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# THE THIRD JAPAN-BLACK SEA AREA DIALOGUE

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**“Prospects of Changing Black Sea Area and Role of Japan”**

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## Conference Papers

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January 26-27, 2010  
Lecture Hall of the International House of Japan  
Tokyo, Japan

Supported by  
The Tokyo Club  
The Japan Foundation

Co-sponsored by  
The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)  
Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)

Under the Auspices of  
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan  
Embassy of the Republic of Turkey in Japan  
Embassy of the Republic of Bulgaria in Japan  
Wider Europe Research Center (WERC), University of Shizuoka

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# 1. program

**第3回「日・黒海地域対話」**  
**The THIRD JAPAN-BLACK SEA AREA DIALOGUE**  
**「変化する黒海地域の展望と日本の役割」**  
**Prospects of Changing Black Sea Area and Role of Japan**

2010年1月26-27日 / January 26-27, 2010  
 International House of Japan / 国際文化会館  
 東京、日本 / Tokyo, Japan

助成 / Supported by  
 東京倶楽部 / The Tokyo Club  
 国際交流基金 / The Japan Foundation

共催 / Co-Sponsored by  
 グローバル・フォーラム / The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)  
 黒海経済協力機構 / Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)

後援 / Under the Auspices of  
 日本国外務省 / The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan  
 駐日トルコ大使館 / Embassy of the Republic of Turkey in Japan  
 駐日ブルガリア大使館 / Embassy of the Republic of Bulgaria in Japan  
 静岡県立大学広域ヨーロッパ研究センター / Wider Europe Research Center (WERC), University of Shizuoka

**2010年1月26日 (火) / Tuesday, 26 January, 2010**

**外務大臣政務官主催レセプション・特別招待者のみ / Welcome Reception hosted by Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan \*Invitation Only**

17:30-19:30

**西村智奈美 日本国外務大臣政務官主催開幕レセプション**

Welcome Reception hosted by NISHIMURA Chinami, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan

**2010年1月27日 (水) / Wednesday, 27 January, 2010**

**"Lecture Hall," International House of Japan / 国際文化会館「講堂」**

**オープニングセッション / Opening Session**

<b>9:30-10:00</b>	
開会挨拶 (5分間) Opening Remarks (5min.)	伊藤憲一 グローバル・フォーラム執行世話人 ITO Kenichi, President, The Global Forum of Japan
開会挨拶 (5分間) Opening Remarks (5min.)	レオニダス・フリサンソプロス BSEC事務総長 Leonidas CHRYSANTHOPOULOS, Secretary General, BSEC
開会挨拶 (5分間) Opening Remarks (5min.)	イヴァン・ペトコフ ブルガリアBSEC議長国代表特使 (BSEC議長国) Ivan PETKOV, Special Envoy, Representative of the Bulgarian BSEC Chairmanship-in-Office (on behalf of the Chairmanship of BSEC)
開会挨拶 (15分間) Opening Remarks (15min.)	谷崎泰明 外務省欧州局長 TANIZAKI Yasuaki, Director-General, European Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
<b>本会議 I / Session I</b>	
<b>10:00-11:50</b>	<b>「黒海地域における安全保障の戦略的意味」</b> <b>"Strategic Implications of Security in the Black Sea Area"</b>
共同議長 (5分間) Co-Chairpersons (5min.)	大河原良雄 グローバル・フォーラム代表世話人 OKAWARA Yoshio, Chairman, The Global Forum of Japan レオニダス・フリサンソプロス BSEC事務総長 Leonidas CHRYSANTHOPOULOS, Secretary General, BSEC
基調報告 (15分間) Keynote Speaker (15min.)	ミシャト・レンデ トルコ外務省経済局長 (トルコ) Mithat RENDE, Director General, Economic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey (Turkey)
基調報告 (15分間) Keynote Speaker (15min.)	六鹿茂夫 静岡県立大学教授 MUTSUSHIKA Shigeo, Professor, University of Shizuoka
コメントA (5分間) Lead Discussant A (5min.)	アウレリアン ネアグ 駐日ルーマニア大使 (ルーマニア) Aurelian NEAGU, Ambassador of Romania to Japan (Romania)
コメントB (5分間) Lead Discussant B (5min.)	内藤泰朗 産経エクスプレス副編集長 (前産経新聞社モスクワ支局長) NAITO Yasuo, Deputy Director, "Sankei Express" (former Moscow Bureau Chief, The Sankei Shimbun)
コメントC (5分間) Lead Discussant C (5min.)	ステファン・フーバー 駐日欧州連合代表部副代表 (欧州委員会) Stefan HUBER, Deputy Head of Delegation, European Commission
コメントD (5分間) Lead Discussant D (5min.)	齋藤元秀 杏林大学教授 SAITO Motohide, Professor, Kyorin University
自由討議 (45分間) Free Discussions (45min.)	出席者全員 All Participants
議長総括 (10分間) Summarization by Co-Chairpersons (10min.)	大河原良雄 グローバル・フォーラム代表世話人 OKAWARA Yoshio, Chairman, The Global Forum of Japan レオニダス・フリサンソプロス BSEC事務総長 Leonidas CHRYSANTHOPOULOS, Secretary General, BSEC

昼食 / Lunch	
11:50-13:00	Lunch Break / 昼食休憩 (会議場外で各自でお取り下さい)
本会議Ⅱ / Session II	
13:00-14:55	「黒海地域の経済発展とエネルギー・環境協力に向けた課題」 "Challenges for Economic Development and Energy and Environmental Cooperation in the Black Sea Area"
共同議長(5分間) Co-Chairpersons (5min.)	東郷和彦 京都産業大学教授 TOGO Kazuhiko, Professor, Kyoto Sangyo University  アルタイ・エフェンディエフ アゼルバイジャン外務省経済協力開発局長 (アゼルバイジャン) Altai EFENDIEV, Head of Economic Cooperation and Development Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan (Azerbaijan)
基調報告(15分間) Keynote Speaker (15min.)	ミコラ・クリニチ 駐日ウクライナ大使 (ウクライナ) Mykola KULINICH, Ambassador of Ukraine to Japan (Ukraine)
基調報告(15分間) Keynote Speaker (15min.)	本村真澄 石油天然ガス・金属鉱物資源機構調査グループ首席研究員 MOTOMURA Masumi, Chief Researcher, Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation
コメントA(5分間) Lead Discussant A (5min.)	廣野 良吉 成蹊大学名誉教授 HIRONO Ryokichi, Professor Emeritus, Seikei University
コメントB(5分間) Lead Discussant B (5min.)	イバン・ムルキッチ 駐日セルビア大使 (セルビア) Ivan MRKIC, Ambassador of the Republic of Serbia to Japan (Serbia)
コメントC(5分間) Lead Discussant C (5min.)	石郷岡建 日本大学総合科学研究所教授 ISHIGOOKA Ken, Professor, Nihon University
コメントD(5分間) Lead Discussant D (5min.)	レバズ・ベシジゼ 駐日グルジア大使 (グルジア) Revaz BESHIDZE, Ambassador of Georgia to Japan (Georgia)
自由討議(45分間) Free Discussions (45min.)	出席者全員 All Participants
議長総括(10分間) Summarization by Co-chairpersons (10min.)	東郷和彦 京都産業大学教授 TOGO Kazuhiko, Professor, Kyoto Sangyo University  アルタイ・エフェンディエフ アゼルバイジャン外務省経済協力開発局長 (アゼルバイジャン) Altai EFENDIEV, Head of Economic Cooperation and Development Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan (Azerbaijan)
14:55-15:05	休憩/Break
本会議Ⅲ / Session III	
15:05-17:00	「日・黒海地域協力の今後の展望」 "Future Perspective of Japan-Black Sea Area Cooperation"
共同議長(5分間) Co-Chairpersons (5min.)	村上正泰 グローバル・フォーラム常任世話人代行 MURAKAMI Masayasu, Acting Executive Governor, The Global Forum of Japan  ニコラオス・ツァマドス 駐日ギリシャ大使 (ギリシャ) Nikolaos TSAMADOS, Ambassador of Greece to Japan (Greece)
基調報告(15分間) Keynote Speaker (15min.)	蓮見雄 立正大学教授 HASUMI Yu, Professor, Risho University
基調報告(15分間) Keynote Speaker (15min.)	イヴァン・ペトコフ ブルガリアBSEC議長国代表特使 (ブルガリア) Ivan PETKOV, Special Envoy, Representative of the Bulgarian BSEC Chairmanship-in-Office (Bulgaria)
コメントA(5分間) Lead Discussant A (5min.)	ユアン・ミルチャ・パシュク 欧州議会議員・同外交副委員長 Ioan Mircea PASCU, Member of the European Parliament (EP), Vice-Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee of EP
コメントB(5分間) Lead Discussant B (5min.)	海部篤 外務省欧州局中・東欧課長 KAIJU Atsushi, Director, Central and South Eastern Europe Division, European Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
コメントC(5分間) Lead Discussant C (5min.)	セルゲイ・ゴンチャレンコ ロシア連邦外務省経済協力局次長 (ロシア) Sergei GONCHARENKO, Deputy Director, Department of Economic Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Russia)
コメントD(5分間) Lead Discussant D (5min.)	廣瀬陽子 静岡県立大学准教授 HIROSE Yoko, Associate Professor, University of Shizuoka
コメントE(5分間) Lead Discussant E (5min.)	ブヤール・ディダ 駐日アルバニア共和国大使 (アルバニア) Bujar DIDA, Ambassador of the Republic of Albania to Japan (Albania)
自由討議(45分間) Free Discussions (45min.)	出席者全員 All Participants
議長総括(10分間) Summarization by Co-chairpersons (10min.)	村上正泰 グローバル・フォーラム常任世話人代行 MURAKAMI Masayasu, Acting Executive Governor, The Global Forum of Japan  ニコラオス・ツァマドス 駐日ギリシャ大使 (ギリシャ) Nikolaos TSAMADOS, Ambassador of Greece to Japan (Greece)
閉幕夕食会 * 特別招待者のみ / Farewell Dinner * Invitation Only	
18:00-20:00	セリム・セルメット・アタジャンル駐日トルコ大使主催閉幕夕食会 Farewell Dinner hosted by Selim Sermet ATACANLI, Ambassador of the Republic of Turkey to Japan

## 2. Biographies of the Panelists

### **【Black Sea Area Panelists】**

#### **Leonidas CHRYSANTHOPOULOS**

*Secretary General, BSEC*

Graduated from the Law School of the University of Athens. Joined the Greek Foreign Ministry in 1972. Served as Director of the Diplomatic Cabinet of the Minister in charge of EEC Affairs, Deputy Permanent Representative of Greece to the United Nations, Minister Counsellor in Beijing, Ambassador of Greece in Yerevan, in Warsaw and in Ottawa, Director General for EU Affairs, and Director General for Bilateral Economic Relations and Multilateral Economic Cooperation before assuming the current post in 2006.

#### **Ivan PETKOV**

*Special Envoy, Representative of the Bulgarian BSEC*

*Chairmanship-in-Office (Bulgaria)*

Graduated from the Moscow State University of International Relations. Entered the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry in 1979. Served as Ambassador of Bulgaria in Iran (1992), Pakistan (1995), Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2001, Responsible for the Bulgarian Chairmanship-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in 2004, Permanent Representative of Bulgaria to the Council of Europe in 2005, Ambassador at large on the Black Sea before assuming the current post in 2009.

#### **Mithat RENDE**

*Director General, Economic Affairs,*

*Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey (Turkey)*

Graduated from Faculty of Political Sciences in Ankara University. Completed the Post Graduate Program of the Royal College of Defence Studies London on Security and International Relations in 2000. Served as Counsellor at the Turkish Embassy in London and Deputy Permanent Representative of Turkey to the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) from 1996-2000. Ambassador of Turkey to the State of Qatar before assuming the current post.

#### **Aurelian NEAGU**

*Ambassador of Romania to Japan (Romania)*

Graduated Academy for Economic Studies in Bucharest in 1983. Entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Served various positions including Economist of National Tourism Office Carpati, Counsellor of the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania, Counsellor at the Embassy of Romania in Seoul and Asia, Africa and Middle East Division. Ambassador of Romania to Singapore.

**Stefan HUBER**

*Deputy Head of Delegation, European Commission*

Received M.A. in Law and Political Science from the University of Innsbruck, Austria. Entered Austrian Federal Economic Chamber in 1990. Served as Deputy Head of the Austrian Trade Commission. Entered European Commission Headquarters, Brussels in 1997. Served as Principal Administrator in Directorate General External Relations (Trade). Nominated as Head of Unit "Social Dialogue" in Directorate General Personnel and Administration in 2002, and Head of Unit "Rights and obligations" in Directorate General External Relations in 2003.

**Altay EFENDIEV**

*Head of Economic Cooperation and Development Department*

*Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan (Azerbaijan)*

Received MBA from City University Business School, London. Joined the Azerbaijan Foreign Ministry in 1992. Served as Economic Counsellor at the Embassy of Azerbaijan in United Kingdom, Head of Economic Cooperation and Development Department in 2000, Economic Adviser to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2000, Deputy Secretary General of the Permanent International Secretariat of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation in 2004.

**Mykola KULINICH**

*Ambassador of Ukraine to Japan (Ukraine)*

Received Ph.D. in History of International Relations from Kyiv State University in 1982. Served as Associate Professor at Kyiv University, First Deputy Director at Institute of International Relations of Kyiv State University, Minister Counsellor at Embassy of Ukraine in Tokyo, Deputy Director of 5th Territorial Directorate (Asia-Pacific, Middle East and Africa) at Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Minister Counsellor at Embassy of Ukraine in Seoul, and Rector at Diplomatic Academy of Ukraine.

**Ivan MRKIC**

*Ambassador of the Republic of Serbia to Japan (Serbia)*

Graduated from the Law Faculty of the University of Belgrade. Employed in the Federal Secretariat of Foreign Affairs in 1978. Served as Minister Counsellor with the Mission of Yugoslavia to the European Community in Brussels, Chief of the Cabinet of the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Ambassador to Cyprus, Assistant to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Chief of Bilateral Relations, President of the National Commission of Serbia and Montenegro for the Implementation of the Chemical weapons Convention.

**Revaz BESHIDZE**

*Ambassador of Georgia to Japan (Georgia)*

Received Ph.D. in Geography from Tbilisi State University in 1990. Entered the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1996. Held various positions, including Head of Military Cooperation Division Department for Politico-Military Affairs, Director of the Department for Politico-Military Affairs, Director of the Department for Security Policy and Euro-Atlantic Integration, Head of Mission of Georgia to NATO before assuming the current post in 2009.

**Nikolaos TSAMADOS**

*Ambassador of Greece to Japan (Greece)*

Received Ph.D. from the Freie Universität Berlin. Entered the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1982. Held various positions, including Deputy and acting General Director for Development Cooperation, Deputy Permanent Representative at the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, France, and Director of A5 Directorate for Russia and other C.I.S. countries, before assuming the current post in 2009.

**Ioan Mircea PASCU**

*Member of the European Parliament (EP),*

*Vice-Chair of Foreign Affairs Committee of EP*

Received Ph.D. in Political Science from the Institute of Political Sciences, Bucharest in 1980. Served as various posts including Presidential Counselor (1990-92), Visiting Senior Research Fellow at the Japan Forum on International Relations (1992-1993), State Secretary in Defense Ministry (1993-96), Chairman of the Defense Committee in The Chamber of Deputies (1996-2000), Minister of National Defense of Romania (2000-2004), Member, Vice-Chair of the Foreign Affairs Ctee since 2007.

**Sergei GONCHARENKO**

*Deputy Director, Department of Economic Cooperation,*

*Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Russia)*

Entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and served various positions. Also, served as Chairman of the Committee of Senior Officials of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation in 2001 and in 2006, Chairman of the Working Group on Economic Cooperation at the Barents/Euro-Arctic Council in 2000-2001 and in 2006-2009, and Chairman of the Working Group on Economic Cooperation at the Council of the Baltic Sea States in 2001-2002.

**Bujar DIDA**

*Ambassador of the Republic of Albania to Japan (Albania)*

Received Ph.D. in Philosophy from University of Tirana in 1994. Appointed Honorary Consul General of Japan in Albania (Term I in 2000, Term II in 2006). Head of Department of Teaching and Career, University "Marin Barleti", Tirana, Albania in 2006. Professor of General and Inorganic Chemistry, Polytechnic University of Tirana, Albania.

(In order of appearance)

**【Japanese Panelists】**

**ITO Kenichi**

*President, Global Forum of Japan (GFI)*

Graduated from Hitotsubashi University. Entered Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1960. Studied at Harvard University (1961-1963). Served as various positions including Director of First Southeast Asian Division until 1977. Served as Professor at Aoyama Gakuin University (1984-2006). Concurrently serves as President of The Japan Forum on International Relations, President of The Council on East Asian Community, and Professor Emeritus of Aoyama Gakuin University.

**TANIZAKI Yasuaki**

*Director-General, European Affairs Bureau,  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*

Graduated from the University of Tokyo. Entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1975. Held various positions, including First Secretary at the Embassy of Japan in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Director of First West Europe Division of European and Oceanian Affairs Bureau, Minister at the Embassy of Japan in Germany, Deputy Director-General of European Affairs Bureau, and Director-General of Consular Affairs Bureau.

**OKAWARA Yoshio**

*Chairman, GFI,*

Graduated from the University of Tokyo. Entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1942. Served various positions including Director-General of the American Affairs Bureau, Deputy Vice Minister for Administration, Japanese Ambassador to Australia and Japanese Ambassador to the United States (1980-1985). Concurrently serving as Special Adviser of Institute for International Policy Studies and President of America-Japan Society, Inc.

**MUTSUSHIKA Shigeo**

*Professor, University of Shizuoka*

Graduated from Sophia University in 1976. Received M.A. in International Relations from Sophia University in 1978 and Ph.D. in Law from University of Bucharest in 1985. Served as Professor at Saitama Women's Junior College, Visiting Fellow at the European Institute of the London School of Economics and Political Science, and Dean of the Faculty of International Relations and a Presidential Aid at University of Shizuoka.

**NAITO Yasuo**

*Deputy Director, "Sankei Express"*

*(former Moscow Bureau Chief, The Sankei Shimbun)*

Graduated from Aoyama Gakuin University. Entered The Sankei Shimbun in 1989. Se Phnom Penh Bureau Chief in 1993, and Moscow Bureau Chief from 2003-2008. Won the Prize of "Golden Word" in 2005 by Russia's non-governmental media organization "Media Soyuz" for series of historical articles "One hundred years after the Russo-Japan War". Also served as a Fullbright Visiting Scholar at the Institute of Russian and Eurasian Studies (IRES), and George Washington University (GWU) from 2001-2002.

**SAITO Motohide**

*Professor, Kyorin University*

Completed the doctoral course at Keio University in 1977. Received Ph.D. in International Relations from Columbia University in 1986. Visiting Professor of the Slavic Research Center at Hokkaido University from 2004-2006.

**TOGO Kazuhiko**

*Professor, Kyoto Sangyo University*

Graduated from the University of Tokyo. Entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1968. Held various positions on the Soviet Union / Russian Federation until 2002. Ambassador to the Netherlands from 2001-2002. After retirement from MOFA, taught at the Universities of Leiden, Princeton, Seoul National and others. Received Ph.D. from Leiden University in 2009.

**MURAKAMI Masayasu**

*Acting Executive Governor, GFI*

Graduated from the University of Tokyo. Entered the Ministry of Finance in 1997. Studied at University of California, San Diego. Served as Vice Consul of the Japanese Consulate-General in New York, Deputy Director for Research Division of International Bureau at Ministry of Finance, Deputy Director for Cabinet Secretariat. Concurrently serving as Acting Executive Director of JFIR and Acting Vice President of CEAC.

**MOTOMURA Masumi**

*Chief Researcher, Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation*

Received M.A. from the University of Tokyo. Entered Japan National Oil Corporation (JNOC) in 1977. Served as Director of Russia and Caspian Division in First Planning Department and the Chief Researcher of Research and Planning Department at JNOC. Also served as Visiting Researcher at the Oxford Institute of Energy Studies in 2001 and Visiting Professor of the Slavic Research Center at Hokkaido University in 2005.

**HIRONO Ryokichi**

*Professor Emeritus, Seikei University*

Graduated from Morehouse College in 1954, and received M.A. in Economics from Chicago University in 1958. Served as Visiting Professor at National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies and Professor at Teikyo University. Concurrently serving as Director of the Japan Committee for UNICEF and Senior Program Advisor of United Nations University.

**ISHIGOOKA Ken**

*Professor, Nihon University*

Graduated from Moscow State University (Faculty of Physics, Astronomy) in 1974. Entered Mainichi Shimbun in 1974. Served as Correspondent in Cairo, Harare, Wien, Moscow and from 2002-2006 as Editorial Writer of Mainichi Shimbun. Also served at Nihon University (Faculty of International Relations) from 2003, Concurrently serving as Professor of Advanced Research Center of Nihon University.

**HASUMI Yu**

*Professor, Rissho University*

Received M.A. in Area Studies from Tokyo University of Foreign Studies in 1988. Served as Economist at Institute for Russian & NIS Economic Studies, Japan Association for Trade with Russia & NIS, Associate Researcher at Keio Jean Monnet Centre for EU Studies, Vice-chief Editor at Monthly Journal 'Russian-Eurasian Economy', Director at the European Union Studies Association-Japan, Chief of Secretariat at Institute of Eurasian Studies.

**KAIFU Atsushi**

*Director, Central and South Eastern Europe Division,  
European Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*

Graduated from Hitotsubashi University. Entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1988. Held various positions, including First Secretary at the Embassy of Japan in the Federal Republic of Germany, Principal Deputy Director at the Overseas Establishments Division, Senior Foreign Policy Coordinator at the Policy Coordination Division of Foreign Policy Bureau.

**HIROSE Yoko**

*Associate Professor, University of Shizuoka*

Received M.A. in Law from the University of Tokyo in 1997, and Ph.D. in Media and Governance from Keio University in 2006. Served as Assistant Professor at Keio University, Special Researcher at Nagoya University, Associate Professor at Tokyo University of Foreign Studies. Concurrently serving as Special Researcher at Slavic Research Center of Hokkaido University.

(In order of appearance)

### 3. Keynote Papers

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#### *Session I: "Strategic Implications of Security in the Black Sea Area"*

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**Mithat RENDE**  
**Director General, Economic Affairs,**  
**Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey**

#### Introduction

I would like to start by expressing my most sincere thanks and appreciation to the Global Forum of Japan for organizing the "Third Japan-Black Sea Area Dialogue" and through them to all the sponsors and supporters of this important initiative. It is a great pleasure for me to be here, in the gorgeous city of Tokyo and address this distinguished audience.

Turkey and Japan, which are situated on the western and eastern banks of the Historical Silk Route, share strong bonds of friendship deep-rooted in history. For Turkey, Japan represents a successful combination of a great civilization and tradition with remarkable economic and technological achievements. This creates a solid ground for further developing and diversifying our relations based on mutual understanding and cooperation, in every field.

The recent visit of the Honourable Foreign Minister of Japan, Mr. Katsuya Okada to Ankara for the launch of the "2010 Year of Japan in Turkey" and his address at the Second Turkish Ambassadors' Conference, on 4 January 2010, are the most recent examples of these friendly relations. It was a great privilege for me as one of the Turkish Ambassadors to hear His Excellency Okada and receive first hand information about the Japanese Foreign Policy agenda. I fully agree with the "joint declaration" made by our Foreign Ministers stating that "the cooperation between the two countries is strong enough to have a positive impact on the future of the globe". In fact Turkey and Japan are, both, members of the G-20 and non-permanent members of the UN Security Council and thus share important responsibilities for the promotion of peace and prosperity in the world as a whole.

Given these excellent relations, we attach importance to furthering our cooperation with Japan, in every field, including in the Black Sea context, which is the main subject of our discussions today.

"Strategic Implications of Security in the Black Sea Area", being the title of this session, let me start by a brief introduction on the Black Sea Area and later

focus on various aspects of security in the region.

### Black Sea Area - General

The Black Sea is a semi-closed sea with an area of 432.000 square kilometers and 4340 kilometers long coastline. It is an important and strategic Sea having a unique position with two narrow outlets to the open seas through an inner sea; The Turkish Straits, namely the Strait of Istanbul, the Strait of Çanakkale and the Sea of Marmara. Turkey lies at the immediate southern part of the Black Sea having the longest shoreline with 2640 kilometers and exercising jurisdiction over the Turkish Straits via a sui generis regime in accordance with Montreux Convention of 1936 which Japan is also a signatory.

For almost 70 years, this Convention has been functioning effectively. It stipulates the passage through the Turkish Straits and regulates tonnage, presence and duration of stay of war ships in the Black Sea.

In fact, the Black Sea, itself, has not been a sea of conflict during the entire period of the precarious Cold War years, mainly due to the balance carefully established by the Montreux Convention. I would like to recall that the then littoral states were the Soviet Union, Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria, namely one NATO member versus three Warsaw Pact members, one of which was the other super power.

With the end of the Cold War, the Black Sea area started experiencing a major transition. Since then, the geo-strategic portrait of the region has changed. The region has witnessed the expansion of both NATO and the European Union. Today, the integration of the Black Sea countries into the Euro-Atlantic institutions is still underway.

The Black Sea region has always been a priority for Turkish foreign policy. Turkey has been the initiator of many of the existing regional cooperation mechanisms. The Main pillars of Turkey's policy towards the region have been inclusiveness and transparency. In other words, any action in the region must rely on mutual respect, with a special emphasis on the regional countries' priorities and needs, and should not exclude anyone. These principles are deemed crucial as they are the very principles that would ensure the prevention of creating new dividing lines in the Black Sea region. Social and economic development as well as effective foundation and maintenance of democratic systems of government and society are also important elements for peace and stability in the region.

### Security Implications in the Black Sea:

There have been a number of studies that have attempted to define the concept of security. However, as many authors have indicated, security is multi-dimensional in nature and diverse in practice. This diversity leads to

difficulty in providing a single all encompassing definition of security.

Cognizant of this fact, our approach to security is also multi-dimensional and not limited to hard security concerns alone. Climate change, for instance, is a global problem also evolving into a security issue in its own right, with serious implications in many fields. Epidemic diseases are no longer tragedies that only threaten the less fortunate areas in the world. The current financial crisis speaks for itself when we look at how badly it affected economies worldwide. Illegal migration, organized crime, energy security, democratization also stick out as crucial topics that are bound to dominate the regional as well as global agenda.

However, maritime security in the Black Sea requires a clear distinction. The Black Sea maritime area is surrounded by 6 littoral states, namely, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Russia, Ukraine and Georgia.

The Black Sea region, on the other hand, forms an integral part of the wider area comprising the Balkans, the Caucasus including the Caspian Sea and beyond, as well as the Eastern Mediterranean reaching into the Middle East. The region is at the converging point of the three major continents and it embodies strategic trade, transport and energy routes of Eurasia. Taking into consideration also is economic and human potential as well as the vast natural resources, the Black Sea Area, undoubtedly, is very important in terms of global security.

The challenges faced in the maritime area on one hand and the wider Black Sea area on the other, are different in nature and scale. The maritime area is relatively immune from immediate risks, and the littoral states have been able to develop efficient means to deter those that may arise in the future. The wider region, instead, involves a number of hot and frozen conflicts such as Nagorno Karabagh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Trans-Dniestria, energy security issues, and other broader challenges which I mentioned earlier.

The two dimensions of the Black Sea, therefore, do not involve the same actors either. While the maritime area is, first and foremost, dealt with by the six littorals, the wider Black Sea Area issues may involve some non-regional actors, in addition to countries surrounding the Black Sea without necessarily having a coastline.

#### Turkey's Black Sea security policy:

The underlying philosophy of Turkey's Black Sea security policy is in harmony with the policies and attempts to reach out its neighbours bordering Turkey: We are seeking to build a neighbourhood that enjoys lasting peace, stability and economic prosperity.

We have adopted a bold and active strategy to free our relations with our neighbors from all problems. I can shortly refer it to as "zero problems with our neighbors". In this context, let me briefly comment on our relations with our neighbors as well as other regional issues.

We are working to maintain the positive environment that surrounds our relations with Greece for over a decade. We continue our constructive efforts to this end. I am happy to say that the problems we once had with Bulgaria are now history. Today Bulgaria is a NATO ally. Likewise, we enjoy very good relations with other Black Sea littoral states like Romania and Ukraine. Russia has also evolved into being Turkey's biggest foreign trade partner. We fully cooperate with Russia in many fields ranging from construction to energy issues.

The existence of frozen conflicts in the region that I alluded to earlier is a major source of concern for Turkey. They should be carefully managed if not resolved. A case in point is the clashes that have occurred in the summer of 2008 in the Caucasus, situated in Russia's south and Turkey's east. They have clearly demonstrated that the frozen conflicts of the region could easily lead to war. Mistrust played a pivotal role in the sparking of this conflict. It also showed, yet again, the need for a dialogue platform that would assist in overcoming mistrust and bring all related parties together.

Turkey took the lead initiative in this issue as well, paving the way for the creation of the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform. Countries in the region support this initiative and hopefully it will create new and constructive dynamics that will assist in the comprehensive settlement of all Caucasian disputes. We have close cultural and historical ties with Azerbaijan, which is one of the key countries in its region. Similarly, the level of our relations with Georgia is very satisfactory. The world public opinion is closely following the recent bold steps we took towards the normalization of our relations with Armenia. We have agreed on a series of issues with this country towards normalizing and improving our relations on the basis of mutual respect. We are working hard to settling the Nagorno Karabakh issue, one of the most outstanding Caucasian problems.

Building on the security environment created by the Montreux Convention, we are also aware that while putting into motion the objective of achieving lasting peace, stability and economic prosperity at the regional level we need to act with our partners in the Black Sea Area. We also recognize that achieving such an objective may be a long and arduous journey.

In the maritime security domain we launched this journey some 10 years ago. Through Turkey's initiative and with the participation of all littoral states the BLACKSEAFOR came into being. The BLACKSEAFOR has been designed as a mechanism to help building confidence among littoral states through activities jointly carried out on areas such as humanitarian aid, search and rescue, environmental protection and port visits.

In addition to that, in 2004, the Turkish Navy initiated the Operation Black Sea Harmony (OBSH) which was designed on the one hand to synchronize the Black Sea's security environment with the global efforts against asymmetric risks and threats, and on the other hand, to harmonize the activities conducted in this spirit by different littoral states. OBSH is also closely affiliated with NATO and

complements Operation Active Endeavour conducted in the Mediterranean. The findings of OBSH are shared with NATO through CC Mar Naples on a daily basis. NATO Military authorities have recognized the efficiency of this mechanism.

#### The Establishment of BSEC:

In the Black Sea context there has been a separation between soft and hard security domains although they are related, inter-linked and mutually supportive. This separation was made for practical reasons, in order not to block cooperation among regional countries with major political problems.

After the end of the Cold War, as a confidence building soft security measure, Turkey took the lead to launch an economic cooperation initiative to help transform the centrally planned economies of the Soviet era and integrate them into the world economy, so that the potential of the region could be maximized. Hence, the establishment of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) in 1992. The main idea of this initiative was that stronger economic cooperation and interdependence among the Black Sea countries will enhance peace and stability in the region.

BSEC was created specifically to encourage active contribution of all the countries in the Black Sea Area to the welfare and stability of the region. Today, after almost two decades, BSEC has reached an institutional maturity, and is now the most established and comprehensive cooperation organization in the Black Sea Area with a well-established legal and procedural framework. It is an important contributor to peace and stability in the region bringing together all countries of the wider Black Sea region in a spirit of confidence and constructive cooperation. It is particularly interesting to note that some of the members of BSEC, which have had conflicting relations with each other in other fora, have demonstrated a fairly sustainable working relationship within the framework of BSEC.

Despite the difficult times that the region has been going through recently, such as in the case of the Russian-Georgian conflict of 2008, BSEC meetings has continued to take place in a friendly and constructive atmosphere. This has been a clear indication of the commitment of all the member states to BSEC and to its goals of turning the BSEC Region into a region of peace, stability and prosperity through economic cooperation.

The cooperation within BSEC has not reached its true potential yet, particularly because of the fact that its members have had diverging priorities. However, the interests of the BSEC Member States have begun to converge in recent years and they are now able to develop common strategies and approaches on various areas, such as energy, transport and protection of the environment.

Energy supply security has become one of the most important issues which dominates the international agenda. In this respect, the wider Black Sea region, where energy producer countries co-exist with energy consumer and transit

countries, presents us a unique case in terms of global energy supply security. This unique position of the Black Sea brings with it important duties and responsibilities to the countries of the region.

BSEC members possess the world's largest oil and gas reserves after the Middle East. Russia is the world's largest oil producer after Saudi Arabia. Azerbaijan is another major oil and gas producing country. BSEC neighbors Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, large producers of oil and gas, depend on BSEC members to export their production to world markets. Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Turkey, Ukraine and recently Greece are serving as energy corridors to Western Europe. Further projects for alternative oil pipelines are in the advanced planning stage to relieve the Turkish Straits from the heavy tanker traffic which poses a grave threat to human life and the marine environment.

The ongoing exploration activities, scientific research and newly discovered fields have demonstrated that the region has a vast potential in hydrocarbon resources both in terms of oil and natural gas. There are a number of promising areas for future exploration and production. This has been an encouraging development for companies to make new investments in the region.

In strategic terms, the region's proximity to oil and gas resources and to all other pipeline projects that by-pass the Turkish Straits makes the Black Sea region even more crucial for consumer countries as well as international stakeholders such as oil and gas companies.

In this regard, projects such as Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum and Blue Stream, which have already become operational, will definitely enhance regional and global energy supply security by providing source and route diversification. Likewise, Nabucco and South Stream projects will not only have a positive impact on the energy security of the Black Sea region, but will also greatly contribute to the increasing natural gas needs of the European markets.

Let me underline at this point that, in many of these projects we have enjoyed the vital contributions of the Japanese companies, which we hope will continue also in the future. In fact, we also wholeheartedly support, the application of Japan for observer status to BSEC, which is viewed by the international community as an anchor of cooperation in the region.

#### BSEC-European Union Interaction:

The EU Commission has been granted observer status within BSEC, during Turkey's Chairmanship-in-office, in 2007. This has allowed the EU Commission to follow the activities of the BSEC and the opportunities and potential it offers for a mutually beneficial and fruitful cooperation between the two organizations.

BSEC and the EU have every reason to engage in closer dialogue and cooperation. After Greece, with Bulgaria and Romania also joined the EU in 2007, there are now three BSEC Member States, which are at the same time members of

the EU. In other words, the European Union has become a littoral of the Black Sea. Among the countries in the region, Turkey is an accession country while Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Moldova are partners of the European Neighborhood Policy within the framework of Eastern Partnership. The Russian Federation is also a strategic partner of the EU.

Conclusion:

Peace and stability are as much important for each country as they are for regions. Therefore, from maritime security mechanisms to the establishment of BSEC, in all these initiatives, Turkey is making every effort to enhancing confidence and strengthening peace and prosperity in the region and on a wider scale.

In today's world, engagement has proven to be the most effective mechanism in uniting nations around universal values and interests. Having said so, enhanced cooperation in the Black Sea region with the involvement of the EU, Japan and other interested stakeholders who uphold universal values, such as democracy, peaceful engagement and rule of law will generate not only economic benefits, but also contribute to the building of confidence and stability in the region.

Thank you for your attention.

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**Transformation of Relations among the Big Powers over the Black Sea Region after the Georgian War**

1. Increased tension between Russia and the West over the Black Sea Region

The balance of power among the big powers—the EU, NATO, and the US on the one hand, and Russia on the other—in the Black Sea region has been transformed every two or three years in the recent past. During 2003 and 2004, it was inclined favorably toward the Western powers as a result of the EU/NATO enlargements in the spring of 2004, as well as the Rose and Orange Revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine in 2003 and 2004 respectively. The EU/NATO enlargement to the Central and East European states caused increased debate within the Western New Independent States (WNIS) and the southern Caucasus over both the choice between domestic reform or status-quo of their regimes and the choice between

accession to the EU/NATO or strengthening relations with Russia. Domestic confrontations over these choices, together with unfair parliamentary or presidential elections in Georgia and Ukraine, brought about the Rose and Orange revolutions in the two states. These revolutions, and new political tendencies in Moldova after the Kozak Memorandum (November 2003), caused a revitalization of the GUAM at the Chisinau Summit in 2005 and at the Kiev Summit in 2006. As a result, the movement towards Brussels in the northern and eastern parts of the Black Sea region increased.

However, the pendulum began to swing back in 2005. The US had enjoyed unilateralism after the end of the Cold War, but it began devoting more and more of its energy to the Iraq issue. The EU failed to adopt a new Constitution, and its internal integration began to decline. NATO also had serious difficulties with ISAF activities in Afghanistan. In this situation, after reviewing its foreign policy, Russia adopted a newly assertive one, and regained its power and influence over its 'Near Abroad'. Russia implemented economic sanctions against Georgia and Moldova in 2005, and attempted to raise the price of oil and gas to the international standard in 2006. In addition, President Putin severely criticized the West in a speech in Munich in February 2007, and declared in July 2007 that Russia would suspend the CFE treaty that December. President Putin's confident speech at Munich in February 2007 showed clearly that Russia had completely recovered its power in the region, and that it had also become a powerful, self-confident power in international politics.

But this new-found Russian confidence caused relations between Russia and Ukraine/Georgia, and between Russia and the West to deteriorate.<sup>1</sup> The EU under the German Presidency during the first half of 2007 advocated the necessity of strengthening the ENP into the ENP Plus and the creation of the EU's Central Asia strategy, as well as the continuation of stable relations with Russia. The EU also held the launch meeting of the Black Sea Synergy in February 2008, through which it started to support regional cooperation in the Black Sea region, as well as to promote relations between the EU and the region. NATO also strengthened its eastern policy through the adoption of the Intensified Dialogue with Ukraine in May 2005 and Georgia in September 2006. US President George Bush praised the color revolutions in Riga and Tbilisi in 2005, while Vice-President Dick Cheney made a critical speech on the insufficiencies of Russian democratic and human rights policies in Vilnius in May 2006. Thus relations between the US and Russia were set back greatly from the warm and trusting relations between the two presidents at the Ljubljana summit in 2001.

Just at the time when relations between the West and Russia became tense over the Black Sea region, Japan proclaimed its "Arc of Freedom and Prosperity" on 30 November 2006. This new direction in Japan's foreign policy, to extend its diplomatic horizon through Eurasia to Europe from Asia-Pacific region and to contribute to the stability and peace of Eurasia including the Black Sea region,

seemed to be welcomed and highly appreciated by the Black sea states as well as the US, the EU, NATO, and the European states.

## 2. The War in Georgia and Its Impact on Georgia and Russia

In this way, relations between Russia and Ukraine/Georgia, and between Russia and the West, became tense during 2005 and 2006. The independence of Kosovo and the declaration of NATO at the Bucharest summit in April 2008 caused relations to further deteriorate. The Georgia-Russia confrontation escalated from economic sanctions to politico-military dimensions. After the US and the European states had recognized the independence of Kosovo in February 2008, Russia's Duma declared on the 21st of March that the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia should be recognized as well.<sup>ii</sup> And during March and May of 2008, Georgian unmanned aerial vehicles were flown over the conflict zone.<sup>iii</sup> In addition, immediately after the NATO Bucharest Summit in April 2008 approved that Ukraine and Georgia would become members of NATO, President Putin issued a presidential order on the 16th of April that relations with South Ossetia and Abkhazia would become official.<sup>iv</sup> This indicated that Russia had abandoned its official policy of supporting Georgia's territorial integrity. After that, Russia increased its military forces in Abkhazia, and repaired the railway connecting Russia with Abkhazia.<sup>v</sup> On the other hand, it was rumored that Georgian hawkish elements were planning to occupy southern part of Abkhazia with military forces.<sup>vi</sup> Thus a situation was created in which Russia and Georgia might start a war with each other at any time. And one did start in August 2008.

The impact of the war was quite different on Georgia and on Russia. The war had a very negative effect on Georgia, while it seems to have contributed to creating a favorable international environment for Russia. Georgia lost the war, suffered enormous damage, and even gave Russia the opportunity to recognize the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Because of this, Georgia now has only two alternatives: 1) to give up its accession to the NATO, and so turn towards a pro-Russia policy in order to negotiate with Russia with the aim to recover its territorial integrity, or 2) to pursue NATO membership without South Ossetia and Abkhazia. But neither of these options can be realized without great pains. Thus, for the time being, the Georgian government will make efforts to recover from the war damage and to implement the conditions imposed by NATO/EU for accession, such as democratization, a market economy, etc. At the same time, the Georgian government will attempt to create an international environment which will make it possible to recover its territorial integrity, while at the same time waiting for the moment that Russia will be obliged to abandon South Ossetia and Abkhazia. However, even by following these policies, it appears that it will be quite difficult for Georgia to secure both objectives – territorial integrity, and accession to NATO. In brief, the war has now made it much more difficult to realize these two objectives.

At the same time, Russia lost credibility in international community by having used disproportionate military force against Georgia, and was isolated for recognizing the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. But this was only a temporary phenomenon. Viewed from a long-term perspective, by having sent a clear message to the West during the War, Russia seems to be creating an international environment favorable to its national interests. Russia showed the West its firm will to oppose Georgian accession to NATO with use of military force, and its willingness to sacrifice good relations with the West. This is why the West froze relations with Russia temporarily, but shortly afterward moved toward a rapprochement with Russia through a process of reviewing its relations with the country. Despite Russia recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and strengthening its military forces in these two regions, the US claimed a necessity to “reset” its relations with Russia, and the EU and the NATO also decided to normalize their relations with Russia. In addition, new voices have been heard in the West claiming even that Russia should be included in the European security system.

### 3. Towards Rapprochement between the West and Russia after the Georgian War (1) “Reset” of relations between the US and Russia

Vice-President Biden said in his address at Munich on the 7th of February 2009 that “it’s time to press the reset button” on relations with Russia.<sup>vii</sup> The presidents of both the US and Russia agreed at the meeting on the 1<sup>st</sup> of April 2009 in London that they would strengthen cooperation in areas of common interest such as reduction of nuclear weapons, nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, anti-terrorism, economic stability, the Middle East peace, etc.<sup>viii</sup> At the Moscow Summit in July 2009, the US and Russia signed a document of Joint Understanding for a follow-on treaty to the START1 treaty, as well as an agreement on military transit to Afghanistan. In addition, both states agreed to organize a presidential committee which will discuss economic development, energy, environment, etc. <sup>ix</sup> It was announced at the end of December 2009 that a follow-on treaty to the START 1 treaty would be signed in January 2010.<sup>x</sup>

In addition, the Obama administration started to tackle the missile defense issue as well, sending a letter to President Medvedev in February 2009. The letter suggested that President Obama would suspend the deployment of a new missile defense system in Eastern Europe if Moscow would help stop Iran from developing long-range weapons.<sup>xi</sup> President Obama said in July that he understood Russian sensitivity about the missile defense issue, and made it clear that his administration was carrying out a comprehensive review of the issue.<sup>xii</sup> President Obama declared on the 17<sup>th</sup> of September 2009 that the US would adopt a gradual and adaptable approach to European missile defense, and that it would no longer deploy missiles and radar in Central Europe.<sup>xiii</sup> In this way, the US has promoted its “reset” policy with Russia.

## (2) NATO-Russia relations

In his declaration of April 16<sup>th</sup>, 2008, the Secretary General of NATO criticized Russia for establishing legal relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia<sup>xiv</sup>, and on the 3<sup>rd</sup> of June expressed his deep concern over the stationing of several hundred Russian soldiers and railway army troops in Abkhazia.<sup>xv</sup> He also urged an immediate stop to military confrontation in Georgia on August 8<sup>th</sup>.<sup>xvi</sup> The North Atlantic Council meeting of ambassadors was convened on the 12<sup>th</sup> of August, and it expressed regret at the Russian use of disproportionate military force in Georgia, urging Russia to respect the territorial integrity of the country.<sup>xvii</sup> The NAC special Foreign Ministers meeting held on the 19<sup>th</sup> of August urged an immediate withdrawal of the Russian army, and announced that the NATO-Russia Council would be postponed until Russia adhered to the cease-fire. It also reconfirmed the significance of urgent implementation of the Georgian-Russian agreement, its support for Georgian territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence, the creation of a NATO-Georgian Commission, a follow-up to the decision made at the NATO Bucharest summit through its Commission, and several other policies supporting Georgia.<sup>xviii</sup> In addition, NATO criticized the recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by Russia as a violation of the UN decision on Georgian territorial integrity and asked Russia to implement the six-principle agreement.<sup>xix</sup>

In this way, NATO had maintained a strict stance towards Russia before, during and after the Georgian War. However, the NATO Ministerial meeting on the 3<sup>rd</sup> of December 2008 pointed out the significance of relations with Russia, and it decided to adopt 'a measured and phased approach'. That is to say, NATO decided to reopen relations with Russia at the political level led by the Secretary General as well as through unofficial meetings of the NRC. <sup>xx</sup> In addition, it also decided that MAP status would not be offered to Ukraine and Georgia as both 'had significant work left to do'.<sup>xxi</sup>

At the NRC meeting reopened in Corfu on the 27<sup>th</sup> of June 2009, structural reform of the NRC was examined, and it was emphasized that the NRC should be an effective and valuable institution for political dialogue and cooperation.<sup>xxii</sup> Choosing the Russian issue for his inauguration speech, the new Secretary General of NATO, Mr. Anders Fogh Rasmussen, emphasized strengthening cooperation with Russia in areas of common interest, making the NRC a forum for the discussion of security issues and consulting with Russia about the 21 century's challenges of security towards productive relations with Russia.<sup>xxiii</sup> Taking into consideration that the NRC did not function effectively at the time of the war in Georgia, the idea emerged that the NRC should be a forum for political dialogue with Russia at critical moments. Based on a review of the NRC, the NRC meeting on the 4<sup>th</sup> of December 2009 agreed to launch the NRC Work Programs for 2010, a reform of the NRC, and a co-examination of the security challenges of the 21 century.<sup>xxiv</sup>

### (3) EU-Russia relations

Once the war in Georgia broke out, France, the presidential state of the EU at that time, took the initiative to conclude the six-point agreement between Georgia and Russia.<sup>xxv</sup> Furthermore, the EU released one million euros in fast-track aid to help with urgent humanitarian needs on August 10<sup>th</sup>, and offered civil protection support through the Monitor Information Center (MIC).<sup>xxvi</sup> The extraordinary meeting of the European Council on September 1<sup>st</sup> criticized the Russian recognition of independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and decided to postpone negotiations on a new partnership cooperation agreement with Russia until it withdrew its military forces to the position held prior to August 7<sup>th</sup>.<sup>xxvii</sup> In addition, the EU decided on September 15<sup>th</sup> that it would send a Monitor Mission to Georgia by October 1<sup>st</sup>.<sup>xxviii</sup>

However, on October 13<sup>th</sup> the Council of the European Union expressed satisfaction with the completion of the withdrawal of Russian troops from the adjacent regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.<sup>xxix</sup> A communication from the Commission to the Council on November 5<sup>th</sup> emphasized the necessity of restarting negotiations on a new strategic partnership agreement with Russia, which had been postponed since the Georgian war.<sup>xxx</sup> According to the Communication, the EU-Russia summit was held in Nice on the 14<sup>th</sup> of November 2008. The EU noted Russia's fulfillment of the cease-fire agreement, its withdrawal of troops, the EU observer mission to Georgia, the start of negotiations in Geneva, and confirmed the continuation of the Partnership agreement negotiations and EU support for the accession of Russia to the WTO.<sup>xxxi</sup> Then EU-Russia summits were held twice, in May and November of 2009, in which the two sides discussed bilateral problems such as the impact of the world economic crisis, the four Common Spaces, trade, human rights, new partnership cooperation agreement negotiations, energy issues, visa issues, Russian accession to the WTO, etc. as well as international problems such as those in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Iran and Sri Lanka.<sup>xxxii</sup> These meetings produced such outcomes as the signing of the agreement on the energy 'Early Warning Mechanism'.<sup>xxxiii</sup>

### (4) European Security Treaty

Another new tendency that appeared in the international community after the Georgian war was the idea to include Russia in a European security system. This was a response by the community to the proposal by Russian President Medvedev regarding a European security treaty. In several speeches after the Russia-German summit in June 2008, President Medvedev talked about the conclusion of a European security treaty, which could offer equal and reliable security to all states through legally binding agreements.<sup>xxxiv</sup> According to his idea, security should be indivisible and cannot be discussed with sacrifice of the others' security.

Some states such as Germany and France responded affirmatively to the

Medvedev proposal, as the President Sarkozy and Chancellor Merkel's joint article of February 2009 showed.<sup>xxxv</sup> This response might have come from the lessons of the Georgian war. The Russian military attack against Georgia made political elites in Europe realize the necessity of including Russia in the European security system. Firstly, the inclusion of Russia might contribute to a transformation of Russia from a revisionist state into a status-quo one for the European security system. Secondly, it also might make it possible to control Russian behavior within such a system, and to prevent Russia from behaving unilaterally with its military forces. Thirdly, the Russian military attack against Georgia made it clear to European political elites that they should take Russian opposition to the NATO enlargement seriously. In order to soften Russia's firm opposition to the NATO enlargement, they understood that it is essential to reconcile with Russia and, for this purpose, to include Russia in the European security system.

#### 4. Obstacles to rapprochement between the West and Russia

Relations between the West and Russia have improved considerably since the war in Georgia, a time when they were 'worse and more dangerous than at any time since the beginning of the 1980s'.<sup>xxxvi</sup> This is because both the West and Russia realized the necessity of cooperating in areas of shared interest in a situation both of increased interdependency in a globalised world and of international economic and financial crisis that began in the autumn of 2008. However, this raised the problem of whether these cooperative relations limited to shared interests will be able to develop into truly stable and comprehensively cooperative relations in a variety of areas.

##### (1) Missile Defense

Unfortunately, we cannot help but recognize the existence of obstacles which lie before the relations between the US and Russia. It is true that the issues of missile defense and nuclear disarmament have almost been resolved, but the revision of missile defense policy by the US administration might imply that the Obama administration has set rapprochement with Russia above the security demands of the Central European states. Poland and the Czech Republic sought the assurance of their defense and security by strengthening bilateral relations with the US, because NATO's collective defense role has been reduced by the expedition of NATO military forces to places out of area and by its increased global partnerships. Therefore, the political leaders of the Central and East European states sent an open letter to President Obama attempting to remind US political elites that Russia was still a 'revisionist power' in Central and Eastern Europe as well as Eurasia.<sup>xxxvii</sup> Vice-President Biden visited Warsaw, Prague and Bucharest in October 2009, and attempted to reassure these states of the US commitment to Central and Eastern Europe.<sup>xxxviii</sup> But it is quite unclear whether his visit had succeeded in reassuring them.

In addition, we should also take into consideration the variety of interests

within Europe, as well as between the US and Central and Eastern Europe. Some of the states of 'Old Europe' opposed the Bush Plan to deploy defense missiles in Central Europe as it invited Russian retaliation in the form of missile deployment in Kaliningrad. Some political elites and ambassadors of the Balkan EU/NATO member states and Ukraine appreciate the new missile defense policy of the Obama administration as it will be able to cover Europe as a whole. It is worth noting that interests concerning missile defense policy are divided within the EU/NATO member states.

## (2) NATO Enlargement

Another obstacle for Russia-US relations is NATO enlargement. NATO refrained from giving MAP status to Ukraine and Georgia at the NATO Ministerial meeting in December 2008 and at the NATO summit in the spring of 2009. However, at the NATO meeting it was decided that NATO would continue to assist the efforts of Ukraine and Georgia towards accession to the organization, making use of the NATO-Ukraine Commission and the NATO-Georgia Commission (created in August 2008).<sup>xxxix</sup> They agreed that the criteria for accession would be implemented through Annual National Programs (ANP) on behalf of MAP. This was the result of a compromise between the NATO member states supporting NATO enlargement to Ukraine and Georgia and the states opposing it. These factors indicate that the NATO enlargement issue has not yet been resolved.

## (3) Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty

The US and Russia almost reached at the end of 2009 an agreement on nuclear disarmament after the START1 treaty had expired. However, the issue of the CFE treaty has not yet been resolved since Russia's unilateral suspension of it in December 2007. Thus security based on conventional forces in Europe has remained unstable.

The CFE treaty was signed in 1990 and entered into force in 1992. But the international environment in which the CFE Treaty was adopted and was functioning was radically transformed once three former Warsaw Treaty Organization members became members of the NATO. Thus the CFE Treaty needed to be revised in accordance with the new international situation which came about after NATO enlargement. So the Adapted CFE Treaty was signed in 1999 at the Istanbul OSCE summit. Russia ratified it, but the NATO states failed to ratify it for the reason that Russia had not implemented the Istanbul commitment to withdraw its troops from Georgia and Moldova. In this situation, Russia declared in July 2007 that it would suspend the CFE treaty in December of that year if the NATO members did not ratify the Adapted CFE Treaty. Furthermore, Russia demanded the abolition of the flank restriction between north and south within Russian territory, accession of the Baltic states to the Adapted CFE Treaty,

and a review of the numerical ceilings on arms deployment in Bulgaria and Rumania, taking into consideration that the US had concluded agreements with both countries on the use of their military bases.<sup>xi</sup>

#### (4) European Security Treaty

Russia and the West seem to have quite different expectations of the European security treaty proposed by President Medvedev since his visit to Germany in July 2008. Russia expects to participate in the decision-making process on European security issues, and wants to influence on them according to its national interests. Furthermore, judging from articles 1, 2, 6-3, 9-2 and 9-3 of the draft treaty, Russia appears to be aiming at a reduction in the role of NATO in European security.

On the other hand, the US and the European states want to promote good and stable relations with Russia by including Russia in the European security system. They expect that cooperation with Russia would make it easier to resolve international issues. In addition, they suppose that engaging Russia in a European security treaty would make it possible to control Russian unilateral behavior within the security system.

However, there are a variety of views in the West on the relationship between a new European security treaty and NATO. Some insist that NATO should be open to Russian accession,<sup>xii</sup> while others say that the major issues for NATO, such as collective defense and organizational enlargement, should be decided within the NATO decision-making process according to its own procedure. This is why well-known political scientist and former US National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski might propose a European security system which keeps NATO's security role and current structure, and, at the same time, allows NATO to cooperate with Russia, CSTO and SCO.<sup>xiii</sup> In fact, this idea on a new European Security is also advocated by a Russian political scientist with whom the author has spoken to. Russian experts on international politics have in mind concepts about the European security system such as a collective security system within the OSCE, a new comprehensive collective security system, a security system composed of NATO and Russia (including current nonmembers of NATO), etc.<sup>xiiii</sup>

#### (5) Eastern Partnership of the EU

Besides negotiations on a new strategic partnership agreement, Russian accession to the WTO, the four common spaces, etc., one of the most significant issues for Russia-EU relations is the Eastern Partnership inaugurated in May 2009, which targets Ukraine, Moldova, the three South Caucasian states, and Belarus. Its objectives are said to be to prepare the accession to the EU of these eastern neighbors, in particular Ukraine, through the conclusion of association agreements, special agreements on energy, environment, science, transport, visa facilitation and the creation of a profound and comprehensive free trade area in

preparation for the moment that the EU would be able to enlarge. Thus if the Eastern Partnership succeeds in strengthening the EU's relations with these Eastern European states, it is inevitable that Russian isolation will increase. The integration of Ukraine into the Union in the area of energy has been actively pursued, and it is said that Ukraine is set to become a member of the Energy Community of the Union in the near future. In such a situation, Ukraine's electricity sector would be run according to EU rules. Such an approach of the Ukraine to the EU can also be seen in the start of negotiations on a profound and comprehensive free trade area in the spring of 2008, despite Ukraine having fluctuated between joining the Single Economic Area with Russia and accession to the EU until a few years ago.

##### 5. Status-quo and revisionism in the Black Sea region

We have discussed relations among the big actors of Wider Europe, but it goes without saying that these relations are closely correlated with the international relations of the Black Sea region. Thus, according to the characteristics of the relations among the big actors, Black Sea international politics have converged into two confrontational tendencies. One is the status quo of maintaining the current balance of power in the Black Sea region by keeping the region as closed as possible, and the other is the revisionism of opening the Black Sea region to Wider Europe as a whole by strengthening relations with the EU, NATO and the US. This international structure composed of status quo and revisionism in the Black Sea region can be discerned not only in the dimension of relations between the Black Sea states, but also in sub-national, trans-national and regional dimensions around the Black Sea region. Thus sub-national and trans-national actors such as political elites, ethnic organizations, religious organizations, military organizations, NGOs seeking democracy, enterprises, terrorist organizations, organized crime syndicates, local entities, etc., in the Black Sea region have promoted activities supporting the status-quo or revisionism in the Black Sea region. This bi-polar structure is noticeable in the issues characteristic of the region, such as the frozen conflicts, democratization, and energy security. This bi-polar structure has influenced regional cooperation within the BSEC and through the EU's Black Sea Synergy as well.

So, how will the transformation of relations among the big actors since the end of the Georgian war influence Black Sea international politics, and in particular the relations between status-quo forces and revisionist forces in national, sub-national, trans-national and regional dimensions? And conversely, how will Black Sea international relations in these four dimensions influence power relations among the big actors in Wider Europe international relations? And will cooperative relations among the big actors facilitate Black Sea regional cooperation within the BSEC and through EU's the Black Sea Synergy? The answers to each of these questions remain to be seen.

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- <sup>iv</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Press Release, The Russian President Instruction to the Russian Federation Government with Regard to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 501-16-04-2008.
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- <sup>vii</sup> Remarks by Vice President Biden at 45<sup>th</sup> Munich Conference on Security Policy, The White House, February 7, 2009.
- <sup>viii</sup> The White House Blog, Reset with Russia, April 1, 2009.
- <sup>ix</sup> White House: Office of the Press Secretary, Press Conference by President Obama and President Medvedev of Russia, July 6, 2009.
- <sup>x</sup> RIANOVOSTI, December 21, 2009.
- <sup>xi</sup> The New York Times, March 2 and 3, 2009.
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- <sup>xiv</sup> Statement by the NATO Secretary General on Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 16 April 2008. [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions\\_7247.htm?mode=news](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_7247.htm?mode=news)
- <sup>xv</sup> NATO Secretary General's Statement on the Deployment of Russian Railway Troops into Georgia, 02 June 2008. <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news=7760.htm?mode=news>
- <sup>xvi</sup> Statement by the NATO Secretary General on events in South Ossetia, 08 August 2008. [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news\\_37136.htm?mode=news](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_37136.htm?mode=news)
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*Session II: “Challenges for Economic Development and Energy and Environmental Cooperation in the Black Sea Area”*

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**Mykola KULINICH**  
**Ambassador of Ukraine to Japan**

**Addressing the Challenges to Economic Development in the Black Sea Area: a Ukraine’s vision**

Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is an honor for me to have a keynote speech at the Third Japan-Black Sea Area Dialogue addressing the issues of economic development in the region. For my country, Ukraine, Black Sea Region is strategically important in terms of both economic cooperation and national security. The pace of regional integration of BSEC is closely related to the economic development of each of the member-countries as well as interregional trade, financial and energy cooperation.

On the one hand, half of the states in the Black Sea Area are under the process of the political and economic transformation aimed at economic liberalization and reforms. The differences in the level of economic development, membership status in EU and WTO and size of the economies put a lot of challenges to economic cooperation within the institutional framework of the regional organization. On the other hand, BSEC countries with the population of 330 mil people, rich of national resources, developed industrial base have a significant potential for developing closer economic ties in many areas, such as energy, infrastructure, finance, trade, agriculture, tourism and environmental policy.

I would like to note that from November 2007, when the 2<sup>nd</sup> Japan Black Sea Area Dialog was held, to April 2008 Ukraine exercised Chairmanship in BSEC. During this time we held a number of events to promote sectoral cooperation in different areas of economy, for example, the First BSEC Banking Forum in Kyiv, the First Container Summit in Odessa, a number of other ministerial meetings on energy, transport, science and technology, education, custom services.

Further, I would like to briefly touch upon challenges to economic development in the Black Sea Area, which require collective and coordinated actions of the member-states.

1. Nowadays the financial economic crisis, which started in September 2008 and adversely affected the global economy, became a new test for the BSEC regional economic development and cooperation. As a result of capital outflows, falling industrial output and demand, high unemployment rate, and banks' liquidity squeeze, the period of high economic growth in many BSEC countries has ended. Ukraine is not an exception and, unfortunately, is in the list of the countries which suffered the most because of the export dependent economic structure and weak banking system. Although the damage from the crisis varies from country to country, the overall impact on the Black Sea Region was very negative. In 2009 it is expected that the GDP growth rate in Black Sea Area would be -6-7%.

The current crisis demonstrated how economically interconnected and interdependent countries are, and that they cannot tackle the global crisis only on a domestic level, but must join their efforts and act together to fight with the consequences of the crisis and take measures to prevent a new one.

On an individual basis, national governments used various financial mechanisms to avoid collapse of banking system and stimulate the economy. Some of the countries, including Ukraine, Romania, Serbia and others received financial assistance from IMF and other international institutions. While these measures are effective to a certain extent, it is desirable to develop financial and banking cooperation, which aims at risk reduction and collective guarantees on the regional level.

In this regard, financial activities of BSEC, especially the Working Group of Banking and Finance, as a consultation mechanism, and Black Sea Trade and Development Bank require a special attention. I hope that in spite of the crisis the Bank will continue its participation in large-scale investment projects contributing into the process of overcoming the economic instability in the region.

Japan also felt the negative impact of the world economic crisis. But in spite of this Japan did not turn away its attention from the problems of other countries, but became a major donor to international financial organizations to help countries in need support their economies. I should note that the third IMF tranche to Ukraine in July 2009 was fully covered by Japan's additional 100 bln dollars contribution to IMF. I greatly appreciate Japanese financial assistance and hope Japan will be able to help BSEC countries stabilize their economies not only through IMF, but also through private investments.

2. Another challenge to the economic development in the Black Sea Area is energy security and disproportional distribution of energy resources. Traditionally the region was a major transit zone with big energy suppliers, such as Russia and Azerbaijan. Thus, energy cooperation within the region as well as with energy importers outside the region such as the EU countries, have an important implication for economic development.

BCES Declaration on Cooperation with the EU in the Field of Energy, which was signed in April 2008 in Kyiv, and the Yerevan Declaration on Energy Cooperation in the BSEC Region, which was adopted by Energy Ministers in March last year, clearly demonstrated the will to coordinate energy policy and integrate energy markets of the BSEC countries as well as the EU. However, consensus on energy strategies of the member countries should be strengthened by practical implementation of joint projects. Ukraine, as a major transit state between Europe and Asia, has a strategic interest in energy cooperation within BSEC and BSEC-EU frameworks and interested in improving energy transportation infrastructure and mutually beneficial diversification of energy resources.

An important component of energy security and independence of any state is diversification of energy resources supply and stability of energy resources transit. In the framework of realization of the energy policy, aimed at strengthening of the Ukraine's position as a reliable partner in energy sphere, my country is actively working on the issues of establishment of new routes of energy transportation from Caspian and Middle East regions. For example, During the Third Energy Summit in Kyiv, which was held in May, 2008, the President of Ukraine Victor Yushchenko initiated the Concept of the Caspian-Black Sea-Baltic Energy Space in order to provide reliable, transparent and predictable energy supply to Europe. Currently the priority project in the framework of the mentioned concept is establishment of the Euro-Asian Transit Corridor.

In the future, the Caspian-Black Sea-Baltic Energy Space will help strengthen the trust between countries in the region and reduce risks over the whole energy chain – from energy exploration in Caspian Sea, energy transit via Black Sea to supply on the European market.

Heavy dependency of the most of the BSEC countries on external supply of oil and gas calls for the need to increase energy efficiency and diversify energy sources. While joint projects in energy exploration and transportation require political will of the member states to cooperate, realization of energy saving projects could be more viable. In this regard, Japan as a pioneer of advanced technologies and one of the most energy efficient countries could be a strategic partner for BCES countries.

I can give you an example of such cooperation between Ukraine and Japan. For Ukraine last year marked a breakthrough in implementation of Japanese energy saving technologies within the framework of "green investment scheme" under the Kyoto protocol. Rising gas prices and tensions with the major gas supplier, which occurred in the past, made the Ukrainian government reconsider its energy policy and start to promote usage of alternative sources of energy and energy saving equipments in communal services, electric power production, metallurgy, chemical industry and other sectors. Successful implementation of such advanced technologies is equal to the economic security and growth. I

believe Japan could play an important role in modernizing and “greening” economies of BSEC countries on a mutually beneficial basis providing investments and technology transfers.

3. Next, environmental issue is one of the most serious threats to the economic development of the Black Sea Area. It includes preservation and management of natural resources in the Black Sea and Danube River as well addressing the problem of global warming on the regional basis. To find effective solution to ecological problems BSEC states need to join their efforts in coordinating national environmental strategies and ecological legislation. Key issues for environmental protection include industrial pollution, pollution of the Black Sea and rivers, waste management especially radioactive waste to name a few. In the case of Ukraine, we are taking different measures to eliminate the consequences of Chernobyl nuclear accident. We appreciate the assistance from Japan in this area and hope that Japan, as the most environmentally friendly nation, will help tackle ecological problems in the Black Sea region.

4. Formation of BSEC has happened on the intersection of trade and economic systems, which previously had different economic development concepts. From the very beginning of BSEC these circumstances conditioned relatively low trade turnover between the countries with different economic systems, in spite of the diversity of industrial capacity, service sectors and natural resources.

According to UNDP data, intra-regional trade is on average small, not exceeding 20% of the total. Currently only Bulgaria, Greece, Georgia, Rumania, Turkey and Ukraine are the members of WTO and others are still negotiating their accession to this organization. As for Ukraine, the major trade partners in the region are only Russia and Turkey.

To increase intraregional trade, the ultimate goal of the BSEC initiative is establishment of the “free trade zone”, however, it is more a long-term perspective than a short-term goal. The main issue at stake is trade facilitation using various mechanisms such as reduction of non-tariffs barriers, implementation of joint economic projects, and participation in regional trade exhibition etc. Last year in October Ukraine hosted a Workshop on Customs Data Exchange as a step to trade facilitation by reducing waiting time at the borders and combating fraud and smuggling. I believe that real-time exchange of information among the customs administrations would help both the customs and business to speed up the process of clearing of imported and exported goods.

At the current economic situation, when the financial crisis badly hit the regional economy, it is important that member-countries do not impose any additional barriers to trade to protect their economies, but follow the international principles of free trade. Accessible and open market of the BCES countries would make the region more attractive to domestic and foreign investors which will

foster private sector development. Furthermore, open markets will promote trade with the countries outside the Black Sea Area, especially with EU, which is the main importer and investor for the BSEC countries.

Geographical proximity to EU and participation of three EU member states in BSEC, on the one hand, makes EU a main economic partner for the region, but on the other hand, puts in a disadvantage position non-EU countries. The challenge they have to face is the adaptation of their regulatory standards and product quality to the EU rules.

To develop joint economic projects and promote investment and trade in the region and with other countries, BSEC Business Council is very instrumental. In many other regional organizations close business ties and cross-countries business network were one of the main impetuses for further institutional cooperation. In this way, I see the role of the BSEC Business Council as a collective mechanism for facilitation of partnership between government and business as well as between regional private companies.

Some might argue that new projects are difficult to implement during the financial crisis. But I would not be so negative. We should think of this crisis as an opportunity to rethink the strategy to business cooperation creating opportunities for new projects in infrastructure, agriculture, energy-saving, tourism and other areas with the participation of private and public sectors as well as foreign investors. A really important instrument for practical implementation and financing of projects is BSEC Project Development Fund. One of the examples of the two regional projects can be the Black Sea Ring Highway and the Motorways of the Sea. Japanese companies are very much welcomed to the Black Sea Area not only on a country-to-country basis but also on a regional basis.

I am also optimistic about the activity of the Black Sea Trade and Investment Promotion Program (BSTIP), which is a joint project between BSEC Project Development Fund and the UNDP aimed at promoting intraregional trade and investment.

To conclude, in spite of the economic diversity and different levels of integration to the global economic system, BSEC countries have common problems which they have to face. Global crisis, climate change, low level of intraregional trade and investments and energy security are the main challenges which call for joint efforts and coordinated policy among member-states. At the same time, Japan as one of the most advanced economies with vast economic and financial capacities can make a significant contribution to the development of the region through its own initiatives as well as through international organizations on a mutually beneficial basis.

I hope that the Government of the Prime-Minister Yukio Hatoyama will also see a lot of opportunities and strengthen the Japanese presence in the Black Sea Area.

Thank you for your attention.

**MOTOMURA Masumi**  
**Chief Researcher,**  
**Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation**

**Energy Flow through the Black Sea Region**

Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen, and distinguished participants.

It's a great honor for me to have an opportunity to give a keynote speech about energy cooperation in the Black Sea Region.

Today, I would like to focus on the new pipeline projects around the Black Sea, since this topic has been drawing attention from the governments and energy industries not only in this region but also from the rest of the world.

1. Progress of pipeline projects around the Black Sea

Due to potential growth for the future gas demand at around 2% per year in Europe, several new gas pipeline projects were planned to increase gas supply to the European market. The first one is named "Nord Stream" or "North Stream" to transport Russian gas from Vyborg at the Baltic Sea to Greifswald in Germany. There were some concerns about realization of this pipeline project, since this plan needs consents from the countries surrounding the Baltic Sea.

Some people fear the growth of influence of Russia over the European gas market and anticipate that "democratic" North European countries would not allow Russian gas to be transported along the bottom of the Baltic Sea. However, most energy experts were predicting that "Nord Stream" will be surely realized because the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) stipulates in article 79 that "All States are entitled to lay submarine cables and pipelines on the continental shelf" and "The delineation of the course for the laying of such pipelines on the continental shelf is subject to the consent of the coastal State." It means the coastal state can say "yes" or "no" only on the individual pipeline route, not on the pipeline project itself.

The governments of Denmark, Sweden and Finland gave approval for "Nord Stream" last autumn.

Procurements for this project have been ready for two years and the construction will start on April first this year.

Nabucco was planned to transport gas to Southern Europe from Azerbaijan and other Caspian countries or Central Asia. The consortium was established in 2004 by Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria, and has been trying to achieve commitments for the gas supply from the Caspian and the Central Asian

countries (Fig.1).

On the other hand, Gazprom of Russia and ENI of Italy announced another gas pipeline project named “South Stream” in June 2007, targeting the Southern European market as well. This pipeline will start from a Russian port at the Black Sea, crossing the sea bottom, and will reach the Bulgarian coast. In Bulgaria the route diverges into two. The northern route will reach finally Northern Italy and Austria and the southern route will go through Greece, the Adriatic Sea and get to southern Italy.

The purpose of this project is obvious. To supply more amounts of gas in a stable manner from the massive Russian gas fields is the most definite way to compete with Nabucco and if possible to eliminate its influence.




Fig. 1 Nabucco Pipeline and South Stream

## 2. Nabucco

### (1) Developments in 2009

In early 2009, a series of international conferences on the Nabucco project were held on the basis of a gas supply crunch from Russia to Ukraine and Eastern Europe in January 2009. Finally, an intergovernmental agreement was signed in July among five transit countries: Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria (Fig. 1). However, no progress has been seen since then. The weak point of Nabucco, as is often mentioned, is the lack of enough sources to supply gas to the pipeline. The second phase of the Shah Deniz gas field offshore Azerbaijan will produce 16Bm<sup>3</sup>, however the capacity of Nabucco is 31Bm<sup>3</sup>. There is some

possibility that the Akkas gas field in the western Iraq (close to Syria), or two gas fields in Kurdistan will join, however the development of these fields has not yet been achieved.

(2) Transit problem with Turkey

Another problem has been Turkey's policy. Turkey wants to purchase 15% of throughput gas at a discount price and has been negotiating with other partners, which caused disharmony among the Nabucco partners. Pursuant to the Energy Charter Treaty, freedom of transport is declared in Article 7. What Turkey is demanding may possibly be not in accordance with this clause.

(3) Azerbaijan's choice

Azerbaijan will start gas exports to Russia by reverse flowing of the existing pipeline, which was used to import gas from Russia until 2005. The planned throughput was only 500 million m<sup>3</sup> at first, however this will increase up to 2 billion m<sup>3</sup> in 2011. This is a symbolic case to show Azerbaijan's intention not to rely only on the Turkish route but to retain another transportation route.

(4) Change of US policy

Mr. Richard Morningstar, the US envoy to Eurasian Energy, said in the middle of July, when the intergovernmental agreement of Nabucco was signed, that half of the capacity is open to the third parties of gas producing countries and Russia can supply gas to the Nabucco pipeline. This is a very important change of policy from the USA, since the USA has been saying that this pipeline is not only to detour Ukraine but also avoid the gas source of Russia.



**Nabucco Gas Pipeline Project Gas Supply Sources for Nabucco**

Fig. 2 Multiple source for the Nabucco pipeline (website of Nabucco)

We must pay attention to what Nabucco participants really want. If we take a look at the website of Nabucco (Fig.2), surprisingly enough, we will find that they are saying Nabucco will transport gas from Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, Egypt

and so on. Only politicians say no gas from Russia. Business people are not interested in overly politicized issues. There are lots of arrows of gas flow from lots of countries flowing into the Nabucco pipeline

So, a question may be raised. What's the difference between Nabucco and South Stream? My answer is that there is no difference and this competition is meaningless. I think the best way for the both sides is to find a way to merge.

### 3. South Stream

Slovenia signed the governmental agreement last November and all the transit countries joined this project. The route has changed several times. Passing through Slovenia, the pipeline runs directly to Italy and a spur will be extended to Austria according to the last plan (Fig.1).

In November, Electricite de France (EdF), a French power company, joined the South Stream project and will take 10% share. Gaz de France Suez has already joined the Nord Stream project. So, this is the second time that a French company has joined a pipeline project to accept Russian gas. It means France also wants to reserve gas to cope with increasing demand for gas in the future.

Another surprising thing is that Turkey approved the construction of South Stream running through the Turkish water of the Black Sea in last August, which Ukraine rejected bluntly at the very beginning of this project.

That's an enigma and rather difficult to understand. Turkey is a member of the Nabucco project and it is obvious that South Stream is a competitor. But still, Turkey might have given some favor to South Stream instead of remaining as rival. My interpretation is that it is free of charge to give the permission of passage in the Black Sea for the government of Turkey but it may work as a "free pass" or an indulgence for Turkey when South Stream and Nabucco decide to merge.

On the other hand, Russia is to pay an expensive price to Turkey.

### 4. Bosphorous bypass oil pipeline

Mr. Putin's visit to Turkey in August 2009 was the most influential one. 20 documents were signed and three important agreements about energy were included.

As I mentioned, the first one is Turkey's approval of passage of South Stream through the Turkish water of the Black Sea. The second one is Russian participation in the Samsun-Ceyhan Bosphorous Bypass oil pipeline. This one is also a competitor against the Russian-led Burgas- Alexandroupolis pipeline, which is another Bosphorous bypass oil pipeline through Bulgaria and Greece (Fig. 3).

It is said that the maximum capacity of the Bosphorous Strait is around 2.2 million barrels per day, which is the current level of actual transportation. Now that the oil production in the Caspian region is souring, demurrage at the entrance of the strait is becoming a big problem.

Russia proposed a detour from Burgas of Bulgaria to Alexandroupolis of

Greece and Russia, Bulgaria and Greece agreed in 2007. To oppose that, Turkey and ENI of Italy proposed the Trans-Anatolian or Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline, and the both plans competed to gain commitment of throughput from oil producing companies. Russia has been predominant since Russian oil companies have the largest oil exports, while the Turkey-Italy group could accept only ENI's products from Kazakhstan.

But now, Russia seems to have chosen ENI as a partner. It is because the South Stream project with ENI became the first priority for Russia.




Fig. 3 Oil pipeline network around the Black Sea

## 5. Blue Stream-2

The third one is that Russia and Turkey agreed to construct Blue-Stream-2, which will transport gas to Cyprus, Syria, Lebanon and Israel. As I mentioned before the Nabucco Company is looking forward to participation of Russia, however this new project might serve as a rebuff to Naubucco.

## 6. Conclusion

Of course, these are all games. Before making investment, all the participants around the Black Sea beat their brains out to possess the better position in the game. We should keep in mind that those are business tactics and far from political strife. Their goal is to establish a good business model which creates value among all the participants. Stability of the business, mutual benefits, and the prosperity of this region may have the first priority.

**HASUMI Yu**

**Professor, Rissho University**

**The Role of Japan in Black Sea Area Cooperation  
— in comparison with the EU’s Strategy to Black Sea Area —**

**1. Enlargement of the EU and European Neighbourhood Policy**

After the 5-th enlargement, the EU was confronted with borders of neighbourhood countries with different degree of instability. Therefore the EU has major interests in seeing stability, economic development and better governance in its neighbours. The European Commission presented European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which covers six eastern neighbours and ten Mediterranean partners – Tree Western NIS (Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine), Southern Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia), and Mediterranean (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, the Palestinian Authority).

Based on shared values and common interests, ENP is the soft security strategy for challenges to various issues between ‘in’ and ‘out’ of the EU. ENP is criticised for its ambiguity, subjective assessment criteria and lacking effective mechanisms to ensure implementation of reforms without promise of membership.

According to F. Tassinari, it is due to the fact that ENP concerns the conceptual, strategic and spatial limits of Europe. Neighbourhood countries are meeting place of various cultures and civilisation. At the same time, the EU as ‘integration process’ meets the EU as ‘foreign actor’ and ‘gravitational power’ meets its ‘normative power’.

Therefore the EU is unsettled in Black Sea region, although it does not come to a standstill there.


**2. Black Sea region as an arena of cooperation between heterogeneous & ‘differentiated’ countries**

The EU communication, Black Sea Synergy—A New Regional Cooperation, characterizes Black Sea region as following;

“The Black Sea region is a distinct geographical area rich in natural resources and

strategically located at the junction of Europe, Central Asia and the Middle East. With a large population, the region faces a range of opportunities and challenges for its citizens. The region is an expanding market with great development potential and an important hub for energy and transport flows. It is, however, also a region with unresolved frozen conflicts, with many environmental problems and insufficient border controls thus encouraging illegal migration and organised crime.”

In fact, Black Sea region comprises a group of heterogeneous countries with difference of economic size, institution and integration perspectives (Fig. 1). Although Organisation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)



Source: V. Astrov and P. Havlik, *Economic Developments in the Wider Black Sea Region*, Wiiw Research Report 349, September 2008, p.122.

was established in 1992, the present level of regional economic integration is rather low because of their economic heterogeneity and political issues. Although Russia, Turkey and Ukraine as larger markets dominate regional trade, the geographic trade patterns do not suggest economic integration of Black Sea region.

At the same time, these countries are ‘differentiated’ by the relationship with the EU as followings;


- 1) The EU member countries (Greece, Bulgaria and Romania),
- 2) The EU candidate (Turkey),
- 3) Four Common Spaces and Strategic partnership (Russia),
- 4) ENP
  - Black Sea Synergy (Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova, Ukraine, Russia,

Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey),  
- Eastern Partnership (Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan).


### 3. Gravitation of the EU – an emerging ‘soft’ Empire based on ‘multilateral open regional governance’

The gravitational power of the EU is produced by ‘Community of institutions’ which sustains 4 Communities of market, security, values and region (Fig.2). The boundary line of the EU is fixed by ‘Community of institutions’ based on *acquis communautaire*. In contrast, the influence of market and values can go beyond the boundary. As neighbourhood countries enjoy ‘Community of market’ and accept the norm of ‘Community of values’ (democracy, rule of law and market economy) through ENP on joint-ownership with the EU, there could be development of social capital for good governance which is something in common with the model of the EU. Eventually it could contribute to promote ‘Community of security’ of the EU itself. In this sense, the EU is characterized as an emerging model of ‘multilateral open regional governance’. Therefore the EU makes the appearance as a ‘soft’ Empire based on the normative power and ENP strategy (Fig.3). While the EU depends on the flow of oil & gas from neighbourhood countries, the latter were exposed to the flow of neo-liberal ideology with shared values of the EU

Fig.2 Gravitation of the EU – an emerging model of ‘multilateral open regional governance’



**Fig.3 The EU – a ‘soft’ Empire based on the normative power and ENP**



because of dependence on the EU market (including immigrants).

We can see the same tendency in the EU’s strategy paper presented in June 2007, *EU and Central Asia – Strategy for a New Partnership*, as followings;

“With EU enlargement, the inclusion of the Southern Caucasus into the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Black Sea Synergy Initiative, Central Asia and the EU are moving closer together”. “The EU strongly believes that strengthening the commitment of Central Asian States to international law, the rule of law, human rights and democratic values, as well as to a market economy will promote security and stability in Central Asia, thus making the countries of the region reliable partners for the EU with shared common interests and goals.”

#### 4. Comparison of Black Sea Synergy and Eastern Partnership

As two Black sea littoral states, Bulgaria and Romania, joined the EU, the European Commission presented Black Sea Synergy – A New Regional Cooperation Initiative on 11 April 2007. It promotes the concept of regional cooperation (regional process) on local ownership within the region and on the idea of sectoral partnership (issues of energy, trade, environment, transport, good governance as well as contacts between local authorities) taking into account interests of various actors (Table.1).

As the concept of Black Sea Synergy harmonizes that of the BSEC—most inclusive and institutionalized regional organisation in the Black Sea area, the

EU became an observer in it. And the first EU-Black Sea ministerial meeting was held in February 2008. For Russia, the consensus decision-making rule of BSEC was attractive as an instrument for retaining control over the EU's insertion into the Black Sea process. Turkey was perhaps more motivated by having been its political initiator and with Istanbul – the location of its headquarters.

But the EU fails to act as a 'centre of gravity' promoting deeper regional integration of Black Sea region as a whole. The multilateral cooperation of the Black Sea countries with the EU is largely confined to sectoral initiatives such as the Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe (INOGATE), the Transport

**Table1 Comparison of Black Sea Synergy and Eastern Partnership**

<i>Issues</i>	Black Sea Synergy	Eastern Partnership
<i>Geographical Scope</i>	Greece, Bulgaria, Romania and Moldova in the west, Ukraine and <b>Russia</b> in the north, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan in the east and <b>Turkey</b> in the south	Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus*, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.  *depend on development of EU-Belarus relations
<i>Purpose of Interaction</i>	Development of cooperation <u>within the Black Sea Region</u> on <u>local ownership</u> and also between the region as a whole and the EU* *EU: observer-Organisation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation(BSEC)	Beyond the ENP bringing a lasting political message from the EU and on <u>joint ownership</u> in order to achieve the objectives of <u>political association and economic integration</u>
<i>Type of interaction</i>	<u>Black Sea wide</u> <b>Regional process</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Better coordinating <input type="checkbox"/> Dialogue <input type="checkbox"/> Region-wide activities <input type="checkbox"/> <b>Sharing experiences and best practices</b> <input type="checkbox"/> <b>Confidence - building</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Setting new legal frameworks in key sectors	<u>EU – 5+1 Eastern countries</u> <b>Enlargement-lite</b> <input type="checkbox"/> <b>Bilateral track</b> designed to create a closer relationship between the EU and each of the countries concerned and on a <b>multilateral track</b> providing a new framework where common challenges can be addressed.
<i>Instruments</i>	<u>Black Sea wide</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Existing EU programmes  <input type="checkbox"/> Programmes of regional relevance (TRACECA, Black Sea Commission, etc.)  <input type="checkbox"/> Black Sea Partnerships	<u>EU – 5+1 Eastern countries</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Differentiated <b>Association Agreements</b> that will contain <u>legally binding commitments on regulatory approximation</u> in trade related areas. <input type="checkbox"/> <b>deep and comprehensive free trade area , Neighbourhood Economic Community</b> <input type="checkbox"/> <u>Tailor-made mobility and security pacts</u> <input type="checkbox"/> Tools: Mobility Partnership, Twinning Projects (TAIEX) <input type="checkbox"/> <b>Comprehensive Institution-Building programme (CIB)</b>

<i>Financial Support</i>	<u><i>Black Sea wide</i></u> <input type="checkbox"/> Principle of co-financing <input type="checkbox"/> Community support could be available under the national, regional and cross border programmes of the ENPI <input type="checkbox"/> For EU members, the Regional Development Fund <input type="checkbox"/> Regional activities of the EBRD, the EIB	<u><i>EU – 5+1 Eastern countries</i></u> <input type="checkbox"/> EIB and EBRD <input type="checkbox"/> Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF)
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Source: revised table of Y. Tsantoulis, Black Sea Synergy and the Eastern Partnership: Different Centres of Gravity, Complementarity or Confusing Signals, ICBSS, *Policy Brief*, No.12, February 2009.

Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA), and the Danube-Black Sea Environmental Task Force (DANBLAS). As a result, Russia, which has larger economic size, could potentially serve as an alternative ‘gravity centre’.

After the war between Georgia and Russia, the EU’s suffering from disruptions of gas supplies as a result of a dispute between Ukraine and Russia, the EU launched Eastern Partnership on 3 December 2008. Eastern Partnership is different in the basic contents from Black Sea Synergy, although complementarity between 2 strategy and other regional and international initiatives was pointed out in the paper. Eastern Partnership emphasises the differentiation with reference of each partner’s ability and aspiration to the EU. Eastern Partnership focuses on deepening bilateral cooperation by offering more profound integration with the EU on joint-ownership between each partner and the EU (for example, Association Agreements with legally binding commitments on regulatory approximation, deep and comprehensive free trade area, tailor-made visa facilitation, Comprehensive Institution Building programme). Therefore it looks like ‘quasi pre-accession’ or ‘enlargement-lite’ (See the arrow of Eastern Partnership in Fig.3).

In the case of Eastern Partnership, there is no reference to the BSEC, no important reference to Black Sea Synergy and exclusion of some key countries (e.g. Russia, Turkey), which might give flexibility to Eastern Partnership from the viewpoint of the EU, but it undermines the spirit of regional cooperation there and it can create new divisions.

## 5. Ten Commandments of the EU vs. Ten values of East Asians – Implications to ‘value oriented diplomacy’ of Japan

Japan’s ‘value oriented diplomacy’ involves placing emphasis on the ‘universal values’ such as democracy, freedom, human rights, the rule of law, and the market economy. Because it is consistent with common values of the EU, cooperation between Japan and the EU will contribute to peace and prosperity in Black Sea region.

Nevertheless, we must not overlook the fact that there is the essential difference in the same word - 'value'. It is due to historical experiences and cultural

**Table2 Comparison of values between the EU and East Asians**

10 Commandments of the EU	10 Values of East Asians (EAs)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Be democratic and respectful of human rights and the rule of law.</li> <li>■ The four freedoms of movement (goods, services, capital, labour).</li> <li>■ Provide for social cohesion between citizens, regions and states.</li> <li>■ Ensure sustainable economic development for the benefit of future generations.</li> <li>■ Reject nationalism and favour the multiple identities of citizens.</li> <li>■ Assure federative multi-tier governance.</li> <li>■ Assure secular governance and favour multi-cultural pluralism.</li> <li>■ Promote multilateral order in international affairs.</li> <li>■ Abstain from threatening or using force against others without just cause.</li> <li>■ Be open, inclusive and integrative towards <b><u>neighbours that adhere to the above.</u></b></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ EAs respect education.</li> <li>■ EAs respect hard work.</li> <li>■ EAs respect saving and frugality.</li> <li>■ EAs version of a social contract.</li> <li>■ Citizens are expected to motivate their children to learn and be self-reliant.</li> <li>■ <b><u>EAs practice national teamwork. Government, business and employees work cooperatively.</u></b> It is related to Triple Helix Model.</li> <li>■ The press should be free, but it must act responsibly.</li> <li>■ Every citizen a stakeholder in the country.</li> <li>■ EAs want their governments to maintain a morally environment for their children.</li> <li>■ EAs do not believe in extreme forms of individualism. Every individual is a member of a society.</li> </ul>
<p>10 Commandments form a framework that has enabled EU to achieve economic prosperity, harmonious relations between citizens, regions and states by <b><u>institutional integration.</u></b></p>	<p>10 values form a framework that has enabled EA to achieve economic prosperity, harmonious relations between citizens by <b><u>de facto functional economic integration.</u></b></p>

Source: by author with reference of followings; M. Emerson, What values for Europe? Ten Commandments, *CEPS Policy Brief*, No.65, Feb. 2005. /P. Dicken, *Global Shift mapping the changing countries of the World Economy*, p. 517.

backgrounds. For example, M. Emerson pointed out 10 Commandments of the EU as values for Europe (Table2). Europe can be open, inclusive and integrative to neighbours only on condition that partners accept European values on their own initiatives. 10 Commandments form a framework that has enabled the EU to achieve functional integration that promotes economic prosperity, harmonious relations between citizens, regions and states by institutional integration.

But functional integration can be achieved without institutional integration, even though it will need appropriate institutions eventually as the regional integration progresses. In East Asia, *de facto* deepening of economic relations is

rapidly progressing, whereas institutional integration is lagging behind. East Asia's inter-regional trade ratio reached the level of the EU's ratio at the time of the formation of a single market there. P. Dicken indicated 10 values of East Asians as a factor of East Asian Miracle. These values may be just personal morality in contrast with social norm of the EU. Nevertheless, taken together, these 10 values form a framework that has enabled East Asian societies to achieve economic prosperity, progress, harmonious relations between citizens, and law and order with acceptance of diversity and practical national teamwork. It may be deprived from the culture of Polytheism.

In contrast, the EU's strategy, especially Eastern Partnership may be based on the conditionality of values derived from Monotheism. In front of Black Sea region, however, the EU does not lose their way, but is unsettled, which is seen in differences between Black Sea Synergy and Eastern Partnership.

The EU looks like tolerant of different values in the framework of Black Sea Synergy. But, seeing recent assertive manners of Russia, different from European values, the EU could hardly be tolerant and returned to the Monotheism in Eastern Partnership.

### **Concluding remarks**

What can we learn from the EU's strategy to Black Sea region? As already mentioned, EU's approach tends to be restricted by conditionality based on shared values. Its characteristics of the EU promote institutional integration in Europe. But it is not suitable to the region where various Gods get together like Black Sea region. Experiences of East Asia including Japan suggest the other possibility of regional integration based on local ownership. Through ODA, Japan has rich experiences of development by finding the strength inherent in the society with respect of local ownership and team work between companies, government agencies, and other institutions like universities and trade associations.

Japan could be a good adviser to the EU which tends to be Euro-centric even in Black Sea region by suggesting different multilateral viewpoints. The cooperation between Japan and the EU with rich experiences of institutional building in Black Sea region will not only enhance estimate of international contribution of Japan, but also suggest various ideas and instruments for regional integration in East Asia to Japan.

I would like to emphasise finding and making use of strength inherent in the society, not conditionality for improvement of weakness. Based on both 'value oriented diplomacy' and 'acceptance of diversity', Japan will serve as a good adviser to Black Sea countries for stability and prosperity because Black Sea region is an arena of coexistence of different values.

**Ivan PETKOV**  
**Special Envoy,**  
**Representative of the Bulgarian BSEC Chairmanship-in-Office**

## **Black Sea Region – Japan: New Developments**

Mr. Chairman Ambassador Okawara,  
Mr. President Prof. Ito,  
Mr. Secretary General of BSEC Ambassador Chrysanthopoulos,  
Distinguished Guests,  
Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I deeply appreciate having the honor and the privilege to be a key note speaker at such an important conference as the Japan – Wider Black Sea Area Dialogue.

It is for the third time that I am coming to Japan and each visit to the Land of the Rising Sun is even more exciting both professionally and personally.

Today we are here to exchange views on the new developments of the cooperation between Japan and the Black Sea Area.

I was born on the Black Sea coast. My home city is Varna – they call it the Summer Capital of Bulgaria. The Black Sea is part of my life and my future is linked to the Black Sea. That is why I was extremely excited when my Minister appointed me as Ambassador at Large on the Black Sea and charged me with a new responsibility – to represent the Bulgarian Chairmanship-in-Office of BSEC at the Permanent International Secretariat in Istanbul.

Now before going into the specific aspects of the prospective of the Japan - Black Sea Cooperation I would like to start by explaining the motto of the Bulgarian Chairmanship, which reads “Bridging Seas, Energizing Cooperation”. We can apply it to the connection between Japan and the Black Sea Region. We both have our Sea, we both promote cooperation. Sea and Cooperation are part of the name of our Organization. These words are the ground work, the foundation of our activities, while the verbs “to bridge” and “to energize” are its engine.

Japan is not a new comer to the Black Sea Region. It has always shown interest in the developments in the area. Japanese companies were involved in building the famous bridges across the Bosphorus, Japanese companies play a leading role in the ongoing construction of the first tunnel under the sea which will connect Asia with Europe; through the Official Development Assistance Japan has been helping the development of the Black Sea Coast Ports by implementing the

Bourgas Port Expansion Project in Bulgaria and the rehabilitation of the port in Constanca in Romania. The metropolitan railway in the capital of my country Sofia is operating with Japanese financial support and know-how.

There is a Japanese interest in the work of South-East European Cooperation Initiative Regional Center for combating trans border crime in Bucharest; Japan has been actively involved in the development of some offshore oil and natural gas fields in the Caspian Sea, in the constructions of Ceylan Oil Pipeline linking Caspian Sea oil reserves to the Turkish Mediterranean Sea Coast and then on to Europe; The South Caucasus natural gas pipeline from Azerbaijan to Turkey via Georgia. The Japanese company SUMITOMO has been providing high quality pipes necessary for the implementation of these projects.

Tokyo has been actively cooperating with other countries in our region and organizations – for instance – since the beginning Japan was a valuable partner in the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe, which was recently replaced by the Regional Cooperation Council, based in Sarajevo.

Now what is the actual situation in the Black Sea Area, what has changed since the last two forums of the Japan – Black Sea Area Dialogue which started in 2005?

Today the strategic importance of the Black Sea as a key geopolitical crossroad, linking Europe with Central Asia and the Caucasus is ever growing. In times of global financial crisis the huge economic potential of the area - 20 million sq. km with 330 million people is even more attractive and challenging. Just to mention that in 2009, there are countries in the region whose economic growth rate was 9%.

The latest efforts of the world players to diversify the supply of energy sources are turning to the Black Sea Region which is an important transit route for Europe and elsewhere. There are heated discussions about the future of the pipeline projects such as Nabuko, South Stream, Bourgas – Alexandropulos. AMBO (linking Burgas on the Black Sea with Vlora at the Adriatic Sea), TRASEKA, Samsun – Ceyhan oil pipeline and so on.

The three-year-old accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union is a major geopolitical change since already the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea are the borders of the European Union. The European Union itself is going through deep changes. The Lisbon treaty which recently entered into force provides for the construction of a stronger united and more powerful European Union capable of playing a key role in international politics. The presence of EU in the Black Sea Area as one of the major players will be a strong driving force to further promote the regional cooperation. The European Union is in deep need to upgrade energy efficiency, develop clean technologies and diversify its sources to grow a competitive, low carbon economy. The 27-nation union has set a target to get 20% of its energy from renewable resources by 2020, more than double the current share. Brussels also intends to expand the use of climate friendly technologies. Not by accident one of the priorities of the Bulgarian Chairmanship-in-Office of

BSEC is the intention to draw the European Union's attention more actively to the Black Sea Region; the BSEC- European Union interaction is directed towards a pragmatic, project oriented, result-based cooperation for resolving the most outstanding issues in the economic development of the region and this will inevitably foster dialogue and mutual understanding. In this light we believe that three directions of the European Union-BSEC dialogue are essential.

First - the Sectorial Partnerships in the frame of the Black Sea Synergy will be launched soon. I am very happy to inform you that during the last EU-BSEC meeting on the 14 December 2009 the European Commission announced that the partnership on Environment would be launched on March 16, 2010, while that on Transport will be launched on June 25. The date of the launching of the Energy partnership will be announced at a later stage. The aim is to gather financial support for common projects in priority areas of cooperation such as Energy, Transport and Environment for all interested stakeholders from the BSEC with the active participation of the three countries which are both BSEC and EU member states – Bulgaria Greece and Romania.

Second - the necessity of effective participation of the European Commission as an Observer to BSEC and of involving more actively the other EU member states with an Observer or Sectoral Partner Status to BSEC, namely Austria, Germany, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, France, The Czech Republic, United Kingdom as well as the Swedish and the Spanish Chairmanships-in-Office of the EU; and

Third - the efforts of strengthening of BSEC-EU dialogue through meetings in Brussels in the framework of COEST working party. In this part Bulgaria has proposed to the Swedish and Spanish Presidencies such BSEC-EU meetings during our Chairmanship-in-Office. The first meeting already took place and was crowned by success.

Additional asset for the region as a whole is the Strategic Partnership which is being developed between European Union and the Russian Federation.

Bulgaria believes that the importance of the contacts between the local and regional authorities in the Black Sea Region should be underlined as well. We believe that the Black Sea - Euroregion established in Varna in September 2008 under the auspices of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, could contribute for the practical regional economic cooperation.

BSEC's think-tank - The International Center for Black Sea Studies has prepared a thorough study which gives a deep analysis and explores the perspectives for the cooperation between EU and BSEC. This guiding document on the future steps is titled Black Sea Regional Strategy (2010-2013) - Promoting a region – wide interaction between the BSEC and the EU.

Another important development and an area of global concern, where Japanese interests coincide with that of the Black Sea Countries, are the security issues.

What are the concrete spheres for cooperation here - expanding cooperation in

the areas of security and stability and to combat organized crime, illegal migration, terrorism, money laundering, illegal traffic of human beings, fight against domestic violence.

Another factor of the changing environment in the modern Black Sea world is the stepping up of the efforts to render BSEC relevant and adequate to today's challenges and to unlock the potential for regional cooperation. When working on the calendar of events we were guided by the following principles: continuity, inclusiveness, and different geometry. Following the logic of the afore mentioned principles we are going to keep on improving the functioning of the organization for further increasing its operational activities and its capacity. We will pursue the project and value- added orientation of the working groups, focusing of the efficiency of the Project Development Fund. Up on our agenda is the development of the regional transport infrastructure. The memoranda of understanding for the coordinated development of the Black Sea Ring Highway (7,000km) and the development of the Motorways of the sea offer us a legal basis for enhancing the cooperation among us thus creating new opportunities for sustainable economic development. I am convinced that the participation of the Japanese companies in these impressive projects will be highly appreciated.

In the area of "soft security" measures, we believe that a working visit in the Black Sea Border Coordination and Information Center in Bourgas will be of interest for all BSEC member states and not only for the littoral states. The aim is to contribute to strengthening the efficiency of border management.

Very encouraging is the sustaining interest of the United States of America (an Observer to BSEC), to the Black Sea Region. The United States Agency for International Development, which is an independent federal government agency and the United States Energy Agency, an association of public and private energy-related organizations and government agencies are actively participating in the discussions on the Energy field. Recently they have contributed a substantial report for the development of the electrical networks interconnection projects in the Black Sea Region.

A higher level of cooperation was reached in establishing closer ties with other important organizations. In 2009 BSEC became a member of the UN Alliance of Civilizations; a Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation between the Permanent International Secretariat of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation and the Central European Initiative – Executive Secretariat is being prepared.

The picture will not be complete if we fail to mention the vast possibilities of cooperation between Japan and the Black Sea countries in culture, tourism, sport, etc. The importance of our region is emphasized by the fact that Istanbul is the European Capital of Culture for 2010; 2010 is the year of Japan in Turkey. In the Bulgarian Chairmanship's calendar of events, a place is reserved for Tourism. We organized in the end of last year a highly successful session of the Working group

on Tourism. Our region is famous for ancient civilizations, beautiful country sides, fantastic sunny beaches, brand new ski resorts, rich cuisine and cultural diversity. For example, in my city of Varna, in the Archeological museum, one can admire the oldest processed gold in the world – 6 000 years of age.

The free circulation of people, goods and services in our region, is constantly developing. A boost in this direction was marked by the recent opening of a new cross-border check point – the forth between Greece and Bulgaria. There are two big forthcoming sport events in our Region – Winter Olympic Games in 2014 in Sochi on the Black Sea Coast in the Russian Federation and the European Soccer Championship that Poland and Ukraine will organize jointly in 2012.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The times when the Japanese foreign policy towards the Black Sea Region was cautious should be over. Faithful to the universal values, such as democracy and market economy Japan would only benefit if it is even more actively involved in the Black Sea Region, and strengthens its ties with Brussels and coordinate its approach toward BSEC area. I have heard Japanese friends say that in the modern world a single country, no matter how powerful and rich, can not survive at the top alone. All we need are serious partners, interdependent and mutually beneficial contacts and fruitful cooperation. The Bulgarian Chairmanship-in-Office shares the opinion that it would be very beneficial to both Japan and the Black Sea Region if the question of granting an Observer status of Japan to BSEC finds its successful solution in the near future. As a global player and a leading economic power, a country with a well known expertise in environmental matters, water management, pioneer in cutting-edge science and technology, institutional renewal and good governance, seismic protection, impressive track record of inter cultural and inter faith dialogue, Japan could play a vital role in upgrading peace, stability and cooperation in the Black Sea Area.

Bulgaria supports the objective of Japan to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council and will do everything it can to realize this goal in order to allow Japan to take the place it deserves in the international arena.

In conclusion I would like to wish success for the cooperation between wider Black Sea Area – Japan, good luck to the famous sumo wrestlers from the Black sea area – the Bulgarian Koto-oshu, the Georgian Kokkai and Tochi-no-shin and the Russian Aran, as well as prosperity for all our friends.

Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to the Global Forum of Japan and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan for the excellent organization of this prestigious event and worm hospitality for me and all other participants and guests.

Thank you very much for your attention.

# 4. An Introduction to The Global Forum of Japan

## (1) Introduction

**[Objectives]** As we embrace the 21st century, international relations are becoming increasingly interdependent, and globalization and regionalism are becoming the big waves. In this global tendency, communicating with the world, especially neighboring countries in the Asia-Pacific region at both governmental and non-governmental level, is one of the indispensable conditions for Japan to survive. On the basis of such understanding, The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) aims to promote the exchange of views on commonly shared interests and issues in the field ranging from politics and security to economy, trade, finance, society and culture, and to help business leaders, Diet members and opinion leaders both in Japan and in their counterpart countries to discuss the formulation of new orders in global and regional arenas.

**[History]** The 1982 Versailles Summit was widely seen as having exposed rifts within the Western alliance. Accordingly, there were expressed concerns that the summit meetings were becoming more and more stylized rituals and that Western solidarity was at risk. Within this context, it was realized that to revitalize the summit meetings there must be free and unfettered exchanges of private-sector views to be transmitted directly to the heads of the participating states. Accordingly, Japanese former Foreign Minister OKITA Saburo, U.S. Trade Representative William BROCK, E.C. Commission Vice President Etienne DAVIGNON, and Canadian Trade Minister Edward LUMLEY, as representatives of the private-sector in their respective countries, took the initiative in founding The Quadrangular Forum in Washington in September 1982. Since then, the end of the Cold War and the altered nature of the economic summits themselves had made it necessary for The Quadrangular Forum to metamorphose into The Global Forum established by the American and Japanese components of The Quadrangular Forum at the World Convention in Washington in October 1991. In line with its objectives as stated above, The Global Forum was intended as a facilitator of global consensus on the many post-Cold War issues facing the international community and reached out to open its discussions not only to participants from the quadrangular countries but also to participants from other parts of the world. Over the years, the gravity of The Global Forum's activities gradually shifted from its American component (housed in The Center for Strategic and International Studies) to its Japanese component (housed in The Japan Forum on International Relations), and, after the American component ceased to be operative, the Board of Trustees of the Japanese component resolved, on February 7, 1996, that it would thereafter act as an independent body for organizing bilateral dialogues with Japan as a hub for all countries in the world, and amended its by-laws accordingly. At the same time, The Global Forum's Japanese component was reorganized into The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) in line with the principle that the organization be self-governing, self-financing, and independent of any other organization.

**[Organization]** The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) is a private, non-profit, non-partisan, and independent membership organization in Japan to engage in and promote international exchanges on policy-oriented matters of bilateral, regional and global implications. While the secretariat is housed in The Japan Forum on International Relations, GFJ itself is independent of any other organizations, including The Japan Forum on International Relations. Originally established as the Japanese component of The Quadrangular Forum at the initiative of HATTORI Ichiro, OKITA Saburo, TAKEYAMA Yasuo, TOYODA Shoichiro in 1982, GFJ is currently headed by OKAWARA Yoshio as Chairman and ITO Kenichi as President. The membership is composed of 11 Business Leader Members including the two Governors, MOGI Yuzaburo and TOYODA Shoichiro; 16 Diet Members including the three Governors, KOIKE Yuriko, HIRONAKA Wakako, and TANIGAKI Sadakazu; and 85 Opinion Leader Members including the four Governors, SHIMADA Haruo, OKAWARA Yoshio, ITO Kenichi and WATANABE Mayu. Friends and supporters of The Global Forum of the Japan are organized into the Supporters' Club of the Global Forum of Japan. Financially the activities of GFJ have been supported by the annual membership fees paid by 11 leading Japanese corporations (Toyota Motor Corporation and Kikkoman Corporation contributing 5 shares each, and the other 9 corporations contributing 1 or 2 shares each) as well as by the grants provided by The Japan Foundation, Japan-ASEAN Exchange Projects, Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund, The Tokyo Club, The Japan-Korea Cultural Foundation, etc. YANO Takuya serves as Executive Secretary.

**[Activities]** Since the start of The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) in 1982, GFJ has shifted its focus from the exchanges with the Quadrangular countries for the purpose of contributing to the Western Summit, to those with neighboring countries in the Asia-Pacific region including US, China, Korea, ASEAN countries, India, Australia, European countries, and Wider Black Sea area, for the purposes of deepening mutual understanding and contributing to the formation of international order. GFJ has been active in collaboration with international exchange organizations in those countries in organizing policy-oriented intellectual exchanges called "Dialogue." In order to secure a substantial number of Japanese participants in the "Dialogue," GFJ in principle holds these "Dialogues" in Tokyo. A listing of topics of "Dialogues" and its overseas co-sponsors in last six years is given below.

Year	Month	Topic	Co-sponsor
2005	April	The Prospect of East Asian Community and Japan-Korea Cooperation	Presidential Committee on Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative (Korea)
	June		ASEAN-ISIS
	November	The Prospect for East Asian Community and Regional Cooperation Peace and Prosperity in the Wider Black Sea Area and the Role of Japan	University of Shizuoka, The Black Sea University Foundation (Romania), The International Center for Black Sea Studies (Turkey)
2006	February	Review and Perspective of the Japan-Taiwan Relationship	Taiwan International Studies Association (Taiwan)
	June	An East Asian Community and the United States	The Pacific Forum CSIS (US), The Council on East Asian Community
	September	Prospect for Japan-ASEAN Strategic Partnership after the First East Asia Summit	ASEAN-ISIS
2007	January	The China-Japan Relationship and Energy and Environmental Issues	China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (China), Energy Research Institute, National Development and Reform Commission (China), The Japan Forum on International Relations
	June	The US-Japan Alliance in the 21st Century	National Committee on American Foreign Policy (US)
	July	The Challenges Facing Japan and ASEAN in the New Era	ASEAN-ISIS
	November	Japan and Black Sea Area in the Rapidly Changing World	Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), Embassy of Turkey, University of Shizuoka
2008	January	An East Asian Community and the US	The Council on East Asia Community, The Pacific Forum CSIS (US)
	June	Cooperation in Environment and Energy	The Council on East Asian Community, The East Asian Institute of National University of Singapore(Singapore)
	July	Japan -China Relations Entering A New Stage	Institute of Japanese Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (China)
September	Prospect of Japan-ASEAN Partnership after the Second Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation	ASEAN-ISIS	
2009	April	US-Japan Relations Under the New Obama Administration	National Committee on American Foreign Policy (US)
	June	Prospect of Japan-China Relationship in the Changing World	China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (China)
	September	Japan-ASEAN Cooperation amid the Financial and Economic Crisis	ASEAN-ISIS
2010	January	Prospects of Changing Black Sea Area and Role of Japan	Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)

## (2) Membership List of The Global Forum of Japan

As of January 13, 2010

In alphabetical order

### 【Chairman】

OKAWARA Yoshio, Special Adviser, Institute for International Policy Studies

### 【President】

ITO Kenichi, President and CEO, The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.

### 【Business Leader Governors】

MOGI Yuzaburo, Chairman and CEO, Kikkoman Corporation  
TOYODA Shoichiro, Honorary Chairman, Toyota Motor Corporation

### 【Diet Member Governors】

HIRONAKA Wakako, Member of the House of Councillors. (DPJ)  
KOIKE Yuriko, Member of the House of Representatives. (LDP)  
TANIGAKI Sadakazu, M.H.R. (LDP)

### 【Opinion Leader Governors】

ITO Kenichi, President and CEO, The Japan Forum on International Relations Inc.  
OKAWARA Yoshio, Special Adviser, Institute for International Policy Studies  
SHIMADA Haruo, President, Chiba University of Commerce  
WATANABE Mayu, Director of Administration, The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc

### 【Business Leader Members】 (11 Members)

HANDA Haruhisa, Chairman, Worldwide Support for Development  
IMAI Takashi, Honorary Chairman, Nippon Steel Corporation  
ISHIKAWA Hiroshi, Director, Kajima Corporation  
KATSUMATA Tsunehisa, Chairman, Tokyo Electric Power Company.  
MOGI Yuzaburo, Chairman and CEO, Kikkoman Corporation  
SEYA Hiromichi, Senior Corporate Adviser, Asahi Glass Co., Ltd.  
TANAKA Tatsuo, Vice President, The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Ltd.  
YAGUCHI Toshikazu, President, Biru Daiko Co., Ltd.  
YAMAMOTO Tadahito, President and Representative Director, Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd.  
TOYODA Shoichiro, Honorary Chairman, Toyota Motor Corporation  
(T B D), Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation

### 【Diet Member Members】 (16 Members)

ASAO Keiichiro, (YP)  
HATOYAMA Yukio, M.H.R. (DPJ)  
HOSODA Hiroyuki, M.H.R. (LDP)  
KITAGAMI Keiro, M.H.R. (DPJ)  
KOIKE Yuriko, M.H.R. (LDP)  
NAGASHIMA Akihisa, M.H.R. (DPJ)  
NAKAGAWA Masaharu, M.H.R. (DPJ)  
OGUSHI Hiroshi, M.H.R. (DPJ)  
SHIOZAKI Yasuhisa, M.H.R. (LDP)  
TANIGAKI Sadakazu, M.H.R. (LDP)  
YAMAGUCHI Tsuyosi, M.H.R. (DPJ)  
FUJITA Yukihiisa, (DPJ)  
HAYASHI Yoshimasa, M.H.C. (LDP)  
HIRONAKA Wakako, M.H.C. (DPJ)  
NAITO Masamitsu, M.H.C. (DPJ)  
SEKOU Hironari, M.H.C. (LDP)

### 【Opinion Leader Members】 (85 Members)

AICHI Kazuo, Chairman, Japan Forum for Strategic Studies  
AKASHI Yasushi, Chairman, International House of Japan  
AOKI Tamotsu, Contract Professor, Aoyama Gakuin University  
AMAKO Satoshi, Professor, Waseda University  
ASOMURA Kuniaki, Professor, North Asia University  
CHINO Keiko, Columnist, The Sankei Shimbun  
FUKUSHIMA Teruhiko, Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan  
GYOHTEN Toyoo, President, Institute for International Monetary Affairs  
HAKAMADA Shigeki, Professor, Aoyama Gakuin University  
HARUNA Mikio, Professor, Graduate School of Nagoya University  
HASEGAWA Kazutoshi, Duputy Chairman, Japan-Korea Cooperation Committee  
HATA Kei, Vice Principal, Sakushin Gakuin  
HATTORI Kenji, Foreign News Editor, Jiji Press  
HIRABAYASHI Hiroshi, Vice President, The Japan Forum on International Relations Inc.  
HIRONO Ryokichi, Professor Emeritus, Seikei University  
HONDA Masaru, Senior Staff Writer Political News Department, The Asahi Shimbun  
ICHIKAWA Isao, Executive Director, Tokyo Gakugei University  
IKEO Aiko, Professor, Waseda University  
IMAGAWA Yukio, former Ambassador to Cambodia  
INA Hisayoshi, Columnist, The Nikkei Newspaper  
INOUCHI Takashi, President, University of Niigata Prefecture  
ITO Eisei, former Member of the House of Representatives  
ITO Kenichi, President and CEO, The Japan Forum on International Relations Inc.  
ITO Tsuyoshi, Professor, Meiji University  
IWAKUNI Tetsundo, Professor, University of Virginia

IWAMA Yoko, Associate Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies  
IZUMI Hajime, Professor, University of Shizuoka  
JIMBO Ken, Associate Professor, Keio University  
KAMIYA Matake, Professor, National Defense Academy  
KAWAI Masahiro, Dean and CEO, Asian Development Bank Institute  
KAWAI Masao, Guest Professor, Hakuo University  
KIMURA Takayuki, Guest Professor, International Christian University  
KINOSHITA Hiroo, Advisor, National Small Business & Information Promotion Center  
KOGURE Masayoshi, former Professor, Toyo University  
KOKUBUN Ryosei, Professor, Keio University  
KONDO Tetsuo, President, Institute for New Era Strategy (INES)  
KUBO Fumiaki, Professor, Keio University  
MANO Teruhiko, former Advisor to the President, The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Ltd.  
MIYAMOTO Nobuo, Diplomatic Commentator  
MIYAZAKI Isamu, Honorary Advisor, Daiwa Institute of Research  
MIYOSHI Masaya, Chairman and CEO, Miyoshi Networks Co., Ltd.  
MORI Toshimitsu, former Ambassador to Kazakhstan  
MORIMOTO Satoshi, Professor, Takushoku University  
MURAKAMI Masayasu, Acting Executive Director, The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc  
MURATA Koji, Professor, Doshisha University  
MUTSUSHIKA Shigeo, Professor, The University of Shizuoka  
NAKAGANE Katsuji, Professor, Aoyama Gakuin University  
NAKAHARA Nobuyuki, President, The American Studies Foundation  
NISHIKAWA Megumi, Foreign News Editor, Mainichi Newspapers  
OGASAWARA Takayuki, Professor, Yamanashi Gakuin University  
OKAWARA Yoshio, Special Adviser, Institute for International Policy Studies  
OKONOGI Masao, Professor, Keio University  
ONUMA Yasuaki, Professor, Meiji University  
OHYA Eiko, Journalist  
SAITO Akira, President, Yomiuri Nippon Symphony Orchestra Tokyo  
SAKAKIBARA Eisuke, Professor, Waseda University  
SAKAMOTO Masahiro, Vice-president, Japan Forum for Strategic Studies  
SAJIMA Naoko, Professor, Senshu University  
SHIMADA Haruo, President, Chiba University of Commerce  
SHIMIZU Yoshikazu, Supreme Advisor, Kamakura Gayukai  
SHIRAIISHI Takashi, Guest Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies  
SOEYA Yoshihide, Professor, Keio University  
SONE Yasunori, Professor, Keio University  
SUDO Shigeru, Director, Energy and Environment Program, International Development Center of Japan  
SUZUKI Keisuke, former Member of the House of Representatives  
TAHARA Soichiro, Journalist  
TAIDA Hideya, Member of the board of trustees, Akita International University  
TAJIMA Takashi, Guest Professor, Akita International University  
TAKAHARA Akio, Professor, The University of Tokyo  
TAKAHASHI Kazuo, Guest Professor, International Christian University  
TAKASHIMA Hatsuhisa, President and CEO, Japan International Broadcasting  
TAKEUCHI Yukio, Justice, Supreme Court of Japan  
TAKEMI Keizo, Professor, Tokai University  
TAKUBO Tadae, Guest Professor, Kyorin University  
TANAKA Akihiko, Professor, The University of Tokyo  
TANAKA Toshiro, Professor, Keio University  
TANINO Sakutarō, former Ambassador to China  
URATA Shujiro, Professor, Waseda University  
UTSUMI Yoshio, former Secretary General, International Telecommunication Union  
WATANABE Mayu, Director of Administration, The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc  
YAMANAKA Akiko, former Member of the House of Representatives  
YAMAUCHI Masayuki, Professor, The University of Tokyo  
YAMAZAWA Ipppei, Professor Emeritus, Hitotsubashi University  
YOSHITOMI Masaru, Special Adviser, Research Institute of Economy, Trade & Industry  
YUSHITA Hiroyuki, Guest Professor, Kyorin University

### 【Supporters' Club Members】 (15 Members)

ASAO Keiichiro, AKASHI Yasushi (5 Unit Members), and others (13 members)

### 【Executive Secretary】

YANO Takuya

[Note] DPJ: Democratic Party of Japan  
LDP: Liberal Democratic Party  
NK: New Komeito  
YP: Your Party

## **5. An Introduction to Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)**

### **About BSEC**

On 25 June 1992, the Heads of State and Government of eleven countries, Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine signed in Istanbul the Summit Declaration and the Bosphorus Statement, giving birth to the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC).

It came into existence as a unique and promising model of multilateral political and economic initiative aimed at fostering interaction and harmony among the Member States, ensuring peace, stability and prosperity, and encouraging friendly and good-neighborly relations in the Black Sea region.

In March 1994, the BSEC Headquarters—the Permanent International Secretariat of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC PERMIS)—was established in Istanbul. With the entry into the force of its Charter on 1 May 1999, BSEC acquired international legal identity and was transformed into a full-fledged regional economic organization: ORGANIZATION OF THE BLACK SEA ECONOMIC COOPERATION. With the accession of Serbia in April 2004, the organization's Member States increased to twelve.

### **Facts about the BSEC Region**

- BSEC covers a geography encompassing the territories of the Black Sea littoral States, the Balkans and the Caucasus with an area of nearly 20 million square kilometers. The BSEC region is located on two continents.
- BSEC represents a region of approximately 350 million people with a foreign trade capacity of over USD 300 billion annually.
- Next to the Persian Gulf region, it is the second-largest source of source of oil and natural gas along with its rich proven reserves of minerals and metals.
- It is becoming Europe's major transport and energy transfer corridor.

### **BSEC Economic Agenda**

BSEC Economic Agenda for the future towards a more consolidated, effective and viable BSEC partnership:

- I. Acceleration of effective multilateral economic cooperation and attainment of sustainable development
- II. Cooperation in the field of institutional renewal and governance
- III. Soft security measures in the framework of multilateral economic cooperation
- IV. BSEC: towards the mature partnership, common, endeavor and shared values
- V. External relations of the BSEC organization

**Related Bodies and Affiliated Centers :** Parliamentary Assembly of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (PABSEC), BSEC Business Council (BSECBC), Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (BSTDB), International Center for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS), BSEC Coordination Center for the Exchange of Statistical Data and Economic Information

**Sectoral Dialogue Partnership :** Black Sea International Shipowners Association (BINSAs), Black & Azov Seas Ports Association (BASPA), Union of Road Transport Association in the Black Sea, Economic Cooperation Region (BSEC-URTA), Black Sea Region Association of Shipbuilders and Shiprepairers (BRASS), Regional Commonwealth in the Field of Communications (RCC), International Network for SMEs (INSME)



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