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# **The Japan-U.S. Dialogue**

The Japan-U.S. Alliance in the Era of the Trump Administration:  
Crossroads or Continuity?

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## **Conference Papers**

March, 3, 2017

Tokyo, Japan

Sponsored by  
The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)

Co-Sponsored by  
The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)  
Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University (INSS)

## **Rules of Proceedings**

### **Presentations: 8 minutes**

Allocated time for a presentation is 8 minutes.

One of the staff members will ring a bell to let you know the remaining time.

- The first bell-----1 minute remaining for your presentation
- The second bell-----The end of your presentation

### **Free Discussions: 2 minutes**

Allocated time for a comment is 2 minutes.

One of the staff members will ring a bell to let you know the remaining time.

- The first bell-----1 minute remaining for your comment
- The second bell-----The end of your comment

Thank you for your cooperation.

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## 1. Program

### Japan-U.S. Dialogue The Japan-U.S. Alliance in the Era of the Trump Administration: Crossroads or Continuity?

Friday, March 3, 2017 / 2017 年 3 月 3 日 (金)  
"Lecture Hall," The International House of Japan / 国際文化会館「講堂」

Sponsored by / 主催  
The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) / グローバル・フォーラム

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The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) / 公益財団法人日本国際フォーラム  
Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University (INSS) / 米国防大学国家戦略研究所

Opening Remarks / 開会挨拶	
14:00-14:10	
Opening Remarks (5 min.) 開会挨拶 (5 分間)	ITO Kenichi, Chairman, GFJ & JFIR 伊藤 憲一 グローバル・フォーラム代表世話人 / 日本国際フォーラム会長
Session I / セッション I	
14:10-15:40	
Prospects and Challenges of the Japan-U.S. Alliance in the Trump Era トランプ時代の日米同盟の展望と課題	
Chairperson 議長	KAMIYA Mataka, Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan / Academic Governor, GFJ / Director and Superior Research Fellow, JFIR 神谷 万丈 防衛大学校教授 / グローバル・フォーラム有識者世話人 / 日本国際フォーラム理事・上席研究員
Presentation A (8min.) 報告 A (8 分間)	Robert MANNING, Senior Fellow, the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, Atlantic Council ロバート・マニング 米大西洋協議会ブレント・スコウクロフト国際安全保障研究センター上級研究員
Presentation B (8min.) 報告 B (8 分間)	NAKANISHI Hiroshi, Professor, Kyoto University / Academic Member, GFJ 中西 寛 京都大学教授 / グローバル・フォーラム有識者メンバー
Presentation C (8min.) 報告 C (8 分間)	Nicholas SZECHENYI, Deputy Director and Senior Fellow, Office of the Japan Chair, CSIS ニコラス・セーチャーニ 米戦略国際問題研究所日本部副部長・主任研究員
Presentation D (8min.) 報告 D (8 分間)	WATANABE Tsuneo, Senior Research Fellow, The Sasakawa Peace Foundation 渡部 恒雄 笹川平和財団特任研究員
Free Discussions (50 min.) 自由討議 (50 分間)	All Participants 出席者全員
15:40-15:50	
Break / 休憩	

Session II / セッションII	
15:50-17:20	
What Should the Two Allies Do? 日米は何をすべきか	
Chairperson 議長	KAMIYA Mataka, Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan / Academic Governor, GFJ / Director and Superior Research Fellow, JFIR 神谷 万丈 防衛大学校教授／グローバル・フォーラム有識者世話人／日本国際フォーラム理事・上席研究員
Presentation A (8min.) 報告 A (8 分間)	HOSOYA Yuichi, Professor, Keio University 細谷 雄一 慶応義塾大学教授
Presentation B (8min.) 報告 B (8 分間)	James SCHOFF, Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace ジェームズ・ショフ カーネギー国際平和財団上級研究員
Presentation C (8min.) 報告 C (8 分間)	KATO Yoichi, Senior Research Fellow, Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation 加藤 洋一 日本再建イニシアティブ研究主幹
Presentation D (8min.) 報告 D (8 分間)	James PRZYSTUP, Senior Research Fellow, INSS ジェームズ・プリスタップ 米国防大学国家戦略研究所上席研究員
Free Discussions (50 min.) 自由討議 (50 分間)	All Participants 出席者全員
Wrap-up Session / 総括セッション	
17:20-17:30	
Wrap-up (10 min.) 総括 (10 分間)	James PRZYSTUP, Senior Research Fellow, INSS ジェームズ・プリスタップ 米国防大学国家戦略研究所上席研究員
	KAMIYA Mataka, Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan / Academic Governor, GFJ / Director and Superior Research Fellow, JFIR 神谷 万丈 防衛大学校教授／グローバル・フォーラム有識者世話人／日本国際フォーラム理事・上席研究員

[NOTE] 日本語・英語同時通訳付き／English-Japanese simultaneous interpretation will be provided



**NAKANISHI Hiroshi****Professor, Kyoto University / Academic Member, GFJ**

Received M.A. from Kyoto University in 1987 and studied in the doctor course of the History Department at the University of Chicago (1988-1990) as Ph.D. candidate. Served as Associate Professor of Kyoto University (1991-2009), Member of Prime Minister's "Council on Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era" (2010), Member of Prime Minister's Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security (2013-14), and President of the Japan Association of International Relations (2014-2016). Concurrently serves as Dean of School of Government, Kyoto University (2016-), Councilor of the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), and Director of Research Institute for Peace and Security. His major interests include rise of the global international history of the 20th century, with particular interest on Japanese foreign and security policy in the Showa Era, and current Japanese foreign and security policy.

**WATANABE Tsuneo****Senior Research Fellow, The Sasakawa Peace Foundation**

Received D.D.S. from Tohoku University in 1988 and M.A. in political science from the New School University in New York. Joined Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. in 1995 and has served as a Visiting Research Scholar, Research Associate, Fellow, Senior Fellow, and currently an Adjunct Fellow. After serving as a Senior Fellow at the Mitsui Global Strategic Studies Institute in Tokyo since April, 2005, joined the Tokyo Foundation in October, 2008, and served as Director for Policy Research and Senior Fellow before assuming the current position since 2016. Published "Asia Pacific Countries and the US rebalancing Strategy"(co-authored, Palgrave Macmillan US, 2016) and US-China Trading Places in 2025 [in Japanese] (PHP Research Institute, 2011), etc.

**HOSOYA Yuichi****Professor, Keio University**

Received his M.I.S. from the University of Birmingham and Ph.D. from Keio University. He is also Senior Researcher at Institute for International Policy Studies (IIPS) and at the Tokyo Foundation (TKFD). Served as Visiting Professor and Japan Chair at Sciences-Po in Paris (2009-10), Visiting Fellow at Princeton University (2008-2009). His research interests include the postwar international history, British diplomatic history, Japanese diplomacy, and contemporary international security. He was a member of Prime Minister's Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security (2013-14), and a member of Prime Minister's Advisory Panel on National Security and Defense Capabilities (2013), in which capacity he assisted to draft Japan's first National Security Strategy.

**KATO Yoichi****Senior Research Fellow, Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation**

Mr. Yoichi Kato is senior research fellow at a Japanese independent think tank, Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation (RJIF). His area of expertise includes national security strategy of Japan and U.S.-China strategic relations. Prior to joining RJIF, he was national security correspondent of the Asahi Shimbun, a Japanese newspaper. He was bureau chief of Asahi's American General Bureau in Washington, DC. While at the Asahi Shimbun, he was invited to the School of International Studies of Peking University in Beijing, China as a visiting scholar. He also held positions of visiting research fellow at both Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Institute for National Strategic Studies of U.S. National Defense University (INSS/NDU) in Washington, D.C. He taught national security strategy at GAKUSHUIN University in Tokyo. He earned his MA from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, U.S.A. He is currently an adjunct fellow of CSIS. His publications include "美国的亚太再平衡战略及其对地区战略环境的影响" (中国国際戦略評論 2013) .

(In order of appearance)

### 3. Presentation Papers

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#### Session I: Prospects and Challenges of the Japan-U.S. Alliance in the Trump Era

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##### Presentation A

#### **Strengthening the US-Japan Alliance in the Trump Era The Context - De-Globalization and its Discontents:**

Robert MANNING

Senior Fellow, the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security,  
Atlantic Council

The ascension of the Trump administration finds the US-Japan alliance facing in the most problematic and uncertain global operating environment since the end of the Cold War. Never since WW2 has the open, rules-based international order been so unsettled, nor faced so many challenges nor so many competing visions of world order. Global trends that complicate the alliance include:

- Demographic changes: aging populations in the US, EU, China, ROK and Japan; demographic bulges in India and SW Asia;
- Global economic slowdown: retreat from open capital flows, trade which grew at twice global GDP, now static, no new global WTO trade round; new pressures on the global middle class;
- Growing environmental stress: water shortages, most pronounced sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, record temperatures and extreme weather as global warming unfolds;
- On-going IT-enabled terrorism threats with the Middle East and Africa engulfed in multilayered sectarian conflict;
- Rapid technological change: commercialization of new technologies – robotics, artificial intelligence, biotech, new materials will bring more technological change in next 20 years than the two decades after the internet in the 1990s;
- Growing nationalism in Europe, Russia, and the US and counter-globalization protests, fed by large scale migration fleeing domestic violence and poverty;
- The most problematic near-term trend is a surging momentum of counter-globalization. The remarkable counter-globalization, anti-trade, anti-elites, anti-immigrant, populist backlash, exhibited in the Brexit vote, the Trump election and the rise of right and left populist, nationalists political parties across Europe represent the prevailing trend.

All these trends will ripple through an already fragile and partially unraveling global governance. In the near-term these trends will test the US-Japan Alliance. Not least among these trends is Donald Trump's "America First" new nationalism in the US which explicitly rejects the continued role of the US as the major provider and guarantor of global economic and security goods. This creates uncertainty about the future of US commitment to continue as a steward of an open rules-based economic and political system.



## **The Abe-Trump meeting was good, but no time for complacency**

NAKANISHI Hiroshi

Professor, Kyoto University / Academic Member, GFJ

The US-Japan summit on February has been widely hailed as success in Japan, with good reason. Not only Mr. Abe got 19 second Trumpshake instead of the misfortune of meeting being cancelled off or phone call hung up, but was able to issue a joint communique which almost parroted Japanese wish lists, including the explicit commitment to the defense of Senkaku islands. Not getting into too much detail, Japanese diplomatic tact such as using Aso-Pence channel for economic talk and the timing of the meeting such as Mr. Michael Flynn being yet to be dismissed worked well for Japan. The fact that he was replaced by General McMaster may suggest that the new administration is getting back to the Republican mainstream.

Having said that, too much complacency needs to be avoided. The bilateral relationship just came close to the starting point where Abe and Obama achieved at the end of the latter's term. The TPP is practically dead without any substantial replacement. Even the content of the joint communique shows the delay of preparation on the side of the Trump administration, for it may suggest there was no body who can check Japanese draft. We are not sure if President Trump understood what he was up to.

The chief concern now is the uncertainty of who is in charge of the American foreign policy, and its impact on crisis management. The urgent concern is no doubt North Korea. It has been almost a regular event that at the beginning of the new US administration, the North resorts to brinkmanship. They started already with one missile, and this time the killing of possibly Mr. Kim Jong-Nam creates another complication. If the US replaces with the strategic persistence policy with outright escalation, the Japan-US alliance faces the biggest challenge since its inception. The confused state of Korean politics makes thing even more difficult.

Overall uncertainty about Trump foreign policy in general is more than a matter of concern for Japan. Neither US-China confrontation nor "grand bargain" may please Japan. US policy toward Russia causes mixed feelings for Abe. Trump shaking hands with Putin may ease Japan's hope to improve Japan-Russia relationship, but that may also weaken Japanese negotiating position. US-European relationship is also a concern, for G7 is still the most important framework for Japan's global influence.

As Mr. Pence and Mattis recently expressed, the Trump administration presses European NATO members to spend more on defense. It is likely that the US puts similar pressure on Japan. Even though the Abe government has been increasing defense spending, what is called for by the US may be beyond political feasibility. Just like 1980s, Japan may need to talk about comprehensive security, which means combining both defense and international security related cost such as ODA, together. This may complement the possible cutback of the American foreign assistance, but large-scale budget is not only politically explosive but complicating to the already messy economic debate in Japan.

## **The Japan-U.S. Alliance in the New Era of the Trump Administration: Crossroads or Continuity?**

Nicholas SZECHENYI

Deputy Director and Senior Fellow, Office of the Japan Chair, CSIS

### Crossroads or Continuity?

- The U.S.-Japan alliance does not appear to be at a crossroads, and there are some grounds for optimism about the way forward.
- The Abe-Trump summit revealed elements of continuity in the U.S.-Japan alliance.
- Close ties at the leadership level are a foundation for agenda-setting.

### Potential Challenges

- The implications of the “America First” construct for U.S. foreign policy in Asia and the U.S.-Japan alliance
- Developing a new framework for bilateral economic ties
- Sustaining joint leadership in multilateral institutions to support a rules-based order

### Conclusion

- The Abe-Trump summit sent important signals: Reassurance and Deterrence
- The rapidly changing security environment in the Asia-Pacific region necessitates close coordination to further develop the alliance agenda and sure that long-term strategies are aligned.
- Trump foreign policy: “Radical rhetoric, conventional policy?”

## What Japan should do in Trump era?

WATANABE Tsuneo

Senior Research Fellow, The Sasakawa Peace Foundation

### US constituency's sentiment in Trump administration

- More American people are supporting "twin evil", inward looking and protectionism.
- The sentiment would remain even after the presidential election and the Trump administration

### How should Japan do?

- Create regional network of cooperation with major US allies and like-minded nations
- Persuade American worried constituency that Asia nation would share more US burden and US presence is mutual interest of the US and Asian nations
- Reassure China that such a move are not an attempt to contain China while trying to persuade China to respect the common international rule.
- Explain people the merit of free trade
- Encourage the post-Trump administration and congress not to give up the TPP and free trade
- Abe's pro-active cooperation to the regional peace are heading towards Asian security architecture, which could be counter-measure to inward-looking US, unpredictable North Korea and assertive China

### PM Abe's domestic politics stability is advantage among other countries

- 1.3 % of non-Japanese citizens in Japan's total population.
- \$3.5 million, most recent annual salary for Akio Toyoda, the president of Toyota Motor Corp. vs. [\\$28.6 million](#) for GM's CEO, Mary Barra in total compensation in 2015.

### Japan's could take a few strategic choices

- Financial restraint is serious in Japan's tight fiscal situation
  - To increase integration to Southeast or South Asian economy and deregulation and competitive restructuring of the domestic economic structure
  - To make efficient defense capability with limited budget
1. Remove legal restriction for more effective defense by Japan itself and with the US.
  2. Create profitable defense industry with technology cooperation with the US "Third off-set strategy"

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## Session II: What Should the Two Allies Do?

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### Presentation A

#### Japan's More Proactive Contribution to the Alliance

HOSOYA Yuichi  
Professor, Keio University

- Although the Trump administration will possibly transform the basic tone of U.S. strategy toward the Asia-Pacific, the strategic environment surrounding Japan has not been transformed. Japan has no practical alternative to the U.S.-Japan alliance to secure its people in increasing unstable security environment in the region. Therefore, the U.S.-Japan alliance remains at the center of Japan's security strategy even in the era of President Trump.
- To maintain sustainable security partnership with the U.S. under the Trump administration, it will be more necessary than before to expand Japan's defense budget above 1.0% of Japan's GDP, as the U.S. should not be alone in undertaking heavy burden to secure the region with its military force. With the increased security role of Japan, the U.S.-Japan alliance should become the cornerstone of the rule-based international order in the Asia-Pacific.
- With his strong domestic political base, PM Abe should play a further more important role in encouraging the U.S. to maintain rule-based international order as well as traditional alliances and partnerships in this region.
- Japan's enhanced security partnerships with Australia and India can help the influence of the U.S.-Japan alliance. This is equal to PM Abe's "Asia's democratic diamond" which was first presented in December 2012 by himself.
- As the regional order in the Asia-Pacific is becoming more and more unstable with the unpredictable future of the North Korean regime, together with more assertive Chinese military activities, Japan should coordinate its national strategy with the U.S. new administration particularly on its strategy toward China.

## **The Japan-U.S. Alliance under the Trump Administration: Crossroads or Continuity?**

James SCHOFF

Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

- Last year when I spoke about important next steps for the U.S.-Japan alliance, I focused heavily on the Security Role of the alliance and implementation of the 2015 bilateral Defense Cooperation Guidelines. I emphasized these new Guidelines because I thought an early head-start was necessary to make sure they lived up to their full potential, and because more alliance defense integration is vital to address new challenges from North Korea's nuclear and missile programs, as well as China's maritime expansion.
- I also mentioned another important role for the alliance, which is the Partnership Role. To be partners in shaping and helping to build a global rules-based order that is stable, productive, open, and environmentally sustainable. This is also vital for our national security and prosperity. There are military aspects to this partnership role, such as engaging in peacekeeping operations, counter-piracy missions, and conducting multinational disaster relief and other types of exercises to strengthen multilateral cooperation, but it also involves diplomatic coordination, making sure that economic markets function properly, development aid cooperation and promoting good governance, infrastructure investment overseas, among other initiatives.
- If Hilary Clinton had won the U.S. presidency, I would have come here today to explain how solid a foundation there is in the U.S. government for this vision, and how clearly a Clinton administration recognizes the mutual value we enjoy from our alliance. I would have told you that the Security Role is stable, with a roadmap for improvement in the form of the new Defense Guidelines. I would be telling you that even as we continue to invest alliance energy in the Security Role, that the Partnership Role is becoming more directly connected to maintaining national security due to globalization, and that there is a lot of room for improvement in this area of alliance cooperation. In fact, I wrote a book about this, called *Uncommon Alliance for the Common Good*.
- But Clinton did not win the presidency, and under Donald Trump we have a very different situation to consider. On the one hand, we should be careful not to overreact, because Trump's election victory was very thin, and he was not elected because of some specific dissatisfaction in America about its alliance relationships. The bureaucracy, the military, Congress, the business community and state governments, the public all still generally support the alliance. But we have less certainty that the Trump administration is fully committed to the Security Role (I think they are, but there are some doubts). And we know that the Trump White House is openly hostile to many aspects of the Partnership Role that advocates for free trade, cross-border regulation, international dispute resolution, overseas aid, and other aspects of a rules-based global order.

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- As a result, there is a need for us to get “back to basics,” so to speak. We are going to have to re-make the argument for a strong and active U.S.-Japan alliance (publicly and privately). We will need to remind people about the beneficial synergy of our military arrangements, the economic growth we and the region have enjoyed, the direct investment, the technology, the quick responses to pandemic disease outbreaks, the recovery after financial crises, etc. Fortunately, there is a broad collection of stakeholders in this special relationship that are receptive to this conversation, but we need to network proactively with them.
- In this process, it will be helpful to reconfirm and publicize the role the alliance plays in each country’s national strategy. Japan’s National Security Strategy does this fairly well, but there is no equivalent focus in America’s national security strategy on the link between the US-Japan alliance and America’s goals. We should use the new bilateral framework discussions (led by Pence and Aso) to highlight this...to clearly identify and emphasize the areas where our strategic interests overlap most strongly (e.g., vis-à-vis North Korea, China, Southeast Asia, and in technology development), and focus alliance cooperation in these areas.
- We don’t need to overthink the bilateral framework discussions, because alliance management is already stable and efficient. New talks became necessary because of the lack of contacts between Trump’s team and Japan’s government (and Trump’s campaign rhetoric). Tokyo wanted a more reliable counterpart in VP Pence. The trade component requires special attention, so reintroducing the METI minister to alliance management is necessary, but the 2+2 process should be able to handle most bilateral and regional issues.
- The trade and economic component in the new bilateral talks will mostly be about “playing defense” from Japan’s perspective (and from the perspective of other alliance stakeholders in the US). Most Americans are not demanding change, and there is a lot of potential damage that can be done with protectionist policies within NAFTA, or with China, or with other countries. So Japan should look to minimize potential damage and look for possible “win-win” opportunities (though I expect few). I don’t think that a bilateral FTA is feasible with this administration. Trump will push on agriculture, currency, and look for more FDI in the US, but he is not likely to give much in return. Japan should stand by free trade principles, as it did in the 1990s and the Clinton administration (and enlist allies in the US).
- It would be helpful if the new bilateral framework discussions can have high-level agreement and coordination on China policy. The challenge now is whether or not Trump will be too aggressive or unpredictable, but we might find common ground. Meanwhile, the 2+2 process should move forward purposefully with Defense Guidelines implementation.
- I would like to see more alliance cooperation in support of international organizations, capacity building overseas, and other efforts to sustain global order, but Trump does understand the value in these activities. Still, we can continue cooperating in this area to address certain tangible problems (e.g., refugee crisis, fisheries depletion, health, etc.).
- Japan should consider more active leadership in Asia through “middle power diplomacy” and regional organizations (backed by US bureaucratic, military, and private sector alliance stakeholders). The Trump dynamic is temporary and we should stay committed to each other, taking advantage of a broader base of alliance support to reconfirm its relevance for us both.

## What Should the Two Allies Do?

KATO Yoichi

Senior Research Fellow, Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation

- Action plan for the alliance
  - (1) Make the initial success sustainable
  - (2) Demonstrate the liberal international order is functional and sustainable. And defend it.
  - (3) Demonstrate that both countries can work together to deter and contain North Korea
  - (4) Maintain the contested U.S. primacy in the region
- (1) Make the initial success sustainable
  - “Abe-Trump” — a good start
  - Questions: How can this initial success be sustainable?
  - The biggest challenge: “Economic Dialogue”
  - Japan pursues “TPP 11.” How can Japan engage the United States back to “TPP”?
  - Success of “Aso-Pence” dialogue is crucial
- (2) Demonstrate the Western system/liberal international order are functional and sustainable.
  - Emerging construct of global competition
    - “The Eurasian continental revisionist powers: Russia, China, Iran” vs.
    - “The Western democratic powers: The United States, EU, Japan”
  - Need to erase the skepticism to the western political/economic system
  - Need to demonstrate the western political/economic system functions and can succeed
  - Engage/coarse revisionist states (China/Russia) from the position of strength
- (3) Demonstrate that J-U.S. can work together to deter and contain North Korea
  - Immediate security challenge– North Korea
  - Need to implement 2011 Common Strategic Objectives:
    - Deter provocations by North Korea
    - Achieve the complete, and verifiable denuclearization of North Korea, through irreversible steps and, through the Six Party process
    - Resolve issues related to proliferation, ballistic missiles, illicit activities, and humanitarian concerns
    - Fully implement United Nations Security Council resolutions and the September 2005 Joint Statement of the Six Party Talks
    - Support peaceful unification

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- (4) Maintain the “contested U.S. primacy”
  - Shift of regional leadership structure
    - (1) Uncontested U.S. Primacy
      - U.S. dominance both in econ/trade and security
    - (2) Contested U.S. Primacy
      - Econ/trade→China
      - Security→U.S.
      - “Dilemma of Dual Dependency” (D3) → Shared with ASEAN
      - .....
  - What is next?
    - (1) Continued “Contested U.S. Primacy”
    - (2) Power Share b/w U.S. and China
    - (3) Chinese Primacy
  - Answer?
    - Continued “Contested U.S. Primacy”?
    - U.S./China — “Mutual hedging”/“Risks management”



## What Should the Alliance Do? An American Perspective

Rust DEMING\*

former U.S. Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State

\*Please note that Rust DEMING is unable to participate in this Dialogue, and this paper is instead presented by James PRZYSTUP.

- **Strategic Reassurance:**
  - U.S. reassurance to Japan and other allies of our treaty commitments and the maintenance a robust American military presence.
  - Firm and unwavering reaffirmation of extended deterrence and application of Article 5 of the MST to the Senkakus.
  - Strengthen bilateral planning and exercises, focusing on “gray zone” contingencies; Expand missile defense cooperation.
  - Early commitment by the new President to attend EAS and APEC.
- **Coordination of diplomatic and security initiatives with respect China’s and North Korea.**
  - China: The Trump administration needs to develop a coherent, consistent, and comprehensive approach to China.
  - North Korea: Coordination with Japan and the ROK must be the cornerstone of a revised American policy toward the DPRK.
- **Economic and Trade Policy: Clarify the new administration’s approach to the global and regional economic system.**
- **Support the rule based architecture in East Asia, focusing on ASEAN.**
- **Support a more active role for Japan in contributing to the regional and global system.**
- **For both the U.S. and Japan, address the basic challenges to the Alliance:**
  - Changing power balances, the unraveling of globalization, the rise of nationalism, dangerous regional and global actors, and a new American President who openly challenges America’s post-War role as the ultimate provider of global goods pose challenges to the US-Japan Alliance unlike any we have seen over the last 70 years.
  - This places a special obligation on American and Japanese policy, civil society and business leaders outside the government to continue to work to strengthen understanding and cooperation and to keep before our citizens and the political leadership the wide variety of shared interests and values and the critical importance of the US-Japan alliance for regional and global peace and prosperity.
  - At the same time, a new, sustainable vision of the alliance is needed for a new age.

## 4. Appendix: Introductions to Co-sponsoring Organizations

### (1) The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)

#### Objectives and History

The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) originates from the Japan Chapter of the Quadrangular Forum (QF), which was established in 1982 in Washington to serve as an informal promoter of the exchange of policy-oriented views and opinions among Japan, US, Europe, and Canada. As the Cold War ended and its aftermath faded away, QF ceased its activity in 1996. The Japan Chapter of QF survived the vicissitudes and developed into the Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) as an independent institution of Japan for international intellectual exchanges. Since then, GFJ has been active as a hub for international exchanges with the global intellectual community at large.

#### Organization

The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) is a private, non-profit, non-partisan, and independent membership organization in Japan. Business Member, Political Member, and Academic Member support its activities as Governors and Members. The Secretariat is housed in The Japan Forum on International Relations. GFJ is currently headed by OKAWARA Yoshio as Advisor, ITO Kenichi as Chairman, and WATANABE Mayu as Vice President. The membership is composed of 10 Business Members including the 2 Governors, TOYODA Shoichiro and MOGI Yuzaburo; 16 Political Members including the 4 Governors, ASAO Keiichiro, KAKIZAWA Mito, KOIKE Yuriko, and TANIGAKI Sadakazu; and 90 Academic Members including the 3 Governors, ITO Go, KAMIYA Mataka, and MUTSUSHIKA Shigeo.

#### Activities

- (1) e-forum “Giron-Hyakushutsu (Hundred Views in Full Perspective)” operated on the website of GFJ
- (2) Monthly held meetings of “Foreign Policy Luncheon” and “Diplomatic Roundtable”
- (3) PR and Enlightenment through publication of “Bulletin,” the website, mail magazine, etc.
- (4) “International Dialogues” convened 3 to 4 times a year on policy-oriented issues with counterparts invited from various parts of the world. Recent International Dialogues are as follows:

Years and Months		Themes	Counterparts
2017	Mar. Feb.	<b>Japan-U.S. Dialogue</b> “The Japan-U.S. Alliance in the Era of the Trump Administration: Crossroads or Continuity?” <b>Japan-China Dialogue</b> “Prospect of Japan-China Cooperation in Aging Society”	Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University (INSS) Shanghai International Studies University / Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences / Fudan University (China)
2016	Nov. Sep. Jul. Mar.	<b>The Dialogue with the World</b> “The International Order in Europe and Asia-Pacific after the Ukraine Crisis and Japan's Course of Action” <b>Japan-China-ROK Dialogue</b> “Japan-China-ROK Relations in the Global Perspective” <b>Japan-Asia Pacific Dialogue</b> “International Order in the 21st Century and the Security of Maritime Asia” <b>Japan-U.S. Dialogue</b> “Evolving Japan-U.S. Alliance in a Turbulent Time of Transition: Sustaining an Open, Rules-based Global Order”	The Institute of World Policy (IWP) The Atlantic Council's Brent Scowcroft Center (BSC) Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat (TCS)  Meiji Institute for Global Affairs (MIGA) / Meiji Institute of International Policy Studies (MIIPS) / Western Sydney University (Australia) Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University (NDU) (U.S.)
2015	Dec.  Sep. Jul. Mar.  Feb.	<b>Japan-East Asia Dialogue</b> “A New Horizon of Regional Cooperation in East Asia – Overcoming the Age of Complex Risk”  <b>Japan-China Dialogue</b> “Toward a Future-Oriented Relationship”  <b>The Second Japan-GUAM Dialogue</b> “the Japan-GUAM Relationship in the Changing world” <b>Central Asia + Japan Symposium</b>  <b>Japan-U.S. Dialogue</b> “Alliance in a New Defense Guideline Era”  <b>Japan-East Asia Dialogue</b> “What Should We Do toward Reliable International Relations in Asia?”	East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore (EAI) (Singapore) / International Relations Department, University of Indonesia (Indonesia) China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) (China) GUAM-Organization for Democracy and Economic Development Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan / the Graduate Program on Human Security of the University of Tokyo / the Japan Times Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University (NDU) (U.S.) / School of Public Affairs, Zhejiang University (China) / the Albert Del Rosario Institute for Strategic and International Studies (ADR-ISIS) (the Philippines)

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## (2) The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)

The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc. (JFIR or The Forum) is a private, non-profit, independent, and non-partisan organization dedicated to improved understanding of Japanese foreign policy and international relations. The Forum takes no institutional position on issues of foreign policy, though its members are encouraged not only to analyze but also to propose alternatives on matters of foreign policy. Though the Forum helps its members to formulate policy recommendations on matters of public policy, the views expressed in such recommendations represent in no way those of the Forum as an institution and the responsibility for the contents of the recommendations is that of those members of the Forum who sign them alone.

The Forum was founded on March 12, 1987 in Tokyo on the private initiative of Dr. OKITA Saburo, Mr. HATTORI Ichiro, Prof. ITO Kenichi, and 60 other independent citizens from business, academic, political, and media circles of Japan, recognizing that a policy-oriented research institution in the field of international affairs independent from the government was most urgently needed in Japan. On April 1, 2011, JFIR was reincorporated as a “public interest foundation” with the authorization granted by the Prime Minister in recognition of its achievements.

JFIR is a membership organization with four categories of membership, namely, (1) corporate, (2) associate corporate, (3) individual and (4) associate individual. As for the organizational structure of JFIR, the “Board of Trustees” is the highest decision making body, which is in charge of electing the “Directors” and of supervising overall activities of JFIR, while the “Board of Directors” is an executive body, which is in charge of the management of day-to-day operations of JFIR.

<b>■Board of Trustees</b> ARIMA Tatsuo                      OHYA Eiko HAKAMADA Shigeki              SAKAMOTO Masahiro HATTORI Yasuo                      SATO Ken HIRONAKA Wakako              WATANABE Toshio HIRONO Ryokichi                  YAMAGUCHI Norio INOUE Akiyoshi ISHIGAKI Yasuji ITO Tsuyoshi KOIKE Yuriko KUROYANAGI Nobuo		<b>■Board of Directors</b> ITO Kenichi <i>Chairman/Acting President</i> WATANABE Mayu <i>Senior Executive Director</i> HANDA Haruhisa <i>Director</i> KAMIYA Mataka <i>Director</i> MORIMOTO Satoshi <i>Director</i> TAKUBO Tadae <i>Director</i>
		<b>■Auditors</b> NAITOH Masahisa WATANABE Kenichi

The Forum’s activities are composed of such pillars as “Policy Recommendations,” “e-Forum” “Research Programs,” “International Dialogues & Exchanges,” “Participation in International Frameworks,” “Diplomatic Roundtable,” “Foreign Policy Luncheon,” and “PR and Enlightenment.” Of these pillars of activities, one important pillar is the “e-Forum: Hyakka-Seiho” which means “Hundred Flowers in Full Bloom” (<http://www.jfir.or.jp/cgi/m-bbs/>). The “e-Forum,” which started on April 12, 2006, is open to the public, functioning as an interactive forum for discussions on foreign policy and international affairs. All articles posted on the e-Forum are sent through the bimonthly e-mail magazine “Meru-maga Nihon Kokusai Foramu” in Japanese to about 10,000 readers in Japan. Furthermore, articles worth attention for foreigners are translated into English and posted on the English website of JFIR (<http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/index.htm>) as “JFIR Commentary.” They are also introduced in the e-mail magazine “JFIR E-Letter” in English. “JFIR E-Letter” is delivered bimonthly to about 10,000 readers worldwide.

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### **(3) Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University (INSS)**

The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is National Defense University's (NDU's) dedicated research arm. INSS includes the Center for Strategic Research, Center for Complex Operations, Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, and Center for Technology and National Security Policy. The military and civilian analysts and staff who comprise INSS and its subcomponents execute their mission by conducting research and analysis, publishing, and participating in conferences, policy support, and outreach.

The mission of INSS is to conduct strategic studies for the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the unified combatant commands in support of the academic programs at NDU and to perform outreach to other U.S. Government agencies and the broader national security community.

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[This “Dialogue” is administered by the Secretariat of The Global Forum of Japan]