult environment for the U.S.-Japan alliance, particularly if it is put on "automatic pilot," without strong leadership on either side to address the full range of challenges. However, there are steps that Japan and the United States can take to mitigate the risks and enhance the opportunities for better outcomes: These include:

1. **Getting our respective economies in order**, including opening of our markets, to give us the economic strength necessary for active international engagement.
2. Using political leadership to **strengthen elite and public support for active, constructive engagement abroad**, including defense spending, ODA, and support for international institutions.
3. Ensuring that the **political leadership in both Japan and the United States devote the time and attention necessary to build the alliance and strengthen mutual confidence**. Both governments should focus on future challenges and opportunities and avoid statements or actions that cause historical differences to reenter the political arena.
4. Devoting the time and resources necessary to **enhance elite and grass roots interchanges between Japanese and Americans** to build a wide and deep network for the future. The JET program is an essential element in this regard, as are these kinds of exchanges.

KATO Yoichi
National Security Correspondent, Asahi Shimbun

“Possible perception gap between Japan and the United States”

1. Introduction

Looking at the current status of the Japan-U.S. alliance relationship, there are a number of perception gaps. Some of them are due to the difference of national interests and some are because of the difference in the geostrategic standings of each country. Among those the most serious are the one on strategic threat perception and the other on tactical situational awareness.

2. Perception Gap 1; Strategic Threat Perception

When analyzing the major threats that each country faces, Japan mainly focuses on the growing military capabilities along with increasingly aggressive behavior of China, while the United States pays more attention to the growing nuclear/missile threat from North Korea.

This gap was most clearly demonstrated when North Korea conducted the third nuclear test in February 2013. The test was preceded by “satellite launch” into orbit, which revealed their intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities. The United States concluded that these capabilities combined pose “existential threat” (former Assistant Secretary of States Kurt Campbell) to the United States. And the United States government took swift and serious counter actions, including an additional deployment of ground-based interceptors in Alaska and advanced radar in Japan.

Japan, of course, took such demonstration of advanced capabilities by North Korea very serious just as the United States did, but did not regard these additional capabilities pose an “existential threat” to Japan, because they are mainly targeted at the continental United States and also because Japan is already within the range of shorter range Nodong missiles, which are more numerous and also nuclear-capable.

The reality is that Japan has been in a more dire potential danger than the United States is since long before.

3. Perception Gap 2: Tactical Situational Awareness

From the U.S. point of view “Anti-access/ Area denial (A2/AD)” is the key concept to characterize the nature of security challenges that China poses to the United States. The Defense Strategic Guidance of 2012 articulated this point as follows;

“States such as China and Iran will continue to pursue asymmetric means to counter our power projection capabilities. Accordingly, the U.S. military will invest as required to ensure its ability to operate effectively in anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) environments.”

And Air-Sea battle is one of the operational concepts which have been developed to counter such A2/AD challenges from potential adversaries.

Japan, however, did not employ either “A2/AD challenge” or “Air-Sea battle” as part of its defense strategy until very recently. It is mainly because of the situational awareness that Japan is

geographically located in “access denied area” to begin with and the perception that “A2/AD” is a concept that is relevant and useful for foreign military forces coming into this area from outside. In short “it is for the United States, but not for us” has been the typical mentality in Japan especially among Self-Defense Forces leadership. But, of course, such a mentality with limited strategic scope does not serve the strategic objectives of Japan. Japan’s defense strategy is structured on the premise that Japan will have substantial reinforcement from the United States in time of foreign aggression. And such reinforcement is only possible when the United States and Japan together neutralize the A2/AD barriers imposed by the adversary.

It was no surprise, therefore, the new National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), which was rolled out in December 2013, has the following paragraph.

“China is believed to be making efforts to strengthen its asymmetrical military capabilities to prevent military activity by other countries in the region by denying access and deployment of foreign militaries to its surrounding areas. “

This was the first time that Japan has ever officially acknowledged “A2/AD” challenge as the potential threat to Japan itself, even though the term “A2/AD” was not used and the expression was rather indirect.

4. Analysis

These two perception gaps mentioned above are both being narrowed under the recent circumstances. The United States seems to pay more serious attention to the aggressive nature of China’s recent actions in the region including the unilateral establishment of its own Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea and the near-collision maneuver of PLA Navy ship against the U.S. frigate in the South China Sea.

And Japan has already started to implement the new defense strategy, which includes “A2/AD” challenge as its integral element.

These are good signs in terms of advancing the strategic/tactical interoperability and deepening the defense cooperation between Japan and the United States. But that does not mean these perception gaps have totally disappeared. They are rooted in fundamental difference in geostrategic interests and perspectives of two countries. Continuous consultation and coordination are needed, if further enhancement of the alliance relationship is the shared goal.

James J. PRZYSTUP
Senior Research Fellow, INSS

Strategic Game Changers in a New Era of “Smart Power”

The Fate of the U.S. and Japanese Economies

Sustained, long-term recovery and revitalization is critical to rebuilding public confidence in both countries. The re-birth of public confidence is, in turn, critical to support for international engagement. We will be challenged to demonstrate the political strength of our shared democratic values and our commitment to open, market economies. In this context, TPP is critical to expanding market access, enhancing international prosperity, and building a rules-based international economic order. It is also critical to the success of the third arrow of Abenomics – the structural reform of Japan’s economy.

In both the United States and Japan economic revitalization will require, an old but true bromide, real and enduring political leadership. If we fail to get our economies right, little else will matter -- we will not be able resource and sustain our shared commitment to regional and global security and to a rules-based international order, in which disputes are settled, not by intimidation or force, but peacefully through diplomacy. Ultimately, international stability and security are based on demonstrated and enduring economic strength.

In the United States, economic revitalization is critical to the ability of future administrations to sustain the military components of the Rebalance to Asia.

China in Transition

The Third Plenum of the CCP has called for a transformation of China’s economy, from the existing export-oriented model to an economy driven by domestic consumption. This will entail restructuring of the existing close CCP ties to China’s state-run industries. Some Chinese economists have warned that the success of economic transformation will also require political liberalization. Questions: Can the CCP pull this off without losing its political monopoly. How will this process affect China’s internal stability? Will the CCP play to Chinese nationalism to sustain its hold on power?

The Alliance and China – Risk Management

Over the years since Deng Xiaoping opened China to the market, the United States and Japan have pursued remarkably similar China policies – to encourage China to become, in Bob Zoellick’s words, a Responsible Stakeholder. This has been and should continue to be the mainline of our respective strategies. In this context, it is critical that we make clear our opposition to unilateral Chinese actions that attempt to alter the status quo through the use of force or intimidation and we continue to stand for our values of openness, transparency and rules-based order.

At the same time, we have to recognize that China may not move in the direction we desire and, accordingly looks for ways to manage that risk. Thus, the United States and Japan must strengthen our bilateral alliance-based cooperation and continue to expand it outward to engage new partners, who share our values and commitment to peaceful change. Implementing the October 3, 2013 2 Plus 2 statement is critical as is coordination in developing the review of the U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines. Our objective should be to strengthen the deterrence picture in the Asia-Pacific region and to expand U.S.-Japan cooperation across the region and beyond.

Strengthening ASEAN and enhancing the national resiliency of its individual members should be high on our alliance priority list. This will require both security and economic support, with private sector driving trade and investment. A strong ASEAN will serve as an independent strategic counterweight to China. Prime Minister Abe's emphasis on the region should be complemented by similar U.S. attention.

The Korean Peninsula

There are many facets to the Peninsula: the future of North Korea – will it still be here in 2030; will it be denuclearized; or will unification take place, and under what circumstances; peaceful or as a result of internal collapse; the role of China in the unification process and after in a unified Korea; the nature of the US-ROK alliance in a unified Korea. The answers to the above questions will significantly shape the strategic landscape, not only of Northeast Asia but the broader Asia-Pacific region. Clearly with respect to North Korea, the United States, as evidenced by the recent visit to Beijing of Secretary of State John Kerry, is asking once again China to use its leverage and move Pyongyang back to the path of denuclearization.

Also to be considered from an alliance perspective is the evolution of ROK-Japan relations. Trends in both Seoul and Tokyo are not encouraging, and the visit by Prime Minister Abe to the Yasukuni shrine on December 26 has only complicated an already difficult relationship. Chinese are easily exploiting the current rift, gaining influence at Japan's expense – and at the expense of broader trilateral alliance cooperation.

Historically, Beijing has supported the DPRK as a buffer state and, recently, in response to the Rebalance, many Chinese analysts have come to view North Korea as strategic asset. But, as underscored by the Xi-Park Summit, China today appears to broadening its aperture on the Peninsula with the long-term objective of inclining a united Peninsula toward China, turning the entire Peninsula into a strategic buffer zone. This would alter the strategic landscape of Northeast Asia and the broader Asia-Pacific, and this would not be in the interest of either the United States or Japan.

Clearly the ROK has to be sensitive to China, its leading trading partner and a country with a significant say in how reunification plays out. The long-term strategic question is whether in a unified Peninsula, historic Korean security concerns with respect to China would resurface and right the geostrategic gyroscope.

Taiwan

Questions similar to those with respect to the Korean Peninsula also apply to Taiwan. President Xi's recent remarks – reunification is not a matter that can be put off indefinitely – seem aimed at turning up the heat on Taiwan. But recent high-level engagement, the meeting of Wang Yu-Chi of Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council and Zhang Zhijun of China's Mainland Affairs Office, may present an opening for higher-level (Xi-Ma?) political dialogue -- which could be reversed depending on the results of the 2016 presidential election.

Russia

The role of Russia, and the strategic direction of Japan-Russia relations, is one of the great unknowns, but one that could have a significant impact of the evolution of the Asia-Pacific region. The key question is whether the Northern Territories question can be finessed politically – is there room for former Prime Minister Mori's construct of a joint development zone that would leave the territorial question for future resolution? What are the prospects for such a deal here in Japan?

<p style="text-align: center;">IZUMIKAWA Yasuhiro Associate Professor, Chuo University</p>
--

The Future of China and U.S.-Japan Relations

Will China continue to increase its rise and replace the United States and become more formidable competitor for the United States? Or, will its rise come to a sudden halt soon due to its mounting problems, such as the unprecedented level of bad loans, demographic problems, the so-called middle-income trap, etc.? To these questions, people are inclined to be drawn to extreme answers. Some predict the emergence of a China-centered hierarchical order in East Asia as a result of China's continuing power growth, while others anticipate the meltdown or breakup of China due to its domestic societal and economic problems. The fact of the matter, however, is that there is no way to predict the future of China accurately, and our policy must be premised upon the assumption that the reality will fall somewhere in the middle of the two extremes. This leads us to believe that China, at least in the short-term, will continued to grow economically although probably at a slower rate and to consider the impact that such a China will have over East Asia.

The impact of China's rise on East Asia has been heavily debated, so there is no need to repeat what has been discussed. However, there are two things that I would like to point out. First, China's policy seems to be increasingly determined by internal rather than external factors. This point has been already noted by an increasing numbers of China experts, but some of the recent decisions made by the Chinese governments, such as its decision to unilaterally impose the ADIZ, indicate that when hawks within the Chinese governments push their policy initiatives by resorting to nationalism and/or the rhetoric of state sovereignty, moderates face significant difficulties resisting them even when they can easily anticipate that such initiatives may defeat China's larger strategic interests. This does not mean that whatever Japan and the United States do toward China will not make a difference. Instead, an important implication may be that external powers are required to take into account how their policies/responses may have repercussions over China's domestic politics, and to pursue the policy that would not strengthen the hawks within the Chinese government.

Second, while China's increasing influence over South Korea (or the Korean Peninsula) and some ASEAN countries have been frequently discussed, attention to its increasing influence toward Taiwan should attract more attention. Many area experts, it seems to me, are rather optimistic about maintaining the de facto independence of Taiwan, and they are probably right. (They point out Taiwan's public opinions, which are overwhelmingly in favor of maintaining the status quo, as a main cause of continuing the status quo.) Nonetheless, China's influence over Taiwan seems to be increasing steadily due to both strategic and economic reasons, and this trend, if continues, may pose intricate and potentially significant problems for U.S.-Japan relations. Despite the fact, the Obama administration had been paying insufficient attention to Taiwan at least until recently. Japan has been accustomed for more than hundred years to the situation in which Taiwan is separated from the mainland China, and it is difficult to predict how Japan may react if some dramatic development occurs in the Taiwan Strait. The U.S. and Japanese governments, therefore, must discuss more earnestly the implications of the cross-strait relations so that they may be able to coordinate their Taiwan policies.

Korean Unification and the Japan-US Alliance

Four possible security options for A Unified Korea

1. Maintenance of the alliance with the United States
2. Alignment with China
3. Neutralization of the entire Korean Peninsula
4. Nuclearization of the entire Korean Peninsula

1. Maintenance of the alliance with the United States

- (1) Likely processes: collapse and absorption by ROK, unification through conflict, integration and peaceful unification
- (2) Other likely causes: the status quo, US influence, US as a “benign” hegemon
 - ✧ Public opinion in ROK (Asan Institute): ROK-US alliance after unification
 - necessary: 75% (2011), 84% (2012), 83% (2013)
 - unnecessary: 25% (2011), 16% (2012), 17% (2013)
- (3) Implications for regional security
 - ✧ A continued US force presence will promote stability.
 - ✧ A collapse-unification crisis could help renew and prolong US primacy in the region.
 - ✧ US Forces Korea (USFK) maintained at current or reduced levels
 - ✧ Peaceful unification may lead to weaken domestic support for US presence in ROK, US, and/or Japan.
 - ✧ China may feel targeted by the ROK-US alliance.
 - ✧ Deployment of USFK may be limited to below the 38th parallel
 - ✧ Unless there is a perceived ground threat from China, USFK would need to be reduced and made more expeditionary.
 - ✧ The ROK-US alliance could be expected to function similarly to the Japan-US alliance.
- (4) Implications for the Japan-US alliance
 - ✧ The Japan-US alliance would be maintained or strengthened.
 - ✧ The possible creation of US Northeast Asia Command
 - ✧ Trilateral cooperation among Japan, US, and ROK?

2. Alignment with China

- (1) Likely processes: integration and peaceful unification, destabilization in North Korea and Chinese intervention (federation)
- (2) Other likely causes: a shared border, greater economic exchange, and a closer political relationship, anti-Americanism
 - ✧ Withdrawal of USFK
 - South Korea is a valuable US asset, but it is not a vital interest.
 - ✧ historical animosity toward Japan
 - ✧ Public opinion in ROK (Asan Institute): biggest threat to a unified Korea
 - China: 63% (2011), 61% (2012), 47% (2013)
 - Japan: 21% (2011), 26% (2012), 38% (2013)

- (3) Implications for regional security
 - ✧ Trends toward Chinese regional primacy would be accelerated.
 - ✧ Japan would feel isolated in Northeast Asia.
 - ✧ security dilemma in the region
- (4) Implications for the Japan-US alliance
 - ✧ Disappearance of the one alliance would make the other more important.
 - ✧ The Japan-US alliance would be enhanced if US Forces Japan (USFJ) is maintained.
 - ✧ If ROK decides to remove US bases, there is likely to be increased domestic pressure in Japan to do the same.

3. Neutralization of the entire Korean Peninsula

- (1) Likely processes: integration and peaceful unification, destabilization in North Korea and Chinese intervention (federation)
- (2) Other likely causes
 - ✧ Public opinion in ROK (Asan Institute): preferred method of reunification
 - South absorbs North: 57% (2010), 57% (2011), 42% (2012)
 - Federation: 42% (2010), 42% (2011), 52% (2012)
- (3) Implications for regional security
 - ✧ Increased competition over Korea among the major powers
 - ✧ A deterioration in regional stability
 - ✧ Better outcome than the status quo from a Chinese perspective
- (4) Implications for the Japan-US alliance
 - ✧ Disappearance of the one alliance would make the other more important.
 - ✧ The Japan-US alliance would be enhanced if USFJ is maintained.

4. Nuclearization of the entire Korean Peninsula

- (1) Likely processes: integration and peaceful unification
- (2) Other likely causes: nationalism (desire for autonomy)
- (3) Implications for regional security
 - ✧ A crisis of the ROK-US alliance
 - ✧ Japan would go nuclear.
 - ✧ A serious deterioration in regional stability
- (4) Implications for the Japan-US alliance
 - ✧ Disappearance of the one alliance would make the other more important.
 - ✧ The Japan-US alliance would be enhanced if USFJ is maintained.
 - ✧ The Japan-US alliance would be weakened if Japan also goes nuclear.
 - ✧ It would be necessary for the US to strengthen its assurance of the nuclear umbrella.

ⁱ http://www.genron-npo.net/english/opinionpoll_js_1.pdf

ⁱⁱ Nikkei newspaper, Feb. 24, 2014

4. An Introduction to The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)

【Objectives】

In today's world, people's attention is focused not only around the ways and means to cope with the globalization, but also the rise of new states including People's Republic of China and the geopolitical evolution both inside and outside the former Soviet Union. Under these circumstances, in addition to traditional dialogue partners in Asia-Pacific region, it has become increasingly important for Japan to establish new channels of dialogue both in the first and the second tracks with countries which she has yet to hold regular meetings with, such as member countries of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (Russia, Turkey, Belarus, etc.). On the basis of such understanding, The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) aims to promote the exchange of views on commonly shared interests and issues in the field ranging from politics and security to economy, trade, finance, society and culture, and to help business leaders, Diet members and opinion leaders both in Japan and in their counterpart countries to discuss about the formulation of new orders in global and regional arenas.

【History】

The 1982 Versailles Summit was widely seen as having exposed rifts within the Western alliance. Accordingly, there were expressed concerns that the summit meetings were becoming more and more stylized rituals and that Western solidarity was at risk. Within this context, it was realized that, to revitalize the summit meetings, there must be free and unfettered exchanges of private-sector views to be transmitted directly to the heads of the participating states. Accordingly, Japanese former Foreign Minister OKITA Saburo, U.S. Trade Representative William BROCK, E.C. Commission Vice President Etienne DAVIGNON, and Canadian Trade Minister Edward LUMLEY, as representatives of the private-sector in their respective countries, took the initiative in founding The Quadrangular Forum in Washington in September 1982. Since then, the end of the Cold War and the altered nature of the economic summits themselves had made it necessary for The Quadrangular Forum to metamorphose into The Global Forum established by the American and Japanese components of The Quadrangular Forum at the World Convention in Washington in October 1991. In line with its objectives as stated above, The Global Forum was intended as a facilitator of global consensus on the many post-Cold War issues facing the international community and reached out to open its discussions not only to participants from the quadrangular countries but also to participants from other parts of the world. Over the years, the gravity of The Global Forum's activities gradually shifted from its American component (housed in The Center for Strategic and International Studies) to its Japanese component (housed in The Japan Forum on International Relations), and, after the American component ceased to be operative, the Board of Trustees of the Japanese component resolved, on February 7, 1996, that it would thereafter act as an independent body for organizing bilateral dialogues with Japan as a hub for all countries in the world, and amended its by-laws accordingly. At the same time, The Global Forum's Japanese component was reorganized into The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) in line with the principle that the organization be self-governing, self-financing, and independent of any other organization.

【Organization】

The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) is a private, non-profit, non-partisan, and independent membership organization in Japan to engage in and promote international exchanges on policy-oriented matters of bilateral, regional and global implications. While the secretariat is housed in The Japan Forum on International Relations, GFJ itself is independent of any other organizations, including The Japan Forum on International Relations. Originally established as the Japanese component of The Quadrangular Forum at the initiative of HATTORI Ichiro, OKITA Saburo, TAKEYAMA Yasuo, TOYODA Shoichiro in 1982, GFJ is currently headed by OKAWARA Yoshio as Advisor, ITO Kenichi as Chairman and ISHIKAWA Kaoru as President. The membership is composed of 10 Business Members including the two Governors, MOGI Yuzaburo and TOYODA Shoichiro; 18 Political Members including the three Governors, ASAO Keiichiro, KOIKE Yuriko, and TANIGAKI Sadakazu; and 93 Academic Members including the two Governors, HIRABAYASHI Hiroshi, and SHIMADA Haruo.

【Activities】

Since the start of The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) in 1982, GFJ has shifted its focus from the exchanges with the Quadrangular countries for the purpose of contributing to the Western Summit, to those with neighboring countries in the Asia-Pacific region including the U.S., China, Korea, ASEAN countries, India, Australia, European countries, and Wider Black Sea area, for the purposes of deepening mutual understanding and contributing to the formation of international order. GFJ has been active in collaboration with international exchange organizations in those countries in organizing policy-oriented intellectual exchanges called "Dialogue." In order to secure a substantial number of Japanese participants in the "Dialogue," GFJ in principle holds these "Dialogues" in Tokyo. A listing of topics of "Dialogues" and its overseas co-sponsors in the last three years is given below.

Year	Month	Topic	Co-sponsor
2014	March	The Japan-U.S. Alliance in Changing International and Domestic Environments	Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University
	January	Toward Building Confidence Between Japan and China in 'New Domains'	The Japan Forum on International Relations
2013	October	Toward the Making of Shared Values in Foreign Policy	Washington College International Studies Program Foundation of Research on Transformation of Malaysia GUAM-Organization for Democracy and Economic Development
	March	Future Prospect of the Japan-GUAM Partnership for Democracy and Economic Development	
	February	How to Develop Japan and Black Sea Area Cooperation	Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)
	January	Toward a Future-Oriented Japan-China Relationship	School of Environment, Beijing Normal University World Resources Institute College of Public Administration, Zhejiang University
2012	September	Japan-U.S. Alliance at a New Stage: Toward a Provider of International Public Goods	Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies
	March	The Future of ASEAN Integration and Japan's Role	Fudan University
	March	The Rise of Emerging Countries and the Future of Global Governance	Nanyang Technological University The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
	February	The Asia-Pacific Region in Transition and the Japan-U.S.-China Relations	China Association of Asia-Pacific Studies
2011	October	The Japan-China Relations at Crossroads	China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR)
	July	The Great East Japan Earthquake and Regional Cooperation on Disaster Management	National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, etc
	February	The Japan-U.S. Relations in the Era of Smart Power	The Center for Strategic and International Studies (U.S.)
	February	East Asia in Transition and New Perspectives on Regional Cooperation	International Studies Department, Vietnam National University (Vietnam)

5. An Introduction to the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University

The mission of Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is to conduct strategic studies for the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Unified Combatant Commands to support the national strategic components of the academic programs at National Defense University (NDU) and to provide outreach to other US governmental agencies and to the broader national security community.

INSS includes the following Centers: Center for Strategic Research (CSR), Center for Technology and National Security Policy (CTNSP), Center for Complex Operations (CCO), the Center for Strategic Conferencing (CSC), the Conflict Records Research Center (CRRC), the Center for Transatlantic Security Studies (CTSS), and the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs (CSMA).

The military and civilian analysts and staff who comprise INSS and its subcomponents execute their mission by performing the following functions: research and analysis, publication, conferences, policy support, and outreach.

[Contact]

Institute for National Strategic Studies
Lincoln Hall, Building 64
National Defense University
Ft. Lesley J. McNair
260 5th Avenue
Washington, DC 20319
(202) 685-2335

6 . An Introduction to The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)

The Forum conducts a variety of activities hosting conferences, organizing research programs, and publishing research reports and policy recommendations, etc.

[History]

The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc. (JFIR or The Forum) was founded on March 12, 1987 in Tokyo on the private initiative of Dr. OKITA Saburo, Mr. HATTORI Ichiro, Prof. ITO Kenichi, and 60 other independent citizens from business, academic, political, and media circles of Japan, recognizing that a policy-oriented research institution in the field of international affairs independent from the government was most urgently needed in Japan. On April 1, 2011, JFIR was reincorporated as a “public interest foundation” with the authorization granted by the Prime Minister in recognition of its achievements.

[Purpose]

The Forum is a private, non-profit, independent, and non-partisan organization dedicated to improved understanding of Japanese foreign policy and international relations. The Forum takes no institutional position on issues of foreign policy, though its members are encouraged not only to analyze but to propose alternatives on matters of foreign policy. Though the Forum helps its members to formulate policy recommendations on matters of public policy, the views expressed in such recommendations represent in no way those of the Forum as an institution and the responsibility for the contents of the recommendations is that of those members of the Forum who sign them alone.

[Organization]

JFIR is a membership organization with four categories of membership, namely, (1) corporate, (2) associate corporate, (3) individual and (4) associate individual. As for the organizational structure of JFIR, the “Board of Trustees” is the highest decision making body, which is in charge of electing the “Directors” and of supervising overall activities of JFIR, while the “Board of Directors” is an executive body, which is in charge of the management of day-to-day operations of JFIR.

Board of Trustees

HAKAMADA Shigeki
HATTORI Yasuo
HIRONAKA Wakako
HIRONO Ryokichi
KOIKE Yuriko
INOUE Akiyoshi
KURODA Makoto
NOGAMI Yoshiji
OHYA Eiko
TANAKA Tatsuo
UTADA Katsuhiro

Directors

Chairman	IMAI Takashi
President	ITO Kenichi
Vice President	HIRABAYASHI Hiroshi
Senior Executive Director	ISHIKAWA Kaoru
Executive Director	WATANABE Mayu
Director	HANDA Haruhisa
Director	TAKUBO Tadae

Auditors

ICHIKAWA Isao
TAKEUCHI Yukio

[Activities]

In tandem with the core activities of the “Policy Council” in making policy recommendations, another important pillar of JFIR’s activities is the e-forum “Hyakka-Seiho” which means “Hundred Flowers in Full Bloom” (<http://www.jfir.or.jp/cgi/m-bbs/>). The e-forum, which started on April 12, 2006, is open to the public, functioning as an interactive forum for discussions on foreign policy and international affairs. All articles posted on the e-forum are sent through the bimonthly e-mail magazine “Meru-maga Nihon Kokusai Fōramu” in Japanese to about 10,000 readers in Japan. Furthermore, articles worth attention for foreigners are translated into English and posted on the English website of JFIR (<http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/index.htm>) as “JFIR Commentary.” They are also introduced in the e-mail magazine “JFIR E-Letter” in English. “JFIR E-Letter” is delivered bimonthly to about 10,000 readers worldwide.



The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)

17-12-1301, Akasaka 2-chome Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052, Japan

[Tel] +81-3-3584-2193 [Fax] +81-3-3505-4406

[E-mail] gfj@gfj.jp [URL] <http://www.gfj.jp/>