Japan- Asia Pacific Dialogue

The Asia-Pacific in Global Power Transition:

How Many Great Powers?

Conference Papers

December, 12, 2014

At Meiji University

Tokyo, Japan

Co-Sponsored by

The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)

Meiji University

University of Western Sydney

The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)

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1. Program

日・アジア太平洋対話
Japan- Asia Pacific Dialogue

パワー・トランジションの中のアジア太平洋：何極の時代なのか
The Asia-Pacific in Global Power Transition: How Many Great Powers?

共催／Co-sponsored by
グローバル・フォーラム ／ The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)
明治大学 ／ Meiji University
西シドニー大学 ／ University of Western Sydney
公益財団法人 日本国際フォーラム ／ The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)

2014 年12 月12 日(金)／Friday, 12th December, 2014
明治大学グローバルフロント1階「グローバルホール」／"Global Hall," Global Front, Meiji University

開会挨拶 ／ Opening Remarks	
13:30-13:40	
開会挨拶（5分間） Opening Remarks (5 min.)	伊藤　憲一　グローバル・フォーラム代表世話人・日本国際フォーラム理事長 ITO Kenichi, Chairman, GFJ / President, JFIR
開幕セッション／Opening Session	
13:40-14:10	**世界の変動と日本** **The World in Transition and Japan**
報告A（15分間） Presenter A (15 min.)	ジョン・ミアシャイマー　シカゴ大学教授 John MEARSHEIMER, Professor, The University of Chicago
報告B（15分間） Presenter B (15 min.)	伊藤　　剛　日本国際フォーラム上席研究員・明治大学教授 ITO Go, Superior Research Fellow, JFIR / Professor, Meiji University
セッションⅠ／Session I	
14:10-15:45	**アジア太平洋の変動と日本** **The Asia-Pacific in Transition and Japan**
議長（5分間） Chairperson (5 min.)	石川　　薫　グローバル・フォーラム執行世話人・日本国際フォーラム研究本部長 ISHIKAWA Kaoru, President, GFJ / Director of Research, JFIR
報告A（10分間） Presenter A (10 min.)	デビッド・ウォルトン　西シドニー大学准教授 David WALTON, Senior Lecturer, University of Western Sydney
報告B（10分間） Presenter B (10 min.)	山田　吉彦　東海大学教授 YAMADA Yoshihiko, Professor, Tokai University
報告C（10分間） Presenter C (10 min.)	林　　正義　台湾中央研究院欧美研究所研究員 LIN Cheng-yi, Research Fellow, Institute of European and American Studies, Academia Sinica
報告D（10分間） Presenter D (10 min.)	佐藤　考一　桜美林大学教授 SATO Koichi, Professor, J. F. Oberlin University
自由討議（50分） Free Discussions (50 min.)	出席者全員 All Participants
15：45-15:55	**休憩 ／ Break**
セッションⅡ／SessionⅡ	
15：55-17:30	**中国の将来と日本** **China in the Future and Japan**
議長（5分間） Chairperson（5 min.)	伊藤　　剛　日本国際フォーラム上席研究員・明治大学教授 ITO Go, Superior Research Fellow, JFIR / Professor, Meiji University
報告A（10分間） Presenter A (10 min.)	門間　理良　防衛研究所主任研究官 MOMMA Rira, Professor, The National Institute of Defense Studies
報告B（10分間） Presenter B (10 min.)	時　永明　中国国際問題研究所副研究員 SHI Yongming, Associate Research Fellow, China Institute of International Studies
報告C（10分間） Presenter C (10 min.)	弓野　正宏　早稲田大学現代中国研究所招聘研究員 YUMINO Masahiro, Research Fellow, Waseda Institute of Contemporary Chinese Studies
報告D（10分間） Presenter D (10 min.)	フー・ティアン・ブーン　南洋理工大学准教授 HOO Tiang Boon, Assistant Professor, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University
自由討議（50分） Free Discussions (50 min.)	出席者全員 All Participants

[NOTE]日本語・英語同時通訳付き／ English-Japanese simultaneous interpretation will be provided

2. Biographies of the Panelists

【Foreign Panelists】

John MEARSHEIMER, *Professor, The University of Chicago*

Received Ph.D. in government from Cornell University in 1981. Served as an Assistant Professor (1982-1984), Associate Professor (1984-1987), Professor (1987-1995), Harrison Chair, (1987-present), and Department Chair (1989-1992) at the Political Science Department, the University of Chicago, and as a Visiting Scholar at the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Harvard University (1992-1993). Concurrently Serves as a R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor and a Co-director of the Program on International Security Policy, the University of Chicago. Published *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (Norton, 2014) which has been translated into 8 languages: Chinese, Greek, Italian, Japanese, Korean, Portuguese, Romanian, and Serbian.

David WALTON *Senior Lecturer, University of Western Sydney*

Received Ph.D. from the University of Queensland. Conducted researches in the field of diplomatic history, foreign policy, and Australia-Japan post-war relations. Taught at Griffith University, University of Tasmania, and University of Western Sydney since 1995. Co-edited *New Approaches to Human Security in the Asia Pacific: China, Japan and Australia* with William T. Tow and Rikki Kersten (Ashgate, 2013) and published *Australia, Japan and the Region, 1952 to 1965: Early Initiatives in Regional Diplomacy* (Nova, 2012). Concurrently serves as Japan Foundation Fellow, School of Law and Politics, University of Tokyo.

LIN Cheng-yi *Research Fellow, the Institute of European and American Studies, Academia Sinica, Taiwan*

Received Ph.D. in Foreign Affairs from the University of Virginia in 1987. Served as the Director of the Institute of European and American Studies at Academia Sinica (1998-2003), Director of Institute of international Relations at National Chengchi University (2004-2005), and Executive Director of the Center for Asia-Pacific Area studies at Academia Sinica (2009-2012). Co-edited *Rise of China*: *Beijing's Strategies and Implications for the Asia-Pacific* with Micahel Hsiao (Routledge, 2009) and *The Future of United States, China, and Taiwan Relations* with Denny Roy (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

SHI Yongming *Associate Research Fellow, China Institute of International StudiesTechnological University*

Graduated from Fudan University, majoring in international politics. Conducted researches on Asia-Pacific issues and international strategic issues for many years. Served as a Consul in Chinese Consulate General in Osaka, Japan. Published "Constructing an International System that Corresponds to a Harmonious World" in *Building a Harmonious World: Theory and Practice* edited by Guo Zhenyuan (World Affairs Press, 2008), "The Impact of U.S. Financial Crisis on International Structure" in *Peace and Development*, No. 4, 2009, and "Barrack Obama's East Asia Policies and Regional Construction" in *Peace and Development* No. 1, 2010.

HOO Tiang Boon *Assistant Professor, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University*

Received Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of Oxford. Served as a Visiting Fellow at the China Foreign Affairs University, Visiting Scholar at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, and Visiting Researcher at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies. Involved in diplomatic initiatives, such as the Singapore-US Strategic Dialogue, Korea-Singapore Forum, and the Network of ASEAN Defense and Security Institutions. Author of publications on China, cross-strait relations, and US-China relations. Concurrently serves as the Coordinator of the M.Sc. Programme for Asian Studies at RSIS.

【Japanese Panelists】

ITO Kenichi *Chairman, GFJ / President, JFIR*

Graduated from Hitotsubashi University and joined Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1960. Studied at GSAS of Harvard University. Served in Japanese Embassies in Moscow, Manila and Washington and also as Director of First Southeast Asian Division until 1977. Since then he served as Tokyo Representative of CSIS (1980-1987) and professor of international politics at Aoyama Gakuin University (1984-2006). He has been President of Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) since it was founded in 1987 and now concurrently serves as Chairman of Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) and Council on East Asian Community (CEAC). He is Professor Emeritus and holds Honorary Doctorate in International Relations.

ITO Go *Professor, Meiji University / Superior Research Fellow, JFIR*

Graduated from Sophia University. Received Ph.D. at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver in 1997. Served as Associate Professor at Meiji University in 1998, and assumed the current position in 2006. Also served as Visiting professor at Beijing University, Academia Sinica(Taiwan), Bristol University(Britain), Australian National University, and Victoria University (Canada), Adjunct Professor (International Security) at Waseda University as well as Sophia University, and as Adjunct Researcher of the House of Councilors. Recipients of the Eisenhower Fellowships in 2005 and the Nakasone Yasuhiro Award in 2006.

ISHIKAWA Kaoru *President, GFJ / Director of Research, JFIR*

Graduated from University of Tokyo and joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1972. Studied at l'Ecole Nationale d'Administration in France. Served as Research Associate of International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), London and Minister-Counselor to France, G8 Summit foreign affairs Sous-Sherpa (1999-2001 and 2005-07), Ambassador in charge of Civil Society (2002), Director General of Global Affairs Department (2002-05), Director General of Economic Affairs Bureau (2005-07), Ambassador to Egypt, Ambassador to the Arab League and then Ambassador to Canada. Also having served as Part time lecturer at Waseda University and Visiting Professor at the University of Tokyo. Concurrently serves as Executive Vice-President of Council on East Asian Community (CEAC).

YAMADA Yoshihiko *Professor, Tokai University*

Graduated from Gakushuin University. Received Ph.D. in Economics from Saitama University. Served as a Trader, Bond Market Section, Finance Securities Department, Toyo Trust and Banking Company, Limited (1989-1991), Director of Maritime Department, the Nippon Foundation (1991-2008), Associate Professor (2008) and Professor (2009-Present), Tokai University. Concurrently serves as Deputy Director, Institute of Oceanic Research and Development, Tokai University.

SATO Koichi *Professor, J.F.Oberlin University*

Received his Ph.D. in International Studies from Waseda University. Served as Sales Engineer of Hitachi Chemical Co. Ltd., Research Fellow of the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), and Lecturer of the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies. Concurrently serves as Lecturer of Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) Staff College, Policy Adviser to Japan Coast Guard, Lecturer of National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS).

MOMMA Rira Professor, The National Institute for Defense Studies

Received his M.A. in 1993 and completed the Ph.D. Program in History and Anthropology at the University of Tsukuba in 1999. Served as a Visiting Research Fellow at the Kazankai Foundation in 1997, Researcher at the Taipei Office of the Interchange Association, Japan (1997-2000), Researcher at the Embassy of Japan in the People's Republic of China (2000-2001), Senior Specialist for Textbooks at the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology of Japan (2001-2012). Concurrently serves as a Visiting Professor at Takushoku University (2008-present).

YUMINO Masahiro *Research Fellow, Waseda Institute of Contemporary Chinese Studies*

Received M.A. in Law（Diplomatic Studies) from Beijing University in 2003 and completed Ph.D. Program in Politics at Waseda University in 2008. Served as a Visiting Lecturer at the Waseda Institute of Contemporary Chinese Studies in 2008 and as a Researcher at the National Institutes for the Humanities of Japan. Published some articles such as "The Enforcement of the 'National Defense Education Law of the People's Republic of China'" in *Waseda Journal of Political Science and Economics* in 2007 and "People's Liberation Army as a Local Community-Based Army" in *Waseda Asia Review* No. 10, 2011 etc.

(*In order of appearance*)

3. Presentation Papers

Opening Session: The World in Transition and Japan

John MEARSHEIMER

Professor, The University of Chicago

The World in Transition and Japan

I. The Changing Balance of Power in Asia

The focus will be on the rise of China and what impact that development will have on the balance of power in Asia. In addition to talking about the changing balance of power between China and its neighbors, considerable attention will be paid to the Sino-American balance and how America's commitments in Europe and the Persian Gulf affect its presence in Asia.

II. The Consequences for the Region

I will make case that if China continues growing economically at an impressive pace, it will build a more powerful military and try to dominate Asia the way the United States dominates the Western Hemisphere. China will try to become a regional hegemon in Asia, because that is the best way for a great power to maximize its security in a dangerous world.

In practice, that means China will seek to maximize the power gap between itself and its neighbors. In other words, Beijing will work to become much more powerful than India, Japan, and Russia. Moreover, it will try to push the US military out of Asia, and in effect develop a Monroe Doctrine of its own for Asia. China will also build a blue water navy so it can protect its sea-lanes and project power into strategically important regions like the Persian Gulf.

Almost all of China's neighbors, as well as the United States, will go to great lengths to contain China and prevent it from becoming a regional hegemon. China's rivals will form a balancing coalition to keep China in check. The United States will play the central role in managing that alliance, although Japan will be a key player in the coalition.

The result of all this will be an intense security competition between China and its neighbors that could easily lead to war. There are certainly a number of possible flashpoints in the region: Korea, the South China Sea, Taiwan, and the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea.

III. The Consequences for Japan

If China continues its rise, Japan will have to spend much more money on defense and the risk of a Sino-Japanese war will increase markedly.

Furthermore, Japan will have to think long and hard about whether to acquire its own nuclear weapons, in large part because those weapons of mass destruction are the ultimate deterrent. Moreover, Japan is the only major power in the region that does not have its own nuclear arsenal.

The main reason for Japan not to acquire nuclear weapons is that the United States has extended its nuclear umbrella over Japan. However, it seems likely that Japan will have doubts about the reliability of extended deterrence, especially if the United States remains pinned down in losing wars in the greater Middle East and also remains bogged down dealing with the Ukraine crisis, which could go on for a long time.

IV. Conclusion

Japan should hope that China does not continue its striking rise. Otherwise Tokyo will face an increasingly dangerous security environment in Asia.

ITO Go

Superior Research Fellow, JFIR / Professor, Meiji University

The World in Transition and Japan

I. Changing "Rules of Games" in International Relations

- China as the second largest economy→Changes in the Balance of Power in Asia
- The US seeks to maintain partnership with China, while at the same time being concerned about China's rapid rise.
- China has been successful in not having its economy dominated by foreign capitals ever since 1978.
- G2 or G20: Both cases indicate a relative decline of US power.
- While seeking to be involved into the "club of advanced countries," the emerging economies emphasize the small size of the GDP per capita, and try to avoid international responsibilities.
- Multilateralism→Irresponsible diplomacy?

II. International Order for International Stability

- International Stability stemming from the Balance of Power or Hegemony
- Asia's stability has long been kept under the US primacy, with which China is now dissatisfied.
- Hainandao Incident in 2001: China started to have fear that the US could come close to the Chinese continent.
- China's claim on "core interests" implies that international relations should be shifted from the US primacy to the BOP between the US and China (=New Type of Great Powers)
- China emphasizes the BOP with the US, while at the same time seeking to have primacy over Asian countries.
- China thinks unilaterally, explores issues bilaterally, and behave multilaterally

III. Incongruence between Security and Economy

- Security has been provided bilaterally by the US, while Asia's economy has come from China's rapid rise. China has been an indispensable partner.
- China as an insider within the economic system, but an outsider in the area of security.
- China looks eager to expand its territories: Senkaku (Diaoyudao)→Okinawa→Maritime Interests in northern Hokkaido
- As China develops economically, its security policy becomes threatened by neighboring countries.

IV. Future Configurations

- Confrontations on military, economies, and international standards
- China seeks the BOP with the US, while trying to have hegemony within Asia
- Ameba-type enlargement: It continues to expand without the others' deterrence.
- Projection of domestic dissatisfaction to the international arena
- For Japan: How to balance between the US "credibility" and Japan's "self-help"

世界の変動と日本

Ⅰ　中国の台頭によって生じた「ルール・オブ・ゲーム」の変容

・ 世界第 2 位の経済大国としての中国→米中間の経済的、政治的なパワーバランスの変容
・ アメリカは、一方で中国とのパートナーシップをとっていきたいという考え、他方で中国の急速な台頭に脅威を感じている
・ 中国は 1980 年代には食品、軽工業、鉄鋼、90 年代には自動車、精密機械、そして現在の第 12 次 5 カ年計画期（2011～15 年）は資源・環境、ライフサイエンス、IT、ナノ、材料工学と、常に選択的に自分の国にとって役立つ産業を海外から受け入れる
・ オバマ政権以降、一方で G2 論、他方で G20 論。いずれにせよ、アメリカの力の減退を示す
・ 経済規模を拡大した新興国が「先進国クラブの中に入れてくれ」と「正当性」は強調する一方、国際社会における責任を負わないことで、取り決めの「実効性」が下がるというジレンマが存在
・ 「国際公共財」なきマルチラテラリズム→無責任外交の交錯

Ⅱ　国際関係が「安定」するための秩序

・ 覇権による安定か、勢力均衡による安定か
・ アジア太平洋の国際秩序というのは長らくアメリカによる圧倒的な優位によって維持されてきたが、中国はその「覇権」による平和に不満
・ 2001 年海南島事件：「アメリカは中国の近くまでやってくるが、その逆はなし」という不満
・ 「核心的利益」論（中国としては譲れない利益）→「アメリカによる覇権」から「米中勢力均衡」へ＝「新型の大国間関係」
・ しかし、アジアでは「中国中心による覇権」こそが東アジア国際政治の安定と主張
・ 一国主義的に思考、二国間主義的に問題を追及、多国間主義的に振る舞う

Ⅲ．安保と経済のミスマッチ

・ 安全保障上の構造と経済システム上の構造とがミスマッチ
・ 前者はアメリカを中心として放射線状にのびる。後者は中国の経済成長と同時に、①中国、②その他のアジア諸国、③アメリカによる三角貿易が展開
・ 中国は経済的な相互依存関係では主要な地位を占めているが、安保システムではよそ者
・ 領土に対する拡大傾向：尖閣→沖縄→北海道と樺太の間に海洋権益
・ 東南アジアの「小国」の切り崩し→アメリカの弟分への嫌がらせ→最後の本丸アメリカ
・ 経済成長すればするほど、安保での脅威感が増す

Ⅳ　今後の展望

・ 軍事的対立＋経済摩擦の政治利用＋スタンダードの対立
・ 中国はアメリカとの勢力均衡を目指すが、アジアでは自らの覇権的秩序を求める
・ 抑止されなければアメーバ的拡大
・ 国内の不満を対外的に投射→国際秩序への関心がなければ、悲惨な結末
・ 日本にとって：アメリカからの「信用性」と、「自助」のバランス

David WALTON

Senior Lecturer, University of Western Sydney

Juggling Triads: Australian foreign policy towards Japan and China

Synopsis

Australia's capacity to promote closer ties with China while remaining firmly ensconced in a security alliance with the United States and close security ties with Japan is of critical importance. In a period of tense relations between China and Japan and strategic competition between the United States and China, officials in Canberra require sophisticated diplomatic skills to maintain a balance between alliance and economic interests. Given the rise of China as an economic superpower over the past ten years, the current focus on China by the Australian Government is not new, but the attention that China receives in Australian Government circles and more broadly in Australia represents a significant shift from the comfortable security arrangements Australia enjoyed with the United States (security) and Japan (Trade) for the previous forty years.

This presentation will consider three key questions in the context of the rise of China:

1. What does the rise of China and subsequent debates about power transition between the United States and China in the region mean in real terms for Australia- Japan political and security relations?
2. What, if any, are the contentious policy issues between Tokyo and Canberra on the rise of China?
3. Australia's capacity to successfully juggle two competing bilateral relations (Japan and China) is viewed in Canberra as vital to Australia's long-term economic and political wellbeing. Is this perception likely to change in the short to mid term during a period of close alignment between Prime Ministers Abbott and Abe?

These questions are significant as they consider the historical shift from a cold war framework to the new less certain realities in the contemporary period. The decision by the Australian Government in 2012 to allow a substantial number of US marines to be based in Darwin demonstrates the continuation of Australia's post-war foreign and security policy and suggests that existing security arrangements with the United States are very much intact. As well, there have been remarkable security upgrades between Japan and Australia since 2007. Nonetheless, the rise of China as an economic superpower represents a significant challenge to current global and regional order. In this context, the issue of the rise of China and its consequence is arguably the most weighty and pressing issue in the history of Australia-Japan bilateral consultation on regional issues.

YAMADA Yoshihiko

Professor, Tokai University

In 2012, problems of territory and territorial waters occurred suddenly between Japan and its neighboring countries. Since 2010, China has been rapidly advancing into East China Sea. In particular, in 2013, the patrol boats of the newly established China Coast Guard have been repeatedly trespassing the territorial waters of Japan. The advance of China was not limited to East China Sea. Its advance into South China Sea has been even more intense. In 2014, a situation developed, one in which a Chinese patrol boat collided with a Vietnamese patrol boat.

Asian countries started to turn their attention to maritime security to maintain peace. The conclusion of the arrangements for maritime security in the Asian waters has become an urgent issue. In Japan, it is the role of Japan Coast Guard to protect marine security.

Japanese citizens have started to pay attention to maritime situations. In particular, the development of seabed resources has been attracting attention. In 2012, the presence of "rare earth" in the seabed near Minamitorishima was reported. Moreover, the prospecting for the commercialization of methane hydrate has begun. In addition, the development of seabed hydrothermal deposit started to be researched with the goal of commercialization. Efforts in maritime development in the waters under the jurisdiction of Japan have started to progress. The indirect support of these developmental endeavors has been added to the missions of Japan Coast Guard.

As symbolized by the defense of Senkaku Islands, the mission expected of Japan Coast Guard is crucial. Moreover, it must have defense capabilities, in terms of both quantity and quality. However, there is a limit to its security activities. Hereafter, along with increasing the number of Coast Guard officers and the number of patrol boats, it is necessary to implement the division of roles with the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force. Needless to say, it is necessary to create a system for the cooperation of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and the Japan Coast Guard. Moreover, it is necessary to have monitoring activities from the air to increase mobility.

In addition to the above endeavors, with the advance in the development of the Northern Sea Route, the maritime security operations in the waters in the north will become more important. We believe that the time has come to restructure the system of maritime security.

In its relations with its neighboring countries, it is crucial for Japan to establish a system to protect its waters, one that is based on international law. Japan is expected to construct a maritime management system with dignity.

日本における海洋安全保障の重要性

2012 年、日本と近隣国の間で領土、領海の問題が勃発した。また、東シナ海の尖閣諸島周辺海域では海洋管理の問題が発生した。

2010 年以降、中国は、東シナ海の進出を急速に進めている。特に尖閣諸島周辺では、2013 年に新設された中国海警局の警備船が頻繁に日本領海への侵入を繰り返している。中国の海洋進出は、東シナ海のみならず、南シナ海においてはさらに激しい。2014 年、ベトナムの警備船に対し、中国の警備船が衝突する事態となった。

アジアの各国は、平和維持のために海洋安全保障に目を向けるようになった。

アジア海域において海洋安全保障にかかわる取り決めの締結が、早急の課題となっている。日本において海の安全を守るのは海上保安庁の役割である。

日本の国民は、海洋の情勢に注目するようになった。特に海底資源開発が注目を集めている。2012 年南鳥島付近の海底にレアーアースが存在することが報告された。また、メタンハイドレートの商業化に向けた試掘が開始されている。さらに、海底熱水鉱床の開発も商業化に向けての研究が始まった。日本の管轄海域内での海洋開発がまさに動き出したのである。この開発行為を側面的に支援するのが、海上保安庁の任務に加わった。

尖閣諸島の警備に象徴されるように、海上保安庁に求められている任務は、重大でありかつ、量、質ともに高い能力を求められている。しかし、海上保安庁の警備活動にも限界がある。今後、海上保安官の人数、巡視船の数を増やすとともに、海上自衛隊との役割分担も進めなければならないだろう。当然に、海上自衛隊と海上保安庁が、連携する体制を作る必要がある。また、機動力を増すために空からの監視活動も必要である。

また、北極海航路の開発が進むと北の海域の海上保安業務もさらに重要な任務となる。海洋安全保障体制を再構築する時期に来ていると考える。

隣国との関係に置いて、国際法に基づき海を守る体制をとることが重要である。威厳を持ち、海洋管理体制を構築することが求められているのである。

LIN Cheng-yi
Research Fellow, Institute of European and American Studies, Academia Sinica

The Japan Factor in the Security of the Taiwan Strait

In the San Francisco Peace Treaty and Japan-Republic of China (ROC) Peace Treaty of 1952, Japan renounced all right, title and claim to Taiwan and Penghu (Pescadores) as well as the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands. In the 1950-1960s, in addition to cooperating with the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) and Taiwan Defense Command, Chiang Kai-shek secretly brought in Japanese military consultants to Taiwan to help his mission in returning to Mainland China. Naosuke Tomita, whose Chinese name was Pai Hung-liang, served in Taiwan as a military consultant to the Chiang Kai-shek government before he died in 1969. Tomita and about 80 Japanese military advisors, known as the Pai Group, assisted Chiang Kai-shek in training the ROC military and conducting war planning for return-to-the-mainland missions.

Japan maintained its diplomatic ties with the ROC on Taiwan until September 1972. Although Japan and Taiwan had no defense security [agreements?], the U.S. transferred weapons such as 8-inch howitzers from Okinawa to Taiwan and Kinmen (Quemoy) during the 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis. In November 1969, in a joint statement with President Nixon, Prime Minister Sato said that "the maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area was also a most important factor for the security of Japan." In Articles 4 and 6 of the 1960 U.S.–Japan Security Treaty, Taiwan's status is unspecified but included implicitly in "the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East." In the 1997 U.S.–Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines, Taiwan is again made implicit in "Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan (SIASJ)." Not until the 2005 and 2011 U.S.–Japan Common Strategic Objectives do these two countries officially welcome "the progress to date in improving cross-Strait relations, [and] encourage the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues through dialogue."

Since the expiration of the U.S.–ROC Mutual Defense Treaty in 1979, the strengthening of U.S.–Japan security ties and continuing U.S. military deployment in Okinawa have played a reassuring role in Taiwan's security. President Lee Teng-hui initiated a Taiwan–Japan–U.S. trilateral secret security dialogue (the *Ming-teh* Project) conducting 20 meetings with Japanese Councillor Motoo Shiina and U.S. politician Richard Armitage from 1994 to 2000. The project helped with coordination between the three capitals in dealing with the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Missile Crises. From the mid-1990s to 2008, cargo and ships navigating between Taiwan and eastern China were instructed to use Ishigaki Island as an intermediary stop because of the prohibition on direct cross-Strait navigation. President Ma Ying-jeou has publicly supported the strengthening of the U.S.–Japan security alliance through the settlement of the Futenma marine base relocation between the Obama administration and the Japanese government. None of Taiwan's presidents have publicly argued for cross-Strait joint cooperation in safeguarding the sovereignty of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.

When asked which country they saw as a threat, the Japanese, the Filipinos and the Vietnamese all named China. A similar sense of enmity is also evident in Taiwanese opinion polls. Japan has topped all others as the friendliest country for Taiwanese people in surveys conducted by the Taiwan Thinktank and the Interchange Association (Japan) from 2011 to 2013. In the cases of China and South Korea, only 8% of Chinese liked Japan while 22% of South Koreans saw Japan in a favorable light.[1] China has always reacted strongly when Japan's prime minister visits Yasukuni Shrine, while South Korea has focused on the comfort women issue. In stark contrast to China and South Korea, Taiwan has a milder reaction to these two issues.

According to the 2013 Chinese Defense White Paper, the PLAN has conducted long-distance training in waters of the Western Pacific involving over 90 ships in nearly 20 batches since 2007. Some Chinese naval ships have conducted their training in the Exclusive Economic Zone of Guam and Hawaii without meeting U.S. objection. Increasing Chinese naval activities in waters northeast of Taiwan and in the Miyako Strait have created additional pressure for the defense of Japan and Taiwan. Japan has deployed radar installations and 100–150 troops on Yonaguni Island, which is Japan's westernmost island and is about 100 kilometers from Taiwan. For Taiwan to avoid waging a two-front battle, one in the Taiwan Strait and the other in the Pacific, leaders in Taipei have had little choice but to side with the U.S. and welcome the strengthening of U.S.–Japan defense cooperation related to Taiwan's national defense.

With the rise of China and its assertive policy toward the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, the Japanese government's security strategy under the Abe government has evolved dramatically since December 2012. After long-awaited executive actions, Japan's National Security Council was established in December 2013, and immediately after, Japan's first ever National Security Strategy was adopted in which the Abe government has taken up the role of proactive contributor to peace. As such, Japan's new national defense program guidelines were finalized along with the mid-term defense program. In April 2014, the Abe government promulgated "the Three Principles on [the?] Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology," which modified the principles set in 1967 for restricting weapons exports to foreign countries. Japan can now transfer its defense equipment and technology to its allies and partners if such a transfer could contribute to Japan's security and international peace.

A more striking development is Japan's Cabinet Decision on the development of security legislation to ensure Japan's survival and protect its people on July 1, 2014. Prime Minister Abe approved a proposal to reinterpret Japan's constitution to end the ban on allowing its military forces to exercise the right of collective self-defense. The move widened the set of options available to Japan's Self-Defense Forces in overseas military activities, but it soon met opposition from both domestic and international sources.

China is always the staunchest opponent of Japan's active security posture. The U.S., Australia, and

[1] Bruce Stokes, "Japan, China Neck and Neck in Asian Popularity Contest," *Nikkei Asian Review*, July 17, 2014.

Singapore have publicly supported Japan's formulation of a new security strategy. Most Southeast Asian countries have been privately supportive but publicly cautious about their stances. Taiwan's ruling party, the KMT, and President Ma Ying-jeou are somewhat ambivalent. For example, Ma does not criticize Japan's new security posture as his counterpart in Beijing does, but he does say that he will watch closely as the situation develops. Ma stated that his great concern is whether Japan's decision will result in a deterioration of its relations with China, particularly in light of the Diaoyu/Senkaku disputes. Taiwan's opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party, has publicly supported Japanese Prime Minister Abe's removal of the ban on collective self-defense rights arguing that it would benefit Taiwan's long-term security in waters surrounding Taiwan and Japan.

Japan's ongoing security restructuring has implications for Taiwan, China, and the United States. The East China Sea issue will be the test case. The U.S. State Department has called on all sides to exercise restraint in this matter. However, the U.S. government has also made known that the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands fall within the scope of Article 5 of the 1960 U.S.–Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. Xi Jinping's new model of major power relations with the U.S. may be at odds if the dispute is not properly managed, and likewise the situation may also complicate Barack Obama's Asian rebalancing strategy.

To date, the ROC and Japan have concluded 36 major agreements since Tokyo severed diplomatic ties with Taipei in 1972. Taiwan is Japan's fifth-largest trading partner, while Japan is Taiwan's second-largest trading partner. Important bilateral agreements include the Private Investment Arrangement (September 2011), Open Skies Arrangement (November 2011), Memorandum on the exchange of financial information related to money laundering and terrorist financing (April 2012), fisheries agreement (April 2013), search and rescue operations involving aviation accidents at sea (November 2013). Among them, the fisheries agreement was signed after 17 years of fisheries talks between the two countries. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe apparently wanted to use the fisheries agreement to prevent Taiwan and China from forming a joint front against Japan in the disputed East China Sea waters. In addition, President Ma has constantly tried to assure the Japanese that Taiwan will not seek cooperation with the PRC in settling the Diaoyu/Senkaku sovereignty dispute. In the eyes of U.S. Secretary John Kerry, the Taiwan–Japan fisheries agreement has demonstrated that shelving the dispute while acting creatively could serve as a good example for promoting regional stability amid escalating tensions in the East China Sea.[2]

[2] "John Kerry Praises Taiwan, Japan for Pact on Sea Claims," *Taipei Times,* August 15, 2014, p. 3.

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China's Rise and the Political Dynamics of the Asia-Pacific Region
Dominance of the Maritime Power, New Containment, or Rise of Trading States?

Professor John Mearsheimer warned the people that the prospects for the war among the regional powers in Europe were likely to increase if the Cold War ended, and the bipolar distribution of military power became a mere name. Late Professor Samuel P. Huntington also warned the people that the crash of the civilizations led by the religious conflicts would emerge in the Post Cold War World when the ideological confrontation between the East and West diminished. What kind of scenery we can observe, if we apply these warnings to the Asia-Pacific Region in the 21st Century?

Firstly, many people say that the rise of China in economic & military fields, and the relative Japanese decline in economic field are remarkable. They consider the power-transition between Japan and China is progressing. The United States, Japan's ally, also reduces the defense budget every year. The U.S. annual reduction amount is almost equivalent to the Japan's annual defense budget, and the U.S. intervention in the Asia-Pacific region is moderate in spite of State Secretary Hilary Clinton's words: "Pivot toward Asia" in October 2011. It is safe to say that China's presence in Asia-Pacific Region is remarkable. From now on, the correlations among China, the U.S., and Japan have the impacts upon the regional politics and economies. The Chinese government intends to become the maritime power, and the military drills and activities of the Chinese navy, China Coast Guard (CCG), Chinese fishing boats in the East and South China Sea are escalated.

Secondly, activities of the terrorists who assert some religious trends such like ISIS, never diminish after the death of Osama bin Laden. Many developing states in the Asia-Pacific Region including China are plural societies which are composed of many religious groups. The Chinese government is worried about the activities of the radicals and separatists in Xinjiang and Tibet, and their exchanges with foreign activists. In short, both of the warnings of Professor Mearsheimer and Professor Huntington are partially materializing in the Asia-Pacific Region.

From the Cold War days, there has been no monolithic multilateral alliance in Asia-Pacific Region such like the NATO in Europe. There is only a hub and spokes security architecture which was composed of

many U.S. – regional states bilateral treaties. If so, the war among the regional powers in Asia-pacific Region which was predicted by Professor Mearsheimer is more likely to increase. It seems to be serious. There is no domestic symptom of the crash of the civilizations in Japan. For the moment the Japanese defense and security issues are the Chinese challenge at the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, and the disturbance of the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.

In Japan and the United States, some people have begun to study the use of the power projection capability to deter the Chinese various maritime provocations; submerged navigation of Han-class nuclear submarine in the Japanese territorial waters in November 2004, dangerous access of the Chinese navy helicopter to the Japan-Maritime Self-defense (JMSDF) Destroyer in April 2010, collision of the Chinese fishing boat against the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) patrol boats in September 2010, weaponry radar-lock on JMSDF destroyer in January 2013, China's set-up of the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in November 2013, and frequent illegal entrance of the CCG patrol boats into the Japanese territorial waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands.

It is said that China's estimated oil storage is only for 30 days, and the Chinese navy weaponry system is not enough to suppress the JMSDF, so that we can do many things. There may be some temptation for Japan to open war against China. "It may be possible for Japan to co-operate with the U.S. and ASEAN states, in closing of the choke points of Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOC) in the East and South China Sea. Together, we can contain China! "

We should remind the fact that the rate of economic interdependence among the competing nations in the 21st Century is much higher than these in the 19th and 20th Century, and many competing nations live together. The economic statistics 2013 shows that China is Japan's largest trade partner (amount 30.3 trillion yen), and Japan is China's second largest trade partner. Currently, 135 thousands Japanese live in China, and 649 thousands Chinese live in Japan. If Japan open war against China, we, the Japanese have to abandon this trade amount and sacrifice many of these citizens' lives.

The situation is not so different at the Chinese side. President Xi Jinping's unhappy face at the meeting with the Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) Summit in November 2014 symbolized it. China could not get any concessions on the Senkaku Islands and Yasukuni Shrine issues from Japan before the APEC Summit. China's energy resource detection in the sea area surrounding the Paracel Islands for the months of May to July 2014, was also recognized as the diplomatic failure, because of the Vietnamese tough resistance and the international criticism of Chinese forcible detection with the CCG patrol boats and Chinese navy vessels.

The U.S. government voiced the concern on it, and China stopped the detection. It is a reality of the interdependent Asia-Pacific Region in the 21st Century that no government can survive without the communication with the uncomfortable partners. China needs more efforts to avoid the frictions with the United States and the neighboring countries including Japan and ASEAN nations. China should shelf the slogan of the maritime power, and concentrate their attention on the mitigation of "the crash of the civilizations" in the domestic fields.

The political leaders of Japan and the United States should stress the importance of the economic interdependence with China and the prospects for the feasible regional development. Japan and the United States should guide China to be the *Trading State* equivalent to Japan, by the economic and technological incentives and power projection capability of Japan-U.S. alliance (Richard Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Trading State*, Basic Books, 1986). Japan and the U.S. should use the soft and hard powers skillfully. It is possible option for Japan to restart the Official Development Assistance (ODA) to China. We can show our goodwill toward China, and assist China's effort to mitigate the serious environmental issues such like air and marine pollutions.

Further, there are political distrusts among Japan, the U.S. and China in the economic regionalism. China has pursued her sphere of influence in East Asia without the U.S. intervention. China has tried to compose it through the plans of East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), and the East Asia Summit (EAS). Professor Shi Yinhong asserts that China should demand the western part of the West Pacific Ocean. It sounds quite anachronistic in current interdependent region. China would like to maintain the protective system for China's State Companies, too. These are at the background of the friction between Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Japan and the United States should persuade China gradually in the process of the EAS for the integration of the TPP and RCEP. Japan and the United States also need the compromise each other, on tariff rate on agricultural products in Japan, and import restriction on Japanese automobiles in the United States, for the progress of the TPP negotiation.

Japan names herself as a "Proactive Contributor to Peace" in the field of defense and security. She should name herself as a "Proactive Contributor to Trade" too, in addition to the actor of Abenomics in the field of economics. These economic policies demand the drastic reform of the distribution system of the goods in Japan, and it is a painful reform. But it is important for the Japanese government, if Japan want to be a well-balanced contributor to the stability of the Asia-Pacific region. The Japanese nation should remind that Japan is one of three pillars of the tripolar system in this region.

中国の台頭とアジア太平洋の政治力学
「海洋強国」の台頭か、新たな封じ込めか、諸貿易国家の興隆か？

冷戦が終わった時、21 世紀の世界について、ジョン・ミアシャイマー教授は、二極システムが終われば、（欧州の）大国間の関係は対立的なものに回帰すると警告した。また、故サミュエル・ハンチントン教授はイデオロギー対立に代わって、宗教対立に導かれる「文明の衝突」が起こると警告した。これらの警告を、21 世紀のアジア太平洋に当てはめると、どのような情景が見えてくるか。

第一に、アジア太平洋地域の国家間関係を見ると、経済・軍事両面での中国の台頭と、日本経済の相対的な地盤沈下が注目されている。日中の間のパワー・トランジッションが進んでいると見られるわけである。また、日本の同盟国アメリカも、毎年日本の防衛予算額に相当するような大幅な国防予算の削減を行っており、2011 年 10 月のクリントン長官の論文の中の「アジアへの回帰」という言葉とは裏腹に、地域への介入は控えめである。アジア太平洋では、現在は中国が突出している。そして、おそらく、今後は、その中国と日米の 3 極の相互作用が、地域を動かすことになるだろう。中国は、「海洋強国」を志向しており、その海軍、海警、漁船による、東シナ海、南シナ海での活動は、エスカレートしている。

第二に、宗教的な主張を背景としている諸テロリストの活動は、ISIS のように、2011 年 5 月のオサマ・ビン・ラディンの死後もなくなっていない。中国を含むアジア太平洋の発展途上国の多くは複数の宗教グループを抱える複合社会である。中国政府自体も新疆ウイグル自治区や、チベット自治区などでの国内の過激派や分離主義者の抑制と、彼らの、国外の勢力との交流に頭を痛めている。言ってみれば、ミアシャイマー教授の警告と、故ハンチントン教授の警告は、アジア太平洋地域では、部分的ながら、同時に進行しつつあるようにも見えるのである。

冷戦期から、アジア太平洋地域には、欧州の北大西洋条約機構（NATO）のような堅固な多国間同盟はない。アメリカと地域諸国の二国間同盟をハブ＆スポーク型に展開した安全保障協力関係があるだけだったから、ミアシャイマー教授の予言した大国間の対立（日米と中、あるいは日中）の実現は、より深刻である。そして、日本国内には、少なくとも深刻な「文明の衝突」的現象はない。日本にとって、当面の安全保障問題は、東シナ海の尖閣諸島の領有をめぐる問題と、重要な南シナ海の航行の自由の確保である。

そのため、これまでの数多くの中国の、東シナ海での挑発行為：漢級原潜の日本領海での潜没航行、艦載ヘリコプターの異常接近、護衛艦への武器管制レーダー照射、防空識別圏の設定、尖閣諸島沖での海保巡視船への中国漁船の体当たり、ほぼ毎週起こっている中国海警船艇の領海侵犯、を止めさせるために、力を行使する研究が、日本でもアメリカでも始まっている。中国は、石油備蓄が 30 日前後しかないというし、自衛隊に対して中国海軍が圧倒的に優勢ではない今なら、かなりのことができる。そして、

アメリカや、ASEAN 諸国と協力すれば、シーレーンのチョークポイントを押さえて中国を封じ込められる、という誘惑が日本側にはある。

だが、ここで考えなければならないことは、19 世紀から 20 世紀にかけての時代と違い、21 世紀の現在は、対立する国同士でも経済的な相互依存の度合いが非常に高く、競合する国民同士が一緒に住んでいる場合も多い、ということである。2013 年の統計では、中国は、日本の最大の貿易相手国（総額 30.3 兆円）であり、日本は、中国にとっても第二の貿易相手国である。また、中国に在住する日本人は 13.5 万人、日本に在住する中国人は 64.9 万人である。日本が戦争をするには、これらの経済及び人的関係を犠牲にする覚悟がいる。

中国側も状況はそう変わらない。11 月 10 日の APEC 首脳会議の際の個別会談で、不愉快そうに顔をゆがめながら、安倍総理を迎えた習近平国家主席の表情がそれを象徴している。中国は、会談前に尖閣問題でも靖国問題でも日本を譲歩させることができなかった。5 月から 7 月にかけてのパラセル諸島沖での天然ガスの資源探査でも、ベトナムの抵抗と国際社会の批判を受け、外交的には失敗した。アメリカが懸念を示し、中国は探査を止めた。不愉快な国でも、付き合わざるを得ないのが、21 世紀の相互依存下のアジア太平洋地域の現実である。中国は、日本や ASEAN 諸国を含む周辺諸国やアメリカとの関係の悪化を避けるには、もっと努力が必要だ。「海洋強国」を目指すスローガンは、棚上げにせざるを得なくなるだろう。その上で、国内の「文明の衝突」の緩和に取り組むべきだ。

日米の政治指導者は、中国との経済的な相互依存と持続可能な地域の経済発展への展望を重視するべきである。経済・技術面での誘因と日米同盟の実力によって、中国を、日本と同じ「貿易国家」へ誘導することが求められる（貿易国家とは、1986 年に、リチャード・ローズクランス教授が著書のタイトルに使った言葉である）。ハードパワーと、ソフトパワーの併用が必要なのだ。日本は、中国に敵意がないことを示し、深刻な環境問題（大気・海洋汚染）の緩和を支援するために、対中 ODA の再開も検討せざるを得ないかもしれない。

貿易自由化をめぐっては、TPP と RCEP の区分の背後に、日米中の間の政治的不信感がある。中国は、EAEC 構想以来、東アジアでアメリカの影響力の及ばない勢力圏を欲し、また国有企業を保護する規制の存続を望んでいる。時殷弘教授などは「西太平洋の西部を中国の戦略空間にする必要がある」と述べているが、これだけ相互依存が進んだ時代に、勢力圏を求める構想はアナクロニズムだ。中国を取り込むには、東アジア首脳会議等の場で時間をかけて、TPP と RCEP を繋ぐ努力が必要だろう。また、TPP の前進には、日米間の農産物の関税撤廃と自動車の輸入制限の問題でも、お互いの妥協が必要である。積極的平和主義を掲げる日本には、経済面ではアベノミクスにプラスして、積極的貿易主義も必要だ。これらの政策は、日本国内の流通構造の改革無しには、実現できない、痛みを伴う改革である。日本がこの地域で、よりバランスの取れた貢献者として、アジア太平洋地域の安定に貢献したいのなら、これは重要である。日本国民は、我が国がアジア太平洋の三極の一つであるという自覚を持つべきである。

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China in the future and Japan

Until around 2030

- Xi Jinping has often pledged "Chinese dreams", "great renewal of Chinese nation" and "Strong army dreams". China denies the current situation of international order and demands new international order which is favorable to the country. This is the basic posture of current Chinese diplomacy.
- The economy of China will keep growing for years. China will also increase national power and military power steadily. However, the economic growth rate of China will stall after that. Moreover, the Chinese Government will have to cope with the aging its population and the increase of the social security expenses.
- While China would avoid a confrontation with the United States, the country hopes the influence of US in Asia becomes weak.
- Although there will be potentially strained relation, China and Russia will maintain strategic partnership.
- With its burgeoning state and military power, China has been taking inflammatory actions in the Senkakus and the South China Sea without fear of friction with neighboring countries. Even though the county knows a stable international relation is a prerequisite for China's future economic growth, China does not make a concession regarding the issues of sovereignty and territorial rights.
- By China Coast Guard and fishing boats, China will continue to put pressure on the Senkaku Islands. Japan must maintain its economic power in order to oppose the pressure.
- China will adhere to the principle of "peaceful reunification and one country, two systems" and the proposal for growing cross-Straits relations. On the other hand, Taiwan Administration will keep the status quo with China.
- The change in the situation of Korean Peninsula can happen. It can affect the security systems in neighboring countries and change the attitude toward the social system in China.
- PLA Navy will deploy two aircraft carriers. Even though they cannot compete with US Navy on the western Pacific Ocean, these Chinese carrier strike groups can threaten Vietnam, Philippine, Malaysia and other neighboring countries on the South China Sea.
- China will be confronted with the problem of environmental pollution and the frequency of minority riot. The corruption of Senior Chinese Officials cannot be eliminated and protest actions will occur frequently. Therefore, the public peace and order in China will be worse.
- As the economic growth rate decreases and the public anxiety increases, the national distrust of the Communist Party of China will increase and its social order will be more unstable.
- The Communist Party of China will be more dependent on People's Liberation Army, People's Armed Police and Militia in order to maintain the government and social order.

中国の将来と日本

2030 年頃まで

- 習近平はしばしば「中国の夢」、「中華民族の偉大な復興」、「強軍の夢」を強調する。中国はこれまでの国際秩序を否定し、中国に有利な新国際秩序を要求している。これが中国の現在の基本的外交姿勢である。

- 中国は今後数年間、経済成長を続ける。中国は国力を伸長させ、軍事力を着実に増大させる。しかし、その後は経済成長率が鈍化していく。また、老齢人口が増加して中国政府は社会保障費の増加に対処しなければならなくなる。

- 中国はアメリカとの決定的な対立を避けたい。しかし、アメリカのアジアへの影響力の低下を望んでいる。

- 中国とロシアとは戦略的パートナーシップ関係を維持しつつも、潜在的緊張関係も継続するだろう。

- 中国は国力増大と軍事力の向上を背景にして、尖閣諸島、南シナ海のいずれの海域においても周辺国との摩擦を恐れない行動をとるようになってきている。中国が経済発展を進めていくためには、安定した国際環境は必要であるものの、主権や領土の問題では譲歩しない姿勢を示している。

- 中国は海警と漁船による尖閣諸島に対する圧力を継続させるだろう。中国の圧力に対抗するために、日本は現在の経済力を維持していく必要がある。

- 中国は台湾に対する「平和統一、一国二制度」の統一方針と、両岸関係を発展させることを堅持するだろう。一方、台湾側は現状維持を貫こうとするだろう。

- 朝鮮半島情勢に変化が現れて、周辺各国の安全保障体制に影響を与える事態が発生する可能性がある。中国にとっても社会体制の変革が意識されるきっかけとなるだろう。

- 中国海軍は新たに空母２隻を配備するが、アメリカに西太平洋で対抗できはしない。しかし、中国の空母攻撃群は南シナ海においてベトナムやフィリピン、マレーシアなどに対し脅威を与えるだろう。

- 中国国内では環境汚染が進行し、少数民族暴動も頻発する。中国高官の汚職は根絶できず、集団抗議行動が多発し、社会治安は悪化する.

- 経済成長率の鈍化や社会不安の増加に従って、中国共産党の統治の正統性に対する疑問が高まるとともに共産党政権に対する信任がさらに薄れていく。中国の社会はますます不安定になっていく。

- 共産党政権は政権維持と社会治安維持のために、人民解放軍や武装警察、民兵、警察に対する依頼度を高めていくだろう。

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China, Japan, in the future

1. China in the future

China will not be a superpower, because the superpower means hegemony, but China's policy is never be a hegemony. After the second world war, only the former Soviet Union and the United States are called superpower.

China will be a biggest economic body, but will not be a biggest military body. We will just keep a force sufficient to self-defence.

China will be a very important power on keeping peace in the world, and will play that role in political way not military

China will be a good neighbor of Asia countries and a common player in regional cooperation.

2. Japan in the future

From Chinese side, we can't understand. The questions are:

Will Japan play a role as a superpower?

Why Japan want to use its military forces in the international politics?

3. China and Japan relations in the future

Now, we are on the cross road,

Will Japan Government abide by the " four-point consensus"?

The future: what kind of relations? Cooperation or confrontation or cooling relation?

Friendship, interests, strategy, and the regional structure, how to deal with these problems?

YUMINO Masahiro

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Dilemma Between Economic Temptation and Political Ideology : How we face with post "China Rising" Era

We now have been facing with the dilemma to choose between Economic temptation and Political ideology. The reason of this dilemma is of course China which still keep its authoritarian regime for more than 6decades and even after collapse of Cold War International Regime. As Chinese economic growth now we face with situation that we accept status quo which China is growing its economic influence to the world and became top economic and trade partners for many countries. But at the same time, we have to ignore reality of political ideology that China is still keeping authoritarian country regime. But Chinas stability and economic prosperity is getting more and more suspicious in these days. So the more Chinese Economy and influence bigger, the more we need to have clear mind to keep political identity, which is Liberty and freedom.

The End of "Chinese rising" Era

Quarter of century ago we were facing Political Regime Change in Communist countries such as Soviet Union, East Europe. Many people had thought next country could be China. But regime change hadn't happened in China. Then From Jiang Zeming, Hu Jingtao to Xi Jingping, China has Succeeded "Economic Reform" policy and Accomplished Economic Prosperity. But those "China Rising" Era looks come to end not as Chinese officials and specialists said. Officially China insists Win-Win economic relations with world but reality is not so well as it said. Chinese domestic economy is facing big problems like bubble economy looked brisk of crash and peoples uprising happening more than 10,000 for a year. P.M 2.5 hurts peoples health and shorten lifespan. Chinese economy had just turned corner of "China Rising" Era.

China as a Fragile Superpower: Not So Powerful and Stable as it seems.

As We all see China looked really powerful and big country, especially after APEC Summit last month in Beijing. China had succeeded to show his power to the world more than he really is. It was just like reflection of Tributary system of China Dynasty. China now is acting strong not just in Diplomatic way but also in Military way and which cause tension with its neighbors like Vietnam, Philippine and Japan. Those tensions mainly came from Chinese aggressive behavior as Sea power. Those behavior looks came from strong nationalism which reflect the strong ambition to recover lost territory. In addition to nationalism, there looks strong profit oriented activity of powerful interest group like oil major, military industrial complex and military. So CCP government is just like a prisoner of those interest group. The more China show strong power in South China Sea or in East Sea, the more actor behind scene will be disclosed.

China still living in Pre-modern Era

Dec 13th is the first national memorial day of Nanjing incident. CCP government decided to make this

day for national Memorial Day and those suggestion has passed as law in this spring. Japan had invaded China more than century ago but for China it is unforgettable incident not just in the history but for people in china today. But Japanese existence is more than in the history but for CCP, it is really important for survival and national unification. China has never had united country and from those aspect it is absurd to insist Post-modern and trans-nation, cosmopolitan identity for China. Western country include Japan and China looks living same age but, actually living different era.

Universal Value - Still the matter for the world include China, and Japan

There are big argument Between Hard liner called left wing party and Soft liner called Right wing party in China. Left supporter emphasize the importance of Maoizm and Chinese Characteristics. And Right supporter emphasize Universal values, so Left supporter strongly criticize Right supporter as traitor. But still universal value is still extremely important not only for the world but for China. Chinese anticorruption policy's key is depend on this universal value, not top down policy order. So it is still and maybe more, important to keep faith with universal value such as democracy and freedom. There are big argument for "Value Diplomacy", but still it is very important not only for Japanese diplomacy but also for China to encourage political reform and to form a country under rule of law.

経済的誘惑と政治アイデンティティの間のジレンマ
私たちはポスト「中国崛起（Rising China）」時代にいかに向き合うか

私たちは今日、経済的な誘惑と政治的アイデンティティをどのように折り合いをつけるかというジレンマに直面している。こうしたジレンマに直面するのは中国共産党一党支配を堅持しながら経済成長を謳歌し、世界第二位の規模にまで成長した中国の存在があるためだ。中国は「建国」から 60 年以上経た今でも共産党一党支配を堅持し、その体制は揺がないようにみえる。東西陣営が対立する冷戦体制が崩壊した当初、私たちは西側資本主義陣営が勝利し、世界は民主主義体制が世界の潮流になるか期待が高まった。ところが中国はその体制の堅持に成功し、GDP の成長率では年率 10%を超える成長を続け、「世界の工場」と言われるまでになった。冷戦の終結から四半世紀。中国は香港マカオの返還を達成し、台湾を残して国家統一を待つのみとなった。ところがここへきて高度成長には陰りが生じ、中国周辺の「ミニ・チャイナ」で反発が高まっている。政治体制改革が進まなかった中国に対して欧米型の民主主義を享受してきた香港や台湾が「No」を突き付けたのだ。中国は巨大な市場を有し、世界にその経済的恩恵を梃子に政治的影響力も行使しようとしている。中国は経済面で双方の関係は「ウィン・ウィン」を強調するが同時に、政治的な選択を強いる場面も少なくない。日中間では尖閣問題を始め、歴史認識、「靖国」参拝が、ベトナムやフィリピン、インドとは領海、領土問題、欧米とは香港や少数民族を巡る人権の問題で譲歩を迫る。中国との経済関係を優先して口をつぐめば経済貿易は発展するだろうが、政治的変化、進歩は停滞し、民主主義、言論表現の自由、という価値で妥協を強いられることになる。つまり根本的スタンスで私たちは中国がもたらす経済的な恩恵と政治的なアイデンティティをどう折り合いをつけるかジレンマに直面している。

「中国崛起（Ring China）」時代の終わり

「中国崛起時代の終わり」という言い方は議論を呼ぶものかもしれない。中国の発展の現状及び将来、近未来に対する評価を表すためだ。中国は今年 GDP の成長率が 7.5%を切り、成長に陰りが見えるが、景気の問題は表層的でメインの課題ではない。それよりも過度に低く抑えられた賃金に依拠した「世界

の工場」としての発展モデルや国有地の割譲（土地使用権の売買）による「打ち出の小槌」が「中国的発展モデル」に依拠する発展が頭打ちになったことが「中国崛起の時代」の終焉を象徴している。こうした状況を打開すべく中国は内需拡大よりも海外に打って出る事でインフラや金融面で外国と協力関係を深め、二か国間では援助外交を強化し、同時に地域毎のマルチな関係でも関係強化に乗り出し、ブリックスやSCOとの多国間外交の場でも影響力を示し、アジア・インフラ投資銀行（AIIB）設立といった金融支援枠組み構築でも存在感を示している。しかし根本的には国内での持続可能な発展が行き詰まっており、パラダイム変換を成し遂げない限り持続的な発展は厳しい。これはPM2.5や水、土壌汚染といった環境問題においても同様である。

「脆弱な超大国」（Fragile Super-power）としての中国

外見では強靭で強硬的で存在感を示す中国だがその実、あまりに多くの問題を国内に抱え、その国家統合さえもままならない。汚職、貧富の格差、少数民族問題、土地バブル崩壊、ゴーストタウン出現など現政権が抱える問題解決の課題は山積みであるにもかかわらず、治安維持、分裂阻止のための武力出動に勢力が削がれ、国防費と治安維持費、そして党のプロパガンダ、教育、ネット監視等の一党体制擁護のための費用が膨大で繁栄を国民皆で享受するどころではない。環境問題もより突出している。民衆の生活向上と内需の拡大が優先されるべきところ、国防や警察力強化に財政支出の重点がおかれ、民衆の不満が高まって年間の集団騒擾事件は10万件を超えると言われている。APECやG20などで国際的なプレゼンスをアピールし、「一帯一路（シルクロード経済ベルト、21世紀海上シルクロード）」構築の対外戦略を打ち出すが、国内的にはそれどころではなく「脆弱さ」はより突出している。

「前近代時代（Pre-Modern）を生きる中国」

12月13日は南京大虐殺犠牲者を追悼する記念日に指定されてから初の国家追悼日だ。近代中国において日本は極めて重要な存在で現在の政権形成には日本が大きな影響を与えたことは否定できないが、本質的な性質の面からいえば、中国は「前近代社会」を生きている。通常、アヘン戦争や清朝、中華民国を近代の境目と捉える傾向があろうが、ここでの「前近代」とは「国民国家」として統合されていないという意味である。中国は統一国家としての悲願を達成しえていないという意味で未だに「国民国家」としての統合を成し遂げていないためだ。1997年に香港返還で国家統合に一歩近づき馬英九政権は中共政権（PRC）への接近政策をとっていたが、馬政権が選挙で大敗北し、香港では学生デモが発生して、「国家統合」への危機感が再び高まりつつある。台湾に対する武力統一主張のような強硬論も見え隠れする。こうした状況から、欧米で多々ポストモダン叫ばれ、「脱国家」や「トランスナショナル」が主張されるが、中国はまだその段階にまで至っていない。つまり欧米や日本と中国は同じ時代を生きているようで異なる時代を生きていることになる。

普遍的価値の重要性を強調し、追い求める必要がある

冷戦体制の残滓が完全に消滅せずに、異なる時代を同時に生きている日本と中国だが、それでも民主、自由といった普遍的価値を謳い守っていくことが極めて重要である。中国では現在、普遍的価値を受け入れるか否かで猛烈なイデオロギー論争を国内で繰り広げているがこれは国内の既得権益層からなる保守グループが猛烈な抵抗を繰り広げているからである。しかし、ネットが普及し、情報が瞬時に入手できる時代になって情報統制は困難になりつつあり、市民意識が高まっている。こうした中で多くの人々に受け入れられるような民主と自由、機会の平等という普遍価値がこれまで以上に重要であることを引き続き強調していく必要があろう。

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Flexing Muscles Flexibly: China's Regional Strategy
Conference Paper

Introduction

1. 'There is one basic difference among us,' China's foreign minister Yang Jiechi reportedly pointed out to his Southeast Asian colleagues at the 2010 ASEAN Regional Forum in Hanoi, 'China is a big country and you are smaller countries.'[1] These words have been commonly evoked to highlight the emerging brand of Chinese regional diplomacy that is being increasingly perceived by many observers as 'newly' assertive or increasingly assertive. Other often cited examples of such purported assertiveness include, *inter alia*, the 2014 oil rig incident in disputed waters off Vietnam's coast; the 2013 declaration of a Chinese Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea; the occupation of the disputed Scarborough shoal since mid-2012; and the harrying of Vietnamese and Philippine boats by Chinese paramilitary vessels. According to Alastair Iain Johnston, the prevalence of perceptions of Chinese assertiveness is like a 'meme' that has 'gone viral.'[2]

2. This paper attempts to make better sense of China's regional policy and behaviour in recent years—in particular, its perceived rising assertiveness in the region. Speaking to, and contributing to, nascent scholarship and debate on China's 'new' assertiveness, the paper aims to address a number of critical questions: Is there a consistent or coherent strategy to China's supposed regional assertiveness? How should we interpret China's regional behaviour? What are some of the factors or dynamics driving this process?

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[1] Odd A. Westad, 'Memo to China: Size Isn't Everything,' *Bloomberg*, 18 October 2012.

[2] Alastair Iain Johnston, 'How New and Assertive is China's New Assertiveness?' *International Security*, Vol. 37, No. 4 (Spring 2013), pp. 7-48. According to survey data by Feng Huiyun and He Kai, even amongst the Chinese scholarly community, some 63.1% of Chinese scholars at the annual conference of the Chinese Community of Political Science and International Studies (CCPSIS) 'somewhat agree (with reservations)' that China's foreign policy has been more assertive since 2008-2009. See Huiyun Feng and Kai He, 'Examining China's Assertiveness through the Eyes of Chinese IR Scholars,' *RSIS Working Paper*, No. 281, 17 September 2014, pp. 1-17.

Nascent Scholarship and Debate

3. There have only been a few works that *specifically* examine the issue of China's assertiveness.[3] In a recent issue of the *International Security* (IS) journal, Iain Johnston probes the veracity of the newly or more assertive China narrative. Iain Johnston concludes that such a narrative is ultimately 'problematic' and exaggerates the degree to which China's actions have been newly assertive, though he does concede that concerning China's regional maritime claims, Beijing's conduct does appear to be more assertive.[4]

4. Bjorn Jerden pursues a similar 'revisionist' argument to Iain Johnston in the *Chinese Journal of International Politics*, and argues that the assertive China narrative is basically flawed. Like Iain Johnston, Jerden notes several empirical examples that challenge the assertive China narrative. Jerden suggests epistemological reasons—e.g. 'information cascade, discursive determinism, realism's prejudices'—for the prevalence of such a narrative.[5]

5. Furthering the debate is Chen Dingding and Pu Xiaoyu's correspondence article in the IS journal. Chen and Pu take issue with Iain Johnston's 'narrow' understanding of assertiveness, and propose that foreign policy assertiveness should be understood from a typology of (i) 'offensive' assertiveness; (ii) 'defensive' assertiveness; and (iii) 'constructive' assertiveness.' They conclude that China's diplomacy has been indeed more muscular in recent times, but that this phenomenon should be more accurately interpreted as a form of defensive assertiveness.[6]

Flexible Assertiveness

6. This paper builds on the nascent debate on the PRC's assertiveness 'syndrome.'[7] But first, two important qualifiers: for one, 'assertiveness' remains both a contested and taken-for-granted concept in international relations. There is little consensus within the literature on what constitutes assertiveness in foreign policy while at the same time, it is often assumed that one recognises assertive state behaviour when one sees it.[8] Second, the notion of assertiveness suffers from what is termed as the tyranny of perceptions. As Miles' Law put it, 'where you stand depends on where you sit.' Thus, perceptions of assertiveness encompass a degree of inherent subjectivity that cannot be objectively eradicated.

7. I agree with Iain Johnston that it is facile and misplaced to generalize China's foreign policy, in particular its regional policy, as being *uniformly* assertive. But Chen and Pu are also right to note that it is

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[3] Here, I only highlight the more representative, recent works that explicitly address the Chinese assertiveness debate.

[4] It should be noted that in Iain Johnston's article, he only focuses on events in 2010. See footnote 2.

[5] Bjorn Jerden, 'The Assertive China Narrative: Why It is Wrong and How So Many Still Bought into It,' *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 47-88.

[6] Dingding Chen and Xiaoyu Pu, 'Correspondence: Debating China's Assertiveness,' *International Security*, Vol. 38, No. 3 (Winter 2013/14), pp. 176-183. See as well Feng and He, 'Examining China's Assertiveness through the Eyes of Chinese IR Scholars.'

[7] Interview with Chinese scholar, Beijing, June 2014.

[8] Johnston, 'How New and Assertive is China's New Assertiveness?'

unhelpful to conceive the notion of assertiveness in monolithic terms and that more analytical nuance would be useful.

8. I suggest here that China's Asia policy can be better understood from the lenses and idea of flexible assertiveness. Flexible assertiveness refers to a two-pronged foreign policy strategy that combines two particular aspects: one, a tougher and more uncompromising approach towards what China regards as its core interests. The other is a more flexible and more beneficent approach towards those interests (so-called 'non-core' national interests) that are perceived as less crucial, and hence, more negotiable.

9. Flexible assertiveness can be characterised by the Chinese axiom '硬的更硬, 软的更软' (i.e. 'hardening the hard, softening the soft'). Thus, in many respects, China's flexible assertiveness reflects a carrot-and-stick strategic approach, but one involving heightened costs and benefits. Chinese commentators have noted the apparent success of this approach in the handling of the Taiwan question (for example, the passing of the 2005 anti-cessation law versus the promises of enhanced economic integration), so some have suggested that this model be applied on a regional wide basis, in particular, to China's maritime territorial issues.[9]

10. It should be emphasized that this flexible assertiveness is not just a one-dimensional, carrot-and-stick policy; here, it is centred on the concept of China's core national interests. This begs the following question: What are China's core interests?

China's Core Interests

11. In brief, the concept of core interests (核心利益) refers to those national interests that China would never 'compromise or trade' (绝不能退让或进行交易的重　大利益). Some analysts interpret this as representing China's 'red lines,' delineating those interests which China would be willing to resort to force (not saying that it would necessarily do so).[10]

12. The rhetoric of core interests first appeared in Chinese diplomatic language around the 2003-2004 period as an expression and response to China's concerns over Taiwan's growing independence movement.[11] By 2007, according to the Chinese government portal, this concept had been 'incorporated' into China's 'official documents and foreign affairs activities.'[12] Around this time, in addition to the Taiwan issue, the Tibet and Xinjiang questions also became linked to, or were included in,

[9] See, for example, '南海解局的关健：软的更软，硬的更硬' (The Key to Solving the South China Sea Conundrum: Softening the Soft, Hardening the Hard), *Zhonghua Wang Luntan*, 2 February 2012; Field interviews in Beijing, March 2014.

[10] 'China's Declaration of Key Interests Misinterpreted,' *Beijing Review*, 26 August 2013.

[11] Caitlin Campbell, Ethan Meick, Kimberly Hsu and Craig Murray, 'China's "Core Interests" and the East China Sea,' *US-China Economic and Security Review Commission Research Backgrounder*, 10 May 2013, pp. 1-7.

[12] 'China's Declaration of Key Interests Misinterpreted.'

the notion of China's core interests. However, it was only at the China-US Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) in July 2009 that the concept was given more specific description for the first time. State Councillor Dai Bingguo identified China's core interests as the 'safeguarding of its political and economic systems and national security, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and sustainable economic and social development.' These themes were further underlined and reiterated in Dai's 2010 article, '坚持走和平发展' (Stick to the Path of Peaceful Development) and the 2011 White Paper on 'China's Peaceful Development.' As Dai put it categorically, 'no violation of these interests will be allowed.'[13]

13. To be sure, Dai's articulation of China's core interests still remains relatively vague and broad. Moreover, these interests appear to be defined in a way that suggests some degree of overlap. That said, it is evident that three particular, mutually non-exclusive areas are of paramount importance to Beijing: (i) the continuity and perpetuation of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) political leadership, i.e. 'socialism with Chinese characteristics'; (ii) ensuring China's economic and social progress; and (iii) ensuring the non-violation of China's political independence and territorial whole.

14. The current Xi government has continued with the engagement of the idea and language of China's core interests. At a 28 January 2013 group study session of the CCP Politburo, Xi Jinping emphasized that:

> 'We will stick to the road of peaceful development but will never give up our legitimate rights and will never sacrifice our national core interests. No country should presume that we will trade our core interests or that we will allow harm to be done to our sovereignty, security or development interests.'[14]

15. The promulgation and continuation of the concept of core interests in Chinese foreign policy discourse are informed by at least two rationales. According to the *Beijing Review*, the concept is about 'preventing misjudgements and reducing the possibility of conflicts.' The logic here is that an explicit enunciation of China's core interests is necessary in order to 'avoid further erosion of those interests.' The second reason is connected to the growing public attention and sentiments paid to such interests, in particular, Chinese territorial interests. It is suggested that rising public 'consciousness' of the PRC's territorial disputes puts pressure on the Chinese government to better protect those interests.[15]

16. Not surprisingly, it is this aspect of the declared core interests, i.e. safeguard sovereignty and territorial integrity (主权和领土完整), that has seen the most expression of China's purported assertiveness. While there has been a range of Chinese diplomatic actions labelled as 'assertive,' the majority of such perceived assertive activities relates overwhelmingly to questions of China's territorial integrity.

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[13] Ibid. See as well Campbell, Meick, Hsu and Murray, 'China's "Core Interests" and the East China Sea.'

[14] 'China's Declaration of Key Interests Misinterpreted.'

[15] Ibid.

17. Given that Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang are areas already specified at one point or another as falling within the locus of China's core interests, the question that has concerned many analysts (and indeed, governments) is whether the territorial claims in the East and South China Seas are being considered by China as part of its core interests. For the reason of consistency, it would appear that Beijing would be inclined to do so.[16] Yet, interestingly, there has been scant official evidence that Beijing has explicitly linked these maritime territorial disputes to its core interests.

18. According to the 8 November 2010 interview of US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton by *The Australian* newspaper, Clinton reportedly affirmed that Dai Bingguo told her that Beijing 'viewed the South China Sea as a core interest.' However, this assertion was not subsequently verified by Clinton nor were there official records confirming that Dai did indeed made such remarks.[17] On 26 April 2013, in response to a question on the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Hua Chunying was reported to have answered, 'The Diaoyu Islands are about sovereignty and territorial integrity. Of course, it's China's core interest.' Yet, when the transcript of the press conference was released on 28 April, the spokesperson was recorded as only saying that the dispute 'concerns' the PRC's core interests.[18]

19. Therefore, based on prevailing evidence, it appears that either the issue (on whether the maritime disputes are part of core national interests) remains a question of continuing debate within Zhongnanhai or that the matter is being kept deliberately ambiguous by Beijing. What is clear, though, is that Beijing has 'neither publicly confirmed nor denied' the elevation of this issue to that of China's core interests.[19] One Chinese scholar describes these maritime territorial interests as 'tacit' core interests.[20]

An Emerging Pattern

20. There appears to be growing evidence that Beijing's regional diplomacy has conformed to a general pattern of flexible assertiveness in recent years, especially since the advent of Xi's leadership. On the one hand, China has pursued a discernibly tougher and more robust posture vis-à-vis its maritime territorial claims in Asia. Most analysts (including Iain Johnston) agree that, as compared to earlier antecedents, this aspect of Chinese diplomacy has been demonstrably more assertive.[21] This should not be surprising because after all, these maritime claims are unavoidably related to the core interest of territorial integrity (even if this connection is not yet explicit).

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[16] Conversation with Chinese analyst in Singapore, November 2014.

[17] Michael Swaine, 'China's Assertive Behaviour: Part One: On Core Interests,' *China Leadership Monitor*, No. 34, 22 February 2011, pp. 1-25.

[18] 'Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying's Regular Press Conference on April 26, 2013,' *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China*, 28 April 2013.

[19] Campbell, Meick, Hsu and Murray, 'China's "Core Interests" and the East China Sea.'

[20] Field interview with Chinese scholar in Beijing, March 2014.

[21] See, for example, Michael Yahuda, 'China's New Assertiveness in the South China Sea,' *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 22, No. 81, pp. 446-459.

21. On the other hand, China has been exercising a more beneficent, more sophisticated and more negotiable approach in its regional economic statecraft. From launching economic-centred initiatives like the Maritime Silk Road (MSR) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), promising substantial infrastructure loans to regional countries, to the promotion of regional integration frameworks such as the Free Trade Agreement of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP), we see a China that appears more willing and committed to extend the benefits of its growth to its peripheries.

Conclusion

22. It is sometimes said that China has been sending 'mixed signals' in the region in recent years.[22] What I have tried to show in this paper is that, amidst these mixed signals, there is actually a considerable degree of coherency and pattern. By understanding China's Asia strategy through the lenses of flexible assertiveness, we can see that Beijing has been fine-tuning its regional policy, making it defter and more sophisticated, so as to respond to what it perceives as an increasingly complex and challenging regional environment (especially in the wake of the US rebalance to Asia).

23. My other aim has been to try to inject greater nuance in the understanding of the idea of China's assertiveness, speaking to the extant debate on this area. Many analyses either make *a prori* assumptions of China's assertiveness or make sweeping generalizations of China as an assertive power. That is unhelpful in my opinion. As this paper has tried to argue, China's assertiveness is not a uniform phenomenon. It is one welded to the notion of Chinese core interests, yet encompassing considerable flexibility for those interests deemed outside of this rubric.

[22] Nguyen Hung Son, 'China Sending Mixed Signals to ASEAN,' *The Straits Times*, 13 May 2014.

4. An Introduction to The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)

【Objectives】

In today's world, people's attention is focused not only around the ways and means to cope with the globalization, but also the rise of new states including People's Republic of China and the geopolitical evolution both inside and outside the former Soviet Union. Under these circumstances, in addition to traditional dialogue partners in Asia-Pacific region, it has become increasingly important for Japan to establish new channels of dialogue both in the first and the second tracks with countries which she has yet to hold regular meetings with, such as member countries of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (Russia, Turkey, Balarus, etc.). On the basis of such understanding, The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) aims to promote the exchange of views on commonly shared interests and issues in the field ranging from politics and security to economy, trade, finance, society and culture, and to help business leaders, Diet members and opinion leaders both in Japan and in their counterpart countries to discuss about the formulation of new orders in global and regional arenas.

【History】

The 1982 Versailles Summit was widely seen as having exposed rifts within the Western alliance. Accordingly, there were expressed concerns that the summit meetings were becoming more and more stylized rituals and that Western solidarity was at risk. Within this context, it was realized that to revitalize the summit meetings there must be free and unfettered exchanges of private-sector views to be transmitted directly to the heads of the participating states. Accordingly, Japanese former Foreign Minister OKITA Saburo, U.S. Trade Representative William BROCK, E.C. Commission Vice President Etienne DAVINGNON, and Canadian Trade Minister Edward LUMLEY, as representatives of the private-sector in their respective countries, took the initiative in founding The Quadrangular Forum in Washington in September 1982. Since then, the end of the Cold War and the altered nature of the economic summits themselves had made it necessary for The Quadrangular Forum to metamorphose into The Global Forum established by the American and Japanese components of The Quadrangular Forum at the World Convention in Washington in October 1991. In line with its objectives as stated above, The Global Forum was intended as a facilitator of global consensus on the many post-Cold War issues facing the international community and reached out to open its discussions not only to participants from the quadrangular countries but also to participants from other parts of the world. Over the years, the gravity of The Global Forum's activities gradually shifted from its American component (housed in The Center for Strategic and International Studies) to its Japanese component (housed in The Japan Forum on International Relations), and, after the American component ceased to be operative, the Board of Trustees of the Japanese component resolved, on February 7, 1996, that it would thereafter act as an independent body for organizing bilateral dialogues with Japan as a hub for all countries in the world, and amended its by-laws accordingly. At the same time, The Global Forum's Japanese component was reorganized into The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) in line with the principle that the organization be self-governing, self-financing, and independent of any other organization.

【Organization】

The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) is a private, non-profit, non-partisan, and independent membership organization in Japan to engage in and promote international exchanges on policy-oriented matters of bilateral, regional and global implications. While the secretariat is housed in The Japan Forum on International Relations, GFJ itself is independent of any other organizations, including The Japan Forum on International Relations. Originally established as the Japanese component of The Quadrangular Forum at the initiative of HATTORI Ichiro, OKITA Saburo, TAKEYAMA Yasuo, TOYODA Shoichiro in 1982, GFJ is currently headed by OKAWARA Yoshio as Advisor, ITO kenichi as Chairman and ISHIKAWA Kaoru as President. The membership is composed of 10 Business Members including the two Governors, MOGI Yuzaburo and TOYODA Shoichiro; 18 Political Members including the three Governors, ASAO Keiichiro, KOIKE Yuriko, and TANIGAKI Sadakazu; and 93 Academic Members including the one Governor, SHIMADA Haruo.

【Activities】

Since the start of The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) in 1982, GFJ has shifted its focus from the exchanges with the Quadrangular countries for the purpose of contributing to the Western Summit, to those with neighboring countries in the Asia-Pacific region including US, China, Korea, ASEAN countries, India and Australia European countries, Wider Black Sea Area, for the purposes of deepening mutual understanding and contributing to the formation of international order. GFJ has been active in collaboration with international exchange organizations in those countries in organizing policy-oriented intellectual exchanges called "Dialogue." In order to secure a substantial number of Japanese participants in the "Dialogue", GFJ in principle holds these "Dialogues" in Tokyo. A listing of topics of "Dialogues" and its overseas co-sponsors in past years given below.

Year	Month	Topic	Co-sponsor
2014	December	The Japan- Asia Pacific Dialogue "The Asia-Pacific in Global Power Transition: How Many Great Powers?	Meiji University University of Western Sydney The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)
	May	The Japan-China Dialogue "Prospect of Japan-China Relationship in the Changing World"	Institute of Japanese Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS)
	March	The Japan-U.S. Alliance in Changing International and Domestic Environments	Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University
	January	Toward Building Confidence Between Japan and China in 'New Domains'	The Japan Forum on International Relations
2013	October	Toward the Making of Shared Values in Foreign Policy	Washington College International Studies Program Foundation of Research on Transformation of Malaysia
	March	Future Prospect of the Japan-GUAM Partnership for Democracy and Economic Development	GUAM-Organization for Democracy and Economic Development
	February	How to Develop Japan and Black Sea Area Cooperation	Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)
	January	Toward a Future-Oriented Japan-China Relationship	School of Environment, Beijing Normal University World Resources Institute College of Public Administration, Zhejiang University
2012	September	Japan-U.S. Alliance at a New Stage: Toward a Provider of International Public Goods	Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies
	March	The Future of ASEAN Integration and Japan's Role	Fudan University
	March	The Rise of Emerging Countries and the Future of Global Governance	Nanyang Technological University The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
	February	The Asia-Pacific Region in Transition and the Japan-U.S.-China Relations	China Association of Asia-Pacific Studies

5. An Introduction to Meiji University

Meiji University was founded in January 1881 as the Meiji Law School by a group of young lawyers barely in their 30's: Tatsuo Kishimoto, Kozo Miyagi, and Misao Yashiro. It was an era characterized by Japan's urgent need to develop as a modern independent nation. The three founded the Meiji Law School in their fervent hope to "foster bright capable youths who would lead a modern civil society in Japan".

Although confronted with countless obstacles and hardships along the way, Meiji University was born as a site for learning and education. Continuing its growth without ever ceasing to ring the chimes of liberty, Meiji University has expanded as one of the prominent private universities of Japan, celebrating its 130th anniversary in 2011. With Rights, Liberty, Independence and Self-government as its guiding principles, Meiji University is committed to fostering students who satisfy the requirements of "austerity and sturdiness", "creation of new intellect" and "needs of the times". Having sent out more than 520,000 graduates into the world to date, it has contributed vastly to the progress of society. The achievements of the university's numerous alumni actively engaged in key roles in various walks of life are highly reputed.

Meiji University ranks solidly among the best universities in Japan, currently consisting of 10 schools: the School of Law, School of Commerce, School of Political Science and Economics, School of Business Administration, School of Arts and Letters, School of Information and Communication, School of Global Japanese Studies, School of Science and Technology, School of Agriculture, and the School of Interdisciplinary Mathematical Sciences. The Graduate School is made up of 15 Schools: the Graduate School of Law, Graduate School of Commerce, Graduate School of Political Science and Economics, Graduate School of Business Administration, Graduate School of Arts and Letters, Graduate School of Information and Communication, Graduate School of Global Japanese Studies, Graduate School of Science and Technology, Graduate School of Agriculture, Graduate School of Advanced mathematical Sciences, and the Graduate School of Humanities. There are independent schools in various disciplines, including the Law School, Graduate School of Governance Studies, Graduate School of Global Business, and the Graduate School of Professional Accountancy. The University also boasts the Meiji University Meiji High School and Meiji University Meiji Junior High School.

In fiscal 2004, in order to respond to the "needs of the times", Meiji University Women's College and the Evening Division ceased recruiting students.

In addition to the Surugadai Campus, Meiji University also comprises the Izumi Campus, Ikuta Campus, and the Nakano Campus newly opened in April, 2013. Along with excellent teaching staff, all of these campuses are linked with other institutions and facilities for education and research and feature the latest facilities, equipment and so on for extracurricular activities. Providing steady education and research opportunities, the Surugadai Campus in particular features the latest IT infrastructure and the Liberty Tower, with 23 stories above ground and three below. On top of this, the construction of “Global Front”, a cutting edge center of excellence in the age of globalization has been completed in January, 2013.

Meiji University aims to make dramatic advances into the world as the top 21st-century urban university in Japan.

6. An Introduction to University of Western Sydney

The University of Western Sydney (UWS) began operation on 1st January 1989, under the terms of the University of Western Sydney Act, 1988 which had been passed by the New South Wales Parliament in December 1988. However, the predecessors of the University date back as far as 1891 with the establishment of the Hawkesbury Agricultural College.

The Act created a federated network university, based on two existing Colleges of Advanced Education - Hawkesbury Agricultural College and Nepean College of Advanced Education.

Following incorporation into the University, the foundation network members were known as the 'University of Western Sydney, Hawkesbury' (UWS Hawkesbury) and the 'University of Western Sydney, Nepean' (UWS Nepean).

The Act was amended by the University of Western Sydney (Amendment) Act, 1989 (Act No. 128, 1989) and the Macarthur Institute of Higher Education became the third University member on 1 November 1989. The new campus was known as the 'University of Western Sydney, Macarthur' (UWS Macarthur).

In 1995 a review of the structure of UWS was undertaken. The Report of the Committee to Review the Structure of the University of Western Sydney (the Rogers Report) recommended restructuring the institution and a new federated University system emerged. The University of Western became a federated university system comprising four co-operative and interrelated elements: Office of the Vice-Chancellor, UWS Hawkesbury, UWS Macarthur, UWS Nepean.

This federated system ensured the University was represented at a national and international level as a single institution with common objectives and values, while giving each of its Members the autonomy needed to react quickly and flexibly to the demands and needs of its local communities. The principal advantage of the federated network structure was the opportunity to build on the individual strengths of each member university, and through the University as a whole to define and achieve objectives that the individual members might have found unattainable. Each member was largely autonomous and responsible for: the development and conduct of courses; the admission of students; the initiation and supervision of research programs; staffing; the development of consultancy and entrepreneurial activities; and the development and maintenance of campus facilities and properties.

On 26 November 1997, the University of Western Sydney Act, 1997 (Act No. 116, 1997) was passed by the State Parliament. This Act which replaced the original Act came into force on 1 January 1998.

Following consultation across UWS the Vice Chancellor put proposals before the UWS Board of Trustees at the end of 1999 for a major restructure of the University. The Board approved the principles of the restructure, and the consequent detailed work to be undertaken to develop the new structure. From the beginning of 2001 the University of Western Sydney operated as a single multi-campus university rather than as a federation.

The new structure of the university was outlined in the 2001 Calendar with revisions and changes outlined in the 2002 Calendar.

The single multi-campus University of Western Sydney has six campuses: Bankstown, Blacktown, Campbelltown, Hawkesbury, Parramatta, and Penrith.

“The University of Western Sydney has been named one of the world's top 400 universities, with the release of the prestigious Times Higher Education (THE) World University Rankings for 2014-2015. UWS has moved into the 351-400 band for the first time, firmly placing it within the top two per cent of universities worldwide.” The information can be found at

http://www.uws.edu.au/newscentre/news_centre/more_news_stories/uws_now_among_the_top_two_per_cent_of_universities_worldwide

7. An Introduction to The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)

The Forum conducts a variety of activities hosting conferences, organizing research programs, and publishing research reports and policy recommendations, etc.

[History]

The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc. (JFIR or The Forum) was founded on March 12, 1987 in Tokyo on the private initiative of Dr. OKITA Saburo, Mr. HATTORI Ichiro, Prof. ITO Kenichi, and 60 other independent citizens from business, academic, political, and media circles of Japan, recognizing that a policy-oriented research institution in the field of international affairs independent from the government was most urgently needed in Japan. On April 1, 2011, JFIR was reincorporated as a "public interest foundation" with the authorization granted by the Prime Minister in recognition of its achievements.

[Purpose]

The Forum is a private, non-profit, independent, and non-partisan organization dedicated to improved understanding of Japanese foreign policy and international relations. The Forum takes no institutional position on issues of foreign policy, though its members are encouraged not only to analyze but also to propose alternatives on matters of foreign policy. Though the Forum helps its members to formulate policy recommendations on matters of public policy, the views expressed in such recommendations represent in no way those of the Forum as an institution and the responsibility for the contents of the recommendations is that of those members of the Forum who sign them alone.

[Organization]

JFIR is a membership organization with four categories of membership, namely, (1) corporate, (2) associate corporate, (3) individual and (4) associate individual. As for the organizational structure of JFIR, the "Board of Trustees" is the highest decision making body, which is in charge of electing the "Directors" and of supervising overall activities of JFIR, while the "Board of Directors" is an executive body, which is in charge of the management of day-to-day operations of JFIR.

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■ Auditors

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TAKEUCHI Yukio

[Activities]

In tandem with the core activities of the "Policy Council" in making policy recommendations, another important pillar of JFIR's activities is the e-Forum "Hyakka-Seiho" which means "Hundred Flowers in Full Bloom" (http://www.jfir.or.jp/cgi/m-bbs/). The e-Forum, which started on April 12, 2006, is open to the public, functioning as an interactive forum for discussions on foreign policy and international affairs. All articles posted on the e-Forum are sent through the bimonthly e-mail magazine "Meru-maga Nihon Kokusai Fōramu" in Japanese to about 10,000 readers in Japan. Furthermore, articles worth attention for foreigners are translated into English and posted on the English website of JFIR (http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/index.htm) as "JFIR Commentary." They are also introduced in the e-mail magazine "JFIR E-Letter" in English. "JFIR E-Letter" is delivered bimonthly to about 10,000 readers worldwide.

MEMO

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