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# **The Japan-ASEAN Dialogue**

Changing Regional Order in the Asia-Pacific  
and Japan-ASEAN Cooperation

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## **Conference Papers**

June 30, 2017

Tokyo, Japan

Sponsored by

The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)

The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)

Co-Sponsored by

The S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University  
The University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Vietnam National University (VNU-USSH)

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## **Rules of Proceedings**

### **Presentations: 8 minutes**

Allocated time for a presentation is 8 minutes.

One of the staff members will ring a bell to let you know the remaining time.

- The first bell-----1 minute remaining for your presentation
- The second bell-----The end of your presentation

### **Free Discussions: 2 minutes**

Allocated time for a comment is 2 minutes.

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- The first bell-----1 minute remaining for your comment
- The second bell-----The end of your comment

Thank you for your cooperation.

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# 1. Program

## 日・ASEAN 対話 The Japan-ASEAN Dialogue 変容するアジア太平洋地域秩序と日・ASEAN 協力 Changing Regional Order in the Asia-Pacific and Japan-ASEAN Cooperation

Friday, June 30, 2017 / 2017 年 6 月 30 日 (金)  
"Lecture Hall," The International House of Japan / 国際文化会館「講堂」

Sponsored by / 主催  
The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) / 公益財団法人日本国際フォーラム  
The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) / グローバル・フォーラム

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The S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University  
/ シンガポール南洋理工大学 S.ラジャラトナム国際関係研究所  
The University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Vietnam National University (VNU-USSH)  
/ ベトナム国家大学人文社会科学院

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Opening Remarks / 開会挨拶	
<b>14:00-14:10</b>	
Opening Remarks (5 min.) 開会挨拶 (5 分間)	ITO Kenichi, Chairman, GFJ & JFIR 伊藤 憲一 グローバル・フォーラム代表世話人 / 日本国際フォーラム会長
Session I / セッション I	
<b>14:10-16:00</b>	
International Environment of the Asia-Pacific in Transition 変容するアジア太平洋地域の国際環境	
Chairperson 議長	KAMIYA Mataka, Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan / Academic Governor, GFJ / Director and Superior Research Fellow, JFIR 神谷 万丈 防衛大学校教授 / グローバル・フォーラム有識者世話人 / 日本国際フォーラム理事・上席研究員
Lead Discussant A (8min.) 報告 A (8 分間)	TAN See Seng, Professor, RSIS (Singapore) タン・シー・セン 南洋理工大学 S.ラジャラトナム国際関係研究所教授 (シンガポール)
Lead Discussant B (8min.) 報告 B (8 分間)	NAKANISHI Hiroshi, Professor, Kyoto University / Academic Member, GFJ 中西 寛 京都大学教授 / グローバル・フォーラム有識者メンバー
Lead Discussant C (8min.) 報告 C (8 分間)	Aries A. ARUGAY, Associate Professor, The University of Philippines Diliman (The Philippines) アリエス・A・アルゲイ フィリピン大学准教授 (フィリピン)
Lead Discussant D (8min.) 報告 D (8 分間)	KATO Yoichi, Senior Research Fellow, Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation 加藤 洋一 日本再建イニシアティブ研究主幹
Lead Discussant E (8min.) 報告 E (8 分間)	Thomas Benjamin DANIEL, Analyst, Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS), Malaysia (Malaysia) トーマス・ベンジャミン・ダニエル マレーシア戦略国際問題研究所研究員 (マレーシア)
Lead Discussant F (8min.) 報告 F (8 分間)	HOSOYA Yuichi, Professor, Keio University 細谷 雄一 慶応義塾大学教授
Free Discussions (60 min.) 自由討議 (60 分間)	All Participants 出席者全員
<b>16:00-16:10</b>	
Break / 休憩	

Session II / セッションII	
<b>16:10-18:00</b>	Prospects for the Japan-ASEAN Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific アジア太平洋地域における日・ASEAN 協力の可能性をさぐる
Chairperson 議長	HASHIMOTO Hiroshi, President, GFJ & JFIR 橋本 宏 グローバル・フォーラム執行世話人／日本国際フォーラム理事長
Lead Discussant A (8min.) 報告 A (8 分間)	Bui Thanh NAM, Associate Professor, VNU-USSH (Vietnam) ブイ・タン・ナム ベトナム国家大学人文社会科学院准教授 (ベトナム)
Lead Discussant B (8min.) 報告 B (8 分間)	OBA Mie, Professor, Tokyo University of Science 大庭 三枝 東京理科大学教授
Lead Discussant C (8min.) 報告 C (8 分間)	Iis GINDARSAH, Researcher, the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Indonesia (Indonesia) アイース・ジンダルサ インドネシア戦略国際問題研究所研究員 (インドネシア)
Lead Discussant D (8min.) 報告 D (8 分間)	SAHASHI Ryo, Associate Professor, Kanagawa University 佐橋 亮 神奈川大学准教授／グローバル・フォーラム有識者メンバー
Lead Discussant E (8min.) 報告 E (8 分間)	Kavi CHONGKITTAVORN, Senior Fellow, The Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS) (Thailand) カヴィ・チョンキッタヴォーン タイ安全保障国際問題研究所シニア・フェロー (タイ)
Lead Discussant F (8min.) 報告 F (8 分間)	SATO Koichi, Professor, College of Liberal Arts, J.F. Oberlin University 佐藤 考一 桜美林大学リベラルアーツ学群教授
Free Discussions (60 min.) 自由討議 (60 分間)	All Participants 出席者全員

[NOTE] 日本語・英語同時通訳付き／English-Japanese simultaneous interpretation will be provided

## 2. Biographies of the Panelists

### **[ASEAN Side]**

#### **TAN See Seng**

#### **Professor, RSIS (Singapore)**

An expert of Asian security, Professor TAN is the author / editor of 16 books and monographs, and has published over 70 refereed articles and book chapters, including *Multilateral Asian Security Architecture: Non-ASEAN Stakeholders* (2015). He is a regular consultant for international organisations and national governments including that of Singapore, and has held visiting appointments and fellowships at various universities and research institutes. He was Head of the RSIS Centre for Multilateralism Studies until April 2015. Before entering academia, he worked at a faith-based, non-profit organisation. He has BA Honours (First) and MA degrees from the University of Manitoba and his PhD is from Arizona State University.

#### **Aries A. ARUGAY**

#### **Associate Professor, The University of Philippines Diliman (The Philippines)**

He has conducted research on comparative democratization, electoral politics, civil-military relations, contentious politics, security sector reform, and international relations in the Asia-Pacific. He was previously a visiting fellow at the Institute of Security and International Studies (Thailand), Carter Center (Venezuela), Centro de Estudios Superiores Universitarios-Universidad Mayor de San Simón (Bolivia), Department of Government and International Relations-University of Sydney, the Jeju Peace Institute (South Korea), and the National Institute for Defense Studies-Japan Ministry of Defense. He serves as Senior Editor of *Asian Politics & Policy* and Associate Editor of the *Philippine Political Science Journal*. In 2015, he was selected as a Young Southeast Asian Fellow by the Southeast Asia Research Group (SEAREG). He obtained his PhD in Political Science from Georgia State University in Atlanta and his MA and BA (cum laude) in Political Science from the University of the Philippines-Diliman.

#### **Thomas Benjamin DANIEL**

#### **Analyst, Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS), Malaysia (Malaysia)**

Mr. Thomas Benjamin Daniel is an Analyst in the Foreign Policy and Security Studies Programme of ISIS Malaysia. Previously, he was a public relations practitioner focusing on social media management and developing media engagement strategies for clients from the government and enterprise technology sectors. His interests include security challenges and big power competition in ASEAN, as well as the relationship between ASEAN and regional powers. Thomas obtained his Master of Arts in International Studies from the University of Nottingham (Malaysia) where he graduated with distinction, completing a dissertation that assessed Malaysia's responses to China in the South China Sea dispute through the balance of threat approach. He also holds a BA in Communication and Media Management, and a BA Honours in Communication, Media & Culture from the University of South Australia.

#### **Bui Thanh NAM**

#### **Associate Professor, VNU-USSH (Vietnam)**

Holds a Doctoral degree, specializing in the fields of international economic relations, Vietnam external economic relations, trade liberalization and the Vietnam international economic integration. Served as Lecturer at the Faculty of International Studies, VNU-USSH (1997-present), Lecturer on "Trade Liberalization and the Vietnam International Economic Integration" in a cooperation project between USSH and Free University, Berlin (2009-2010), and Lecturer on "Vietnam Economic Development since Doi Moi" in a cooperation project between USSH and Chulalongkorn. Published *FTAs in the Asia – Pacific region: Reality and Prospects* (Information and Communication Publishing House, Hanoi 2016), *The formation and development of international organizations since 1945* (World Publishing House, Hanoi 2015), and so forth.

#### **Iis GINDARSAH**

#### **Researcher, the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Indonesia (Indonesia)**

Received M.Sc. in International Relations from the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia in 2009 and in Strategic Studies from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University in 2010. Served as a Research Analyst at the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies (IDSS), Singapore. His research interests include defense transformation, military technological innovations, civil-military relations, defense diplomacy and regional security complex in East Asia. Published essays and commentaries in journals and media outlets, including *Contemporary South East Asia*, *Defense and Security Analysis*, and the *Jakarta Post*. Concurrently serves as an Adjunct Lecturer at the Department of International Relations, University of Indonesia.

#### **Kavi CHONGKITTAVORN**

#### **Senior Fellow, The Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS) (Thailand)**

He has been a journalist, covering domestic and international affairs as well as commentaries and editorials. Served as Bureau chief in Phnom Penh (1987-88) and Hanoi (1988-90), Special assistant to Secretary General of ASEAN (1994-95), Reuter fellow at Oxford University (1993-94) and a Nieman fellow at Harvard University (2000-01). Currently, he is a columnist of the *Nation*.

(In order of appearance)

## **【Japanese Side】**

### **ITO Kenichi**

### **Chairman, JFIR & GFJ**

Graduated from Hitotsubashi University and joined Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1960. Studied at GSAS of Harvard University. Served in Japanese Embassies in Moscow, Manila and Washington and also as Director of First Southeast Asian Division until 1977. Since then he served as Tokyo Representative of CSIS (1980-1987) and professor of international politics at Aoyama Gakuin University (1984-2006). He formerly served as President of Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) since it was founded in 1987 until 2017. Now he concurrently serves as Chairman of the Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) and Chairman of the Council on East Asian Community (CEAC). He is Professor Emeritus of Aoyama Gakuin University and holds Honorary Doctorate in International Relations.

### **KAMIYA Mataka**

### **Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan / Academic Governor, GFJ / Director and Superior Research Fellow, JFIR**

KAMIYA Mataka is concurrently adjunct research fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs and Member of the Board of Directors of the Japan Association for International Security. He served as Distinguished Research Fellow at the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand (1994-1995) and Editor-in-chief of Discuss Japan - Japan Foreign Policy Forum (<http://www.japanpolicyforum.jp/en/>) (2013-2016). He is co-editor of Introduction to Security Studies, 4th edition, (Tokyo: Aki-shobo, 2009), the most widely read textbook on security studies in Japan (Chinese and Korean translations have been published). Born in 1961 in Kyoto, he is a graduate of the University of Tokyo, and Columbia University (as a Fulbright grantee).

### **NAKANISHI Hiroshi**

### **Professor, Kyoto University / Academic Member, GFJ**

Received M.A. from Kyoto University in 1987 and studied in the doctor course of the History Department at the University of Chicago (1988-1990) as Ph.D. candidate. Served as Associate Professor of Kyoto University (1991-2009), Member of Prime Minister's "Council on Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era" (2010), Member of Prime Minister's Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security (2013-14), and President of the Japan Association of International Relations (2014-2016). Concurrently serves as Dean of School of Government, Kyoto University (2016-present), Councilor of the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), and Director of Research Institute for Peace and Security. His major interests include rise of the global international history of the 20th century, with particular interest on Japanese foreign and security policy in the Showa Era, and current Japanese foreign and security policy.

### **KATO Yoichi**

### **Senior Research Fellow, Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation**

Mr. KATO Yoichi is Senior Research Fellow at a Japanese independent think tank, Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation (RJIF). His area of expertise includes national security strategy of Japan and U.S.-China strategic relations. Prior to joining RJIF, he was national security correspondent of the Asahi Shimbun, a Japanese newspaper. He was bureau chief of Asahi's American General Bureau in Washington, DC. While at the Asahi Shimbun, he was invited to the School of International Studies of Peking University in Beijing, China as a visiting scholar. He also held positions of visiting research fellow at both Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Institute for National Strategic Studies of U.S. National Defense University (INSS/NDU) in Washington, D.C. He taught national security strategy at GAKUSHUIN University in Tokyo. He earned his MA from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, U.S.A. He is currently an adjunct fellow of CSIS. His publications include "美国的亚太再平衡战略及其对地区战略环境的影响" (中国国際戦略評論 2013) .

### **HOSOYA Yuichi**

### **Professor, Keio University**

Received his M.I.S. from the University of Birmingham and Ph.D. from Keio University. He is also Senior Researcher at Institute for International Policy Studies (IIPS) and at the Tokyo Foundation (TKFD). Served as Visiting Professor and Japan Chair at Sciences-Po in Paris (2009-10), Visiting Fellow at Princeton University (2008-2009). His research interests include the postwar international history, British diplomatic history, Japanese diplomacy, and contemporary international security. He was a member of Prime Minister's Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security (2013-14), and a member of Prime Minister's Advisory Panel on National Security and Defense Capabilities (2013), in which capacity he assisted to draft Japan's first National Security Strategy.

**HASHIMOTO Hiroshi****President, GFJ & JFIR**

Graduated from the Faculty of Law, Hitotsubashi University, in 1964 and joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA). Having served as First Secretary at the Embassy of Japan in the Soviet Union, Director of Regional Policy Division, Asian Affairs Bureau, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at the Embassy of Japan in the United States, Ambassador to Singapore, and Ambassador to Austria, retired from MOFA in 2004. Joined JFIR in the same year and served as Auditor from 2010 to 2013. Now he concurrently serves as Chairman of the Council on East Asian Community (CEAC).

**OBA Mie****Professor, Tokyo University of Science**

Graduated from International Christian University in 1991. Received M.A. in 1994 and Ph.D. in 2002 from the University of Tokyo. Served as Visiting Research Fellow, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore (2004), Academic Associate, Program on U.S.-Japan Relations at Harvard University (2006-2007), and Associate Professor, Tokyo University of Science (2007-2014) before assuming current position in 2014. Her major is International Relations and the politics in Asia-Pacific. Her current research interests include the development of regionalism in this region as well as theories of regional integration and regionalism.

**SAHASHI Ryo****Associate Professor, Kanagawa University / Academic Member, GFJ**

Received B.A. from International Christian University and Ph.D. from the Graduate Schools for Law and Politics at the University of Tokyo. He also studied at Department of Political Science, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. He has been Visiting Associate Professor, Walter H. Shorenstein Asia Pacific Research Center, Stanford University and Shigeru Yoshida Chair, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM). He also served adjunct Senior Research Fellow at Sasakawa Peace Foundation, Tokyo Foundation-German Marshall Fund of the United States Partnership Fellow, and Guest Researcher for First Special Committee Research Office, House of Councilors. He is also Research Fellow at the Japan Center for International Exchange.

**SATO Koichi****Professor, College of Liberal Arts, J.F. Oberlin University**

Received his Ph.D. in International Studies from Waseda University. Served as Sales Engineer of Hitachi Chemical Co. Ltd., Research Fellow of the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), and Lecturer of the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies. Concurrently serves as Lecturer of Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) Staff College, Policy Adviser to Japan Coast Guard, Lecturer of National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS).

(In order of appearance)

### 3. Presentation Papers

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#### Session I: International Environment of the Asia-Pacific in Transition

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##### Presentation A

#### Whither East Asian Regionalism in a "Post-Liberal" World?

TAN See Seng  
Professor, RSIS (Singapore)

- Let me take a different tack by asking what might the apparent trend of anti-globalisation and protectionism is likely to mean for East Asia and what East Asian Regionalism (hereafter EAR) can---or should---do in response. We recall at Davos in January 2017—just days before Donald Trump became President, promising take the US down a protectionist and populist path—Chinese President Xi Jinping positioned himself—unusually for the leader of Communist China—as the champion of globalisation and free trade.
- Against that backdrop, let me make 3 broad points. Firstly, it is not a foregone conclusion that protectionism will win out, in the light of mitigating factors that have impelled the great powers to cooperate, if only instrumentally and in the short term (like China-US cooperation over North Korea). Should Trump and other anti-globalists have their way, how might their behaviour impact the liberal international economic order? What would be really bad is if other countries retaliate against US protectionist actions; it is this that serves as the basis for concerns that the US could precipitate a trade war. But while retaliatory trade behaviour might only be a short-term thing, the more fundamental risk is if countries reject global norms and institutions that underpin the globalised economy, should they feel that the US is no longer committed to upholding the liberal economic order and shouldering its burden.
- On the other hand, recent developments suggest that Mr. Trump has been forced by unanticipated events to delay or defer the pursuit and realisation of his anti-liberal agenda. Along with a series of abrupt reversals over NATO and US allies, over US involvement in Syria, etc., the Trump Administration has also retreated from labelling China as currency manipulator and seeking to impose a tax tariff (up to 45%) on Chinese goods. Why? Because Chinese cooperation is sorely needed to manage a recalcitrant North Korea. But while these moves suggest a return to the norm or a more conventional US foreign policy, it remains unclear how Trump's insistence on a transactional approach to FP would play out in the foreseeable future. What happens if the Chinese aren't able to deliver on US expectations concerning North Korea? What might that mean for China-US relations downstream? What happens if Mr. Trump's "transactional" gambles---meaning, he talks tough in the hope that others will give him good enough reasons not to carry through with his threats---what if that fails to elicit the responses Trump wants?

(Continued from the previous page)

- My second point: the regional history of East Asia from the Cold War to the present has been one where an emphasis on the preservation and protection of neutrality has given way, in the post-Cold War period, to "open regionalism", that is, a broad-based preference for extensive and deep engagement with external powers and access to outside markets and resources. It is worth noting that the emergence and evolution of EAR did not occur apart from the liberal international order but within it. If anything, EAR has sought to complement rather than compete against liberalism. Yes, we briefly flirted with the idea for an exclusivist regional bloc with ex-Malaysian PM Mahathir's East Asian Economic Group/Caucus idea back in 1990. But the creation of APEC in 1989 and the ARF in 1993 marked a strategic shift in the way East Asia viewed the involvement of the big economic and military powers in the post-Cold War era, which differed markedly from the preoccupation with neutrality and non-intervention in the Cold War era as embodied in ASEAN's ZOPFAN (Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality) concept.
- This paradigm shift, conceptualised as open regionalism, was operationalised in at least 3 ways: (1) trade facilitation or open trade expansion through APEC; (2) inclusive regionalism through the inclusion of outside powers into the memberships of APEC, ARF and much later the EAS – not only to expand trade zones but also to balance against hegemonic ambitions of revisionist powers; (3) regionalism as a modality of last resort, as an insurance to be activated if and only if the usual approaches are exhausted. For example, despite the existence of a reasonably huge reserve currency pool in the form of the CMI/CMIM, the IMF nonetheless remains the first port of call when financial troubles strike. Likewise, despite the existence of dispute settlement mechanisms at the regional level (e.g., ASEAN Charter, ASEAN High Council), regional states still look to bilateral methods, on the one hand, or international mediation, arbitration and/or adjudication on the other hand, e.g., ICJ, ITLOS, PCA, UN Conciliation Commission.
- Thirdly and finally, the shared commitment of East Asians to "open regionalism" makes EAR, despite the present uncertainty surrounding regional trade deals like the TPP and RCEP, an important counter-narrative and alternative model to the populist-cum-protectionist zeitgeist before us. Since the US withdrawal from TPP, some (Australia, Japan) are pushing in favour of an 11-member TPP trade deal sans the US, without ruling out the future possibility of the latter's return to the fold. Others are hoping that the RCEP would become a reality by the end of this current year, the best possible outcome is likely to be a framework agreement. Despite the uncertainty surrounding TPP-11 and RCEP, they remain key reference points for any defence of trade liberalisation. Open regionalism is inherently and intuitively trade-liberalising and hence anti-protectionist. At least it tries to be. As the advocate and practitioner of open regionalism, East Asia, or more pointedly EAR, becomes a key political counterpoint to the anti-globalisation that has seized the geo-economic cum geopolitical imaginations of the West. This is perhaps the most important role that EAR can and hopefully will play in the foreseeable future, namely, as a bulwark against the anti-globalisation tide through reinforcement of the liberal message.
- That said, the more important message East Asia and EAR can and must bring to the world is not one in defence of globalisation and liberalism "as usual" — that is, with the devastating and destructive excesses that led to the Global Financial Crisis — but one where sustainable development and distributive justice go hand-in-hand to mitigate the negative conditions that fuel populism and protectionism.

[END]

## Changing Strategic Landscape of ASEAN and the Role of Japan

NAKANISHI Hiroshi

Professor, Kyoto University / Academic Member, GFJ

/ Since Obama administration announced “pivot” and “rebalance” to Asia around 2010 and with the onset of the 2nd Abe cabinet in 2012, the ASEAN formed a key strategic region for Japan. PM Abe visited all ASEAN countries very early in his second premiership tells that importance.

/ In the last twelve months or so, however, the strategic landscape of the region has changed rapidly and radically. The biggest change is no doubt the election of the Trump administration, which brings in the greatly different world view from any of the postwar US presidency. In a nutshell, at least President Trump, if not the whole administration, does not believe that the postwar international institutions built around the American hegemony serve its interest and discredits the long-cherished diplomatic relationship with traditional allies and partners. Much of this administration’s foreign policy is still unclear, but withdrawing from the TPP and the Paris Agreement already shows the fundamental philosophy of this Presidency.

/ In addition to the American change, the politics in Southeast Asia is rapidly changing. The election of President Duterte in the Philippines marks the clear break from the foreign policy of the previous administration, particularly with its willingness to engage deeply with China while taking anti-US stance.

/ While there is general tendency that ASEAN is moving forward to the greater integration, reverse trend of division and instability among the ASEAN countries is discernible. Thai politics after the death of King Bhumibol, increasing sign of ethnic strife in Myanmar, particularly with the Rohingya minority, and the escalating threat of Islamist radicals, typically in the Mindanao of the Philippines.

/ Japan needs to step up its cooperation with and support to the ASEAN and its members in the variety of arenas in order to revive, maintain, and strengthen the rule based international order in the region based on the common values seeking for the liberal democracy and market economy. Japan needs to promote both the TPP-11 and the RCEP to cap the trade liberalization. Japan needs to beef up its cooperation with Offshore countries of the South China Sea to strengthen maritime governance capability. Japan, along with ASEAN member countries, to create the stable middle-road oriented political forces, which will enable the stable and gradualist evolution of political regimes based on people’s will and consent, marginalizing the extremist moves which threatens people’s lives and welfare by spreading fear.

[END]

## International Environment of the Asia-Pacific in Transition: Some Thoughts

Aries A. ARUGAY

Associate Professor, The University of Philippines Diliman (The Philippines)

1. ***Turbulent Asia.*** Tremendous economic growth, intensified economic integration, and trade cooperation has not resulted in increased strategic trust among major, middle, and small powers. This has undermined the gains from economic interdependence and has endangered deeper economic integration projects. The “Asian paradox” has disproven the conventional wisdom that political and security cooperation flows from convergence of economic interests.
2. ***Institutions under Stress.*** Multilateralism has considerably expanded in the Asia-Pacific with mutually overlapping cooperative projects as part of the regional security architecture. The lack of collective leadership, increasing assertiveness of some powers and the neglect of others, and the inability of institutions such as ASEAN to evolve has caused stress on the continued reliance on these institutions. If states think that bilateralism is the way to best serve national interests, the Asia-Pacific regional institutional architecture will be gradually ignored.
3. ***Rise of Populism.*** Populism emerged out of the creation of economic losers and winners under globalization. Leaders, notably in fragile democratic systems, took advantage of the polarizing nature of globalization and liberal democracy projects within their countries. Their ability to challenge the existing regional order and the states like the US that built it are increasing the uncertainty in the region. These leaders rely less on shared values as the basis of cooperation but more on personal relationships with other leaders as well as how foreign policy can realize largely domestic goals. The lack of these grand collective visions of these populists can contribute to the uncertainty in the region.
4. ***Small Powers Matter.*** While previously considered as heavily reliant and/or dependent on major powers, smaller states are becoming relevant in the region. Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte has caught global attention because of his unconventional leadership style, fiery rhetoric, and anti-establishment sentiments. Though he campaigned to address the country’s domestic ills such as criminality, corruption, and inequality, he has become infamous for his drastic statements about foreign relations and the role of the Philippines in Asia’s turbulent strategic environment. Duterte’s pursuit of an independent foreign policy is embedded within major power rivalry in the region, ASEAN’s midlife crisis, and other political changes in other countries. The realization of this goal needs to be reconciled with existing strategic realities, institutional logics, and the trajectory of Philippine domestic politics.
5. ***Credible Commitment.*** Confidence among states and mutual cooperation requires credible commitment and a foreign policy conducted in good faith. This also entails respecting international norms, international law, and institutions. The major crisis in the region is a crisis of confidence in big, middle, and small powers.

[END]

## Change of Leadership Structure in the Asia-Pacific

KATO Yoichi

Senior Research Fellow, Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation

### (1) Drivers of Trump Foreign Policy: Values vs. Interests

	Values	Interests
Common	<b>Common Values</b> <hr/> Pre-Trump U.S. ("universal values" "like-minded countries") U.S.-J Alliance UN/EU	<b>Common Interests</b> <hr/> China ("Core Interests" → "Common Interests") U.S.-C US-J Alliance C-J ASEAN
Individual	<b>Individual Values</b> <hr/> Bush U.S. → Neo-Con → U.S. Unilateralism	<b>Individual Interests</b> <hr/> China ("Core Interests" → 新型大国関係) <b>Trump U.S. ("America First")</b> → NTUSU (New Type of U.S. Unilateralism, 新型米国単独行動主義)

### (2) Regional strategy of the Trump administration

- (1) Reassurance of continued engagement/commitment in the region
- (2) Warning against North Korea
- (3) Engagement and management of difference with China
  - SecDef Mattis speech on June 3 at Shangri-La Dialogue
  - The first major regional policy speech by a cabinet member of the Trump administration
  - He said "all the right things."
  - But,,,

COMMENTARY (U.S.)

### America First Doesn't Mean America Alone

We are asking a lot of our allies and partners. But in return the U.S. will once again be a true friend.



Leaders of the NATO alliance in Brussels, May 25. PHOTO: GETTY IMAGES

By H.R. McMaster and Gary D. Cohn  
May 30, 2017 7:37 p.m. ET

President Trump just returned from nine days in the Middle East and Europe that demonstrated his America First approach to ensuring security and prosperity for our nation. America will not lead from behind. This administration will restore confidence in American leadership as we serve the American people.

## (2) Regional strategy of the Trump administration

- What was lacking was the explanation of the relationship with “all the right things” and “America First” approach
- The Asia-Pacific region is NOT exempt from “America First” as the U.S. withdrawal from TPP clearly demonstrated.
- How can the Trump administration make the following statement in the WSJ Op-ed possible and relevant in this region ?

### **America First Doesn't Mean America Alone**

We are asking a lot of our allies and partners. But in return the U.S. will once again be a true friend.

## (3) Emerging Views in the region

“In this brave new world we cannot rely on great powers to safeguard our interest. We have to take responsibility for our own security and prosperity.”

“Australian will pull its weight in an increasingly multipolar region.”

--Keynote Address by Malcom Turnbull, Prime Minister of Australia at Shangri-La Dialogue on June 2, 2017

## (4) Regional Leadership Structure in transition

Uncontested US Primacy (Cold War Era)



Contested US Primacy (Present)



U.S.-China Strategic Rivalry  
Or “Power Share”? (Future)

#### (4) Regional Leadership Structure in transition

Uncontested US Primacy (Cold War Era)



Contested US Primacy (Present)



U.S.-China Strategic Rivalry  
Or "Power Share"? (Future)

#### "New Normalcy" of Sino-U.S. relations

"Through the eight years of Obama administration the Sino-U.S. relations has entered a kind of '**New Normalcy**,' in which

(1) both the strategic cooperation and competition simultaneously intensifies


(2) In the area of economy and global governance the cooperation has become the main character, while in national security and politics competition is the main character.

(3) The influence of domestic politics on the bilateral relations has increased."

(Wang Jisi, Peking University)

#### Public Opinion Poll after the U.S. Presidential Election

(Yomiuri Shimbun November 12,13, 2016)



## Public Opinion Poll after the U.S. Presidential Election



### (5) Era of “Multi-dimensional Hedging”?

- U.S.-related risks on the regional states
  - Unpredictability of U.S. politics
  - U.S. decline/disengagement→Shift to “offshore balancing”?
  - Failure of TPP 12→“TTP 11”
  - Exacerbation of U.S.-China strategic rivalry→Growing “Strategic Distrust”
  - Deepening of “Dilemma of Dual Dependency (D3)”
- China-related risks
  - China's escalation of aggressive behavior
  - China's political instability toward 19<sup>th</sup> party congress
  - Decline of Chinese economy
  - Rise of Tension b/w Japan and China
- Korea-related risks
  - Deterioration of North Korean situation
  - Deterioration of the ROK domestic politics
  - Deterioration of J-ROK relations

Multiple risks → “Multi-dimensional Hedging”

### Japan's Strategic Choice

◆ If Japan cannot depend on the United States any more,

(Default) “America Hugging”

(1) Internal Balancing;

- Build up its own military capabilities to be independent of the United States
  - ←Anti-American Nationalism
  - ←Anti-Trump sentiment

(2) External Balancing;

- Look for alternative alliances and/or coalitions
- “Middle power coalition”?

(3) Bandwagoning;

- Accommodate China's growing influence/dominance←Anti-China Sentiment



## International Environment of the Asia-Pacific in Transition

Thomas Benjamin DANIEL

Analyst, Institute of Strategic & International Studies (ISIS), Malaysia (Malaysia)

### Introduction

While the international environment in the Asia Pacific has always been in a state of transition, the significance, scale and impact of developments over the last few years are indeed noteworthy and concerning – more to some than others. The regional order established in post-Cold War Asia Pacific is undergoing change at a significant pace. This change covers nearly all spheres – economic, socio-political, security etc. This change, like all significant changes, will come with its own ‘growing pains’.

This changing regional order has left institutions and issues in this region in a state of flux. The terms ‘systemic shock’ has been used by some observers. The possibility of a new type of big power politics appears to be back on the cards – much to the concern of smaller countries in the region. The impact and influence of international law and established conventions, and the commitment of major powers to existing multilateral mechanisms are also in question.

The following four issues outline some key aspects of this changing regional order. Understanding these developments, its possible directions and impacts, and inculcating them within policy calculations could help stakeholders align outputs and engagement strategies accordingly.

### 1. Moving towards a multipolar Asia Pacific

The Asia Pacific appears to be moving towards a multipolar regional order – one that accommodates at least two major/primary powers, and perhaps several other lesser or middle powers. The two major powers are the US and China respectively, with much made of the decline of the former and the rise of the latter. The US has clearly accepted that China is now a major regional, if not a global power, and is unlikely to directly attempt to openly restrict it. Given the nature of globalisation and the intertwining of US and Chinese interests, it is likely that despite the contestation between the two, cooperation and coordination will also define this relationship. For better or for worse, the US-China relationship will be a major defining factor in shaping the regional order of the Asia Pacific and in the relations between nations in the region.

The Trump Administration, with its ‘America first’ rhetoric, is perceived to lack both the commitment and strategy towards maintaining comprehensive American engagement in Asia, especially in terms of existing multilateral commitments and the interests of its longstanding allies. The Trump Administration has been even accused of undermining the system that its predecessors spent much time and energy to build. However, some observers argue that ultimately, the US is unable to radically swing away from its current approach to the Asia Pacific without severely jeopardising its own interests and position. Rhetoric aside, the room for realistic deviations from the core of its existing policies and approach is strategically limited.

(Continued from the previous page)

In the case of China, how effectively Beijing manages its transition to the status as a major Asia Pacific power will shape the regional balance of power in the decades to come. It now has to adjust to this role that it has long aspired to – and to the responsibilities and challenges that it entails China is not only in a position to have a bigger say in writing the rules of the region and the international system, but is now able to set some of them as well. Chinese foreign policy pronouncements now have a grand strategic nature, with long term interests at stake in addition to a new vision for regional security and economic wellbeing. The policies China develops for its on-going regional programmes like the Belt and Road Initiative and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and how these initiatives are ultimately operationalised are an important indication of the nature of the impending regional order.

## **2. The role of other (medium) regional powers**

The next issue concerns the role of other Asia Pacific powers, or the so called middle powers, in navigating and managing the changing regional order. Several countries are commonly described as such – Australia, Japan, and India – perhaps even South Korea and Indonesia. Most interestingly, some of these countries were a key part of the US' 'hub and spoke' alliance system that was established in the Asia Pacific after World War 2. Could developments in the Asia Pacific force them to play a bigger, more coordinated role in the region? Driven primarily by the rise of China and its expanding influence, Japan has embarked on a more robust and active policy of engagement with the region. India, realising that it has been slow to the game in the Asia-Pacific is attempting to 'Act East'.

Most of the discourse on the subject has focused on the role of these middle powers in balancing against the rise of China, often in concert with the US. Recent developments in the US however and its corresponding concerns has given rise to a new consideration – the role of middle powers in maintaining multilateral mechanisms in the Asia Pacific in the face both a more dominant China and a US with shifting priorities in the region. The concern is that the vested interests of both major powers – in terms of trade, geopolitics and security, could leave the rest of the Asia Pacific at a disadvantage. In the absence of the US as a stabilising role against China, or even the perception of such an absence, it is likely that smaller countries – particularly those that have serious concerns over the aims and interests of China, will look to such middle powers for leadership to fill the gap as best they can. The question then is whether these middle powers are capable of doing so.

## **3. Priorities for developing countries in the Asia Pacific**

For developing nations in the Asia Pacific, especially in Southeast Asia, continued economic development and prosperity is a key, if not the key, priority. After a long period of growth, pressure is mounting on regional countries to maintain positive levels of growth and job creation. Economic development in the region has seen the rise of a new middle class – young, educated, consumer oriented and globalised. Importantly, this new demographic is also a growing component of the electorate in many countries which means that policymakers and leaders need to ensure their needs are met. Continued growth and progress that allow them options to better their lives and that of their children is a major consideration.

(Continued from the previous page)

This means that countries and policymakers will be hard pressed to take steps to ensure such growth and progress, especially during periods of global economic uncertainty. This increasing pressure will lead to decision makers doing whatever necessary, including pivoting towards the powers that offer opportunities for such growth. It is important for major or middle powers that seek to engage or influence developing nations in the Asia Pacific to understand this and craft their policies and engagement strategies accordingly.

The economic promise and opportunities offered by China undoubtedly factors strongly into the calculations of developing countries in the Asia Pacific and beyond. China on its part, has hit the nail on the head in Southeast Asia with its focus on improving connectivity and infrastructure growth. This could explain the overwhelmingly positive response to the Belt and Road Initiative by many developing countries, even in its early days when details and strategies were scant and lacking in substance. Its appeal in mainland and maritime Southeast Asia and beyond should not be underestimated.

#### **4. ASEAN's transition and transformation**

The fourth issue is the transition and transformation, of and within, ASEAN and Southeast Asia. Celebrating its 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary this year, the regional organisation is now almost two years into its Community which seeks to transform Southeast Asia into a more integrated, connected, cohesive and people-oriented region. Time will tell whether ASEAN Member States will truly be able to meet the various goals and ambitions stipulated within several blueprints and vision documents. Some key challenges include the need for a truly people centric organisation, fewer barriers to trade and movement of people, best practice in governance and human rights and a more equitable economic framework.

At the same time, ASEAN will have to manage growing internal and external challenges that will impact its significance to its own people, centrality and ability to continue in the driving seat for wider regional platforms. Its ability to act cohesively in the South China Sea dispute for example, especially in the face of a new status quo by China, and continued negotiations towards the completion of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership free-trade agreement are some examples. Questions are being raised on the structure and functions of ASEAN – are its rules and core frameworks still the best fit for the environment, goals and challenges that the organisation and region faces today?

Last but not least, recent developments have indicated that non-traditional security issues in Southeast Asia, once thought to be stabilising, appear to be simmering once again. Internal unrest continues in parts of Myanmar leading to the displacement of tens of thousands of refugees, impacting regional countries including Bangladesh, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia. Recent intelligence have indicated that portions of Southeast Asia has been identified as the new '*wilayah*' or territory for the Islamic State's caliphate with further reports of not just returning fighters from the Middle East but an influx of foreign fighters from elsewhere as well. Alarming trends of increasing religious conservatism and extremism in parts of Southeast Asia – both Muslim and Buddhist – bodes ill for the region. These changing views could impact electoral outcomes in the near future, with cascading impacts on national priorities and policymaking making.

[END]

## Japan's Response to New Challenges in the Asia-Pacific International Order

HOSOYA Yuichi  
Professor, Keio University

1. One of the most important aspects of the transformation of the Asia-Pacific order is the rapid change in the balance of power in this region. China has been expanding its military power and international influence in this region. The United States has been presenting its limits in responding to military challenges coming from three nuclear powers, namely China, Russia and North Korea. Japan has been in difficulty in maintaining its economic growth. In sum, China has become more predominant in this region economically and politically.
2. The beginning of the Trump Administration in the United States further brings uncertainties in the future of American security commitment to East Asia. Besides, it is often said that the liberal international order is now being challenged by the US new president.
3. The core of Japan's approach to Asian regional cooperation has been "ASEAN Centrality". Fumio Kishida, Japan's foreign minister, said in his speech of May 2, 2016, that "ASEAN occupies a central role in peace and stability in the Asian region, as the core of political frameworks in East Asia such as the East Asia Summit (EAS) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)". Japan is perhaps the only major player in this region which has been respecting "ASEAN Centrality" for four decades since the establishment of the ASEAN.
4. Japan as a "proactive contributor to peace" has several tools to improve security in the Asia-Pacific; (1) enhancing the rule of law, (2) leading the process of disarmament and non-proliferation, (3) consolidating "Open and Stable Seas" in this region, and (4) sharing core values such as supporting democratization, the development of legal systems and human rights, and reassuring human security, as written in Japan's National Security Strategy of 2013.
5. Japan should be more responsible and more proactive in defining the future of the Asia-Pacific order. For this purpose, Japan should enhance its defense capabilities in the next National Defense Program Outlines, as well as strengthening the US-Japan alliance.

[END]

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## Session II: Prospects for the Japan-ASEAN Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific

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### Presentation A

#### Japan-ASEAN relations in the context of regional integration

Bui Thanh NAM

Associate Professor, VNU-USSH (Vietnam)

ASEAN and Japan first established informal dialogue relations in 1973, after which the relationship was formalized in March 1977 by hosting the first ASEAN-Japan Forum. Since then, ASEAN-Japan relations have made significant progress in all fields of political security, economic and financial and social and cultural co-operation.

ASEAN and Japan together implemented the political and security dialogue through various mechanisms, including the ASEAN-Japan Summit, the Ministerial Conference, the Senior Officials Meeting and experts. Japan participates in ASEAN-led mechanisms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN +3 (APT), East Asia Summit (EAS), and the ASEAN + ADMM - Plus). Japan also joined the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in Southeast Asia in July 2004. In economic terms, ASEAN and Japan signed the ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (AJCEP) on April 14, 2008. This Agreement entered into force on 1 December 2008.

ASEAN-Japan relations have grown steadily in all fields of economics, politics, culture and education, contributing positively to peace and stability not only in Southeast Asia but also in the Asia – Pacific region. Japan became the leading partner of many ASEAN countries on trade, investment and official development assistance. Foreign direct investment (FDI) from Japan to ASEAN accounted for 9.8% of total FDI into ASEAN, second ranked only behind the European Union (EU). Two-way trade between ASEAN and Japan reached 229.1 billion USD in 2014, accounting for 9.1% of ASEAN's trade, Japan now is ASEAN's third largest trading partner after China and the EU. Annually, ASEAN countries welcome more than 4 million Japanese visitors to ASEAN in many diversity purposes, while the number of ASEAN tourists traveling to Japan is more than 2 million by 2015, up nearly three times from 2014. More than 9,000 Japanese businesses are operating in ASEAN. In 2007, at the initiative of Prime Minister Abe, the program "Japan-East Asia Network of Exchange for Students and Youth" (JENESYS) was launched, attracting more than 14,000 young people Japan and ASEAN visit each other. Recently, Prime Minister Abe has announced that he will continue to launch JENESYS 2.0, to attract more than 30,000 young ASEAN and other Asian countries to visit Japan, the country of the rising sun.

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ASEAN-Japan relations have reached maturity, creating a strong premise and basis for furthering the multifaceted cooperation between ASEAN and Japan in the new century. The 2003 ASEAN-Japan Summit adopted the "Tokyo Declaration for a Dynamic and Sustainable ASEAN-Japan Partnership in the New Millennium" and the "Action Program". These two important documents not only set out major orientations for the future of Japan-ASEAN relations in the 21st century, but also put forward comprehensive and concrete measures, bringing the two sides together. The new commitment is more substantial, deeper, more stable and more sustainable and meeting the interests of the people of ASEAN and Japan.

In the future, ASEAN-Japan cooperation for peace and development is facing fundamental advantages and challenges. The biggest advantage of the current situation is that peace and development are still the mainstream in the Asia Pacific region. In this context, countries give priority to economic development, enhance national synergy, and actively participate in regional and international economic integration. For ASEAN and Japan, the achievements and lessons learned from the cooperation over the past 40 years, together with the common aspirations for a more comprehensive, stronger partnership between the two sides, the benefits are fundamental for developing strategic partnerships in the coming time.

However, the ASEAN-Japan cooperative relationship also faces enormous challenges, encompassing traditional and non-traditional challenges. These are including the negative effects of the adverse effects of globalization, particularly on the gap between the rich and the poor in each East Asian country, the threat of terrorism and transnational crimes, the security issues, regional sovereignty disputes, the rise of China and Its demand for a new regional order.

Facing current challenges to the environment of peace and security, the ASEAN countries and Japan all emphasize the need for cooperation and promotion of mechanisms such as ASEAN - Japan and the ASEAN Regional Forum The ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM Plus) and the ASEAN Maritime Expansion Forum (EAMF), the ASEAN-Japan Dialogue to address the challenges of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction maritime security, freedom of navigation, sovereignty disputes. Japan considers ASEAN unity to be the key of addressing these challenges. While many ASEAN countries expect the greater role of Japan in the regional integration of East Asia. With the multifaceted parallelism interest in East Asia, it is clear that Japan-ASEAN relations will have more opportunities to further develop, boosting the prosperity of the region.

[END]

## **Political and security challenges of the ASEAN and the prospect of Japan's contribution**

OBA Mie

Professor, Tokyo University of Science

The ASEAN becomes 50 years old this year. Despite a lot of outcomes which the ASEAN accomplished including the establishment of the first regional community in Asia, it is facing various challenges in terms of peace and stability in Southeast Asia.

First, the South China Sea issues actually threaten peace and security in Southeast Asia. The ASEAN countries demonstrate their concerns about the “recent development” in the South China Sea and the importance of solution of territorial issues with the respect of international laws including the UNCLOS in various statements which were adopted in the AMMs and ASEAN summits. However, it is also clear that China's pressure shadows on ASEAN countries' reactions to these issues and shakes “ASEAN unity” in terms of the South China Sea issues.

Second, terrorism is now seriously threatening peace in Southeast Asia. According to the research of the Public Security Intelligence Agency of Japan, 11 terrorist attacks occurred in some of ASEAN countries (Indonesia, the Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines and Thailand) in 2016. In addition, 5 terrorist attacks already occurred in the Philippines and Indonesia this year. ASEAN leaders and ministers reiterated that terrorist threat is one of the most serious concerns for security in Southeast Asia.

Third, the situations in terms of human rights and democracy in ASEAN countries are taking a step backward though the ASEAN Charter stipulates “protection of human rights” and “promotion of democracy” are objectives of the ASEAN cooperation. President Duterte's fierce anti-drug war led several thousand victims. The Thai junta which began to rule its own country by means of coup d'état in 2013 attempts to prolong its rule. Prime Minister of Cambodia Hun Sen has kept its position over two decades, and his regime is almost “dictatorship”. Myanmar's democratization is limited at least in the current stage, and Rohingya issue is now a resource of tension between some ASEAN member countries including Myanmar and Malaysia. Japan's National Security Strategy adopted in 2014 said the ASEAN countries are partners because they share “universal values and strategy interests”, but in terms of “universal values” the situations of some ASEAN countries are so problematic.

Japan-ASEAN cooperation used to focus only on economic cooperation for prosperity of the ASEAN countries. But now, it aims to accomplish not only economic prosperity but also peace by means of promotion of political security cooperation. To compare Tokyo Declaration in 2003 and Vision Statement in 2013, this shift of Japan-ASEAN cooperation is obvious. In addition, Japanese government is expanding maritime security cooperation toward some of the ASEAN countries, including capacity building of coast guards as well as defense equipment transfer. Japan and ASEAN should make clear their vision for desirable East Asia/Southeast Asia for both sides in order to promote effective cooperation leading peace and prosperity in this region.

[END]

## The Prospect of ASEAN-Japan Partnership in Asia-Pacific

Iis Gindarsah

Researcher, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) (Indonesia)

Today, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Japan enjoy shared economic development and increasing stability in their bilateral and regional relationship. Since 1977, ASEAN-Japan cooperation focused on the paramount importance of economic development for countries in the region and on building a deep sense of trust and amity between Japan and Southeast Asian countries. As they moved into the 21st century, the relationship is no longer confined to economic partnership alone but now includes political and security cooperation as well.

Nevertheless, several of the underlying conditions that had allowed Asia Pacific to enjoy its peace and prosperity have been changing significantly. One of the most profound geopolitical changes underway is the narrowing power gap between China and the United States. The trend represents in the increased level of “strategic distrust” that lead to growing competition between the great powers. If the risks of Sino-U.S. rivalry are not mitigated, the region will become more volatile and precarious in the years ahead.

Other complex security concerns and threats continue to plague countries in Asia Pacific as well. Many of regional security challenges are non-traditional in nature and caused by a wide range of factors that include threats such as cyber security stemming from advances in information technology; climate-induced threats to water, food, and energy security, which are exacerbated by devastating natural disasters in the region; and declines in human security resulting from population displacement, illegal migration, and extreme poverty.

The heightened rivalry between China and the United States presents not just a risk but also an opportunity for enhancing the ASEAN-Japan partnership in in Asia Pacific. Over four decades, the former have provided a “strategic space” for interactions among major powers and regional countries. ASEAN-centered multilateral frameworks help reinforce confidence among all stakeholders that regional relations will be all-inclusive and not dominated by one great power. Given the importance of its regional role, cooperation with Japan will help ASEAN achieve its political-security community building goals.

The complex web of security challenges requires states to work together and pool resources in order to address collective problems. This highlights the importance of advancing and “cooperative security” agenda in the region. As key regional actor, ASEAN and Japan should jointly ensure the existing regional platforms remain vibrant and useful for fostering peaceful and responsible behaviors from all stakeholders and promoting closer functional cooperation to address critical security concerns and shared vulnerabilities. This way, the ASEAN-Japan partnership strengthen Asia-Pacific regional order.

[END]

## Japan's Strategic Hedging under Trump

SAHASHI Ryo

Associate Professor, Kanagawa University / Academic Member, GFJ

US President Donald Trump's unpredictable diplomacy is downgrading US primacy and has reduced trust in US ties. America's regional allies have powerful incentive to play a decisive role in shaping the fate of Asia's security terrain: if they succeed in acting collectively they can help underpin the rules-based, liberal order.

Failing to act collectively may invite the emergence of a divisive and competitive order. If they act collectively but to support a China-led order, for example, Asia will look very different in the long run.

It is not yet clear whether US leadership and military presence is retreating in the region. Trump diplomacy has recently shown some continuing commitment in the military sphere. For instance, in May 2017 Pacific Command Chief Admiral Harry Harris landed on Yonaguni island with his Japanese counterpart Admiral Katsutoshi Kawano. Joint freedom of navigation operations have also resumed in the South China Sea. And US defence spending is set to continue increasing at the expense of other important budget items.

But it is difficult to place trust in Trump's diplomacy. Unpredictable and unstable governance from the United States jeopardises the strategic calculations of partner states, spurring the need for fundamental shifts in alliance behaviour.

Japan is no exception. Over the past six months, Japan's foreign policy has given much attention to the new US president's uncertain stance on postwar US internationalism. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe expended considerable political resources visiting Trump and seeking affirmation that the United States' commitment to East Asia remains stable and reliable.

Japan has positioned itself to reduce uncertainty in its strategic environment. But it has also moved to shift its external security strategy from simple balancing to a complex form of hedging.

The approach involves decoupling security and economic affairs as well as postponing tough economic negotiations. The successful outcome of the February 2017 Japan-US summit, at least in the eyes of Japanese policymakers, included deepening US commitment to the security of Japan — including on the issue of the East China Sea — as well as the launch of a new economic dialogue system between US Vice President Mike Pence and Japanese Finance Minister Taro Aso.

Crucial steps going forward were also announced in the joint statement from the meeting. That statement confirmed that the Senkaku islands are covered by Article V of the US-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, the first time a US president has pledged this commitment in writing. The Japanese government is trying to shape Trump's Asia policy through personal friendship between the two countries' leaders, as evidenced in the frequent telephone conversations, including two taking place before and after the US-China summit meeting in Florida. While Tokyo is deeply worried about Trump's ignorance of the international security order and international affairs, it has given priority to having the best channel of communication to Trump in Asia and the Pacific and avoiding being the first target of Trump pressuring tactics.

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Japan's foreign policy is characterised, however, by a delicate balance between alliance management and neighbourhood diplomacy. Trump's withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), for example, dealt a severe blow to Japan's strategic paradigm. Japan's primary conception of TPP, as a key check against China's economic and political influence, has been left in tatters. Escalation of unpredictability and uncertainty in relations with Washington leaves Japan with little choice but to review its tenuous relationship with China.

While the Japan-China relationship was knocked off course after two Senkaku incidents in 2010 and 2012, some cordiality has returned to it this year. There was a warming in deputy ministerial talks in April, of a kind not recently seen in high-level bilateral meetings. Since 2017 is the 45th anniversary year of Japan-China normalisation and 2018 will be the 40th anniversary of the Japan-China Treaty of Peace and Friendship, officials in both governments are making efforts to push the bilateral agenda.

In the last week of April, a visit by Toshihiro Nikai, Secretary General of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party, was suddenly scheduled during the Belt and Road Forum. Takaya Imai, the Prime Minister's Secretary for Political Affairs and his closest aide, accompanied Nikai. Nikai delivered his speech at a plenary meeting and also met Xi, with Abe's personal letter, to emphasise the importance of Japan-China relations. Both before and after this trip, Nikai publicly suggested that Japan would consider participation in the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). In a TV interview in May just after China's Belt and Road Forum, Abe himself implied the possibility of participating in AIIB.

Another high level meeting was held on 29 May between Shotaro Yachi, Japan's Secretary General of National Security Secretariat, and Yang Jiechi, China's State Councilor. They confirmed intentions to hold a summit meeting. Then, on 5 June, Prime Minister Abe publicly voiced his intention to cooperate with the Belt and Road Initiative with conditions.

It is too early to judge whether these moves suggest a shift towards Beijing stemming from its worries about Trump diplomacy. They are still embryonic. Japan's aims are likely directed at relieving short-term security and political troubles with China and seeking Beijing's cooperation on North Korean issues. To provide conditional support to China-led initiatives were not costly for Japan, but Japan received far more benefits in bilateral relations. Japan still rejects any idea of a long-term China-led regional order.

Japan's has not yet undertaken any wholesale review of its established foreign policy strategy. But it is surely re-evaluating its strategy because of anxiety about the signs of America's dwindling commitment to the established order.

As long as ASEAN and Japan share the political objectives to keep the liberal order to be preserved in Asia, however, by promoting multilateralism, supporting the development of liberalism in the rest of Asia and the world, and stretching more their own assets, the US-led order is eroded but sustained. In other words, the emergence of American isolationism could tempt its partners to work together against the possibility of broken international order. ASEAN and Japan should work more, with other like-minded countries, to promote what we have achieved last decades. The remaining question is, how long the order can sustain itself as it is, without strong US commitment.

[END]

## **New areas of cooperation on ASEAN-Japan relations**

Kavi CHONGKITTAVORN

Senior Fellow, The Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS) (Thailand)

After four decades of development-for-all diplomacy, Japan has now shifted its approach to fit the new strategic environment in regional and international arena, very much to the chagrins of its neighboring countries. Developing countries in the region, which used to Japan's ODA and flying-goose model, are now also grappling with a more encompassing economic and security policy under the leadership of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Both sides are on a steep learning curve. Due to the nature of long-standing cooperation, a new mindset is urgently needed. New areas of multi-layer cooperation, especially in strategic and people-centered matters, should be considered.

1. Establishing high level consultation on strategic matters between Japan and like-minded ASEAN members.
2. Focusing on counter-terrorism and extremists, maritime security, cyber security, nuclear non-proliferation and multilateralism.
3. Broaden the people-to-people exchange and assistance—the Japanese volunteers should be dispatched to assist ASEAN members in health care, broaden collaboration of civic groups in all areas.
4. Promoting Japan and ASEAN media joint efforts in all platforms to disseminate information and analysis that would impact on public opinion and boost ASEAN-Japan mutual understanding of regional and international landscapes.
5. Build up new-generation youth groups linking ASEAN and Japan that are more interactive and substantive than existing ones such as Ship for Southeast Asian and Japanese Youth Program.

[END]

**[Draft Only, Not for Citation]**  
**Coping with Maritime Low Intensity Conflicts in the South China Sea**  
**-A New Attempt of Japan-ASEAN Cooperation-**

SATO Koichi

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How to cope with the South China Sea Conflict? It's a big challenge for Japan and ASEAN nations. The South China Sea Conflict can be categorized into three sections. First, there are the nuclear patrols of the Chinese strategic submarines against the U.S. navy, and the U.S. navy conducts the close-in-reconnaissance activities by air and sea. It is relevant to high intensity conflict. It's beyond our capability to handle. Secondly, there are issues of the conventional naval warfare, such like the frictions between the Chinese reclamation & militarization of the maritime features in the South China Sea, and the U.S. Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOs). It's relevant to the middle intensity conflict. We can raise the questions of the legitimacy of the Chinese activities at the ASEAN's conference diplomacy, though the ASEAN's consensus-based decision-making procedure hampers the strong criticism. Further, ASEAN nations can invite not only the U.S. navy but also the Japan Maritime-Self Defense Force (JMSDF), and Australian navy for the fraternal port calls. If the frequent port calls of these external powers to Subic Bay and Cam Ranh Port realize, they will have some deterrent effect against the Chinese military behaviors in the South China Sea.

Thirdly, there are various sea skirmishes in the South China Sea. They are relevant to the low intensity conflict. The collisions and violent law enforcement activities of the China Coast Guard (CCG) vessels against the ASEAN's fishing boats and their law enforcement agencies' vessels are happened frequently. The CSIS report shows that of the 48 major incidents identified in the South China Sea from 2010 to the first half of 2016, at least one CCG (or other Chinese maritime law enforcement) vessel was involved in 77 percent of incidents. Four additional incidents involved a Chinese naval vessel acting in a maritime law enforcement capacity, raising that number to 85 percent. There are sea skirmishes among the ASEAN nations' various vessels, too. The Japanese government has donated patrol boats, not only to Indonesia, but also to Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines. If ASEAN maritime law enforcement agencies use the Japanese-donated patrol boats and have sea skirmishes each other, it's a nightmare for Japan. We cannot ignore these maritime security issues. This is the very thing that Japan and ASEAN friends should cope with.

We should construct a kind of maritime security architecture to monitor, manage and control the situation. First, we should establish the ASEAN-Japan maritime security cooperation meeting under the venue of Japan-ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting, or the East Asian Summit (EAS), because currently Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF) is not well functioned. The ASEAN nations should take an initiative, and develop the communication network among the ministries of foreign affairs, navies, coast guard agencies, and fishery ministries, of regional nations and all the relevant external powers.

(Continued from the previous page)

Secondly, we should establish the maritime security information sharing center in ASEAN. The Information Sharing Centre of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) that was established in Singapore in 2006, and it would be a good precedent. The Japanese government should give ASEAN nations the financial and technological supports. The information sharing centre should cooperate with the regional navies, coast guard agencies and fishery ministries. The centre should collect, analyze the maritime incidents' information, and make statistics, then suggest reports to the ASEAN-Japan maritime security cooperation meeting. It will be effective to promote a common maritime situational awareness (MSA) picture among the regional nations.

Thirdly, we should establish the maritime monitoring and preventive mechanism against violent maritime incidents including sea skirmishes among the regional nations. Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines began to conduct joint naval patrols in the Sulu Sea on 19 June 2017 to cease cross-border kidnap for ransom schemes. It is also said that the United States Pacific Command had an idea to conduct a joint exercise with the navies of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to assist the 10-member group in strengthening its surveillance capabilities. These attempts suggest us the possibility to set up the linkage of maritime security patrols among the ASEAN nations and external powers, and establish the regional monitoring and preventive mechanism against various violent maritime incidents.

Late Mr. S. Rajaratnam, Singapore's respectable foreign minister stressed in 1976; "Since we cannot wish away great power rivalries in the region, the next best thing for small nations is to encourage the presence of all great powers. Our capacity to resist big power pressure would be greater if there were a multiplicity of powers present in the region. When there are many suns, the gravitational pull of each is not only weakened but also, by a judicious use of the pulls and counterpulls of gravitational forces, the minor planets acquire a greater freedom of navigation." ASEAN can survive under the strong pressure of the Chinese Sea Power, if ASEAN utilizes the influence of Japan and the U. S. A. more skillfully.

[END]

## 4. Appendix: Introductions to Co-sponsoring Organizations

### (1) The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)

#### Objectives and History

The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) originates from the Japan Chapter of the Quadrangular Forum (QF), which was established in 1982 in Washington to serve as an informal promoter of the exchange of policy-oriented views and opinions among Japan, US, Europe, and Canada. As the Cold War ended and its aftermath faded away, QF ceased its activity in 1996. The Japan Chapter of QF survived the vicissitudes and developed into the Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) as an independent institution of Japan for international intellectual exchanges. Since then, GFJ has been active as a hub for international exchanges with the global intellectual community at large.

#### Organization

The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) is a private, non-profit, non-partisan, and independent membership organization in Japan. Business Member, Political Member, and Academic Member support its activities as Governors and Members. The Secretariat is housed in The Japan Forum on International Relations. GFJ is currently headed by OKAWARA Yoshio as Advisor, ITO Kenichi as Chairman, HASHIMOTO Hiroshi as President, and WATANABE Mayu as Vice President. The membership is composed of 10 Business Members including the 3 Governors, TOYODA Shoichiro, MOGI Yuzaburo, and ISHIKAWA Hiroshi; 16 Political Members including the 4 Governors, ASAO Keiichiro, KAKIZAWA Mito, KOIKE Yuriko, and TANIGAKI Sadakazu; and 65 Academic Members including the 3 Governors, ITO Go, KAMIYA Mataka, and MUTSUSHIKA Shigeo.

#### Activities

- (1) e-forum “Giron-Hyakushutsu (Hundred Views in Full Perspective)” operated on the website of GFJ
- (2) Monthly held meetings of “Foreign Policy Luncheon” and “Diplomatic Roundtable”
- (3) PR and Enlightenment through publication of “Bulletin,” the website, mail magazine, etc.
- (4) “International Dialogues” convened 3 to 4 times a year on policy-oriented issues with counterparts invited from various parts of the world. Recent International Dialogues are as follows:

Years and Months		Themes	Counterparts
2017	June	<b>Japan-ASEAN Dialogue</b> “Changing Regional Order in the Asia Pacific and Japan-ASEAN Cooperation”	The S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University / The University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Vietnam National University (VNU-USSH)
	Mar.	<b>Japan-U.S. Dialogue</b> “The Japan-U.S. Alliance in the Era of the Trump Administration: Crossroads or Continuity?”	Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University (INSS)
	Feb.	<b>Japan-China Dialogue</b> “Prospect of Japan-China Cooperation in Aging Society”	Shanghai International Studies University / Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences / Fudan University (China)
2016	Nov.	<b>The Dialogue with the World</b> “The International Order in Europe and Asia-Pacific after the Ukraine Crisis and Japan's Course of Action”	The Institute of World Policy (IWP)
	Sep.	<b>Japan-China-ROK Dialogue</b> “Japan-China-ROK Relations in the Global Perspective”	The Atlantic Council's Brent Scowcroft Center (BSC)
	Jul.	<b>Japan-Asia Pacific Dialogue</b> “International Order in the 21st Century and the Security of Maritime Asia”	Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat (TCS)
	Mar.	<b>Japan-U.S. Dialogue</b> “Evolving Japan-U.S. Alliance in a Turbulent Time of Transition: Sustaining an Open, Rules-based Global Order”	Meiji Institute for Global Affairs (MIGA) / Meiji Institute of International Policy Studies (MIIPS) / Western Sydney University (Australia)
2015	Dec.	<b>Japan-East Asia Dialogue</b> “A New Horizon of Regional Cooperation in East Asia – Overcoming the Age of Complex Risk”	Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University (NDU) (U.S.)
	Sep.	<b>Japan-China Dialogue</b> “Toward a Future-Oriented Relationship”	East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore (EAI) (Singapore) / International Relations Department, University of Indonesia (Indonesia)
	Jul.	<b>The Second Japan-GUAM Dialogue</b> “the Japan-GUAM Relationship in the Changing world”	China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) (China)
	Mar.	<b>Central Asia + Japan Symposium</b>	GUAM-Organization for Democracy and Economic Development
		<b>Japan-U.S. Dialogue</b> “Alliance in a New Defense Guideline Era”	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan / the Graduate Program on Human Security of the University of Tokyo / the Japan Times
	Feb.	<b>Japan-East Asia Dialogue</b> “What Should We Do toward Reliable International Relations in Asia?”	Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University (NDU) (U.S.) / School of Public Affairs, Zhejiang University (China) / the Albert Del Rosario Institute for Strategic and International Studies (ADR-ISIS) (the Philippines)

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## (2) The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)

The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc. (JFIR or The Forum) is a private, non-profit, independent, and non-partisan organization dedicated to improved understanding of Japanese foreign policy and international relations. The Forum takes no institutional position on issues of foreign policy, though its members are encouraged not only to analyze but also to propose alternatives on matters of foreign policy. Though the Forum helps its members to formulate policy recommendations on matters of public policy, the views expressed in such recommendations represent in no way those of the Forum as an institution and the responsibility for the contents of the recommendations is that of those members of the Forum who sign them alone.

The Forum was founded on March 12, 1987 in Tokyo on the private initiative of Dr. OKITA Saburo, Mr. HATTORI Ichiro, Prof. ITO Kenichi, and 60 other independent citizens from business, academic, political, and media circles of Japan, recognizing that a policy-oriented research institution in the field of international affairs independent from the government was most urgently needed in Japan. On April 1, 2011, JFIR was reincorporated as a “public interest foundation” with the authorization granted by the Prime Minister in recognition of its achievements.

JFIR is a membership organization with four categories of membership, namely, (1) corporate, (2) associate corporate, (3) individual and (4) associate individual. As for the organizational structure of JFIR, the “Board of Trustees” is the highest decision making body, which is in charge of electing the “Directors” and of supervising overall activities of JFIR, while the “Board of Directors” is an executive body, which is in charge of the management of day-to-day operations of JFIR.

<b>■Board of Trustees</b> ARIMA Tatsuo                      OHYA Eiko HAKAMADA Shigeki              SAKAMOTO Masahiro HATTORI Yasuo                      SATO Ken HIRONAKA Wakako              WATANABE Toshio HIRONO Ryokichi                  YAMAGUCHI Norio INOUE Akiyoshi ISHIGAKI Yasuji ITO Tsuyoshi KOIKE Yuriko KUROYANAGI Nobuo		<b>■Board of Directors</b> ITO Kenichi <i>Chairman</i> HASHIMOTO Hiroshi <i>President</i> WATANABE Mayu <i>Senior Executive Director</i> HANDA Haruhisa <i>Director</i> KAMIYA Mataka <i>Director</i> MORIMOTO Satoshi <i>Director</i> TAKUBO Tadae <i>Director</i>	
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The Forum’s activities are composed of such pillars as “Policy Recommendations,” “e-Forum” “Research Programs,” “International Dialogues & Exchanges,” “Participation in International Frameworks,” “Diplomatic Roundtable,” “Foreign Policy Luncheon,” and “PR and Enlightenment.” Of these pillars of activities, one important pillar is the “e-Forum: Hyakka-Seiho” which means “Hundred Flowers in Full Bloom” (<http://www.jfir.or.jp/cgi/m-bbs/>). The “e-Forum,” which started on April 12, 2006, is open to the public, functioning as an interactive forum for discussions on foreign policy and international affairs. All articles posted on the e-Forum are sent through the bimonthly e-mail magazine “Meru-maga Nihon Kokusai Foramu” in Japanese to about 10,000 readers in Japan. Furthermore, articles worth attention for foreigners are translated into English and posted on the English website of JFIR (<http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/index.htm>) as “JFIR Commentary.” They are also introduced in the e-mail magazine “JFIR E-Letter” in English. “JFIR E-Letter” is delivered bimonthly to about 10,000 readers worldwide.

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### **(3) The S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)**

The S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) was established in January 2007 as an autonomous school within the Nanyang Technological University. Known earlier as the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies when it was established in July 1996, RSIS' mission is to be a leading research and graduate teaching institution in strategic and international affairs in the Asia Pacific. To accomplish this mission, it will:

- Provide a rigorous professional graduate education with a strong practical emphasis
- Conduct policy-relevant research in defence, national security, international relations, strategic studies and diplomacy
- Foster a global network of like-minded professional schools

#### **Graduate Programmes**

RSIS offers a challenging graduate education in international affairs, taught by an international faculty of leading thinkers and practitioners. The Master of Science degree programmes in Strategic Studies, International Relations, Asian Studies, and International Political Economy are distinguished by their focus on the Asia Pacific, the professional practice of international affairs, and the cultivation of academic depth. Thus far, students from 65 countries have successfully completed one of these programmes. In 2010, a Double Masters Programme with Warwick University was also launched, with students required to spend the first year at Warwick and the second year at RSIS.

A select Doctor of Philosophy programme caters to advanced students who are supervised by senior faculty members with matching interests.

#### **Research**

Research takes place within RSIS' five components: the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS, 1996), the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR, 2004), the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS, 2006), the Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre, 2008); and the Centre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS, 2011). Research is also conducted in the National Security Studies Programme (NSSP), and the Studies in Inter-Religious Relations in Plural Societies (SRP) Programme. The focus of research is on issues relating to the security and stability of the Asia Pacific region and their implications for Singapore and other countries in the region.

The School has four endowed professorships that bring distinguished scholars and practitioners to teach and to conduct research at the school. They are the S. Rajaratnam Professorship in Strategic Studies; the Ngee Ann Kongsi Professorship in International Relations; the NTUC Professorship in International Economic Relations; and the Peter Lim Professorship in Peace Studies.

#### **International Collaboration**

Collaboration with other professional schools of international affairs to form a global network of excellence is a RSIS priority. RSIS maintains links with other like-minded schools so as to enrich its research and teaching activities as well as learn from the best practices of successful schools.

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## **(4) University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Vietnam National University (VNU-USSH)**

### **Foundation date**

VNU University of Social Sciences and Humanities was established in 1995, based on the former departments of social sciences of the former University of Hanoi (established in 1956) and University of Literature (established in 1945).

### **Mission Statement**

Having traditional prestige, a leading role and a long history, VNU University of Social Sciences and Humanities pursues a mission to be the leading center to pass on knowledge and educate qualified human resource in social sciences and humanities in service of national construction and development.

### **International Relations and Cooperation**

VNU University of Social Sciences and Humanities highly evaluates international cooperation to contribute to improving the professional qualifications of the staff and students, supporting training and scientific research of the University, strengthening understanding, solidarity, friendship and co-operation among nations.

Various forms of international cooperation, such as scholar and student exchanges, delivery of short term courses, organizing international conferences, and collaborating in joint-research programs, have been expanding. Most of these cooperative activities are bilateral and multilateral.

Currently, the University has been cooperating with over 100 universities, educational institutions and international organizations in the world; and have signed cooperative agreements with well-known universities in the region as well as in the world, such as Princeton University, Greiswald University(Germany), Paris 7 University, ToulouseII University (France), Aston University(England), Moscow State University(Russia), National University of Singapore(Singapore), University of Tokyo (Japan),Yonsei University (Korea), Australia National University, New South Wales University (Australia), Victoria University of Wellington (New Zealand), etc.

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