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# **The Japan - Indo-Pacific Dialogue**

"Free and Open Indo-Pacific Initiative and Maritime Order"

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## **Conference Papers**

January 21, 2019

Tokyo, Japan

Co-Sponsored by

The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)

The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)

Meiji Institute of Global Affairs (MIGA)

Meiji Organization for International Collaboration

Pathfinder Foundation

"Routledge Studies on Think Asia"

## **Rules of Proceedings**

### **Presentations: 10 minutes**

Allocated time for a presentation is 10 minutes.

One of the staff members will ring a bell to let you know the remaining time.

- The first bell-----1 minute remaining for your presentation
- The second bell-----The end of your presentation

### **Free Discussions: 3 minutes**

Allocated time for a comment is 3 minutes.

One of the staff members will ring a bell to let you know the remaining time.

- The first bell-----1 minute remaining for your comment
- The second bell-----The end of your comment

Thank you for your cooperation.

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# 1. Program

<div>日インド太平洋対話</div> <div>The Japan - Indo-Pacific Dialogue</div>	
<div>「自由で開かれたインド太平洋構想と海洋秩序」</div> <div>"Free and Open Indo-Pacific Initiative and Maritime Order"</div>	
<div>2019年1月21日 / 21 January 2019</div> <div>明治大学駿河台キャンパス、グローバルフロント「多目的室」、東京、日本 / "Multi-Purpose Room," Global Front, Surugadai Campus, Meiji University, Tokyo, Japan</div> <div>共催 / Co-sponsored by</div> <div>日本国際フォーラム / The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)</div> <div>グローバル・フォーラム / The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)</div> <div>明治大学国際関係研究所 / Meiji Institute of Global Affairs (MIGA)</div> <div>明治大学国際連携機構 / Meiji Organization for International Collaboration</div> <div>パスファインダー財団 / Pathfinder Foundation</div> <div>『ラウトリッジ・シンク・アジア』 / "Routledge Studies on Think Asia"</div>	
<div>2019年1月21日 (月) / Monday, 21 January 2019</div> <div>明治大学グローバルフロント「多目的室」 / "Multi-Purpose Room," Global Front, Meiji University</div>	
開会 / Opening	
17:00 - 17:15	
開会挨拶 (5分間) Opening Remarks (5min.)	伊藤 剛 明治大学国際関係研究所長・教授 / 日本国際フォーラム理事・研究主幹 ITO Go, Director, MIGA and Professor, Meiji University / Director and Director of Research, JFIR
開会挨拶 (5分間) Opening Remarks (5min.)	渡辺 茜 日本国際フォーラム副理事長 / グローバル・フォーラム執行世話人 WATANABE Mayu, Vice President, JFIR / President, GFJ
セッションⅠ / Session I	アジアの海洋秩序構築に向けて Toward Establishing the Maritime Order in Asia
17:15 - 18:30	
議長 Moderator	鈴木 健人 明治大学情報コミュニケーション学部教授 SUZUKI Taketo, Professor, Meiji University
報告A (10分間) Presenter A (10min.)	佐藤 考一 桜美林大学教授 SATO Koichi, Professor, J.F. Oberlin University
報告B (10分間) Presenter B (10min.)	ジャヤナス・コロンバゲ パスファインダー財団所長 / 元スリランカ海軍大将 (スリランカ) Jayanath COLOMBAGE, Director, Centers for Indo Lanka Initiatives and Law of the Sea of Pathfinder Foundation / former Chief of Sri Lanka Navy (Sri Lanka)
報告C (10分間) Presenter C (10min.)	渡辺 紫乃 上智大学教授 WATANABE Shino, Professor, Sophia University
自由討議 (40分間) Free Discussions (40min.)	出席者全員 All Participants
基調講演 / Keynote Speech	
18:35 - 18:50	
基調講演 (15分間) Keynote Speech (15min.)	番匠 幸一郎 元陸上自衛隊陸将 BANSHO Koichiro, Lieutenant General (Ret.), the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF)
18:50 - 19:00	
休憩 Break	
セッションⅡ / Session II	「自由で開かれたインド太平洋」構想の進展に向けて For the Progress of "Free and Open Indo-Pacific Initiative"
19:00 - 20:20	
議長 Moderator	伊藤 剛 明治大学国際関係研究所長・教授 / 日本国際フォーラム理事・研究主幹 ITO Go, Director, MIGA and Professor, Meiji University / Director and Director of Research, JFIR
報告A (10分間) Presenter A (10min.)	ケリー・ガーシャネック 台湾国立政治大学客員研究員 / 元米海軍省戦略広報部長 (米国) Kerry GERSHANECK, Visiting Scholar, National Chengchi University, Taiwan / former Senior U.S. Department of the Navy Strategic Communications director (U.S.)
報告B (10分間) Presenter B (10min.)	山田 吉彦 東海大学教授 YAMADA Yoshihiko, Professor, Tokai University
報告C (10分間) Presenter C (10min.)	ジャガナナス・パンダ 防衛研究分析研究所研究員 / 『ラウトリッジ・シンク・アジア』編集長 (インド) Jagannath PANDA, Research Fellow, Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses / Editor for "Routledge Studies on Think Asia" (India)
報告D (10分間) Presenter D (10min.)	畠山 京子 関西外国語大学准教授 HATAKEYAMA Kyoko, Associate Professor, Kansai Gaidai University
自由討議 (40分間) Free Discussions (40min.)	出席者全員 All Participants
閉会 / Closing	
20:20 - 20:30	
総括 (10分間) Closing Remark (10 min.)	伊藤 剛 明治大学国際関係研究所長・教授 / 日本国際フォーラム理事・研究主幹 ITO Go, Director, MIGA and Professor, Meiji University / Director and Director of Research, JFIR

日本語・英語同時通訳付き / English-Japanese simultaneous interpretation will be provide

## 2. Biographies of the Panelists

### 【Overseas Side】

**Jayanath COLOMBAGE** *Director, Centers for Indo Lanka Initiatives and Law of the Sea of Pathfinder Foundation / former chief of Sri Lanka navy (Sri Lanka)*

Admiral (Dr.) Jayanath Colombage is a former chief of Sri Lanka navy who retired after an active service of 37 years as a four-star Admiral. He is a highly decorated officer for gallantry and for distinguished service. He served the Sri Lanka navy during the entire spectrum of war and commanded various ships and four naval areas. He is a graduate of Defence Services Staff College in India and Royal College of Defence Studies, UK. He holds a PhD from General Sir John Kotelawala Defence University (Sri Lanka). He also holds MSc on defence and strategic studies from Madras university and MA on International Studies from Kings college, London. He is an alumnus of Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies (USA-Hawaii) as well. He has presented and published papers on maritime security, IUU fishing, blue ocean economy, combatting global terrorism and extremism and countering maritime terrorism, Indo-Lanka relations, China-Lanka relations in various local and international forums. He is a visiting lecturer at the University of Colombo, Defence Services Command and Staff college (Sri Lanka), Kotelawala Defence University, Bandaranaike Center for International Studies and Bandaranaike International Diplomatic Training Institute. He is a Fellow of Nautical Institute, London UK. Admiral Colombage is currently the Director of the Centres for Indo- Lanka Initiatives and Law of the Sea of the Pathfinder Foundation. He is also a member of the Advisory council of 'Institute of National Security Studies Sri Lanka'. He is a Guest Professor at Sichuan University and Leshan Normal University in China.

**Kerry GERSHANECK** *Visiting Scholar, National Chengchi University, Taiwan / former Senior U.S. Department of the Navy Strategic Communications director (U.S)*

Prof. Gershaneck is currently a visiting scholar at the Graduate Institute of East Asian Studies, College of International Affairs, National Chengchi University, Taiwan. He is also a Professor and Senior Research Associate at Thammasat University Faculty of Law (CPG) and an Adjunct Professor with University of Canberra's Institute for Governance & Policy Analysis (IGPA). While on a Fellowship in Taiwan this year, he is on sabbatical as the Distinguished Visiting Professor at Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy, Kingdom of Thailand, where he has taught for five years. Prior to his academic appointment in Thailand, he was a Senior Associate with Pacific Forum CSIS, then the world's top-rated foreign policy and security-related think tank, and Professor at Hawaii Pacific University.

**Jagannath PANDA** *Research Fellow, Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses / Editor for "Routledge Studies on Think Asia" (India)*

Dr. Jagannath P. Panda is a Research Fellow and Centre Head for East Asia at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi, India. He is an expert on China-India Relations, Indo-Pacific security, Indian Foreign Policy and Korean peninsula. Dr. Panda is also the Series Editor for "Routledge Studies on Think Asia". He was a Korea foundation fellow for the year 2018. Dr. Panda has also received a number of prestigious fellowships such as the STINT Asia Fellowship from Sweden, Carole Weinstein Fellowship from the University of Richmond, Virginia, USA; National Science Council (NSC) Visiting Professorship from Taiwan; Visiting Scholar (2012) at University of Illinois (Urbana-Champaign), USA and Visiting Fellowship from the Shanghai Institute of International Studies (SIIS) in Shanghai, China. Dr. Panda is in charge of East Asia Centre's academic and administrative activities, including the Track-II and Track 1.5 dialogues with the Chinese, Japanese and Korean think-tanks/institutes. He is a recipient of V. K. Krishna Menon Memorial Gold Medal (2000) from the Indian Society of International Law & Diplomacy in New Delhi. Dr. Panda is the author of the book India-China Relations: Politics of Resources, Identity

and Authority in a Multipolar World Order (Routledge: 2017). He is also the author of the book China's Path to Power: Party, Military and the Politics of State Transition (Pentagon Press: 2010). He has also edited many books to his credit. He has also been a visiting fellow at the USA, Sweden, China, Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan. Dr. Panda is a Member of the Editorial Board of the Journal of Asian Public Policy (Routledge).

## **【Japanese Side】**

### **ITO Go**

**Director and Director of Research, JFIR /  
Director, MIGA and Professor, Meiji University**

Graduated from Sophia University. Received Ph.D. at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver in 1997. Served as Associate Professor at Meiji University in 1998, and assumed the current position in 2006. Also served as Visiting Professor at Beijing University, Academia Sinica (Taiwan), Bristol University (Britain), Australian National University, and Victoria University (Canada), Adjunct Professor (International Security) at Waseda University as well as Sophia University, and as Adjunct Researcher of the House of Councilors. Recipients of the Eisenhower Fellowships in 2005 and the Nakasone Yasuhiro Award in 2006. Concurrently serves as Superior Research Fellow, JFIR.

### **WATANABE Mayu**

**Vice President, JFIR / President, GFI**

Graduated from Chiba University. Received M.A. in Education from the Graduate School of the University of Tokyo in 1997. Joined the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) in 2000 and appointed Senior research fellow in 2007, during which period she specialized in global human resource development and public diplomacy. Appointed Executive Director in 2011 and assumed Senior Executive Director in 2017. She has served as Vice President since 2018. Concurrently serving as President of the Council on East Asian Community (CEAC).

### **SUZUKI Taketo**

**Professor, Meiji University**

Received Ph.D. at the Gakushuin University, Graduate School of Political Science in 2002. He has been working at Meiji University since 2009 before which he worked at Hiroshima City University (HCU), as a Lecturer, Assistant Professor and Associate Professor. He was a member of the set up committee of the Peace Research Institute of HCU and the Chair of the working group of the set up committee. Recently He has studied Japan's Grand Strategy and East Asian Security and as a parallel project, Anglo-American Global Strategy in the early Cold War. In April 2013, he became the head of a joint study project "Beyond the Dichotomy of 'Containment' and 'Engagement': East Asian Security and China's Rise," of Shakaikagaku Kenkyujo (Institute of Social Sciences), Meiji University.

### **SATO Koichi**

**Professor, J.F. Oberlin University**

Received his Ph.D. in International Studies from Waseda University. Served as Sales Engineer of Hitachi Chemical Co. Ltd., Research Fellow of the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), and Lecturer of the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies. Concurrently serves as Lecturer of Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) Staff College, Policy Adviser to Japan Coast Guard, Lecturer of National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), Research Fellow of the Center for Study of South China Sea, Doshisha University, Visiting Fellow of the Research Institute for Oriental Cultures, Gakushuin University.

**WATANABE Shino****Professor, Sophia University**

Graduated from the University of Tokyo, received her M.A. in Law and Diplomacy from the Fletcher School, Tufts University and earned her Ph.D. from the Woodrow Wilson Department of Politics, University of Virginia. Served as a research fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), Associate Professor at the Faculty of Liberal Arts, Saitama University, and Associate Professor at the Faculty of Global Studies, Sophia University. Held the current position since 2017.

**BANSHO Koichiro    *Lieutenant General (Ret.), the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF)***

LTG Bansho started his career as an infantry officer in 1980 with the Infantry and Ranger specialty after graduation of the National Defense Academy. After completing the Command and General Staff College, in 1989 he was assigned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a defense affairs staff. After a company command of the 45th Infantry Regiment, in 1993 he was assigned to the Ground Staff Office (GSO). Upon his graduation from U.S. Army War College (Master of Strategic Studies) in 2000, he was assigned as Chief, Policy and Programs section, GSO. And then, he took command of 3rd Infantry Regiment in Hokkaido. Subsequently, he commanded the first Japanese Contingent to Iraq deployed in al-Samawah in 2004. After his service as Chief, Public Affairs Office, GSO, he was assigned as the Commandant, JGSDF Officer Candidate School. He followed by a Director, Policy and Programs Department (G5), GSO in 2009. As a significant temporary assignment, he was called up as the Chief of Japan-U.S. Bilateral Coordination Center for the first ever Japan-U.S. bilateral disaster relief operation known as “Operation Tomodachi,” when Japan suffered the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011. After his mission of G5 and HADR, he was assigned as the Commanding General, 3rd Division in 2011. And then, he was assigned to the Vice Chief of Staff, JGSDF in 2012. Finally, he took command of the Western Army responsible for the defense of South-western region of Japan from 2013 to 2015. After retired from JGSDF, he assumed the Senior Adviser of the Marubeni Corporation on Dec 2015 and served as the Advisor of the National Security Secretariat, Cabinet Secretariat from 2016 to 2018. And he has assumed the President of All Japan Jukendo (martial art by beyonet fencing) Federation from May 2018.

**YAMADA Yoshihiko****Professor, Tokai University**

Graduated from Gakushuin University. Received Ph.D. in Economics from Saitama University. Served as a Trader, Bond Market Section, Finance Securities Department, Toyo Trust and Banking Company, Limited (1989-1991), Director of Maritime Department, the Nippon Foundation (1991-2008), Associate Professor (2008) and Professor (2009-Present), Tokai University. Concurrently serves as Deputy Director, Institute of Oceanic Research and Development, Tokai University.

**HATAKEYAMA Kyoko****Associate Professor, Kansai Gaidai University**

Graduated from Keio University. Received Ph.D. from Macquarie University in Australia in 2008. Served as Research Analyst at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Assistant Professor at Kansai Gaidai University and lecturer at Asia-Pacific University and Yokohama City University. Currently serves as Associate Professor at Kansai Gaidai University.

*(In order of appearance in the “Program”)*

## 2. Presentation Papers

**SATO Koichi**  
**Professor, J.F. Oberlin University**

### **Japan's Approach for the Free and Open Maritime Order in the Indo-Pacific**

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Much has been said about China's reclamation and militarization of the maritime features in the South China Sea. Dragon's long reach is approaching to the ASEAN nations. The U.S. Navy began to conduct the Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) to check the Chinese navy's rampant activities in 2015. The number of the FONOPs in 2015 is only one, though it jumped up to five in 2018. The U.S. defense cooperation approach to the ASEAN nations is always direct!

On the contrary, the Japan restrained their defense cooperation with the ASEAN nations, because the ASEAN nations had been cautious about the revival of Japanese militaristic adventurism, and they didn't ask Japan for defense and security cooperation during the Cold War Era. But the regional security landscape has changed a lot, because the end of the Cold War promoted the withdrawal of the military bases of the U.S. Navy and the Russian Navy in the Southeast Asia, and China came to fill the power gap in the South China Sea.

The Japanese government has begun to dispatch the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) discreetly, in response to the requests of the ASAEAN nations. The Japanese government let the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) join the Exercise Pacific Reach, a search and rescue training exercise for the submarine accident in 2000. The Japanese government let the JSDF observer join the multilateral Exercise Cobra-Gold organized by the U.S. and Royal Thai Army in 2001. The Japanese government let JSDF formally join in Ex. Cobra Gold 2005, because the U.S. and Royal Thai Army decided the exercise theme as Tsunami and other non-traditional security issues.

The Chinese navy's Sovremenny Class missile destroyer and other three military ships passed through the Strait of Tsugaru and they navigated along the Japanese Islands in October 2008. It marked Japan's turning point in the Asia Pacific Defense Strategy. The Japanese people understood that China's military threat was not only the matter of the far sea, but also the matter of our own territory. China dispatches the Chinese navy, China Coast Guard (CCG), and Chinese fishing boats to the East & South China Seas and the Pacific Ocean, and China asserted its sovereignty of the almost all the East & South China Seas including the Japanese Senkaku Islands.

The Japan Coast Guard (JCG) has continued their patrol in the sea area surrounding the Senkaku Islands since 1970, and the JCG strengthened it in 2012. Japan and several ASEAN nations such as Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, have maintained the bilateral



defense exchanges such as the fraternal port calls, and begun the joint trainings such as the Japan-Philippine Joint Naval Training on CUES in 2015. Japan also dispatched multipurpose helicopter destroyer and a submarine to the South China Sea in September 2018, and the Japanese government let them conduct the anti-submarine exercise. Further, the Japanese government adopted new national defense guidelines in December 2018. It decided to modify helicopter carriers can launch U.S.-made F-35B fighter jets. It also attached importance to adopt cross-domain strategy, and to form multi-dimensional joint defense force.

Japan, the U.S.A., and other allied forces ask China to stop reclamation and militarization of the maritime features in the South China Sea, and CCG's navigation surrounding the Senkaku Islands. We would like to maintain the free and open maritime order in Indo-Pacific region. If China pays respect to the freedom of navigation, and stop these provocative activities, the allied forces also stop the defense activities against China. If China continues current maritime offensive, the allied forces' new containment policy may appear in the future, and sea skirmishes in the East and South China Seas will become the naval engagements. It is a grim story that I don't want to see.

### Jayanath COLOMBAGE

**Director, Centers for Indo Lanka Initiatives and Law of the Sea of  
Pathfinder Foundation / former Chief of Sri Lanka Navy (Sri Lanka)**

#### 1) This is a region of:

- Strategic competition
- Strategic convergences
- Strategic dilemma
- **Security contest** taking place in **maritime Domain**.
- For smaller states it is all about trade, investment and obtaining technology
- For major powers, it is a contest to gain strategic advantage for themselves
- Indo-Pacific is no longer a **Benign** medium.
- The Maritime order has been increasingly Challenged
- World need unfretted flow of oil and cargo
- Indo-Pacific is a region of Economic Relevance
- Hence this is undoubtedly the Center of Gravity of World Commerce and Security
- **Uni-polar** world is giving way to a **Multi-polar** world – **multilateral security architectures**
- **Insecurity** of one nation should not lead to **insecurities** of other nations
- This is a region of **Strategic Mistrust**
- Therefore, we need **Military, Security** and **Diplomatic** CBMs to develop partnerships and clear mistrust

- **However, I must say that The Rule based maritime order is adhered to and no maritime border disputes in the IOR**
- Therefore, this is the best time to discuss about maintaining a Free and Open Indo-Pacific

## 2) Major Strategic Concerns and Issues in the IOR Slide 05

### a. Instability of the Gulf Petroleum Exporting States

- i. Sunni- Shia fault lines.
- ii. Arms race and possible nuclearization of the Persian Gulf.
- iii. Two key **choke points**, which is most relevant to the **flow of oil out of Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz and Bab-El-Mandeb**, are in most volatile area of this region in close proximity to failed states, rebel groups armed with **anti-ship missiles** and **remotely operated high-speed suicide boats**.

### b. India-Pakistan Conflict.

- i. Both India and Pakistan are **nuclear powers**.
- ii. Both countries have large military forces.
- iii. They are engaged in developing and **modernizing military capacities and capabilities**
- iv. The **seventy-year-old Kashmiri dispute** is continuing with frequent skirmishes and is a flash point for escalation.
- v. Both countries accuse each other of **sponsoring cross-border terrorism** in others territory with a view to destabilize.
- vi. This **regional conflict** has the potential to escalate in to a **nuclear conflict**, which would not only impact the two countries but the whole region.

### c. Struggle for Influence Between China and USA.

- i. China has emerged as a **major economic power** in the Asia-Pacific region.
- ii. China is also developing and modernizing its military. Chinese President in his address to the **19<sup>th</sup> congress** in Beijing indicated China's aspiration to have a **modernized military by 2035 and great power by 2050**.
- iii. **Rise of China** and its focus on building its own **world class navy**
- iv. **USA** is a non-resident but established maritime power
- v. **China** is a resident and emerging maritime power
- vi. The **USA**, though with a declining military power, is still **world's number one military and economic power**. USA power relies on the ability to **form alliances and partnerships**

- vii. The USA is **not ready** to allow a **multi-polar world** and to relinquish its role in the **global standings**.
- viii. What is happening is states try to **Outthink, outmaneuver, out-partner** and **out-innovate** Adversaries and Competitors
- d. **Conflict and Tension Between India and China.**
  - i. These two countries have unhealed wounds from the **1962 war**.
  - ii. The **land border dispute** between China and India, **China- Pakistan** military and economic relationship, and **CPEC** contribute to the mistrust between these two countries.
  - iii. China with **surplus of finances and capacities** have invested heavily in **India's neighbours** and New Delhi perceive this as an attempt to strangle and Isolate India.
  - iv. China's **Belt and Road Initiative** is considered as part of a **strategic move** rather than purely and economic maritime infrastructure building project by India, USA, Japan and Australia.
  - v. India has launched its own initiative such as **Neighbourhood first policy**, Security and Growth for all in the Region (**SAGAR**) to counter growing Chinese influence. India, together with Japan, has proposed '**Asia Africa Growth Corridor**' (**AAGC**) to link East and South Asia to Africa.
  - vi. But now we hear some positive developments. **India PM** and **Chinese President** have met **15 times** during the last four years.
  - vii. We hear about '**Wuhan Spirit**', **Shangri-La Spirit**'
- e. **The Fall of Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIS).**
  - i. The future of Islam has come under increased pressure from extremists and the gap between moderates and extremists is widening.
  - ii. The ISIS has been eliminated from Iraq and Syria as a military force.
  - iii. large number of ex-ISIS combatants would return back to their country of origin and they could resort to violence.
- f. **Presence of Non- State Actors.**
  - i. Somali **piracy**, which threatened the world merchant marine fleet is a **classic example of power and influence** of non-state actors.
  - ii. Due to these **combined efforts, incidence** of piracy in the Western Indian Ocean has come down to zero. However, the risk of piracy still prevail since there is no effective government in **Somalia**.

- iii. **Maritime Terrorism** is another major concern of Non-state actor. The Indian Ocean has witnessed the **maritime domain being exploited** by terrorists who carry out attacks against land and Sea targets.
- iv. Use of ocean by the **Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)** for attacks against targets at sea and on land and transporting of large-scale warfighting materials by using ships engaged in international voyages, international ports and Sea lanes of communication (SLOC).
- v. The unstable situation in **Yemen** at the entrance to the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea is a source of concern as they have used **anti-ship missiles** and **remotely operated high speed suicide boats** against maritime targets.
- vi. The unstable security conditions in **Afghanistan and Iraq** and possible spillover to maritime domain cannot be ruled out as a major security concern.
- vii. **Transnational Human Trafficking crime syndicates** have operated across the IOR. Till about 2012, Sri Lanka was considered as a major source country for Irregular Migration by sea, mainly to Australia
- viii. In the recent past the focus of attention was to **Rohingya refugee flow in to Bangladesh**, India and ASEAN and Australia.
- ix. Then there are **Illegal Unreported and Unregulated Fishing** taking place in the Indian Ocean. The FAO estimated that Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing remains one of the **greatest threats** to aquatic ecosystems, undermining national and regional efforts to manage fisheries sustainably and conserve aquatic biodiversity.

#### g. Three More Factors/Developments

##### i. Quad or Quad Plus

The **quadrilateral Security Dialogue** or 'Quad' between Australia, India, Japan, and the USA has been moving ahead but India seems to be having apprehension in formally joining what is seen as a **military alliance**.

- ii. **Indo-Pacific** is an Ocean centric strategy whereas **Asia-Pacific** is more land centric
- iii. **Do we need Quad or Quad Plus for Indo-Pacific?**
- iv. **Is Quad going to be an Inclusive outfit or an exclusive military alliance?**
- v. The big question is whether Quad or Quad plus will not **officialize the un-official maritime cold war**, which is taking place in the Indo-Pacific region?

#### China Factor

- vi. The next Question is should we try to keep China out or engage ad work with China?
- vii. **Estimated Financial Gap** (From 2016 to 2030) for **Hard** and **Soft** Infrastructure in Asia per year is \$ 459 Billion. Where can this amount come from?
- viii. **BRI** is a combination of both **Land** and **Ocean** strategy, Coming from a **developing country**
- ix. We need more **connectivity**, **BRI** is an **opportunity**.
- x. We have bi-lateral projects such as **CPEC** and **CMEC**
- xi. **China**, **Japan** and **India** working together will be the best option for the region.
- xii. We saw **Japan** is now willing to work on selected BRI projects with a view of maintaining transparency.

#### **Tri-Lateral Partnership Between Australia, Japan and the USA**

- xiii. 12<sup>th</sup> November 2018, Australia, Japan and USA have signed the “Tri-lateral Partnership for Infrastructure Investment in the Indo-Pacific”
- xiv. They intend to work together to mobilize and support the deployment of **private sector investment capital** to deliver major **new infrastructure** projects, enhance **digital connectivity** and **energy infrastructure**, and achieve **mutual development goals** in the Indo-Pacific.
- xv. This is a very positive development

#### **The IOR is heavily militarized**

- a. Presently about **120 warships** are present in the IO at any given time.
- b. 450 Warships visited Sri Lankan Ports from 2008 to 2018; Heavy militarization

### **3) The need- “Maritime Good Governance”**

- a. A rule based maritime order
- b. Respect for international conventions
- c. Freedom of navigation and overfly
- d. Freedom of maritime commerce and economic prosperity
- e. Maritime Security (End State); Maritime Threats are Countered; Maritime risks are managed and Maritime Freedom is Preserved
- f. Mutually beneficial collective security, Deepening interoperability and security cooperation
- g. Not to be dominated by a single hegemonic power
- h. Partnerships based on sovereign equality
- i. That should give us Win-Win outcomes, not the ‘Winner take it all’

#### 4) What capacity do we need?

- a. Capacity to avoid maritime blindness or Ocean Blindness
- b. As per the IMO 57% merchant ships do not report their position accurately and do not operate AIS as stipulated by International Conventions
- c. 40% fishing is IUU
- d. How a Small group of Somali Pirates took the entire world merchant shipping to ransom
- e. Gun running, Narcotic smuggling and human smuggling
- f. Marine Pollution
- g. Foremost imperative is to develop a picture of this ocean space
- h. No single Navy or coastguard is capable of being the “Net Security provider”

#### Conclusion and Way forward

- a. Indo-Pacific is economically and strategically the most important maritime space in the 21<sup>st</sup> century
- b. There is a huge **‘Trust Deficit’** in this area
- c. We need to overcome **Maritime Blindness** and **MDA** may be the way forward
- d. We need to improve **collective Capacities** and **Capabilities**
- e. We need to move from **cooperation** to **collaboration**
- f. We need **inclusive partnerships** and **networks** and **Burden sharing**.
- g. **Integrated strategy** and **policy approach**.
- h. We need **Good Governance** at sea; We need **Maritime Security** and **Maritime Governance**
- i. Everybody talks about the need for CBMs and a ‘New Regional Maritime Security architecture’. But no one seems to be sure what it should be.
  - a. Is it a Code of Conduct?
  - b. Is it through the existing arrangements?
  - c. Do we have to create a new mechanism?
- j. **Confidence Building Measures to clear mistrust** among states in the Indo-Pacific is the need of the hour
- k. We need a Maritime Architecture; one that we are prepared and not the other way around

<p><b>WATANABE Shino</b> <b>Professor, Sophia University</b></p>
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**China's Growing Role in the Global Trade and Its Implications for the Maritime Order**

Introduction

Growing Economic Interdependence b/w China and BRI Countries

China's Major Activities in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century Maritime Silk Road

China's Expanding Role in the Shipping Industry

Major Implications for the Region and Beyond

Conclusion



# **CHINA'S GROWING ROLE IN THE GLOBAL TRADE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MARITIME ORDER**

Shino Watanabe, Sophia University

The Japan-Indo-Pacific Dialogue  
Meiji University, Tokyo  
January 21, 2019

## **TODAY'S TOPICS**

- Growing economic interdependence b/w China and major countries
- China's expanding role in the shipping finance
- Major implications for the region and beyond
- Conclusion



# GROWING ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE

China's trade with ASEAN countries (ranking and %)

	Year	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Borneo	Export	n.a.	7	6	6	5	n.a.	9	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	9	11	14	11	8	7
	share	n.a.	4.14	6.30	6.67	4.05	n.a.	2.32	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	2.68	1.36	0.91	1.92	4.67	4.83
	Import	n.a.	11	7	6	5	n.a.	5	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	3	4	3	3	3	1
Cambodia	Export	n.a.	3.30	3.86	4.86	6.19	n.a.	7.86	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	11.38	11.25	9.94	10.43	13.04	20.81
	share	n.a.	3.30	3.86	4.86	6.19	n.a.	7.86	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	11.38	11.25	9.94	10.43	13.04	20.81
	Import	n.a.	4	4	3	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	n.a.
Indonesia	Export	7.96	10.05	11.85	12.70	16.53	16.62	17.55	17.49	21.13	22.59	24.20	28.31	29.84	36.35	38.24	36.80	36.79	n.a.
	share	7.96	10.05	11.85	12.70	16.53	16.62	17.55	17.49	21.13	22.59	24.20	28.31	29.84	36.35	38.24	36.80	36.79	n.a.
	Import	n.a.	4	4	3	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	n.a.
Malaysia	Export	5	5	5	5	5	5	4	4	4	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	1	1
	share	4.46	3.91	5.08	6.23	6.43	7.78	8.28	8.48	8.40	9.87	9.95	11.27	11.40	12.38	9.99	10.00	11.62	13.61
	Import	5	5	4	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Philippines	Export	6.04	5.95	7.76	9.09	8.82	10.13	10.87	11.49	11.80	14.46	15.06	14.77	15.33	15.99	17.19	20.41	22.71	22.79
	share	6.04	5.95	7.76	9.09	8.82	10.13	10.87	11.49	11.80	14.46	15.06	14.77	15.33	15.99	17.19	20.41	22.71	22.79
	Import	n.a.	6	5	4	4	4	4	4	4	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Singapore	Export	10	6	5	4	4	4	4	4	4	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	share	3.08	4.39	5.60	6.48	6.71	6.56	7.24	8.78	9.58	12.20	12.53	13.12	12.64	13.45	12.04	13.04	12.51	13.48
	Import	6	5	4	4	4	4	3	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Thailand	Export	3.96	5.16	7.70	8.73	9.83	11.53	12.19	12.91	12.84	14.04	12.55	13.19	15.14	16.38	16.91	18.82	20.37	19.67
	share	3.96	5.16	7.70	8.73	9.83	11.53	12.19	12.91	12.84	14.04	12.55	13.19	15.14	16.38	16.91	18.82	20.37	19.67
	Import	12	12	9	8	5	3	4	4	3	5	4	3	3	3	3	3	4	4
Vietnam	Export	1.74	2.47	3.86	5.94	6.70	9.94	9.76	11.39	11.14	7.64	11.09	12.70	11.85	12.19	12.98	10.90	11.0	11.06
	share	1.74	2.47	3.86	5.94	6.70	9.94	9.76	11.39	11.14	7.64	11.09	12.70	11.85	12.19	12.98	10.90	11.0	11.06
	Import	13	8	8	6	6	5	5	5	5	3	4	3	2	1	1	1	1	1
Vietnam	Export	2.28	2.95	3.20	4.49	6.04	6.56	7.04	7.21	7.48	8.85	8.42	10.07	10.80	12.99	15.02	16.24	18.52	18.13
	share	2.28	2.95	3.20	4.49	6.04	6.56	7.04	7.21	7.48	8.85	8.42	10.07	10.80	12.99	15.02	16.24	18.52	18.13
	Import	7	6	6	5	5	5	4	4	4	4	3	4	4	2	1	1	1	1
Vietnam	Export	3.90	4.38	4.89	6.28	7.72	8.57	9.70	9.99	9.12	9.71	10.30	10.25	10.66	11.73	13.16	14.37	13.11	14.48
	share	3.90	4.38	4.89	6.28	7.72	8.57	9.70	9.99	9.12	9.71	10.30	10.25	10.66	11.73	13.16	14.37	13.11	14.48
	Import	4	4	4	4	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	1	1	1	1	1
Vietnam	Export	5.29	6.20	7.08	8.10	9.31	10.23	11.41	12.07	10.45	10.51	10.75	10.27	10.29	11.33	11.75	13.67	13.87	13.84
	share	5.29	6.20	7.08	8.10	9.31	10.23	11.41	12.07	10.45	10.51	10.75	10.27	10.29	11.33	11.75	13.67	13.87	13.84
	Import	5	5	5	4	3	3	3	3	3	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2
Vietnam	Export	4.08	4.39	5.17	7.09	7.30	8.29	9.03	9.76	9.12	10.58	10.99	11.79	11.72	11.92	11.09	11.06	11.04	11.04
	share	4.08	4.39	5.17	7.09	7.30	8.29	9.03	9.76	9.12	10.58	10.99	11.79	11.72	11.92	11.09	11.06	11.04	11.04
	Import	4	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1
Vietnam	Export	5.45	5.98	7.61	8.00	8.98	9.44	10.60	11.59	11.23	12.74	13.29	13.33	14.84	15.06	16.90	20.26	21.59	21.59
	share	5.45	5.98	7.61	8.00	8.98	9.44	10.60	11.59	11.23	12.74	13.29	13.33	14.84	15.06	16.90	20.26	21.59	21.59
	Import	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	4	3	3	2	2	3	3	2	2	2	n.a.
Vietnam	Export	10.61	9.43	9.09	9.35	10.95	10.01	8.14	7.51	7.74	9.46	10.72	11.98	11.21	9.98	9.94	10.23	12.43	n.a.
	share	10.61	9.43	9.09	9.35	10.95	10.01	8.14	7.51	7.74	9.46	10.72	11.98	11.21	9.98	9.94	10.23	12.43	n.a.
	Import	5	5	5	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	n.a.
Vietnam	Export	8.96	9.90	10.90	12.43	14.37	16.05	16.46	20.25	19.79	23.84	23.81	23.29	25.52	27.94	29.92	29.82	28.60	n.a.
	share	8.96	9.90	10.90	12.43	14.37	16.05	16.46	20.25	19.79	23.84	23.81	23.29	25.52	27.94	29.92	29.82	28.60	n.a.
	Import	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

Source: Global Trade Atlas

## CHINA'S MAJOR ACTIVITIES IN THE MARITIME SILK ROAD

- Land reclamation in the South China Sea
- Infrastructure development
  - port facilities
  - railway & public highways
  - pipelines & power plants, etc.
- Shipping finance

## CHINA'S EXPANDING ROLE IN THE SHIPPING INDUSTRY

- Increasing its fleets
- Participating in the shipping finance
  - pre-shipment financing
  - loans
  - leasing

## CHINA'S EXPANDING ROLE IN THE SHIPPING FINANCE

Chinese financial institutions in the global shipping portfolio (top 40 companies)\*1 (USD bn.)

	200812	201011	201101	201211	201311	201411	201512	201612	201712
Bank of China	-	13.2	13.2	16.5	19.0	20.0	20.0	20.0	17.5
バンク	-	12	15	8	3	3	2	2	1
China Exim B/K	-	13.0	13.0	14.5	14.0	14.0	18.5	18.5	17.0
バンク	-	15	16	12	14	12	4	3	2
China Development B/K	-	-	-	-	-	-	12.0	12.0	10.0
	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	12	17
ICBC*2	2.2	4.7	4.7	14.5	17.0	17.5	19.0	8.0	6.0
バンク	29	29	28	9	6	6	3	19	22
CIC*3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.0	-
バンク	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	39	-
Total loans of 40 companies	395.4	449.76	452.0	422.135	401.0	391.45	397.84	355.25	345.0

Source: Petrofin Bank Research - Global shipping portfolios  
(<https://www.petrofin.gr/petrofin-bank-research-global-shipping-portfolios/>)

\*1 31 companies in the end of 2008

\*2 ICBC: Industrial & Commercial Bank of China (中国工商银行)

\*3 CIC: China Investment Corporation (中国投资有限责任公司)

## **MAJOR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REGION AND BEYOND**

- China's role in the shipping finance is growing especially when the shipping industry suffers from money shortage.
- China's ownership of merchant fleets will increase significantly both inside and outside China (particularly through leasing finance).
- China enhances its shipping power and plays a more important role in the global seaborne trade.
- China can exert its leverage in the shipping industry to control important parts of the supply chain.

## **CONCLUSION**

- China can expand its control of the global trade route by growing shipping portfolios in addition to Chinese-built maritime infrastructure.
- China seeks to gain influence in the maritime domain.
- Whether China exerts the leverage has yet to be seen, but it could translate into a source of Chinese maritime power.




**BANSHO Koichiro**

**Lieutenant General (Ret.), the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF)**




## Strategic & Geopolitical Value of Japan



## China's Defense Budget

- Some think that China's announced defense budget is a mere part of China's real defense-related expenditures and does not include major categories such as R&D expenses and foreign procurement
- It is pointed out that China's announced defense budget in 2016 was at least 1.23 times as much as the announced defense budget (U.S. DoD "China Military Power Report 2018").



※ There are limits to the comparisons of national defense budgets which have simply been converted into foreign currency when the different elements are taken into consideration, such as each country's price levels. However, to simplify the comparison, this graph dares to represent the Japan's defense-related expenditures and China's announced defense budget that has been converted into yen using the exchange rate published by the Ministry of Finance Japan (MOFJ) each fiscal year (FY).

([http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/surround/pdf/ch\\_d-act\\_201810a.pdf](http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/surround/pdf/ch_d-act_201810a.pdf))



# Recent PLA's Activities

- China has broadly and rapidly reinforced its forces, based on **high-level increase of its national defense budget**
- It is believed that China aims to build up **capabilities to conduct operations in more distant waters and airspace**
- China has **rapidly expanded maritime activities both in qualitative and quantitative ways**

Examples  
Aircraft →  
Vessels →  
Passage through territorial waters →

\*Broken lines represent activities of information gathering ships


Descriptions and locations of each event are solely for illustration purpose, based on media reports. Locations of Island Chains are based on U.S. DoD Reports.




([http://www.mod.gov.cn/approach/surround/pdf/ch\\_d-act\\_201810a.pdf](http://www.mod.gov.cn/approach/surround/pdf/ch_d-act_201810a.pdf))



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([http://www.mod.gov.cn/Press/press2018/press\\_pdf/p20180413\\_05.pdf](http://www.mod.gov.cn/Press/press2018/press_pdf/p20180413_05.pdf))




## Japan's Homeland Defense







## Strengthen Defense of SW Japan



## New Deployment at SW Islands







## Key Elements for the new NDPG

- 1 Promote “Free & Open Indo-Pacific Strategy”
- 2 Strengthen Japan’s Defense Capability
  - Multi-Domain Warfare (Cyber/Space/EMP)
  - Promote Joint Ops Capability in all domain
  - Fulfill SDF’s Sustainability & Resiliency
- 3 Deter & Response to the Japan’s threats
- 4 Strengthen Japan-U.S. Alliance
- 5 Tighten Security relation with Partner Nations
- 6 Promote International Peace Cooperation
- 7 Prepare Large Disasters & Multiple Situations

## General View of Indo-Pacific Area





**“Win all without fighting”**



**“A friend in need is a friend indeed.”**



**Kerry GERSHANECK**  
**Visiting Scholar, National Chengchi University, Taiwan / former Senior**  
**U.S. Department of the Navy Strategic Communications director (U.S)**

**Enhancing Japan-U.S. Military Cooperation  
To Support the Indo-Pacific Strategy**

***Abstract:** The strength of the Japan-America Security Alliance (JASA) is central to successfully achieving both countries' visions for an Indo-Asia-Pacific Strategy. This paper addresses strengths and key challenges associated with the alliance. It also provides three recommendations that will strengthen the alliance's military capacity: enhancing JASA and JSDF Command & Control (C2), establishment of combined maritime task forces, and implementation of an expanded archipelagic missile defense strategy based the opportunity provided by America's recent announced withdrawal from the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty with Russia. It also provides recommendations for countering political warfare operations that undermine public support for necessary JASA reform and enhancements.*

## **A “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Region”**

The vision of a “free and open” Indo-Asia-Pacific Region can properly be attributed to Japan’s Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, who articulated the concept during his first term as premier in 2007.<sup>1</sup> For a number of political reasons, Abe was unable to fully develop the concept during his first premiership. The term re-emerged and took on greater urgency in a dramatically changed regional security environment in November 2017, when U.S. President Donald J. Trump described his general concept for it at the APEC CEO Summit.<sup>2</sup> President Trump emphasized his administration’s priorities for the region as fair and reciprocal trade, and respect for the principles of rule of law, individual rights, and freedom of navigation and overflight, including open shipping lanes.

Central to the security and success of what is now called a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) is a strong, assertive, and militarily capable *Japan-America Security Alliance* (JASA). Democracies in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region that value individual liberty, consensual government, and rule of law are especially reliant on this alliance as a bulwark against nearby totalitarian and authoritarian regimes: those regimes threaten with dramatically darker visions regarding governance and human rights.

Initially following Trump’s pronouncement, it was unclear to America’s allies, friends, competitors, and adversaries what substantive form this American vision will take. There was reason for skepticism, particularly following eight years of

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<sup>1</sup> Russell Hsiao, “Backgrounder: A ‘Free’ and ‘Open’ Indo-Pacific and Taiwan,” *Global Taiwan Brief* Vol. 3, no. Issue 18 (September 19, 2018), [http://globaltaiwan.org/2018/09/vol-3-issue-18/?utm\\_source=Global+Taiwan+Updates&utm\\_campaign=813cab5c70-EMAIL\\_CAMPAIGN\\_2018\\_09\\_18\\_07\\_59&utm\\_medium=email&utm\\_term=0\\_d5a87749a5-813cab5c70-436750393&mc\\_cid=813cab5c70&mc\\_eid=22a4cf919a#WallaceGregson09192018](http://globaltaiwan.org/2018/09/vol-3-issue-18/?utm_source=Global+Taiwan+Updates&utm_campaign=813cab5c70-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_09_18_07_59&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_d5a87749a5-813cab5c70-436750393&mc_cid=813cab5c70&mc_eid=22a4cf919a#WallaceGregson09192018).

<sup>2</sup> Hsiao.

Obama Administration touting the *Pivot to Asia* (later renamed *The Rebalance*), which proved ultimately to be largely empty rhetoric. Over the course of the past year, however, the Trump Administration has taken this initially amorphous slogan and evolved it into something more tangible, with supporting strategies. In late 2017, the White House released its first *National Security Strategy* (NSS), which defined the challenges and highlighted the principles of how it will actualize a “free” and “open” Indo-Pacific region.<sup>3</sup>

The NSS was quickly followed by the Department of Defense’s *National Defense Strategy*, and subsequent FY2019 Defense Authorization legislation established a new name for America’s largest military “unified” command: the *U.S. Pacific Command* was renamed the *U.S. Indo-Pacific Command*. This name change was significant: it belatedly reflected the importance of a more focused U.S. effort to influence and secure the maritime theater from the east coast of Africa to the west coast of the United States, and from Japan through the first and second island chains to Australia.<sup>4</sup>

It is important to note that the “free and open” concept is not strictly defense oriented. In July of this year at the *Indo-Pacific Business Forum*, U.S. Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo provided the most comprehensive speech to that point of the underpinnings of the “free and open” Indo-Pacific strategy. Specifically, he said:<sup>5</sup>

*When we say “free” Indo-Pacific, it means we all want all nations, every nation, to be able to protect their sovereignty from coercion by other countries. At the national level, “free” means good governance and the assurance that citizens can enjoy their fundamental rights and liberties.*

*When we say “open” in the Indo-Pacific, it means we want all nations to enjoy open access to seas and airways. We want the peaceful resolution of territorial and maritime disputes. This is key for international peace and for each country’s attainment of its own national aims. Economically, “open” means fair and reciprocal trade, open investment environments, transparent agreements between nations, and improved connectivity to drive regional ties – because these are the paths for sustainable growth in the region.*

In June, at the annual *Shangri-La Dialogue* with Asian defense officials, U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis reinforced Pompeo’s comprehensive strategy overview by emphasizing the need to look beyond traditional military and defense issues to such elements as economic issues, rule of law, transparency, and civil society in the development of this strategy. Mattis defined several lines of effort involving all elements of national power to give substance to this initiative. He called for expanding attention and action in the maritime space because “(t)he maritime commons is a global good, and

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<sup>3</sup> Wallace C. Gregson, “An American Perspective on Taiwan in the INDOPACOM Region,” *Global Taiwan Brief* Vol 3, no. Issue 18 (September 19, 2018), [http://globaltaiwan.org/2018/09/vol-3-issue-18/?utm\\_source=Global+Taiwan+Updates&utm\\_campaign=813cab5c70-EMAIL\\_CAMPAIGN\\_2018\\_09\\_18\\_07\\_59&utm\\_medium=email&utm\\_term=0\\_d5a87749a5-813cab5c70-436750393&mc\\_cid=813cab5c70&mc\\_eid=22a4cf919a#WallaceGregson09192018](http://globaltaiwan.org/2018/09/vol-3-issue-18/?utm_source=Global+Taiwan+Updates&utm_campaign=813cab5c70-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_09_18_07_59&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_d5a87749a5-813cab5c70-436750393&mc_cid=813cab5c70&mc_eid=22a4cf919a#WallaceGregson09192018).

<sup>4</sup> Gregson.

<sup>5</sup> Michael R. Pompeo, “Secretary of State Michael Pompeo’s Remarks on ‘America’s Indo-Pacific Economic Vision’” (July 30, 2018), <https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/07/284722.htm>.

the sea lanes of communication are the arteries of economic vitality for all.”<sup>6</sup> He also stated that the U.S. will help its partners to build up naval and law enforcement capabilities and capacities to improve monitoring and protection of maritime borders and interests and improve “interoperability” (defined as the ability to integrate the efforts of militaries, law enforcement, and economies) to better support common goals.

Mattis also highlighted that rule of law, civil society, and transparent governance will “be the sunlight that exposes the malign influence that threatens sustainable economic development.”<sup>7</sup> Notably, Mattis called for improved financial institutions to assist private sector investment, and for U.S. agencies across the “whole of government” to work more closely with regional economic partners. These statements and subsequent actions by the Trump Administration reflect significantly more seriousness of intention and effort than was ever evidenced by the lost years of the so-called “Pivot”.

The United States is not pursuing its Indo-Pacific strategy unilaterally or in a vacuum. A number of its allies and partners, including the ROC, are pursuing similar strategies. Several of these initiatives pre-date the U.S. strategy. India’s is called the “Act East” policy, South Korea’s is called the “New Southern Policy”, Japan’s is the “Free & Open Indo-Pacific Strategy”, and Taiwan’s is the “New Southbound Policy.” Australia has also published a Foreign Policy Whitepaper with similar goals and objectives<sup>8</sup>, and Indonesia has attempted to develop an Indo-Pacific concept for more than a decade, dubbing it variously as an *Indo-Pacific Treaty*, an *Indo-Pacific regional architecture* and an *Indo-Pacific cooperation umbrella*. All the policies seek to expand ties throughout the Indo-Asia-Pacific, and in particular with the nations of Southeast Asia and the *Association of Southeast Asian Nations* (ASEAN). In the sense that these strategies overlap, they overlap in focus on regional engagement that results in a strong, free, and open fabric that knits the region together, preserves sovereignty, and promotes prosperity.

Related to these wide-ranging unilateral Indo-Pacific strategies, Japan developed *The Quad* concept roughly a decade ago. The Quad concept encompasses four countries (Japan, Australia, India, and the U.S.) working together to achieve vital common interests of these major maritime democracies.<sup>9</sup> This concept supports a vision of stability and prosperity. As important, however, the Quad is a vision of how to cope with an increasingly threatening, expansionist, militarily and economically powerful, repressive, fascist and totalitarian Peoples Republic of China (PRC).

Deep concerns about the PRC’s intentions and capabilities underlie all countries’ versions of their Indo-Pacific Strategies as well.

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<sup>6</sup> James Mattis, “Remarks by Secretary Mattis at Plenary Session of the 2018 Shangri-La Dialogue” (June 2, 2018), <https://dod.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/1538599/remarks-by-secretary-mattis-at-plenary-session-of-the-2018-shangri-la-dialogue/>.

<sup>7</sup> Mattis.

<sup>8</sup> Allan Gyngell, “To Each Their Own ‘Indo-Pacific,’” *East Asia Forum*, May 22, 2018, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2018/05/23/to-each-their-own-indo-pacific/#more-127635>.

<sup>9</sup> Gregson, “An American Perspective on Taiwan in the INDOPACOM Region.”

# The Japan-America Security Alliance: Strengths and Challenges

## *Northeast Asia: A Very Tough Neighborhood*

Before examining the JASA strengths and challenges, it is useful to examine Japan's uniquely precarious security situation. Japan, to use Chicago gangland terminology, resides in "a very tough neighborhood". It faces security challenges from all of its immediate neighbors.

The most imminent challenge is the PRC--by any objective assessment an expansionist, coercive, hyper-nationalistic, brutally repressive, totalitarian<sup>10</sup> state. Japan is reminded daily through the PRC's bombastic propaganda organs that the PRC is now militarily and economically powerful and eager to avenge Japan's brutal past imperialism of the 1930s and 1940s. Official PRC propaganda organs openly voice intention to take Japan's territory such as the Senkakus (also known as *Tiaoyutai Islands* in the ROC and as *Diaoyu Islands* in the PRC)<sup>11</sup> and the Ryukyus (Okinawa).

Also in the neighborhood is the totalitarian Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (DPRK), or North Korea, a slave state whose crimes against humanity are well documented by the United Nations<sup>12</sup> and which also has intense historical grievances against Japan. Two other neighbors occupy lands and adjacent waters claimed by Japan: the Republic of Korea (ROK) occupies *Takashima Island* (which the ROK calls *Dokdo Island*, and which is also claimed by North Korea); and Russia occupies Japan's *Kurile Islands*, Japan's northern territories occupied by Soviet forces in the closing days of World War II.

As nuclear powers, Russia and North Korea, like the PRC, are each capable of destroying Japan as a civilization within a matter of minutes. Japan has no nuclear counterforce deterrent of its own, nor a fully reliable anti-missile defense system to deter this existential threat.

The status of the ROC also poses a serious challenge for Japan, in that PRC occupation of Taiwan would severely compromise Japan's southern flank and lead to increased pressure on its territorial integrity. Economic, psychological, and other damage from Taiwan "going Red" would also be severe. The PRC threat to the ROC is well known, of course. In the name of a so-called "China Dream", the PRC is engaged in an all-encompassing campaign to bring the ROC into its tender embrace. In its relentless war against the ROC, the PRC employs economic, informational, political, and military warfare on a daily basis.

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<sup>10</sup> Dr. Stein Ringen, "A Letter to Fellow China Analysts: Totalitarianism," September 19, 2018.

<sup>11</sup> James E. Fanell and Kerry K. Gershaneck, "White Warships and Little Blue Men: The Looming 'Short, Sharp War' in the East China Sea over the Senkakus," Project 2049 Institute Policy Paper (Washington D.C.: Project 2049 Institute, April 2018), <https://project2049.net/2018/03/30/white-warships-and-little-blue-men-the-looming-short-sharp-war-in-the-east-china-sea-over-the-senkakus/>.

<sup>12</sup> UNHRC, "Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea" (United Nations Human Rights Council, February 2014), <https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/hrc/coidprk/pages/commissioninquiryonhrindprk.aspx>.

All these means are destabilizing and demoralizing, but it is the military tool that is of most concern: PRC ruler Xi Jinping has ordered the Peoples Liberation Army to be able to invade and secure Taiwan by the year 2020—just 14 months from now.<sup>13</sup> As part of the PRC’s ongoing psychological warfare, as a likely prelude to a real military operation, as recently as late October PRC Minister of Defense Wei Fenghe warned that “challenges” to its sovereignty over Taiwan could lead China to use military force, according to the press reports.<sup>14</sup>

These threats to Japan and its alliance with America, combined with recent economic stresses, led to the development of an October 2018 report on JASA by the U.S. think tank *Center for Strategic & International Studies* (CSIS). The CSIS report concluded:<sup>15</sup>

*Reinforcing allied deterrence and warfighting effectiveness is paramount given the growing array of military capabilities and coercive actions being developed and practiced by China, North Korea, and Russia. Moreover, without domestic political support from both sides of the Pacific, neither the United States nor Japan will remain a reliable ally. Therefore, political sustainability must remain an imperative. Finally, budgets are limited in Washington and Tokyo, so the allies must also make the most efficient use of scarce resources.*

### **JASA Strengths**

The CSIS report highlights some of the JASA’s strengths available to meet these challenges. In recent years, the report notes, “the allies have concluded new defense guidelines, established the alliance coordination mechanism, and jointly developed the SM-3 Block IIA ballistic missile interceptor. Japan has renovated its domestic security legislation, enabled the exercise of collective self-defense, improved its secrecy provisions, embraced a more proactive global engagement strategy, and taken on a more visible leadership role within the Indo-Pacific region, including by championing the *Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership* (CPTPP). Meanwhile, the United States has committed to rebalance to Asia and pursue a free and open Indo-Pacific. American and Japanese national leaders enjoy close personal ties, which serve as ballast for the relationship.”<sup>16</sup>

Shinzo Abe, Japan’s strongest prime minister in decades, deserves substantial credit for building and sustaining these strengths. Unlike some previous Japanese premiers, he recognizes the threats facing Japan, and has taken substantial steps to address shortfalls within his limited political maneuvering space. He has ordered two revised *National Defense*

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<sup>13</sup> “PRC ‘Taiwan Invasion’ Propaganda Backfires,” *SinoInsider*, September 7, 2018,

<https://sinoinsider.com/2018/09/geopolitics-watch-prc-taiwan-invasion-propaganda-backfires/>.

<sup>14</sup> “China Says Army Will Act ‘at Any Cost’ to Prevent Taiwan Split,” *Channel News Asia*, October 25, 2018,

<https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=4&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwiNkqmg6TfAhUHvbwKHeIlBqgQFjADegQIBxAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.channelnewsasia.com%2Fnews%2Fasia%2Fchina-says-army-will-act--at-any-cost--to-prevent-taiwan-split-10862236&usg=AOvVaw3mHvflzW85hO-ffnIU4OD>.

<sup>15</sup> Richard Armitage, Joseph Nye, et al., “More Important Than Ever: Renewing the U.S.-Japan Alliance for the 21st Century” (Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), October 2018), <https://www.csis.org/analysis/more-important-ever>.

<sup>16</sup> Armitage, Nye, et al., 1–2.



*Program Guidelines*, revised the *US-Japan Guidelines for Cooperative Defense*, spearheaded the *2015 Legislation for Peace and Security*<sup>17</sup>, and pledged to amend Article IX of the Constitution to codify the Self-Defense Force's existence. In addition, Abe has begun preparing a significant new *Midterm Defense Plan* that will guide defense projects and acquisitions essential to high-end warfare.<sup>18</sup>

But, in reality, many challenges still face the alliance.

### ***General Alliance Shortfalls***

While the relationship looks good on paper, there are vexing shortcomings in the security alliance and with Japan's defense structure that could have devastating consequences. To set the context before addressing specific alliance shortfalls, it's important to highlight a pressing threat identified in the CSIS report: military competitors are narrowing the alliance's military edge. "China in particular," says the report, "has engaged in rapid military modernization and embraced 'gray zone' operations, which have reduced the gap between it and the United States, forcing the alliance to reassess its ability to deter and defeat aggression."<sup>19</sup>

This challenge is daunting enough, but there are also internal, structural problems the alliance must overcome to be truly effective. Japan still has not yet implemented a coherent national defense strategy and its forces face major shortfalls in funding, manpower, communications, doctrine, training, and weapons and equipment.

Of great importance also are Japan's perceived Constitutional restrictions on defense, and failure to develop a Joint JSDF warfighting command, as well as the yet unfulfilled requirement for a combined Japan-U.S. command structure (an alliance coordination mechanism) that will be useful in a crisis situation and to develop true interoperability of U.S. military and Japan Self Defense forces.<sup>20</sup>

Further, there is a need for a flexible deployable combined force that can help shape the Indo-Asia-Pacific Region, and the need to enhance Anti-Access/Area Denial capabilities to reduce the prospects of totalitarian state adventurism in the region. These topics will be the focus of subsequent discussion.

### ***JASA Command & Control (C2) Challenges***

As the CSIS report notes, in order for U.S. and JSDF forces to successfully execute combined operations in a major contingency, the alliance's existing command structures will need to be updated.<sup>21</sup> Currently, on the U.S. side, the

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<sup>17</sup> Jiro Hanyu and Richard et al Armitage, "The U.S.-Japan Alliance to 2030: Power and Principle" (Sasakawa Peace Foundation & Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2016), 4, <https://www.csis.org/programs/japan-chair/us-japan-commission-future-alliance>.

<sup>18</sup> Armitage, Nye, et al., "More Important Than Ever: Renewing the U.S.-Japan Alliance for the 21st Century," 3–4.

<sup>19</sup> Armitage, Nye, et al., 2–3.

<sup>20</sup> Armitage, Nye, et al., 7–8.

<sup>21</sup> Armitage, Nye, et al., 7–8.

commander of the Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) would serve a variety of functions, including not only directing the warfighting in and around Japan, but also managing relations with Washington, sustaining manpower and logistics support, and coordinating with allied forces.

While there is a *Commander, U.S. Forces Japan* (COMUSFJ) staff headquarters in Yokota Air Base, USFJ is not configured, staffed, nor trained as a warfighting command as is, say, Headquarters, U.S. Forces Korea. Further, USFJ does not have the authority to carry the fight beyond the territorial waters of Japan, limiting its combat effectiveness even if given this new mission. Rather than burden the commander of INDOPACOM, headquartered in Hawaii, with this warfighting mission, CSIS recommends that Japan and the U.S. create a stand-alone *combined Japan-U.S. joint task force* for the western Pacific.<sup>22</sup>

This combined joint task force, or CJTF, would focus on possible contingencies in the region, particularly with the PRC over Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the East China Sea. Such a CJTF would need to be established in coordination with U.S. allies and partners: Japan, of course, would be part of the CJTF, but other forces or at least Liaison Officers should be embedded in the organization. Standing up such a command in a crisis would be difficult, so this must be a “standing CJTF” with responsibility and funding for routine training and exercises that allows it to conduct multi-domain operations. Another option, of course, would be to change the mission of USFJ from “defense of Japan” to a more regional role, but that change would likely cause significant political fallout in both Japan and the U.S.

The keys to conducting successful contingency operations are good planning and the ability to act quickly. Accordingly, within this new CJTF (or other new warfighting coordination mechanism), combined planning must be dramatically systematized and practiced if the U.S. and Japan are to respond quickly to acts of aggression. Although some combined planning already occurs, it is too ad hoc. The PRC often relies on *fait accompli tactics*, which take advantage of slow decision-making cycles, says the CSIS report.<sup>23</sup> Improving the speed of JASA decision-making is critical, as is the need to have pre-existing response plans and options. Commanders must be able to act rapidly, and rapid response requires advanced coordination by political leaders for some types of operations. This is not a new concept, but it is inexplicably missing from the JASA command relationships: combined planning has long been inherent other U.S. alliances, both in Europe and Asia. For example, U.S. and ROK forces have together developed both warfighting and counter-provocation plans to deter and respond to North Korean escalations.

CSIS suggests that such prior planning and coordination will help limit PRC adventurism, especially if U.S. forces are involved earlier in so-called “gray zone” incidents, which include aggression that occurs below the level of major conflict.<sup>24</sup> This step would make clear that any acts of aggression would trigger deeper alliance cooperation, regardless of whether they cross the threshold of an armed attack under Article V of the *Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America*.

Directly related to the combined C2 and planning shortfall is a similar organizational shortfall within Japan’s governmental

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<sup>22</sup> Armitage, Nye, et al., 7.

<sup>23</sup> Armitage, Nye, et al., 8.

<sup>24</sup> Armitage, Nye, et al., 2.

organization. Japan's Self Defense Forces, in particular, suffer from inadequate C2 organization and lack of flexibility in planning and operations. Japan's existing command structures place too great a burden on the chief of staff of the Japan Self-Defense Forces.

Currently, the chief of staff effectively serves as both a *combatant commander* and *chief of defense*. It is vital to disaggregate the duties of the “*supported*” *warfighter* and the *national-level chief of defense* and “*force provider*” (or supporting) commanders. The former *fights the force*, while the latter two *develop, train, and equip the force* and its supporting facilities and (for the Chief of Defense) provides advice to the political leadership during the crisis. In practice, this means that Japan's Ministry of Defense should devolve some of the JSDF chief of staff's operational responsibilities to a subordinate joint force commander. This will allow the combatant commander to focus fully on the fight and therefore increase the operational effectiveness of Japanese forces, particularly during a major contingency.<sup>25</sup>

A good model for the JSDF is Australia's *Joint Operations Command* (JOC), led by a three-star commander who serves as chief of joint operations. The JOC commander has responsibility for all military operations, as well as training and readiness of the force. Such a model, adapted to account for Japan's unique organizational, legal, historical, and cultural characteristics, would help prepare Japanese commanders and forces for the stress of high tempo day-to-day operational requirements readiness to conduct future operations. Ultimately this structure would be integrated into the combined force structure, which would be similar in structure to Combined Forces Korea.

The obstacles to overcoming the challenges are increased by a sophisticated PRC Political Warfare campaign, abetted by Japanese radical activists. The struggle to build the domestic support for reform of the alliance against both PRC and radical activists political warfare operations will be examined next.

### ***Radical Activists & PRC Political Warfare***

As noted in the CSIS report, “without domestic political support from both sides of the Pacific, neither the United States nor Japan will remain a reliable ally. Therefore, political sustainability must remain an imperative.”<sup>26</sup> Accordingly, the PRC and others attack and undermine that political support, primarily through what is called “political warfare”.

Prime Minister Abe faces a major political warfare campaign as he labors to normalize the status of Japan's armed forces. There is a very small but powerful radical minority in Japan that desires a weak, neutralized Japan. Nearby hostile totalitarian regimes such as the PRC, the DPRK, and Russia benefit from, and support, these radicals.<sup>27</sup> The PRC's Political Warfare operations are particularly effective in their goal to “disintegrate” this PRC “enemy” in accordance with the *Three Warfares* doctrine.

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<sup>25</sup> Armitage, Nye, et al., 8.

<sup>26</sup> Armitage, Nye, et al., 6.

<sup>27</sup> Kerry K. Gershaneck, “‘Faux Pacifists’ Imperil Japan While Empowering China,” *Asia Times*, June 10, 2018, <http://www.atimes.com/article/faux-pacifists-imperil-japan-while-empowering-china/>.

While there are some genuine pacifists in Japan who sincerely question the need for defense reform, it is Japan's radical activists (*kagekiteki katsudoka*) that generate the most hysteria.<sup>28</sup> In their worldview, Abe's efforts will upend Japan's "pacifist" tradition and lead it to fascism and rapacious regional conquest. But Japan is not pacifist, nor is Japan's *kagekiteki katsudoka*.

Japan is now a *peaceful* nation. After a particularly vicious era of near-genocidal rampage followed by U.S. military occupation and democratic reform, Japan has not fought in a foreign war in 73 years. It has been a role model in international aid, foreign direct investment, and humanitarian actions. Japan's pacifism post-1945 is a curious mix of moral posturing buttressed by a large defense establishment and reliance on the U.S. military force to obliterate any country that threatened Japan.

Despite its "peace constitution", Japan quickly built a real military after North Korea (NK) invaded South Korea in 1950. At the request of UN forces, Japan dispatched minesweepers to support the fight. From early on, then, the JSDF was an *armed force* in the sense most nations understand the term, even if it has been subject to various (and sometime highly restrictive) interpretations since. During the Korean War, Japanese communists and other radical activists protested support for the UN forces fighting NK-PRC-USSR aggression. As they protested Japan supporting the defense of South Koreans from one of the more oppressive, murderous states in world history, the *kagekiteki katsudoka* set their pattern for the rest of the Cold War and its aftermath: attack and undermine liberal democracies and provide support for communist dictatorships.<sup>29</sup> They always accuse the democracies of militarism and fascist aggression, while ignoring (or defending) hyper-nationalistic, fascist aggression from communist dictatorships.

Reasoned debate is desirable in any democracy, but *faux pacifist* attacks directed against Japan's overdue defense efforts amounts to simple *Political Warfare* that supports the PRC's larger drive for regional and, arguably, global hegemony. If, as Clausewitz wrote, "war is the extension of politics by other means", then it's fair to say that the PRC's political warfare is "an extension of armed conflict by other means". A useful definition of Political Warfare is "those operations that seek to influence emotions, motives, objectives, reasoning, and behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the PRC's objectives".

The PRC's version of PW is all encompassing. It is *Total War* that goes beyond traditional Liaison Work (building coalitions in a "United Front" to support the PRC and to "disintegrate" enemies) and the "Three Warfares" (strategic psychological warfare, overt and covert media manipulation, and use of "Lawfare") to include use of violence and other forms of destructive attacks. In Japan, it has successfully exploited anti-defense, anti-bases organizations in Japan to obstruct military reform and paralyze relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps' *Futenma Replacement Facility* on Okinawa.<sup>30</sup>

The pattern is well established, predictable, and blatantly hypocritical. Radical activist news media and anti-defense groups always find fault with any efforts by Japan to strengthen its defensive posture—yet they will never utter a word of

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<sup>28</sup> Gershaneck.

<sup>29</sup> Kerry K. Gershaneck, "Taiwan's Future Depends on the Japan-America Security Alliance," *The National Interest*, June 7, 2018, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/taiwans-future-depends-the-japan-america-security-alliance-26167?page=show>.

<sup>30</sup> Gershaneck.

criticism about the PRC's massive military buildup, illegal occupation of disputed islands, and ecological terrorism in destroying the South China Sea to build massive naval and air bases to threaten Asia and Oceania. Another PW example is the contrived hysteria regarding Japan's recent activation of a small JSDF amphibious brigade. This unit can, in reality, land only perhaps 600 JGSDF soldiers to re-capture a Japanese island occupied by a hostile force: 600 people is less than the number of passengers inside a single Tokyo *Yamanote Line* subway train at rush hour. However, the PRC is building a 100,000-man Marine Corps, yet there is not a mention of this looming regional threat from the *faux pacifists*.

It is their violence, however, that earns them the title *faux pacifists* and takes simple hypocrisy to a different level--to physical assault and active military sabotage that amounts to terrorism. In pursuit of their anti-defense agenda, radical activists have violently attacked women, schoolchildren, and employees at military installations; fired mortars against JSDF and US bases and at Narita Airport; attempted to cause aircraft to crash, booby-trapped military facilities, sabotaged military and other equipment, and blocked off gates to installations to interfere with essential emergency base functions.<sup>31</sup>

The *faux pacifists'* actions actively support PRC PW against both Japan and the alliance. Accordingly, the PRC invests heavily in Japan to support a pro-Beijing, anti-defense PW campaign. Tactics used in Japan are common to those the PRC uses in the ROC, Australia, the U.S., and other countries.<sup>32</sup> The include establishment of *United Front* organizations, entertaining and funding pliable politicians, news media, and academic institutions; and hosting trips visits by eager academics, GOJ officials, and other opinion leaders to the PRC. In Okinawa, another tactic has been to "educate" Okinawans that they are "from the same womb" as the Chinese; that is, persuade them their allegiance is to China and not Japan. Strategies include establishing direct linkages between Okinawan and other Japanese news media organizations and universities to CCP-directed PRC counterparts, and heavy PRC investment in Hokkaido and Okinawa to develop political and economic leverage in what has been termed "a North-South Pinch".

It is long past time for Japan and the US to more openly confront the PRC-aligned radicals in terms of public information, and in terms of their financial and other relations with the PRC. An immediate action would be to establish a Japan-US coordination mechanism that would act like a political campaign "war room" to identify the ever-evolving PRC PW threat and develop Strategic Communications and other responses to confront the common threat. Then each country should begin PW counter-offensives, to include emulating Australia's recent successful public exposure of PRC United Front influence operations.

## **Alliance Enhancement Possibilities**

In addition to the JASA alliance managers' requirement to address the C2 issues addressed previously, those managers should consider the following alliance enhancements to ensure JASA helps effectively shape the security environment in support of the Indo-Pacific Strategy. Two initiatives that should be implemented include establishment of a standing Combined Maritime Task Force and enhancement of "Archipelagic Defense" through the opportunity offered by America's recent decision to withdraw from the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty with Russia.

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<sup>31</sup> Gershaneck, "'Faux Pacifists' Imperil Japan While Empowering China."

<sup>32</sup> Gershaneck.

## *Establish Combined Maritime Task Forces Pacific*

As stated previously, U.S. Defense Secretary Mattis, at the June Shangri-La Dialogue, called for expanding attention and action in the maritime space because “(t)he maritime commons is a global good, and the sea lanes of communication are the arteries of economic vitality for all.”<sup>33</sup> He also stated that the U.S. will help its partners to build up naval and law enforcement capabilities and capacities to improve monitoring and protection of maritime borders and interests and improve “interoperability” (defined as the ability to integrate the efforts of militaries, law enforcement, and economies) to better support common goals.

A significant step that JASA could take in building up naval and law enforcement capabilities and capacities, as well as interoperability, is to establish a standing Combined Maritime Task Force. This concept, first proposed by noted regional security expert Eric Sayers at CSIS, is modeled on NATO’s *Standing Naval Forces Atlantic* construct that was proposed in the late 1960’s and successfully operated during the 1970s and 1980s, to deter and if need be, fight, the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact.

According to Sayers, current policy is “for the United States and like-minded navies to operate independently across the region and only come together on an intermittent basis to exercise.”<sup>34</sup> However, he argues that as the PRC’s maritime power and reach grow, “the region continues to demand that the U.S. remain engaged in new and innovative ways”. Establishing a *Combined Maritime Task Force Pacific* would further “U.S. and regional cooperation to contribute consistently to naval activities across the region and remain committed to a free and open Indo-Pacific maritime environment.”<sup>35</sup>

The Standing Naval Force Atlantic (SNFA) was established in 1967 as the first permanent multinational naval unit that operated during peacetime. The SNFA was comprised of 6–to-10 surface ships (destroyers, cruisers, frigates, and support ships) that attached to the squadron for up to six months at a time. Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States were the five permanent contributors to the standing force, and other European nations contributing ships periodically. The SNFA commander reported directly to the NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, headquartered in Norfolk, Virginia, and command of the squadron rotated among contributing nations.

The squadron demonstrated NATO’s ability “to bring significant multilateral naval power to bear at a time and place of its choosing,” notes Sayers. But the real utility, he argues, was that “its permanent and consistent nature allowed contributing navies to work together to build interoperability during peacetime. Instead of conducting intermittent exercises throughout the year, Standing Naval Forces Atlantic gave the alliance a tool to ensure it was always signaling contributing navies’ growing alignment and desire to work together.”<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> Mattis, “Remarks by Secretary Mattis at Plenary Session of the 2018 Shangri-La Dialogue.”

<sup>34</sup> Eric Sayers, “Time to Launch a Combined Maritime Task Force for the Pacific,” *War on the Rocks*, June 1, 2108, <https://warontherocks.com/2018/06/time-to-launch-a-combined-maritime-task-force-for-the-pacific/>.

<sup>35</sup> Sayers.

<sup>36</sup> Sayers.

The all-too-quick “knee jerk” response to proposal modeled on NATO experience has often been “Europe of the Cold War era is not the Asia of today, and the NATO alliance is not a useful guide for organizing cooperation in the less cohesive Indo-Asia-Pacific Region of today”. But such facile dismissal of this proposal on those grounds represents extremely narrow and unimaginative thinking--at a time when broad and highly imaginative thought processes are required to meet the rapidly evolving threats and challenges in the Indo-Asia-Pacific Region.

From the Indo-Asia-Pacific perspective, the SNFA concept presents a historical roadmap for how to encourage like-minded partners facing shared challenges to contribute more to regional security. Sayers’ Asia version, if applied within the well-established JASA, would help expand regional naval cooperation from intermittent exercises into a more permanent effort to protect the “free and open Indo-Pacific” maritime environment.

Sayers’ vision for the task force’s duties includes *conducting port calls across South Asia, Oceania, and into Northeast Asia; conducting exercises, joining existing multilateral exercises, and responding to natural disasters and other emergencies, all while sailing together on a regular basis and building cooperation, trust, and interoperability. One month, the task force might be doing port calls throughout the South Pacific; the next it might join a high-end maritime exercise in the Indian Ocean. The force could then be diverted to help respond to a cyclone in Southeast Asia, after that it might head off to visit Manila Harbor and host ASEAN officials aboard for a dinner before the various members sail together to Hawaii to join RIMPAC 2020.*<sup>37</sup>

Adapting Sayers’ general *Combined Maritime Task Forces Pacific* (CMTFA) concept for JASA implementation would be relatively easy. Assuming Abe’s success in broadening the concept of “collective self defense” in Japan’s Constitutional debate, and based on past successful JMSDF operations and exercises with other nations abroad, the concept would be politically acceptable with both the U.S. and Japan. Also politically, it would be important regionally and within the U.S. for Japan to formally propose the concept; there is already support within some circles in GOJ for the concept.

The U.S. and Japan would then provide the core naval assets (4-to-6 surface ships, to include embarked U.S. Marines and JGSDF Amphibious Brigade forces and aviation assets), to be routinely deployed. As Japan’s Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) and the U.S. Navy have a long-standing closer working relationship, it would not take long to build the core capacity for C2 and interoperability between these two core naval components. Once initial operating capability is established, the MCTFA would be augmented by like-minded countries when possible, to include navies and coast guards from Asian and European partners, as well as from Australia and New Zealand and possibly South America.

It is a given that the PRC will also complain that this maritime combined task force is yet another conspiracy designed to “contain China”. It will use all diplomatic and political warfare means available to it to subvert this new cooperative maritime initiative. Ironically, it is the PRC’s increasingly threatening behavior that has set the conditions for such cooperation like this *more possible* than it would have been just a decade ago. So a threatening PRC eager to expand via “Gray Zone” and “salami slicing” operations is indeed a factor in the establishment of the MCTFA.

Nevertheless, observes Sayers, “potential members of the task force are likely to balk at the idea as Beijing seeks to apply

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<sup>37</sup> Sayers.

pressure and torpedo the nascent initiative”<sup>38</sup> so careful planning and well-conceived strategic communications are required. Among other planning steps Sayers offers to avoid the perception that this will be an “anti-China coalition”, JASA’s CMFTA mission should focus on a specific problem at the outset, and eventually be allowed to grow into a more mature regional concept. The initial focus would be to support those tenets laid out by Secretary Mattis regarding a “free and open Indo-Pacific Region”. Accordingly, the CMFTA would be established based on a statement of principles that include supporting freedom of overflight and navigation, protection of the maritime ecological environment, and agreement that all disputes should be resolved peacefully.

Operating under these principles, JASA’s CMFTA could become a very significant military tool in helping to ensure both Indo-Asia-Pacific “regional security” as well as “human security”. The latter is particularly important in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, where modern maritime cooperation emerged in the wake of a natural disaster (the 2004 Boxing Day earthquake and tsunami that killed nearly 300,000) and has continued to this day.

To paraphrase Sayers, a Combined Maritime Task Force for the Pacific is sure to take the Japan-American Security Alliance and other prospective members out of their normal comfort zone, but it offers a credible, achievable, and historically proven range of ways to address current and future challenges that cannot be ignored.

### ***Enhance the Archipelagic Defense Strategy***

While each country views the challenges to a free and open Indo-Pacific somewhat differently, as addressed previously, the intentions and capabilities of an increasingly threatening, militarily and economically powerful, totalitarian PRC underlie all countries’ versions of their Indo-Pacific strategies. The ability of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) to increasingly project nuclear and conventional power throughout the Indo-Asia-Pacific Region impacts directly on JASA’s ability to help ensure the region remains “free and open”. President Trump’s announcement on October 20 that the U.S. will withdraw from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty with Russia offers and option for augmenting JASA’s ability to counter PRC aggression in the Indo-Asia-Pacific Region.

The reasoning behind this is tied directly to the concept of *archipelagic defense*. Andrew Krepinevich first used the term in a Foreign Affairs article in 2015: this strategy would use America’s own anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) systems to lock down the waters within the “first island chain” and transform the PRC’s near seas into what scholars like Michael Swaine and others have described as a “no man’s land” in the event of war.<sup>39</sup> Such a strategy would be capable of deterring and containing Chinese military aggression without having to place U.S. surface vessels and aircraft at significant risk. The result could be more strategic stability rather than less, according to security analysts such as England’s Adam Taylor, for two reasons.<sup>40</sup>

“First, it has the potential to be significantly cheaper (in both money and lives) than relying on incredibly expensive carrier

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<sup>38</sup> Sayers.

<sup>39</sup> Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., “How to Deter China: The Case for Archipelagic Defense,” *Foreign Affairs*, April 2015, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-02-16/how-deter-china>.

<sup>40</sup> Nathan Levine, “Why America Leaving the INF Treaty Is China’s New Nightmare,” *The National Interest*, October 22, 2018, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/why-america-leaving-inf-treaty-chinas-new-nightmare-34087>.



battle groups to maintain sea control,” says Taylor. “The loss of those assets would be such a traumatic disaster for America (with up to six thousand lives lost with a single aircraft carrier, for example) that any U.S. leader would feel immense pressure to immediately and dramatically escalate the scale of the conflict. Instead, cheap, unmanned long-range strike weapons could serve in their place, reducing the chance of crisis escalation.”

Second, asserts Taylor, “with fewer American surface ships required to operate close to China, the tactical necessity for U.S. commanders to strike Chinese missile systems within mainland China as a defensive measure would be reduced. This is significant because, as Caitlin Talmadge explains in the most recent issue of *Foreign Affairs*, China’s nuclear weapons are intermingled with its conventional missile forces, and it would be nearly impossible for the United States to strike at China’s conventional ballistic missiles without inadvertently destroying elements of China’s strategic nuclear deterrent.” As Talmadge explains it: “faced with such a threat, Chinese leaders could decide to use their nuclear weapons while they were still able to,” increasing the chances of a conflict going nuclear.

Security Analyst Nathan Levine argues persuasively that America’s renewed ability to develop and deploy INF weapons—intermediate range missiles--would be the cornerstone of the archipelagic strategy.<sup>41</sup>

As the then-Commander of U.S. Pacific Command, ADM Harry Harris testified before the U.S. Congress in February of this year, the PRC’s “historically unprecedented economic development has enabled an impressive military buildup that could soon challenge the U.S. across almost all domains. Key Chinese advancements include significant improvements in missile systems”. These missile systems are of particular concern for both their ability to intimidate nations within the Indo-Asia-Pacific Region and their potential to deny the JASA and other impacted nations the ability to properly respond to military provocations and aggression by the PLA against Japan, the ROC, and others. Harris testified:<sup>42</sup>

*Perhaps nowhere is the PLA making more dramatic progress than in ballistic missiles. While the PLA is rapidly expanding the number, type, and sophistication of all of its missiles, China has made the most progress in intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) technology, with IRBMs now constituting approximately 95 percent of the PLA’s overall missile force.*

*Chinese media routinely trumpets missile developments, carefully noting their missiles do not target any specific country. However, a simple comparison of missile ranges with geography suggests where Chinese missiles would most likely be targeted – SRBMs against Taiwan and U.S. carrier strike groups operating at sea, IRBMs against U.S. bases in Japan and Guam, and ICBMs against the continental U.S. China’s pursuit of advanced hypersonic missile technologies portends even greater challenges over the next few years.*

Harris also noted that “PLA forces have become more expeditionary and more integrated” in general, and that the PLA Navy (PLAN) “is in the midst of a massive shipbuilding program. If this program continues, China will surpass Russia as the world’s second largest Navy by 2020, when measured in terms of submarines and frigate-class ships or larger.” The

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<sup>41</sup> Levine.

<sup>42</sup> Harry B. Harris, “Statement of Admiral Harry B. Harris, Jr. Commander, U.S. Pacific Command,” § House Armed Services Committee (2018), <http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20180214/106847/HHRG-115-AS00-Wstate-HarrisJrH-20180214.pdf>.

PLAN, which is building a 100,000-man Marine Corps, is emerging as a global naval force, training for combat in open ocean environments, and “operating in more locations, more often, leading to greater degrees of proficiency”. Often those locations include the Taiwan Straits and the East and South China Seas. In combination with the extended range provided to its PLA Air Force long-range, nuclear strike-capable H-6K bombers from its militarized artificial islands in the South China Sea, the PRC has the ability to rapidly project power from its mainland and artificial island bases. In cases where the PRC’s power projection is to coerce, intimidate, or defeat JASA or other partners in the Indo-Pacific Region, is important that JASA enhance its ability to check the PRC’s power projection capabilities.

The PRC’s *Ministry of State Security* (MSS) was quick to condemn the U.S. withdrawal from the INF treaty as being targeted not so much against Russia as against the PRC. A spokesperson for the *China Institute for Contemporary International Relations* (CICIR), a think tank “front” for the MSS spy agency<sup>43</sup>, complained that Trump’s decision to “tear up” the INF treaty was really “as sign that Washington was gearing up for a long-term strategic battle with China,” according to a recent *South China Morning Post* article.<sup>44</sup> This complaint is, of course, merely another variation of CICIR’s constant reprise of accusations regarding Western efforts to “contain China”. But this time, there may be some validity to the MSS assessment.

In fact, Trump’s decision allows the U.S. (and implicitly JASA) to finally compete with Beijing in building intermediate range missiles previously banned under the treaty, according to Taylor.<sup>45</sup>

The U.S. is pulling out of the INF treaty, which bans the development or deployment of both nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 500 to 5,500 kilometers, because of Moscow’s repeated violations of it. Moscow reportedly began test flights of a prohibited cruise missile as early as 2008. So the U.S. effectively unilaterally disarmed itself of this useful deterrent weapon, while allowing Russia a 10-year head start in re-developing its INF capabilities. The U.S. is now particularly concerned by a Russian ground-launched cruise missile known as the SSC-8.

The PRC, however, has never been a signatory of the INF Treaty. This has allowed China to build up a vast arsenal of conventional A2/AD weapons, such as the DF-21 “carrier killer” anti-ship ballistic missile, with a reported range of 1,500 kilometers. In 2017, ADM Harris had testified before Congress that the PLA now had the “largest and most diverse missile force in the world, with an inventory of more than 2,000 ballistic and cruise missiles.” He added that 95 percent of those missiles would violate the INF Treaty if China were a signatory.

Until Trump’s announcement, the U.S. was legally prohibited from deploying this class of weapons as a counterweight, as U.S. President Ronald Reagan did in Europe during the Cold War, to force the Soviets to the negotiating table. While it is questionable whether the PRC would ever be willing to negotiate away its massive INF superiority, U.S. deployment of

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<sup>43</sup> Bill Gertz, “Chinese Think Tank Also Serves as Spy Arm,” *Washington Times*, September 28, 2011, <https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/sep/28/chinese-think-tank-also-serves-as-spy-arm/>.

<sup>44</sup> Kristin Huang, “Donald Trump ‘Targets’ China by Pulling out of Missile Deal with Russia,” October 21, 2018, <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2169551/donald-trump-targets-china-pulling-out-missile-deal-russia>.

<sup>45</sup> Levine, “Why America Leaving the INF Treaty Is China’s New Nightmare.”

INF weapons as part of JASA would certainly cause Beijing to hesitate before considering any military aggression in the Indo-Pacific Region.

The U.S. is further along in planning for use of such INF weapons than might be expected, as Congress' annual defense authorization bill has funded research and development into these weapons, specifically making the argument that these weapons could be used to counter China if the agreement were scrapped.<sup>46</sup> Placing road-mobile INF missiles in Japan would require complicated negotiations, but would be no more difficult than was President Reagan's Herculean—and ultimately successful—campaign to deploy INF missiles within Western Europe to force Soviet concessions. With increased public understanding of the existential threat that the PRC poses to Japan's sovereignty and the sovereignty of friendly Indo-Asia-Pacific nations, and with better-focused efforts on countering PRC and radical anti-alliance activists in Japan, the popular support for such a deployment on Japanese soil is possible.

## Conclusion

The strength of the Japan-America Security Alliance is central to successfully achieving both countries' visions for an Indo-Asia-Pacific Strategy, and in support of the broader regional objectives associated with a “free and open Indo-Pacific Region”. The long-standing alliance has built on significant strengths to meet the challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, but it must address serious (perhaps fatal) shortfalls to be effective and credible cornerstone for Indo-Pacific security.

Three significant areas for improvement include enhancing JASA and JSDF Command & Control (C2), establishment of a combined maritime task force, and implementation of an expanded archipelagic missile defense strategy based the opportunity provided by America's recent announced withdrawal from the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty with Russia.

It is also important that JASA develop capabilities to more effectively counter PRC and anti-alliance political warfare operations that undermine public support for necessary JASA reform and enhancements.

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<sup>46</sup> Levine.

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## ***Agenda***

- **The Indo-Asia-Pacific Strategy**
- **Japan's Security Concerns & Strategy**
- **JASA Strengths & Shortfalls**
  - C2 Enhancement Requirements
  - Radical Activists & PRC Political Warfare
- **For the Progress of FOIP**
  - Combined Maritime Task Force Pacific
- **Summary**
- **Discussion (Q&A)**



## Free and Open Indo-Pacific

- PM Abe 2007
- Pres. Trump, Nov. 2017: set priorities
- National Security Strategy Dec. 2017
- National Defense Strategy Jan. 2018
- FY19 NDAA (Congressional support)
- SecDef Mattis, June 2018, *Shangri-La Dialogue*
- SecState Pompeo, July 2018, *Indo-Pacific Business Forum*

## FOIP Core Themes

1. rules-based order in Asia,
2. freedom of navigation and overflight in the maritime commons,
3. respect for international law,
4. enhancing connectivity,
5. maritime security,
6. the North Korean threat and nonproliferation,
7. and terrorism.

## SecDef Mattis

June 2018

*“The maritime commons is a global good, and the sea lanes of communication are the arteries of economic vitality for all.”*

*The U.S. will help its partners build up naval and law enforcement capabilities to improve monitoring and protection of maritime borders and interests and improve interoperability (defined as the ability to integrate the efforts of militaries, law enforcement, and economies) to better support common goals.*

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## SecState Pompeo

*When we say “free” Indo-Pacific, it means we all want all nations, every nation, to be able to protect their sovereignty from coercion by other countries.*

*At the national level, “free” means good governance and the assurance that citizens can enjoy their fundamental rights and liberties.*

*When we say “open” in the Indo-Pacific, it means we want all nations to enjoy open access to seas and airways. We want the peaceful resolution of territorial and maritime disputes.*

*Economically, “open” means fair and reciprocal trade, open investment environments, transparent agreements between nations, and improved connectivity to drive regional ties . . .*

## FOIP: Multiple Visions

- ROC: *New Southbound Policy*
- India: *Act East Policy*
- South Korea: *New Southern Policy*
- Japan: *Free & Open Indo-Pacific Strategy*
- Indonesia: *Indo-Pacific Treaty, Indo-Pacific regional architecture, and Indo-Pacific cooperation umbrella.*
- Australia: *Foreign Policy Whitepaper with similar goals and objectives*

## Why the renewed FOIP Focus?

Each country views the challenges to a free and open Indo-Pacific somewhat differently. However, the intentions and capabilities of an

*increasingly threatening,  
expansionist,*

*militarily and economically powerful,  
fascist and totalitarian*

*Peoples Republic of China*

underlie all countries' versions of their Indo-Pacific strategies.

8



**Japan's Security Concerns**  
***"Biggest crisis in the postwar period"***  
**Existential Threats: Russia, DPRK, PRC**  
**Sovereign territory occupied by Russia, ROK**  
**ROC Concerns**

**Japan's Security Concerns**  
***"Biggest crisis in the postwar period"***  
**Existential Threats: Russia, DPRK, PRC**  
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
**Japan's Security Concerns**  
***"Biggest crisis in the postwar period"***  
**Existential Threats: Russia, DPRK, PRC**  
**Sovereign territory occupied by Russia, ROK**  
**ROC Concerns**



## A Tough, Dangerous Neighborhood!

**The PRC's Grand Strategy**  
*Secure Periphery: take Taiwan, SCS, ECS,  
neutralize Korea, break Island Chains, evict U.S.*

**The PRC's Grand Strategy**  
*Secure Periphery: take Taiwan, SCS, ECS,  
neutralize Korea, break Island Chains, evict U.S.*



## Regional--then global--hegemony <sup>10</sup>



# Japan's Security Strategy



**A strong, assertive, militarily capable  
*Japan-America Security Alliance (JASA)*  
is central to the success of FOIP.**



***But JASA must become more effective!***

## ***For the Progress of FOIP Alliance Enhancements***

- ***Fix JASA and JSDF Command & Control,***
- ***Implement an expanded archipelagic missile defense strategy, utilizing INF capabilities***
- ***Counter political warfare operations that undermine public support for JASA reform***
- ***Establish Combined Maritime Task Force Pacific***

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## ***For the Progress of FOIP Alliance Enhancement***

***Establish  
Combined Maritime  
Task Force Pacific***

14



# SecDef Mattis

*Shangril-La Dialogue, June 2018*

*The maritime commons is a global good, and the sea lanes of communication are the arteries of economic vitality for all.”*

*The U.S. will help its partners build up naval and law enforcement capabilities to improve monitoring and protection of maritime borders and interests and improve interoperability (defined as the ability to integrate the efforts of militaries, law enforcement, and economies) to better support common goals.*

15

## Eric Sayers' CMTFP Concept

- Current policy: *U.S. and like-minded navies operate independently across the region and only come together on an intermittent basis to exercise.*
- Sayers: Be innovative and establish **Combined Maritime Task Force Pacific**
  - Modeled on *Standing Naval Force Atlantic*
- Adapt Sayers' concept: Make it a **standing JASA-Plus CMTFP**.
  - Japan & U.S. forces form the core structure, but other nations can join.

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# CMTFP Mission & Duties

## ➤ Mission:

- Contribute to a free and open Indo-Pacific maritime environment.
- Deter PRC Grey Zone and other aggressive actions.

## ➤ Duties:

- conduct port calls across South Asia, Oceania, and into Northeast Asia;
- conduct exercises,
- join existing multilateral exercises,
- respond to natural disasters and other emergencies,
- sail together on a regular basis, building cooperation, trust, & interoperability.

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# Conclusion

- The strength of JASA is central to successfully achieving a *free and open Indo-Pacific*.
- The alliance has significant strengths, but it must address serious shortfalls to be effective cornerstone for Indo-Pacific security.
  - *Fix JASA and JSDF Command & Control*
  - *Implement an expanded archipelagic missile defense strategy, utilizing INF capabilities*
  - *Counter political warfare operations that undermine public support for JASA reform.*
- Establish Combined Maritime Task Force Pacific

18

<p style="text-align: center;"><b>HATAKEYAMA Kyoko</b> <b>Associate Professor, Kansai Gaidai University</b></p>
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**Free and open Indo-Pacific strategy: Towards a rule-based order?**

Introduction

1. What factors sustain Asian order?
  - a. Material aspects
  - b. Normative aspects
2. Various conceptions of norms and order
  - a. How does Japan perceive the regional order and norms?
  - b. How does China perceive the regional order and norms?
  - c. How other Asian states perceives the regional order and norms?
3. Japan's normative diplomacy: as a norm protector
  - a. Value based diplomacy
  - b. Active engagement in the South China Sea issue
  - b. Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy
4. Will the strategy work?

Conclusion

## 4. Appendix: Introductions to Co-sponsoring Organizations

### (1) The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)

The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc. (JFIR or The Forum) is a private, non-profit, independent, and non-partisan organization dedicated to improved understanding of Japanese foreign policy and international relations. The Forum takes no institutional position on issues of foreign policy, though its members are encouraged not only to analyze but also to propose alternatives on matters of foreign policy. Though the Forum helps its members to formulate policy recommendations on matters of public policy, the views expressed in such recommendations represent in no way those of the Forum as an institution and the responsibility for the contents of the recommendations is that of those members of the Forum who sign them alone.

The Forum was founded on March 12, 1987 in Tokyo on the private initiative of Dr. OKITA Saburo, Mr. HATTORI Ichiro, Prof. ITO Kenichi, and 60 other independent citizens from business, academic, political, and media circles of Japan, recognizing that a policy-oriented research institution in the field of international affairs independent from the government was most urgently needed in Japan. On April 1, 2011, JFIR was reincorporated as a “public interest foundation” with the authorization granted by the Prime Minister in recognition of its achievements.

JFIR is a membership organization with four categories of membership, namely, (1) corporate, (2) associate corporate, and (3) individual. As for the organizational structure of JFIR, the “Board of Trustees” is the highest decision making body, which is in charge of electing the “Directors” and of supervising overall activities of JFIR, while the “Board of Directors” is an executive body, which is in charge of the management of day-to-day operations of JFIR.

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The Forum’s activities are composed of such pillars as “Policy Recommendations,” “e-Forum” “Research Programs,” “International Dialogues & Exchanges,” “Participation in International Frameworks,” “Information Gathering,” and “PR and Enlightenment.” Of these pillars of activities, one important pillar is the “e-Forum: Hyakka-Seiho” which means “Hundred Flowers in Full Bloom” (<http://www.jfir.or.jp/cgi/m-bbs/>). The “e-Forum,” which started on April 12, 2006, is open to the public, functioning as an interactive forum for discussions on foreign policy and international affairs. All articles posted on the e-Forum are sent through the bimonthly e-mail magazine “Meru-maga Nihon Kokusai Foramu” in Japanese to about 10,000 readers in Japan. Furthermore, articles worth attention for foreigners are translated into English and posted on the English website of JFIR (<http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/index.htm>) as “JFIR Commentary.” They are also introduced in the e-mail magazine “JFIR E-Letter” in English. “JFIR E-Letter” is delivered bimonthly to about 10,000 readers worldwide.

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## (2) The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)

### Objectives and History

The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) originates from the Japan Chapter of the Quadrangular Forum (QF), which was established in 1982 in Washington to serve as an informal promoter of the exchange of policy-oriented views and opinions among Japan, US, Europe, and Canada. As the Cold War ended and its aftermath faded away, QF ceased its activity in 1996. The Japan Chapter of QF survived the vicissitudes and developed into the Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) as an independent institution of Japan for international intellectual exchanges. Since then, GFJ has been active as a hub for international exchanges with the global intellectual community at large.

### Organization

The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) is a private, non-profit, non-partisan, and independent membership organization in Japan. Business Member, Political Member, and Academic Member support its activities as Governors and Members. The Secretariat is housed in The Japan Forum on International Relations. GFJ is currently headed by ITO Kenichi as Chairman, WATANABE Mayu as President, and TAKAHATA Yohei as Vice President and Executive Secretary. The membership is composed of 10 Business Members including the 4 Governors, TOYODA Shoichiro, MOGI Yuzaburo, ISHIKAWA Hiroshi, and YAGUCHI Toshikazu; 10 Political Members including the 4 Governors, KAKIZAWA Mito, SUEMATSU Yoshinori, SUZUKI Keisuke, and FUNADA Hajime; and 56 Academic Members including the 3 Governors, ITO Go, KAMIYA Mataka, and TAKAHARA Akio.

### Activities

- (1) e-forum "Giron-Hyakushutsu (Hundred Views in Full Perspective)" operated on the website of GFJ
- (2) Monthly held meetings of "Foreign Policy Luncheon" and "Diplomatic Roundtable"
- (3) PR and Enlightenment through publication of "Bulletin," the website, mail magazine, etc.
- (4) "International Dialogues" convened 3 to 4 times a year on policy-oriented issues with counterparts invited from various parts of the world. Recent International Dialogues are as follows:

Years and Months		Themes	Counterparts
2018	Jul.	<b>Dialogue with the World</b> "Goeconomics and the 21st Century World and Japan"	The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)
	Mar.	<b>Strategic Dialogue with Central Asia</b> "Strategic Prospects of Regional Cooperation and Security in Central Asia"	The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)
	Feb.	<b>Japan-U.S. Dialogue</b> "China Risks and China Opportunities – Implications for the 'Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy' –"	Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) (U.S.)
	July	<b>The Dialogue with the World</b> "Eurasia 2025"	The French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs (IRIS) (France)
2017	Aug.	<b>Dialogue with the World</b> "GEOECONOMICS and The 21st Century World and Japan"	The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)
		<b>The JAPAN-RUSSIA DIALOGUE</b> "Possibility of Japan-Russia Cooperation in an Increasingly Complex Northeast Asianew"	The Far East Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences (FEB RAS)
	Aug.	<b>"Central Asia + Japan" Dialogue</b> "Prospects on the Current and Future Japan-Central Asia Relations"	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
	Jun.	<b>Japan-ASEAN Dialogue</b> "Changing Regional Order in the Asia Pacific and Japan-ASEAN Cooperation"	The S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) (Singapore), Nanyang Technological University / The University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Vietnam National University (VNU-USSH) (Vietnam)
2016	Mar.	<b>Japan-U.S. Dialogue</b> "The Japan-U.S. Alliance in the Era of the Trump Administration: Crossroads or Continuity?"	Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University (INSS) (U.S.)
	Feb.	<b>Japan-China Dialogue</b> "Prospect of Japan-China Cooperation in Aging Society"	Shanghai International Studies University / Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences / Fudan University (China)
	Nov.	<b>The Dialogue with the World</b> "The International Order in Europe and Asia-Pacific after the Ukraine Crisis and Japan's Course of Action"	The Institute of World Policy (IWP) (Ukraine) / The Atlantic Council's Brent Scowcroft Center (BSC) (U.S.)
	Sep.	<b>Japan-China-ROK Dialogue</b> "Japan-China-ROK Relations in the Global Perspective"	Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat (TCS)
2016	Jul.	<b>Japan-Asia Pacific Dialogue</b> "International Order in the 21st Century and the Security of Maritime Asia"	Meiji Institute for Global Affairs (MIGA) / Meiji Institute of International Policy Studies (MIIPS) / Western Sydney University (Australia)
	Mar.	<b>Japan-U.S. Dialogue</b> "Evolving Japan-U.S. Alliance in a Turbulent Time of Transition: Sustaining an Open, Rules-based Global Order"	Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) (U.S.)

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### (3) Meiji Institute of Global Affairs (MIGA)

明治大学国際関係研究所

Director: Go Ito (Professor, Meiji University)

Tel & Fax: 03-3296-4163

E-mail: meijimiips@gmail.com

- 1) The Meiji Institute of International Policy Studies (MIIPS) was established in January 2013 within Meiji University as a research unit engaging in international studies.
- 2) In collaboration with the Meiji Institute for Global Affairs (MIGA), the MIIPS held an international conference entitled "What are Big Power Relations?: Toward Peace, Prosperity, and Stability in the Asia-Pacific" with distinguished invitees such as Douglas Paal (Vice President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), Gerald Curtis (Professor, Columbia University), and Song Yanghui (Academia Sinica, Taiwan).
- 3) During 2013-2015, with funding from the US-Japan Foundation, the MIIPS conducted a joint study with the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (Honolulu, Hawaii) on the role of the US and Japan for maritime security in the East and the South China Seas.
- 4) In December 2014, the MIIPS invited Professor John Mearsheimer (Professor, University of Chicago) for his first visit to Japan. During his visit, he conducted lectures on offensive realism at the Cabinet Office, the Foreign Ministry, the Defense Forces, various universities and thinktanks, including "The Asia-Pacific in Power Transition: How Many Powers?" co-sponsored by the MIIPS and the Global Forum.
- 5) In July 2015, the MIIPS conducted an international conference entitled "Enhancing Cooperation for Peace and Stability in a Maritime Asia" with invitees from the United States, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Taiwan.
- 6) In April 2018, together with the closing of the above MIGA, the Director of the MIIPS decided to take over the name of the MIGA (with a slight modification from the Meiji Institute for Global Affairs (MIGA) to the Meiji Institute of Global Affairs (MIGA)) to advocate studies on international affairs at Meiji University. Organizationally speaking, the new MIGA is a research institute independent of the former MIGA.
- 7) The new MIGA has been conducting such studies as US security commitment to Asia with China's rise, the role of the self-defense forces in natural disasters, and possible agenda on the US-Japan cooperation for maritime peace and stability in the East and South China Seas. The new MIGA is now planning to publish a book on the future configurations of Indo-Pacific international relations.

### (4) Meiji Organization for International Collaboration

- 1) In 1989 the International Exchange Center was set up at Meiji University in order to support international activities such as academic exchanges, accepting overseas students and sending Meiji University students to universities in other countries.
- 2) The Organization for International Collaboration was set up in October 2009 with the aim of further promoting and hastening the spread of internationalization, and making a greater international contribution through increasingly high levels of education and research. It consists of three separate sections, and each of these bodies is linked to various institutions within the University, and through such collaborations they are expanding internationalization at the university.
- 3) Headquarters of International Collaboration decides on policies concerning the promotion of internationalization at Meiji University. It is involved in activities such as planning, promoting links with higher educational institutions in other countries, promoting the University as an international base and organizing international conferences, etc.
- 4) The International Student Exchange Center promotes international education by supporting international exchange of students from other countries and in turn, sending Meiji students on exchanges to foreign countries.
- 5) The Japanese Language Education Center promotes international educational exchange by carrying out Japanese language education and research for overseas students during their stay at Meiji University.

## **(5) Pathfinder Foundation**

The Pathfinder Foundation (PF) is a non-profit, non-partisan research & advocacy think-tank which has played a direct and catalytic role in promoting economic policy reforms in Sri Lanka. Registered in 2008 the Institution's focus is on promoting market oriented economic reforms and public private partnerships together with building foreign partnerships to promote people-to-people relations.

As of recently, thePF has established a consultancy arm. The objective is to provide high quality professional services in; Infrastructure Development, with a particularly focus on Diagnostic Studies & Project Management; Power& Energy and Road Development Sectors. The PF will draw on its extensive network of local & international resource persons for mobilizing its project teams.

### **Contact**

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## **(6) "Routledge Studies on Think Asia"**

This series addresses the current strategic complexities of Asia and forecasts how these current complexities will shape Asia's future, impacting the security dynamics of Indo-Pacific. Bringing together empirical and conceptual analysis, the series examines critical aspects of Asian politics, with a particular focus on the current security and strategic complexities. The series includes academic studies from universities, research institutes and think-tanks, primarily policy oriented studies. Focusing on security and strategic analysis on Asia's current and future trajectory, this series welcomes submissions on country specific studies, country specific relationship patterns (bilateral, trilateral and multilateral) in Indo-Pacific, regional and sub-regional institutions and mechanisms, corridors and connectivity, maritime security, infrastructure politics, trade and economic models and critical frontiers (boundaries, borders, bordering provinces) that are crucial to Asia's future.

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# Memo



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