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**THE “JAPAN-U.S. DIALOGUE”  
OF THE GLOBAL FORUM OF JAPAN**

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**Promoting Japan-U.S. Cooperation in Non-Traditional Security :  
the Case of Counter Piracy**

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**Conference Papers**

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May 14, 2010  
Lecture Hall of the International House of Japan  
Tokyo, Japan

Supported by  
The Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership

Co-sponsored by  
The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)  
National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR)

Entrusted by  
Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)

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# 1. Greetings



On behalf of The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ), which is a co-sponsor of the “Japan-U.S. Dialogue: Promoting Japan-U.S. Cooperation in Non- Traditional Security---the Case of Counter Piracy,” I would like to thank first to our U.S. counterpart of The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) for all its contributions to the successful preparations of the joint venture. I would also like to add that we are happy to welcome so many participants from the public in the open symposium. The “Dialogue” deals with an issue of rising concern for the 21th century world, i.e. piracy, which has emerged as one of the new threats known as "non-traditional" security issues. Piracy can no longer be considered just as a criminal matter. It is now a part of the national security threat. With our economy more and more deeply integrated in the "borderless" global economy, it is imperative that peace on oceans be secured to guarantee uninterrupted tradings among nations.

For today’s “Dialogue,” we have brought together a group of key experts on the issue, who will provide guidelines to deploy multiple approaches to counter this threat of piracy, with an aim of paving way for international maritime cooperation. With valuable insights gained from them, I am confident that today’s “Dialogue” will successfully achieve its task of further strengthening Japan-US cooperation in "non-traditional" security, especially in the field of counter piracy. Also, I am confident that this “Dialogue” will help promote discussions among business, academic, political and media circles of both Japan and the U.S as well as the international community to better understand the ways to enhance the global maritime security. Besides, today’s “Dialogue,” I hope, will become the start of a constructive relationship between GFJ and NBR.

Lastly, I would like to stress my deepest appreciation for The Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership (CGP) without whose support it was never possible for us to achieve this result.

Best regards,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads 'Ito Kenichi' in a cursive style.

ITO Kenichi  
President, The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)  
Tokyo, Japan  
May 14, 2010



Greetings!

On behalf of The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) in its capacity as a co-sponsor, it is my pleasure to welcome you to this symposium – “Promoting Japan-U.S. Cooperation in Non-Traditional Security: the Case of Counter Piracy.” We are pleased to partner with the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) on this symposium, which explores an issue that has made headlines in recent years, both in Asia and in other areas of the world, particularly in the Horn of Africa. We have an outstanding group of scholars gathered here today to help inform our understanding of the lessons learned and the challenges that remain as countries work to enhance maritime security and ensure the safe passage of goods through the world’s most important waterways. I would like to express appreciation to JFIR for inviting NBR to partner on this critically important initiative.

The authors and presenters participating in this symposium are the foremost experts in their fields, and we are honored that they have agreed to participate in this project. Their research and analysis will allow policymakers, academics, and business leaders in Japan, the United States, and across the globe to engage one another more effectively, leading to more beneficial outcomes and to a healthier international environment. Indeed, international waterways are the backbone of the global trading system and maintaining their security is a critical priority for all trading nations. Through this project we will gain a better understanding of the trends and drivers that influence maritime safety and security, as well as explore ways in which Japan and the United States might partner to enhance their already robust cooperation on these issues.

Initiatives such as this are not possible without the support of committed sponsors and partners. I would particularly like to thank the Japan Foundation/Center for Global Partnership for their support. Finally, this project promises to be the beginning of a fruitful and enduring relationship between NBR, the Japan Forum on International Relations, and the Global Forum on Japan. For this we are truly excited and grateful.

Thank you for participating and contributing to the symposium.

Warm regards,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'R. J. Ellings'.

Richard J. Ellings  
President  
Seattle, Washington, USA  
May 14, 2010

## 2. Program

**グローバル・フォーラム「日米対話」**  
**The "Japan-U.S. Dialogue" of the Global Forum of Japan**

**非伝統的安全保障における日米協力の推進：海賊対策をめぐって**

**Promoting Japan-U.S. Cooperation in Non-Traditional Security:**  
**the Case of Counter Piracy**

2010年5月14日／May 14, 2010  
 国際文化会館「講堂」／"Lecture Hall," International House of Japan

2010年5月14日(金)／Friday, 14 May, 2010  
 国際文化会館「講堂」／"Lecture Hall," International House of Japan

**セッション I / Session I**

13:00-14:00 非伝統的安全保障における日米協力の推進 Promoting Japan-U.S. Cooperation in Non-Traditional Security	
議長挨拶 (5分間) Greeting by Chairman (5 min.)	平林 博 日本国際フォーラム副理事長 HIRABAYASHI Hiroshi, Vice President, the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)
報告A (10分間) Paper Presentation A (10 min.)	伊藤 剛 明治大学教授 ITO Go, Professor, Meiji University
報告B (10分間) Paper Presentation B (10 min.)	シェルドン・サイモン アリゾナ州立大学教授 Sheldon W. SIMON, Professor, Arizona State University
自由討議 (30分間) Free Discussions (40 min.)	出席者全員 All Participants
議長総括 (5分間) Summarization by Chairman (5 min.)	平林 博 日本国際フォーラム副理事長 HIRABAYASHI Hiroshi, Vice President, JFIR

<b>セッションⅡ / Session II</b>	
<b>14:00-15:25</b> 海賊対策の教訓と課題：マラッカとソマリアの事例を中心に Lessons and Challenges of Counter Piracy : Cases of Malacca and Somalia	
議長挨拶 (5分間) Greeting by Chairman (5 min.)	ティム・クック 全米アジア研究所政治安全保障問題担当プロジェクト・ディレクター Tim COOK, Project Director, Political and Security Affairs, NBR
報告A (10分間) Paper Presentation A (10 min.)	ニール・クォータロ コロンビア大学特任准教授 Neil QUARTARO, Adjunct Assistant Professor, Columbia University
報告B (10分間) Paper Presentation B (10 min.)	山田 吉彦 東海大学教授 YAMADA Yoshihiko, Professor, Tokai University
報告C (10分間) Paper Presentation C (10 min.)	ジェームズ・マニコム ウォータールー大学バルジリ国際関係大学院特別研究員 James MANICOM, Fellow, Balsillie School of International Affairs, University of Waterloo
自由討議 (45分間) Free Discussions (45 min.)	出席者全員 All Participants
議長総括 (5分間) Summarization by Chairman (5 min.)	ティム・クック 全米アジア研究所政治安全保障問題担当プロジェクト・ディレクター Tim COOK, Project Director, Political and Security Affairs, NBR
<b>15:25-15:35</b> 休憩 / Break	
<b>セッションⅢ / Session III</b>	
<b>15:35-17:00</b> 海賊対策と日米同盟：海洋安全保障協力の可能性をめぐって Counter Piracy and the Japan-U. S. Alliance: Prospects for Maritime Security Cooperation	
議長挨拶 (5分間) Greeting by Chairman (5 min.)	矢野 卓也 グローバル・フォーラム事務局長、日本国際フォーラム研究室長 YANO Takuya, Executive Secretary GFJ / Research Coordinator, JFIR
報告A (10分間) Paper Presentation A (10 min.)	小谷 哲男 海洋政策研究財団研究員 KOTANI Tetsuo, Research Fellow, the Ocean Policy Research Foundation
報告B (10分間) Paper Presentation B (10 min.)	ジョン・ブラッドフォード 国防総省日本課長 John BRADFORD, Country Director for Japan, Office of the Secretary of Defense
報告C (10分間) Paper Presentation C (10 min.)	金田 秀昭 岡崎研究所理事 KANEDA Hideaki, Director, the Okazaki Institute
自由討議 (45分間) Free Discussions (45 min.)	出席者全員 All Participants
議長総括 (5分間) Summarization by Chairman (5 min.)	矢野 卓也 グローバル・フォーラム事務局長、日本国際フォーラム研究室長、 YANO Takuya, Executive Secretary GFJ / Research Coordinator, JFIR

[Note] Japanese-English simultaneous interpretation provided / [注] 日本語・英語同時通訳付き

### 3. Biographies of the Panelists

#### **【U.S. Panelists】**



**Sheldon W. SIMON** *Professor, Arizona State University*

Received Ph.D. from University of Minnesota. Served as a chair of the Political Science Department at Arizona State University and subsequently served as the Director of The Center for Asian Studies at the University. Held faculty appointments at the Universities of Hawaii, British Columbia, and Kentucky as well as at George Washington University, Carleton University (Ottawa), The Monterey Institute of International Studies, and The American Graduate School of International Management.



**Tim COOK** *Project Director, Political and Security Affairs,  
The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR)*

Received B.A. from Carleton College and M.A. from the University of Washington in International Relations. Entered The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) in 2006 as a member of the inaugural class of Next Generation Leadership in Asian Affairs fellows. Served as the Assistant Director of Political and Security Affairs, and Assistant Director of Washington, DC Office.



**Neil QUARTARO** *Adjunct Assistant Professor, Columbia University*

Received B.A. in International Relations from York University and J.D. from Fordham University. Currently practices in the International Litigation group in the New York office of Watson, Farley & Williams. Also lectures at Columbia University and serves on the research team at Center for Energy, Marine Transportation & Public Policy (CEMTPP). Co-chairs the New York State Bar Association (NYSBA) International Section Committee.



**James MANICOM** *Fellow, Balsillie School of International Affairs,  
University of Waterloo*

Graduated from Mount Allison University, New Brunswick, Canada. Received M.A. in International Relations from Flinders University in 2004 and Ph.D. from School of Political and International Studies, Flinders University. Currently, serves as part-time Professor at Canadian Forces College. Asian Institute Affiliate at University of Toronto.



**John F. BRADFORD** *Country Director for Japan,  
Office of the Secretary of Defense*

Received B.A. from Cornell University and M.S. from Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore. Served in three navy warships, as the Combat Systems Officer and Chief Engineer in USS STETHEM (DDG63), Navigator in USS FORT MCHENY (LSD 43), and First Lieutenant in USS JOHN S. MCCAIN (DDG 56). Also completed an assignment as the Assistant Plans Officer on the Commander Naval Forces Japan staff.

## 【Japanese Panelists】



**HIRABAYASHI Hiroshi** *Vice President, the Japan Forum  
on International Relations (JFIR)*

Graduated from the University of Tokyo. Entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1963. From 1991 to 2006, served successively as Deputy Chief of Mission in Washington D.C. , Director-General of Economic Cooperation Bureau at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs , Chief Cabinet Councilor on External Affairs at Prime Minister's Cabinet, Ambassador to India and Ambassador to France. Concurrently President of the Japan-India Association, Visiting Professor of the Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies of Waseda University and so forth.



**ITO Go** *Professor, Meiji University*

Graduated from Sophia University. Received Ph.D. at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver in 1997. Served as Associate Professor at Meiji University in 1998, and Promoted to Professor in 2006. Also served as Adjunct Professor (International Security) at Waseda University as well as Sophia University, and as Adjunct Researcher of the House of Councilors. Recipients of the Eisenhower Fellowships in 2005 and the Nakasone Yasuhiro Award in 2006.



**YAMADA Yoshihiko** *Professor, Tokai University*

Received Ph.D. in Economics from Saitama University. Served as a Trader, Bond Market Section, Finance Securities Department, Toyo Trust and Banking Company, Limited in 1989-1991. Served as the Director of Maritime Department at the Nippon Foundation in 1991-2008. Currently serves as Professor at Tokai University.



**YANO Takuya** *Executive Secretary, The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ)*  
Graduated from the Faculty of Literature of Keio University in 1998. Received Master of Law from Keio University in 2000. Completed Doctoral Program at Keio University in 2004. Served as Associate Research Fellow and Research Fellow of The Japan Forum of International Relations (JFIR). Held the current position since 2009. Concurrently serves as Senior Research Fellow / Research Coordinator of JFIR and Executive Secretary of The Council on East Asian Community.



**KOTANI Tetsuo** *Research Fellow, the Ocean Policy Research Foundation*  
Served as Visiting Fellow at the Center for U.S. -Japan Studies and Cooperation at Vanderbilt University in 2003-2006. Also a member of the International Advisory Council of the Project 2049 Institute, and a book review editor of the Journal of Indian Ocean Region. Recipient of the Japanese Defense Minister Prize of 2003 and the 2006-2008 Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS) Security Studies Fellowship.



**KANEDA Hideaki** *VADM (ret), Director of the Okazaki Institute*  
Graduated from the National Defense Academy in 1968, and the Maritime War College in 1983, and U.S. Naval War College in 1988. Served as Senior Fellow of Asia Center and J. F. Kennedy School of Government of the Harvard and Guest Professor of Faculty of Policy Management of Keio University. Director for the Okazaki Institute, Adjunct Fellow of Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), and trustee of Research Institute of Peace and Security (RIPS).

(In order of appearance)

## 4. Keynote Papers

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### *Session I: "Promoting Japan-U.S. Cooperation in Non-Traditional Security"*

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**ITO Go**  
**Professor, Meiji University**

#### **THE ESTABLISHMENT OF U.S.-JAPAN COMPREHENSIVE APPROACHES TO COUNTER-PIRACY**

This paper first points out the need of multiple approaches with which both the Japanese and the U.S. governments should control threats of piracy. Secondly, the paper introduces several mechanisms for combat piracy, which is being used or under consideration in the Gulf of Aden (GOA). Thirdly, it argues that the international community should extend to the GOA and Somali waters the lessons from Southeast Asia in the practice of counter piracy.

#### **Counter-Piracy and Japan's Relations with the United States**

Piracy is a global problem that requires global effort to counter. In light of the events of 9/11 and the subsequent Global War on Terrorism, piracy can no longer be considered just as a criminal matter. Due to its growing partnership with terrorism, it is now a national security threat. With the global economy deeply integrated with each other, it is imperative that security on oceans remains undeniable in order to provide uninterrupted trade routes and secure access.

Under the banner of the U.S.-Japan partnership, both governments recognize that there will be no one answer to fighting piracy, and realize that it will need to use multiple approaches involving different instruments of power to control this threat. For these reasons, both governments must develop a multi-faceted comprehensive counter-piracy policy that coordinates its international efforts along with its inter-agency efforts.

Both governments should, through their active presence, enhance the safety of commercial maritime routes and international navigation along the Malacca Straits and also off the Horn of Africa. They will assume a high visible profile, conducting surveillance tasks and providing protection to deter and suppress piracy and armed robbery. The utility and flexibility of the

counter-piracy system, if successfully constructed, will clearly demonstrate the importance of the bilateral and multilateral cooperation on issue of counter-piracy, and will also become the proto-type of the international maritime cooperation.

### **Mechanisms for Combating Piracy**

A range of options exists for combating maritime piracy, but experts stress that most of the current tactics are defensive in nature, and do not address the state instability that allows piracy to flourish. The mechanisms used or under consideration in the most prevalent piracy area, the Gulf of Aden, can be classified as follows:

#### **(1) Onboard deterrents:**

Individual ships have adopted different onboard deterrents. Some use rudimentary measures such as fire hoses, deck patrols, or even carpet tacks to repel pirates. Others use a nonlethal electric screen with a loudspeaker system that emits a pitch so painful it keeps pirates away.

#### **(2) Naval deployments:**

By January 2009, an estimated thirty ships were patrolling an area of about 2.5 million square miles. More than a dozen countries--including Russia, France, the United Kingdom, India, China, and the United States--had sent warships to the Gulf of Aden to deter pirates. There were also two multinational anti-piracy patrols in the area: the European Union's military operation, which began in December 2008; and a multinational contingent, known as Combined Task Force 150, which was originally tasked with counterterrorism efforts off the Horn of Africa.

#### **(3) Regional anti-piracy patrols:**

Some experts have suggested that East African and Middle Eastern countries should work together to patrol the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden. Peter Lehr, a lecturer in terrorism studies at the University of St. Andrews, writes that such patrols could be modeled (*Guardian*) on those that the navies of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand conducted in the Malacca Strait. Western navies could provide technical assistance and secondhand ships, he suggests.

#### **(4) Establishing effective coast guard:**

Experts unanimously stress that the only effective long-term piracy deterrent is a stable state. When Somalia was briefly under the control of the Islamic Courts Union in 2006, piracy stopped completely. Until recently, sovereignty prevented outside states from targeting inland pirate infrastructure. A UN resolution passed on December 2, 2008, allows states to enter

Somalia's territorial waters in pursuit of pirates, and another resolution passed on December 16, 2008, implicitly authorizes land pursuit.

### **The Opposite Side of the U.S.-Japan Alliance: Non-Traditional Security Issues**

Our bottom line is that the military might is not the only viable option to foster and maintain international order and peace. In order that Japan could contribute to the order formation and rulemaking in East Asia especially in the area of non-traditional security issues as well as traditional ones and thus could project a duly responsible presence in regional and global arena, it is imperative that Japan seeks close cooperation with the U.S. and that Japan and the U.S. as allies assume responsibilities on a equal bases towards the regional order in East Asia.

Unlike conventional precedent researches on multilateral security frameworks in the area, this paper will focus not on the numbers of actors involved in the order formation and rulemaking in East Asia, but rather on the natures of issues addressed in the region as well as on the multi-faceted nature of regional security.

### **Malacca and Somalia**

While corresponding to the above third category referring to the regional anti-piracy patrols, the following two cases differ significantly over the extent to which the coastal states need to prepare the coercive elements of power.

#### **(1) The Malacca Strait**

While piracy in Africa has become a major international security concern, the problem in the strait has been almost completely eradicated. Only two attacks were attempted there in 2008, even as the global total reached a record high. In the first quarter of 2009, the bureau reported that the number of pirate attacks around the world nearly doubled, to 102 incidents, compared with the same period last year; only one of them occurred in the Strait of Malacca.

Maritime security analysts say a combination of factors — both on sea and land — contributed to the pirates' near total defeat. Most significantly, the success in the strait shows how concerted and well-coordinated action by regional governments can prevent pirate attacks on commercial shipping.

#### **(2) Somalia and the Gulf of Aden**

In the case of Somalia, both unilateral and multilateral initiatives to deter piracy in the waters off Somalia and in the strategic GOA have been treated as a great leap forward in the fight against

piracy. Indeed this robust approach is gathering steam and participants at a remarkable rate. But, there is also a concern that it may turn out to be only a stop gap, short term response that satisfies some countries strategic goals but fails to address the root cause of the problem while setting an undesirable precedent for some developing states bordering piracy-prone waters.

### **(3) Lessons from the Strait of Malacca and the Gulf of Aden**

Rather than extend the Somali intervention lessons to Southeast Asia, the international community should extend to the GOA and Somali waters the lessons from Southeast Asia. This means assistance to enhance political and social stability, economic development, as well as anti-piracy technology and training with the goal of indigenous control of the anti-piracy response.

<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Sheldon W. SIMON</b> <b>Professor, Arizona State University</b></p>
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## **SAFETY AND SECURITY IN THE MALACCA STRAITS: THE LIMITS OF COLLABORATION**

The Malacca and Singapore Straits are arguably the world's busiest and most important waterways. An estimated 25 to 40 percent of all world trade passes through them each year, including significant amounts of global oil supplies and other natural resources. Increased vulnerability of shipments through the area, from such causes as piracy and armed robbery to navigational safety concerns, prompted littoral and user states to mount a series of initiatives that helped significantly bolster ship security in the region over the last several years. However, questions remain about the sustainability of these programs, additional needs and opportunities, and the lessons they may offer for enhancing safety and security in other regions.

This paper explores efforts to enhance safety and security in the Malacca and Singapore Straits through the prism of the main actors in the region and their interests, the challenges that these actors face, and the measures that have been taken to combat those challenges. The paper concludes that safety and security arrangements in the region will continue to involve a potpourri of activities, which together have been and will continue to be reasonably effective and predominantly decentralized.

## Major Actors in the Malacca Straits

The three most important players determining how safety and security in the Malacca Straits are to be achieved include the *littoral states*, *user states*, and *shippers*. The littoral states have the right to prescribe rules for navigation safety and security, prevent accidents, and provide regulations for marine pollution. User states' vessels are provided the right of transit passage through the Straits by the UN Law of the Sea. Shippers use the Straits to transport goods from their origin to their destination market.

The littoral states, namely Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia, often have differing views of best practices in the Straits, which may vary according to national threat perceptions, sovereignty concerns, national capabilities, and nonaligned orientation. Examining the capacities and policies of the littoral states helps to understand some of the obstacles to better collaboration. Singapore has the most integrated arrangement of the three with an interagency Maritime and Port Security Working Group that brings together the navy, coast guard, and port authority, which controls ship movements within the port. Given the complexities of such activities, Singapore is a vocal advocate of international cooperation and has also provided armed sea marshals who board and accompany high value vessels that use the port.

Neither Malaysia nor Indonesia has capabilities that match those of Singapore. Malaysia is in the process of acquiring new patrol vessels and has built a string of radar tracking stations along the Straits, and has also placed armed police officers on some tugboats and barges. In 2005, in reaction to the Straits being placed on Lloyd's "war list," Malaysia established a centralized coast guard, known as the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency.

Indonesia gives the least attention to the Malacca Straits, primarily due to pre-occupation with land-based security concerns involving separatist movements and communal strife. Given these challenges, in addition to a dearth of ships capable of patrolling the waterways, piracy is low on Jakarta's list of priorities. While the navy is acquiring new ships, their numbers remain well below those needed for effective surveillance.

Of the user states, the United States and Japan are the primary contributors to the promotion of safety and security in the Straits, with South Korea, China, and India more recently becoming involved. Extra-regional countries primarily assist in capacity building, training, and technical assistance on a bilateral basis.

While commercial shippers are clearly concerned about safety in the Malacca Strait, they oppose any mandatory fee that would contribute to the Strait's safety as contrary to the UN Law

of the Sea's transit passage provision.

### **Challenges in the Malacca Strait: Piracy, Maritime Crime, and Terrorism**

Piracy, maritime crime, and terrorist threats are the primary challenges facing the Malacca Straits. While piracy and maritime crime declined significantly in the Malacca Strait after 2005, there has been an increase in two areas beginning in 2008, namely the Riau archipelago south of Singapore and the northern Malacca Strait between Sumatra and the west coast of Malaysia where there is no agreed EEZ boundary between the two countries. Most maritime crime is small-scale robbery, involving ships at anchor and entering or leaving a harbor and could be countered more effectively by port authorities.

There are many reasons for the difficulty in curbing the incidence and impact of these challenges. Piracy analysts note the contributing economic factors, particularly on the Indonesian side where overpopulation, unemployment, and the absence of infrastructure to encourage investment all contribute to piracy's appeal. Further, piracy by definition occurs in international waters and requires international cooperation, which can be difficult to achieve due to the littoral states' hesitation over sovereignty infringements.

There is also little appetite for burden-sharing on the part of shipping companies when it comes to maintaining safe waterways. The littoral states have requested user state and shipping company assistance to help pay for security, safety, and environmental improvements in the Straits, but they have so far demurred, occasionally because the cost of anti-piracy measures makes little economic sense based on economic analysis of piracy costs to them.

Finally, piracy suppression is further complicated by the Straits' proximity to territorial waters. Pirates can attack a ship in Singapore waters and then flee to Malaysian or Indonesian jurisdictions.

In addition to piracy and related to it are navigational safety and environmental protection problems in the Straits concerning the maintenance and replacement of aids to navigation such as lighthouses, buoys, and radar installations. The littoral states have agreed to specific projects meant to mitigate these challenges.

### **Current Measures for Improving Safety and Security in the Straits**

Current measures for improving safety and security in the Malacca Straits include the Malacca Strait Patrols, external aid to Strait states, and the establishment of the Regional

Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP).

The Malacca Strait Patrols (MSP) is Southeast Asia's only indigenous multilateral ongoing military arrangement, involving the coast guards, navies, and air forces of the littoral states and since 2008, Thailand. A joint coordinating committee meets twice a year, and intelligence is also shared among the participants. However, MSP is more coordinated than joint with each country responsible for patrolling its own sector and each ship under national command.

While external states are not generally involved in patrolling the Malacca Straits, they do play an important role in helping the littorals build capacity. External states have assisted the littoral in improving safety and security practices, through the supply of coastal radars, patrol boats, and training opportunities such as the CARAT and SEACAT exercises conducted with the U.S. Navy. Japan has the longest involvement in supporting Malacca Straits safety with projects dating back to 1969.

While sovereignty concerns limit the littoral states' willingness to participate in multilateral forums, one example of a successful multilateral maritime security regime is the ReCAAP initiative. ReCAAP was launched in 2006 to provide more timely and accurate reports of maritime crime against ships in the region while facilitating best practices among the states concerned. Sixteen states covering South, Southeast, and Northeast Asia belong, though neither Indonesia nor Malaysia are members. Although Indonesia and Malaysia are not members, they have expressed support.

Other forms of cooperation exist, including the "Cooperative Mechanism," which is a 2007 agreement engendered by the International Maritime Organization for the purpose of enhancing navigational safety, security, and environmental protection in the Straits. In addition to the Cooperative Mechanism, the Singapore Navy established the Information Fusion Center in 2009, which houses a number of information sharing arrangements, including the Western Pacific Naval Symposium and MSP Information System.

## **Conclusion**

This study has addressed prospects for enhanced multilateral cooperation among large states, small states, and the private sector shipping industry for improving safety and security in the Straits of Malacca. Our review has demonstrated that there already is significant collaboration among several dimensions by the littorals, from user states to littorals through a variety of assistance arrangements, from littorals to shippers via safe navigation arrangements in

the Straits, and most recently by all of them through the 2007 Cooperative Mechanism for the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.

Nevertheless, for the most part, the foregoing arrangements are ad hoc and incomplete and will likely continue to be decentralized and many, ranging from individual littoral states' capacities, bilateral aid arrangements from users to littorals, limited multilateral protection arrangements among the littorals (e.g., MSP), and multilateral maritime information collection and diffusion (ReCAAP, Cooperative Mechanism, Singapore's IFC). Together, they have created a reasonably effective, decentralized way of keeping the Malacca Straits open to international traffic. Absent a major catastrophe in the Straits, these several, uncoordinated arrangements are unlikely to change.

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*Session II: "Lessons and Challenges of Counter Piracy: Cases of Malacca  
and Somali"*

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**Neil QUARTARO**  
**Adjunct Assistant Professor, Columbia University**

**THE CHALLENGE OF THE JOLLY ROGER: INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES ON  
PIRACY**

Piracy is not a new problem for maritime commerce, though it has been rare in modern times. There has been a recent upswing in attacks, commencing about 15 years ago with ship boardings and robberies in the Straits of Malacca region, and continuing today, most notably off Somalia. Piracy has many forms, and so there are some varying definitions. One of the broader definitions, supplied by the International Maritime Bureau ("IMB"), is that piracy is "the act of boarding any vessel with an intent to commit theft or any other crime, and with an intent or capacity to use force in furtherance of that act", which is a suitable definition for this article.

The international security response to piracy and armed robbery at sea, particularly in the Gulf of Aden, has been the deployment of naval forces from a number of countries and coalitions, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union. Commercially, many vessel owners and operators have responded by taking more robust measures to deter the boarding of their vessels, to the point of employing armed guards in some instances.

This paper explores the cases of piracy in the Gulf of Aden and those in the Strait of Malacca. The paper finds that there are serious structural differences between the two regions, although this should not preclude looking to the Straits of Malacca experience as providing important guidance in reducing piracy in the GOA region. In addition to exploring a comparison of the two regions, this paper canvases the responses employed by non-state commercial stakeholders to combat piracy and armed robbery at sea.

**Key non-state stakeholders in the global marine transportation system**

For the purpose of this paper, the non-nation-state stakeholders in the international marine transportation system are comprised of: (1) Vessel owners and operators; (2) Charterers and

cargo interests; (3) Crew; (4) Protection and indemnity clubs and marine insurance. While this list is by no means exhaustive, each of these stakeholders can fairly be defined as a “commercial stakeholder” in reference to their underlying pecuniary motivation for involvement in the international marine transportation system (which is different than the underlying national security and strategic concerns that primarily motivate nation-states). In addition to these commercial stakeholders, all of whom have been in existence in some form for millennia, is a relative new-comer, the private security company (“PSC”). In its most typical seafaring role, PSCs provide armed guards, usually former military servicemen, for vessels transiting areas where the risk of piracy is high, especially the Gulf of Aden (“GOA”) area off the coast of Somalia. A number of PSC’s are currently actively providing security services to, in particular, shipowners.

### **Straits of Malacca Experience**

The Straits of Malacca are widely considered one of the most important maritime strategic chokepoints in the world. A series of attacks beginning in the 1990s took place in the region, with the attacking pirates coming alongside in small boats and boarding vessels underway. Once aboard, the pirates restrain the crew and steal whatever they can, usually focusing on the master’s safe. Japan, which receives a large portion of its energy supplies through the Straits of Malacca, took the lead in establishing regional cooperation to combat this problem. This effort resulted in the 2004 Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (“ReCAAP”) between the 10 ASEAN nations and Japan, China, Republic of Korea, India, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. The ReCAAP agreement has been credited with general reduction of piracy in the Straits of Malacca region.

In recent months, there have been an increased number of piracy incidents just outside the Straits of Malacca, in the area East of Malaysia. These attacks appear to have the pattern typical for the area, with vessels boarded by knife-wielding pirates while underway, cash and valuables stolen, and the vessel then abandoned back to the crew. These incidents highlight an increase in attacks in the region, particularly off Indonesia, where 8 vessels have reported attacks in the first quarter of 2010, compared to just one in 2009.

### **Piracy in the Gulf of Aden Region Compared to the Straits of Malacca**

The most immediate difference between piracy in the GOA and the Straits of Malacca is of

course the presence of a failed nation-state, Somalia. The lack of central authority and the rule of law along the majority of Somalia's lengthy, rugged coastline is often cited as the root cause of piracy in the GOA, as well as the primary reason that it can't be stopped. While Somalia's neighbors have largely been as cooperative as their means allow, the GOA is a large physical area of open ocean, beyond the means of any or all of the countries in East Africa to effectively control.

This is fundamentally different from the situation in the Straits of Malacca in the 1990s or now. There, all of the neighboring states have functioning governments, albeit with different levels of resources and ability to control the Straits and their environs. Additionally, the geographic area of coverage is smaller, and more conducive to patrolling with the smaller vessels typical of the Indonesian, Malaysian and Singaporean militaries. In contrast, the GOA area covers over 1 million square miles, most of it open ocean, rendering it hard to effectively police.

Other differences between piracy in the two regions include:

- While both Somali and some of the attackers in the Straits of Malacca boarded and took control of vessels while they were underway, the Southeast Asian experience was still largely limited to robbery of the ship's stores and the contents of the master's safe. In the GOA incidents, the entire object of piracy is usually to take control of the ship, crew, and cargo for a prolonged period of time in order to negotiate a ransom.
- The military presence in the GOA has forced Somali pirates to change tactics, most notably by heading out further from shore, in some cases well over 1,200 km from the coastline.
- Politically, GOA piracy is impacted by myriad factors not present in Southeast Asia. The Somali transitional federal government has been largely limited to allowing other forces to interdict pirates inside Somali waters, with U.N. Security Council authorization.
- Complicating the cooperation of the Somali transitional government is the radical Somali Islamist group al Shabaab, which has links to various Islamist organizations identified as terrorist organizations, and is itself considered a terrorist organization.

These differences should not, however, lead to the automatic conclusion that regional cooperation agreements such as ReCAAP have no place in combating GOA piracy. In fact, countries in the GOA region have looked to ReCAAP as a model for certain issues already, such as for the definition of acts considered to constitute piracy.

## Commercial stakeholder positions regarding piracy

### *Ship owners and operators*

The primary concerns of ship owners and operators are generally the continued generation of revenue by their vessels and the safety of the asset. The former concern may relate to not just revenue generation, but to the ability to satisfy underlying debt obligations, such as ship mortgages. In the Straits of Malacca incidents the monetary loss to the owner was usually low. A successful attack in the GOA usually removes a vessel from service for some time, and entails significant operating and other costs in the interim, as well as an eventual ransom payment in the millions of dollars. Given the potentially high cost to ship owners, and their access to resources, it is not surprising that many have reacted to the threat in the GOA in a robust way, with the most common response appearing to be the use of routes that avoid the Somali coast and offer some degree of cover from the various military forces deployed in the GOA. Also, vessels can travel in convoys, which are much easier to protect than a number of vessels traveling separately.

Other common responses by ship owners include:

- Low-tech measures such as the sharing of best practices and increasing watches in high risk areas
- Employing evasive maneuvers and speeding up if an attack appears to be in progress
- The placement of physical barriers around ships and the use of water cannons
- The outfitting of ships with “secure rooms” for crew to retreat to in the event of being overtaken by pirates
- In some cases, the deployment of security guards, both armed and unarmed

### *Cargo and chartering interests*

The interests of crew and cargo interests are largely the same as owners, except that the primary concern of most cargo and chartering interests is the timely and efficient delivery of goods. For vessels that have been time-chartered (a time charter is an agreement to provide a ship and crew for an-agreed period of time, with the ship’s travels, but not operation, directed by the charterer), the time charterer is usually responsible for the expenses of preparing a vessel to transit the GOA area.

### *Crew*

The primary interest of vessel crews undergoing an attack or captured by pirates is of course

personal physical safety. If a vessel is captured, it is usually taken to the Somali coast and anchored until the pirates agree to release it. During this time, the physical environment for the crew is difficult but it is unlikely that the pirates will harm the crew. Thus, the primary risk posed to crews in the GOA is during an attack and boarding of their vessel, with the physical risk declining after a vessel is taken.

#### *Protection and Indemnity Clubs and Marine Insurance*

Protection and indemnity clubs ("P & I") and marine insurance both offer ship owners protection from risk and liability, but in different ways and for different exposures. P & I is a pooled risk group, in which an owner's expenditures for certain types of liability will be repaid by the P & I. P & I coverage includes crew loss of life and injuries, cargo claims, wreck removal, and possibly pollution. Marine insurance is simply third party liability insurance in favor of the owner, with policies such as hull and machinery insurance ("H & M"). An H & M policy pays an owner if the engine fails or the vessel sinks.

Neither P & I nor marine insurance policies typically pay for damages stemming from a pirate attack or the payment of ransom, although war risk policies often contain coverage. It should be noted that some marine insurers have begun to offer kidnap and ransom policies, but these are not normally carried and are quite expensive and have been blunted with U.S. President Barack Obama's signing of Executive Order 13536.

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#### **DANGEROUS SEA AREAS WHERE MANY CASES OF PIRACY TAKE PLACE**

This paper explores the current state of security at sea, focusing on these two areas of the Gulf of Aden and the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, both of which are well known as places where many cases of piracy occur, as well as places that many ships navigate through. The paper first provides an overview of actual conditions of Somali Pirates and countermeasures which have been taken. Next, it examines the nature of piracy in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. The paper concludes that new systems for patrols at sea should be strengthened in order to combat maritime crimes including piracy and terrorism.

## Actual Conditions of Somali Pirates

According to data published by a private organization called the IMB (the ICC International Maritime Bureau) that collects and announces worldwide information about piracy and anti-piracy measures, 406 cases of piracy were committed in the world in 2009. Of these, the largest number took place in the Gulf of Aden and off Somalia where 211 cases of piracy occurred.

### Number of Cases of Piracy

Year	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Worldwide	329	276	239	263	293	406
Southeast Asia	158	102	83	70	54	45
Straits of Malacca and Singapore	46	19	16	10	8	11
Somalia and the Gulf of Aden	10	45	20	44	111	211

(Sources: IMB reports)

Japan is in no way immune to Somali pirates. In 2008, five ships associated with Japan were attacked by pirates, and two of them were hijacked in Somali waters. On April 21, a Japanese tanker called Takayama (150,000 gross tons) was attacked with an anti-tank rocket launcher while navigating in the Gulf of Aden, and a rocket hit it between a ballast tank and a fire wall.

The main reason why many pirates are rampant off Somalia is that a state of anarchy has been continuing in Somalia since the collapse of the socialist military despotic government in 1991. There is serious antagonism among tribes and there is no central government to control it in Somalia. Though the Somali Transitional Federal Government has its capital in Mogadishu and tries to rule the nation somehow, it is helpless to control and patrol its coastal zone, which allows pirates to do whatever they like.

### Countermeasures against Somali Piracy

Asked to take measures against Somali piracy by member states, the Security Council of the United Nations adopted a resolution on June 20, 2008 that called upon the member states to take every possible countermeasure against piracy. This resolution allows member states to take any countermeasure against piracy in Somali territorial waters after obtaining the consent of the Somali Transitional Government and reporting to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Currently, navies from the Combined Task Force centering on those from the U.S., NATO, the EU, Russia and India are patrolling the coast of Somalia in order to combat piracy. They also advise ships navigating through the Gulf of Aden to use the navigation zone under special alert where they regularly patrol, with the U.S. playing a key role. In spite of these efforts, the number of cases of piracy is not declining at all, presumably because the area in which pirates are active is too wide for the patrol vessels to control, and they cannot act rashly when a large number of sailors are being held hostage.

### **Straits of Malacca and Singapore**

The safe transit of ships through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore has more influence on Japanese society than through other world-famous straits. For example, about 86% of the oil imported into Japan is transported by ships sailing through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. Therefore, these areas are called the Japanese lifeline. According to a survey by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport and The Nippon Foundation in 2004, 93,755 ships sailed through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore in one year. Of these, 14,198 were substantially controlled by Japanese shipping companies, the largest number for one country in the world. Japan is typical of countries that benefit from shipping through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.

### **Victims of Piracy in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore**

Having experienced such cases of piracy as the incidents of the ship *Tenyu* and the ship *Alundra Rainbow*, an international system to combat piracy in Asian waters was established, led by the Japan Coast Guard. An international conference on how to combat piracy was held in 2000 in Tokyo, which led to the beefing up of patrols along coasts in accordance with the agreement among maritime security agencies of Asian countries at the conference, and the number of cases of piracy fell for a while. These patrols, however, got into a rut, and the number of cases of piracy increased again to 445 in 2003. Asian countries had a sense of crisis again, facing increasing cases of piracy, and strengthened their patrols and promoted international cooperation, including sharing information, with Japan playing a key role. This pushed down the number of cases of piracy to 325 in 2004, 276 in 2005 and 239 in 2006. One reason for the drastic decline in 2005 was that the tsunami caused by the earthquake off Sumatra damaged pirates' bases in the sea off Indonesia, which kept them from practicing piracy.

Though the number of cases of piracy in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore was declining as the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia entered into force and coastal states strengthened their patrols, there are concerns that the worldwide economic downturn may cause cases of piracy to increase again. We should be fully cautious, and remember the many cases of piracy that occurred after the Asian currencies crisis in the 1990s.

### **Threat of Terrorism at Sea**

It is difficult to tell terrorism at sea from piracy. Since 2001, typical groups of pirates in the Strait of Malacca combined with anti-government organizations and groups of terrorists, thereby integrating piracy and terrorism at sea into a new type of marine crime. In June 2001, a spokesman for the Free Aceh Movement, an Indonesian anti-government organization, declared that ships sailing through the Strait of Malacca should obtain permission from the Free Aceh Movement, which attacked small tankers. Thus the number of cases of piracy by anti-government organizations increased in the Strait of Malacca from 2001 to 2004. Pirates cooperating with anti-government organizations are armed with machine guns and rifles, they attack small tankers, tug boats and fishing boats, and they abduct sailors and demand ransoms. The appearance of such pirates has called for countermeasures that span borders.

### **Conclusion**

Countries around the world are calling for strengthened patrols at sea, led by the IMO, but the seas of the world are too wide to take care of in reality. Somali piracy has made us realize the limits of patrolling the sea. We need to strengthen new systems for patrols at sea, including ships' self-defense measures from now on. Japan also needs to consider establishing cooperative systems between the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force and the Japan Coast Guard, overcoming their sectionalism, including legal systems.

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## **JAPAN'S ROLE IN STRENGTHENING MARITIME SECURITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA**

This paper explores Japan's contributions to regional maritime security in Southeast Asia. It examines the impetus for Japan's efforts to improve the security of Southeast Asian waters, with specific reference to the Straits of Singapore and Malacca and assesses how these initiatives have been received by coastal states. The paper argues that the bulk of Japan's efforts have been aimed at treating the symptoms of maritime piracy (broadly defined) rather than the root causes. By contrasting Japan's efforts with its efforts to combat piracy off the coast of Africa, the paper argues that Japan could do more to build state capacity and foster development in Southeast Asia, which could reduce the incidents of piracy. The paper concludes with policy recommendations in this vein.

### **Japan's interests in sea lane security**

The importance of Southeast Asian sea lanes to Japan's national security cannot be overstated. As a resource poor island nation Japan relies on secure seas to provide for the wellbeing of its citizens. Japan imports 99% of its oil, 80% of which travels through the Malacca Straits. Likewise, Japan imports most of its food; 60% of its caloric intake. Also, as a trading state, 99% of Japan's trade by value travels by sea. Therefore policing its maritime approaches and its SLOCs is the cornerstone of the military dimension of Japan's "comprehensive national security."

Since the end of the Cold War, Japan's outlook on sea lane security has shifted from defending primarily against state-based threats to maintaining open sea lanes. There are four primary influences that have contributed to the continued policy relevance of SLOC security for Japan. First, the post-Cold War era brought about considerable uncertainty over the nature of future threats and the defense structure needed to meet those threats. The prevailing academic wisdom was that East Asia would become a dramatically less stable environment as old animosities, long buried under Cold War prerogatives, would resurface. Low level conflict was expected over disputed land and maritime boundaries, and the region's marked growth in

military spending was also a cause for concern. Such uncertainty, combined with a rise in maritime piracy in East Asia reinforced the perception in Japan that its SLOCs were vulnerable.

The second reason SLOC security maintained its relevance was institutional. The importance of sea lane defence as a justification for improved naval capabilities ensured that sea lane threats remained a prominent theme in Japanese defence circles. The 1994 Higuchi report is credited with maintaining the bulk of the Maritime Self Defense Force's force structure, despite pressure to downsize.

Piracy has also played a key role as Japan was increasingly seen to be a victim of increased attacks during the 1990s, with the hijacking of the *Alondra Rainbow* serving as the watershed event for Japanese threat perceptions. The attack and resultant media attention raised the profile of piracy issues in Japan.

Finally, the emergence of China and the mounting and direct threat posed by China's growing military and naval ambitions have preoccupied Japanese defense planners since the early 1990s. Chinese rhetoric such as its desire to project power beyond Japan and control the "first island chain" directly challenges the security of Japan's sea lanes.

### **Japan's Efforts to Combat Maritime Piracy**

Japan's efforts to combat piracy in Southeast Asia were initially ambitious, state-centric, and heavy handed in the wake of the *Alondra Rainbow* incident. However, wariness toward outside assistance on the part of the littoral states of Southeast Asia has served to temper the types of assistance Japan now provides.

The majority of Japan's assistance today comes in the form of multilateral collaboration with coastal states on issues such as information sharing, capacity building, and technical assistance. In addition, Japan has concluded bilateral agreements on anti-piracy training exercises with a host of regional states, which are led by the Japan Coast Guard (JCG).

In 2002, Prime Minister Koizumi proposed an ambitious multilateral plan, accentuated by the perceived link between terrorism and piracy, which called for the further strengthening of cooperation between the JCG and regional enforcement bodies in Southeast Asia. What later emerged is known as the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP). ReCAAP established an information sharing center in Singapore, which is tasked with the collection, analysis and dissemination of reports of incidents of piracy in the region. Although some littoral states refuse to participate in ReCAAP, it and other Japanese forms of overseas development assistance (ODA) are credited with contributing

to the reduction in the number of piracy attacks in the Malacca and Singapore Straits.

### **What More Can Japan Do?**

It is widely accepted that the next step in the fight against piracy is to shift from addressing the symptoms of piracy – attacks on vessels – to addressing the roots of piracy. Piracy is a consequence of the nexus of several factors including a populace that is disenfranchised and marginalized from the mainstream state identity, experiences a high degree of socio-economic imbalance, lives proximate to a busy international waterway and is of a seafaring nature. Furthermore, the state is often incapable of addressing these issues because of weaknesses in governance, endemic corruption, and financial constraints.

This paper proposes that Japan directly target ODA funding to reduce poverty, improve governance and address human security challenges in known pirate havens. While ODA has traditionally been understood as a mechanism for the pursuit of Japanese commercial or geo-economic interests, recent research indicates that MOFA has adopted a more humanitarian approach to the dispersal of grant aid in particular with the aim of reducing the economic disparities within ASEAN states.

Despite considerable ODA to Southeast Asian states, the author was unable to find explicit evidence of programs meant to address the root causes of piracy in the pirate havens of Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, Japan's posture toward piracy in the Gulf of Aden emphasizes both capacity building and root-cause efforts, which may serve as a template for future efforts in Southeast Asia. In ODA terms, Japan has provided funding for capacity building and maritime security efforts in Yemen and Djibouti and humanitarian aid to Somalia. Its ODA plan for Yemen includes basic and vocational educational training programs, agriculture, and clean water assistance as well as coast guard training.

### **Conclusion**

This paper has argued that Japan has done a great deal, more than other user states, to provide for the maritime security of Southeast Asia. The paper argued that the bulk of Japan's efforts have been aimed at treating the symptoms of piracy, particularly capacity building to improve the enforcement of coastal state jurisdiction. This indirect approach is a product of coastal states' concerns about violations of national sovereignty. Recent developments indicate that this approach, combined with resolve on the part of coastal states, has led to a reduction in

the incidence of piracy in the Malacca and Singapore Straits. However, incidents of piracy are on the rise elsewhere along the SLOCs to Japan. The paper argued that one way to address this issue, without interfering in the sovereignty of coastal states, would be for Japan to address piracy at its source. By targeting ODA for poverty alleviation schemes in known pirate havens, Japan could further reduce the incentive structure that makes piracy appealing.

Whether such initiatives are feasible for Japan remains to be seen. If Japan's economic growth remains stunted, its ODA budgets will suffer. Furthermore, direct poverty alleviation in pirate havens will likely be a long-term project and may not survive internal audits for progress in the context of declining ODA funds. Finally, it may also be the case that such initiatives are simply not worth the money. Aside from the crippling effect of the 2004 tsunami, the dramatic progress made on combating piracy has been made on the enforcement side of the coin.

While the cost of piracy is difficult to ascertain, it appears unlikely that it will become so prohibitive as to undermine global trade or present an existential threat to the Japanese economy. In an era of belt tightening, it may be that further efforts to address the root causes of piracy through poverty alleviation schemes and improved governance are simply not worth it. While such a perspective does fall into the trap of being complacent, particularly if economic conditions in coastal communities worsen as a result of the global recession, the alternative may simply be more than user states like Japan are willing to pay.

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*Session III: "Counter Piracy and the Japan-U. S. Alliance: Prospects for  
Maritime Security Cooperation"*

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**JAPAN'S COUNTER-PIRACY POLICY AND THE U.S.-JAPAN PARTNERSHIP**

**Piracy: Implications for the U.S.-Japan Alliance**

Outbreak of piracy is a barometer of hegemonic power. History tells that piracy thrives when the power of a hegemon declines, and continues to flourish until addressed by firm measures. Recent outbreak of piracy in Southeast Asia and then in the Horn of Africa indicates the relative decline of the U.S. sea power. Under the U.S.-Japan alliance, the United States provides extended deterrence and long-range sea-lane protection for Japan, while Japan provides bases for U.S. armed forces. This alliance structure is premised on U.S. hegemony in Asia. However, the United States is losing its dominance, although it is still an indispensable power. Japan cannot enjoy free and safe sea-lanes any longer under the alliance. Japan is one of the primary beneficiaries of the free trade system under U.S. leadership and needs to contribute to securing the sea-lanes, taking the leadership with the United States in the "1,000-ship" navy.

**Japan's Counter-Piracy Efforts in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore**

Japan has special interest in maintaining good order at sea in Southeast Asian waters, especially in the Straits of Malacca (and Singapore). Piracy has been posing a constant threat to shipping through this sea area since the 1990s. Piracy attacks in the Straits of Malacca reached a peak in 2000 with about 80 attacks, and dropped after there were 37 in 2004. Japan took initiative to develop a multilateral framework to repress piracy in the region. At the same time, Japan contributed to capacity building of coastal states.

**Lessons from the Straits of Malacca**

The multi-layered regional approach, augmented by national measures, has led to a dramatic decline in the maritime piracy in the Straits of Malacca. According to the 2009 IMB

annual report, there were 12 piracy incidents reported in the Straits of Malacca in 2005, 11 in 2006, 7 in 2007, and 2 in 2008 and 2009. Japan took a right approach to counter-piracy measures in the Straits of Malacca when the United States suffered from negative image of unilateralism. Respecting the sovereignty of coastal states, Japan has taken multilateral approaches in accordance with the law of the sea. For maritime security, Japan focused on information sharing and regional capacity building. In addition, Japan assisted the littoral states to build capabilities to secure navigational safety and environmental protection. Another unique feature of Japan's approach is public-private partnership. Japanese private sector has cooperated with the government providing valuable knowledge, ideas and financial assistance. The United States learned a lot from Japanese counter-piracy initiatives in Asia.

### **The Development in Japan's Counter-Piracy Policy**

Japan sent two JMSDF destroyers to the Gulf of Aden to escort Japanese-related ships in March 2009 and two P-3C patrol aircraft in May 2009 under maritime security order. Under maritime security order, the JMSDF can protect only Japanese-related ships and its rule of engagement is restrained—the use of force is allowed only for emergency evacuation and self-defense. To deal with piracy threats more efficiently, Japan enacted the Law on Punishment of and Measures against Acts of Piracy in June 2009. Under this law, the JMSDF can protect any ship regardless of its nationality and fire gun to stop a suspicious ship. The Law defined piracy as a crime and punishment includes death penalty. Although the enactment of the antipiracy law was an epoch-making progress in Japan's maritime security policy, the future direction of Japan's counter-piracy policy is unclear because of the change of government from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in August 2009.

### **Proposals for U.S.-Japan Partnership**

When piracy is ignored in a particular region, it tends to proliferate; conversely, when it is addressed by coastal states and the international community, it tends to decline. In the contemporary era, this phenomenon reflects the "broken window" theory of law enforcement, first developed by James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling. In addition, warships, UN Security Council resolutions, and multilateral cooperation are all part of the solution to piracy, but any political commitment to repressing piracy and safeguarding a region's waters must, for lasting effectiveness, emanate from coastal and affected states.

Although the number of piracy and armed robbery in the Straits of Malacca is decreased, the 2009 ReCAAP annual report says that the number of armed robbery incidents in Bangladesh, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia is constant or even increasing. Enhanced surveillance and enforcement efforts are necessary in those areas. Since only coastal states have jurisdictions over those armed robbery incidents, Japan and the United States should coordinate their capacity building programs for those states. In this regard, Japan needs to relax its armed export policy so that it can provide necessary equipment to coastal states. It is also urgent to strengthen the ReCAAP by encouraging Indonesia and Malaysia to ratify the agreement. ReCAAP ISC should upgrade the current unofficial cooperation into official and seek the establishment of operational centers in both countries. Doing so would open U.S. participation in the ReCAAP.

There is more room for U.S.-Japan cooperation in counter-piracy measures in the Horn of Africa than in the Straits of Malacca since regional capacity is still too weak. For example, Japan and the United States should take measures to solve the route causes. Behind the outbreak of piracy off Somalia is illegal fishing by foreign ships in Somali exclusive economic zones and illegal dumping of toxic waste by foreign companies. The United States and Japan therefore should take the lead to regulate these illegal activities. On the other hand, both countries should consider operational cooperation in addition to cooperation in regional capacity building. One idea is Japan's refueling for U.S.-led CTF-151 ships, which will enhance the operation tempo of the CTF-151. Other areas of cooperation include the apprehension, custody and prosecution of pirate suspects.

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## **UNITED STATES STRATEGIC INTERESTS AND COOPERATIVE ACTIVITIES IN MARTIME SOUTHEAST ASIA\***

This paper explores United States strategic interests and cooperative activities in Maritime Southeast Asia. It begins with an exploration of the October 2007 American maritime strategy document entitled "A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower," also known as "CS21."

Following a brief explanation of CS21, the paper proceeds to analyze U.S. interests and activities in maritime Southeast Asia in five sections. The first section examines the strategic importance of maritime Southeast Asia, especially the region's bridging position between the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific. The next section outlines major threats to the region, from natural disasters to human activities such as terrorism and piracy. The paper then explores lessons learned by the United States and its partners when responding to recent challenges, both natural and man-made. The paper concludes with a look at current and ongoing U.S. naval activities in maritime Southeast Asia, followed by a brief exploration of areas and activities in which U.S.-Japan cooperation would be particularly favorable.

### **A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower**

In October 2007, the Chiefs of the United States Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard issued a new American maritime strategy, *"A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower."* This document, now referred to in short-hand as "CS21," articulates the first comprehensive U.S. maritime strategy published since 1986. Among its key provisions, CS21:

- Prioritizes the prevention of wars as equal to prevailing in war.
- Directs that maritime forces be employed in times of peace to build confidence and trust among nations through collective maritime efforts that focus on common threats and mutual interests.
- Affirms the value of U.S. maritime forces' constabulary and civil assistance missions. Specifically, CS21 elevates Maritime Security and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response (HA/DR) to core capabilities, placing them together with four "hard power" capabilities: Deterrence, Power Projection, Forward Presence and Sea Control.
- CS21 observes that in an increasingly interconnected world, it is not feasible for any nation to operate independently when confronting the challenge of ensuring safety, security, and stability of the global commons. Therefore, the strategy embraces a flexible vision of voluntary partnerships of varying levels of formality, scope and capability to meet the world's needs.

### **The Strategic Importance of Maritime Southeast Asia**

CS21 specifically mentions two regions as places where maritime forces must focus their

energies, the Western Pacific and Arabian Gulf/Indian Ocean. Southeast Asian straits provide some of the world's most important sea lines of communication. In particular, the Malacca Strait serves as the primary link between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. These trade lanes are tremendously important both because of the volume they transport and because of the critical nature of the cargo. The busy nature of these sea lanes has enabled the ports of maritime Southeast Asia to become exceptionally successful transshipment hubs. Without the activity of these ports, global commerce would literally grind to a halt. Furthermore, because these straits and ports are also chokepoints, they represent strategic vulnerabilities.

### **Security Threats to Maritime Southeast Asia**

From a geopolitical standpoint, maritime Southeast Asia appears relatively stable and the risk of interstate war in the region is minimal. However, maritime Southeast Asia does face a range of significant security threats. Natural disasters are a leading source of insecurity, but the creation of non-state actors such as pirates and terrorists also create significant risks.

Southeast Asia is seismically unstable and home to an unusually high concentration of active volcanoes. Maritime Southeast Asia is also vulnerable to weather-related disasters, most notably the cyclones that blow in from the Indian Ocean and typhoons that come west off the Pacific Ocean.

While Mother Nature poses the greatest security threat to maritime Southeast Asia, transnational human actors also create strategic risks that concern the United States. Maritime terrorism is another area where Southeast Asia seems to have stemmed the tide, but one cannot assume that the threat has been routed. In the first five years of the twenty-first century, terrorist organizations executed a number of serious attacks on targets in maritime Southeast Asia.

### **Lessons from the Malacca Strait**

Primary security threats in maritime Southeast Asia correlate to the two "lower tier" capacities CS21 identifies as core elements of maritime power, maritime security and HA/DR. In order to meet these challenges, CS21 emphasizes the importance of partnership-building, the advantages of building trust before crises begin, and sustained respect for sovereignty.

Two particular experiences, both from the Straits of Malacca, are useful to illustrate the logic behind CS21. When the Indian Ocean tsunami crashed ashore on 26 December 2004, the United States was quick to deploy maritime forces to participate in the relief operations. The response

provided assistance to thousands of people, stemmed the spread of disease, and helped create the political space that assisted reconciliation of the three decade-old civil war in Indonesia's Aceh province. Several lessons from the Aceh experience directly informed the creation of CS21. For one, HA/DR was validated not just as a worthy use of maritime forces, but as a strategic priority. The United States Navy also demonstrated that its hard power assets, such as nuclear aircraft carriers and their escorts, had the fungible capacity to address "lower tier" missions such as HA/DR. It also learned about the value of acting with diverse partnerships.

Lessons from counter-piracy efforts in the Strait of Malacca also reinforce the aptness of CS21's tenets. In this case, piracy has been curbed primarily by the actions of the littoral states, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia. Although this successful maritime partnership took action without direct involvement of the U.S., it clearly exemplifies the type of partnerships envisioned by CS21.

### **U.S. Navy Partnership Activities in Maritime Southeast Asia**

As called for in CS21, U.S. forces are actively engaged in maritime Southeast Asia working with partners to strengthen capacity and promote a safer, more secure, maritime domain. This engagement takes a variety of forms. U.S. forces do not perform constabulary functions but are actively involved in the provision of security through disaster relief operation and humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) missions. U.S. forces also work to enhance partnership capacity through exercises, technological assistance programs, and by supporting regional cooperative ventures. These programs are designed to promote local capacity, strengthen interoperability, and accelerate the "speed of trust" so that partners can come together more quickly and more effectively in response to security needs.

The most visible U.S. maritime operations have been disaster relief operations. U.S. maritime forces have also been actively building sustainable relationships with diverse partners through pre-planned cooperative humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) missions. The most significant of these HCA missions in Southeast Asia is the PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP mission which evolved directly from the unprecedented international disaster response for countries devastated during the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami.

The U.S. is involved in a number of combined exercises that play important roles in building both capability and interoperability of regional fleets, The United States also provides allies and partners in Southeast Asia with training and equipment, from radars to patrol craft, to enhance their ability to assert control over waterways that have been used by smugglers, pirates, and

terrorists. A final element of CS21 activity in maritime Southeast Asia has been support for regional cooperative organizations and dialogues.

### **Conclusion: Opportunities for U.S.-Japan Cooperation in Maritime Southeast Asia**

Both the United States and Japan rely upon the safe and secure sea lines of communication that pass through Southeast Asia and therefore share strategic interests in the region's maritime security. These allies might best focus their near term energies on HA/DR cooperation, which is an area in which they already have a strong track record. For example, Japan provided disaster relief after the January 2010 Haiti earthquake operating from U.S. bases and with U.S. logistic support. To better facilitate such cooperation in the future, the two nations should establish better organization frameworks in order to streamline cooperation. They could also improve interoperability by expanding their bilateral and multilateral HA/DR training programs. Closer coordination when executing pre-planned HCA missions will also enable Japan and the U.S. to enlarge the positive impacts of their operations and enhance their capacities. Finally, Japan would also be an excellent nation to host a regional disaster relief training and logistics center.

**\*The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not represent official policy of the United States Navy, the Department of Defense, or the United States Government.**

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### **FUSING U.S'S NEW MARITIME STRATEGY & JAPAN'S MARTIME DEFENSE STRATEGY---FOCUSING ON RESPONSE AGAINST NON-TRADITIONAL THREATS---**

This paper explores the possibility of strategic coordination of Japan-US Alliance against piracy which would promote interests of Japan as well as US. The paper first outlines "A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Sea Power," a new US maritime strategy which was issued in October 2007. Secondly, it examines the "Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) in a new maritime era" which is a counterpart of the US maritime strategy. In conclusion, the paper

proposes establishment of “Japan-US Allied Maritime Strategy” that conforms to each maritime strategy.

### **New Maritime Strategy of the US**

In October 2007, the United States announced a New Maritime Strategy “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Sea Power” under the names of top leaders in the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guards. This New Maritime Strategy is a “Unified Maritime Strategy”, jointly developed by the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guards under the initiative of the Navy. It is the first time these three different organizations developed a joint strategy, signifying the importance of mutual coordination among these organizations in this era following the 9.11 terrorist attacks of 2001.

The New Maritime Strategy can be summarized as to “integrate sea power with other elements of national power, as well as those of our friends and allies” under the rapidly changing environment of global maritime security. It is a strategy with an aim to defend and maintain an international system consisted of mutually dependent global networks linked through seas and oceans. The New Maritime Strategy acknowledges that “no one country can secure the safety and security of entire seas and oceans of the world” in the responses against varied forms of conflicts and confrontations, which may occur as the globalization continues and further expands at multi-dimensional levels, while fighting against emerging unlawful nations and international terrorism. It also emphasizes the importance of building the Global Maritime Partnership initiative with allies and friendly nations, since “the mutual trust and cooperation cannot be made overnight”, although the US Forces have sufficient capability to make global response, when needed.

### **New Maritime Defense Strategy of Japan**

Japanese strategy that may correspond to the US’s New Maritime Strategy can be “Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) in a new maritime era” announced in August 2008. This report describes strategy of JMSDF for the achievement of its objective to respond against situation and states projected for the future. It divides the strategy to “Engagement Strategy” to be adopted by JMSDF from the peacetime, and “Response Strategy” to respond against crisis. Concerning the theme of this report, we shall discuss mainly the Engagement Strategy.

Engagement Strategy involves issues and policies JMSDF needs to address during peace time. Mainly it concerns the efforts to maintain necessary preparation in surrounding waters based on the joint links with the US Navy to prevent the occurrence of confrontations, etc., and to ensure freedom of maritime use in cooperation with relevant countries. For Japan, the oceans to cover in terms of securing freedom of maritime use involves the energy route areas extending from surrounding waters of Japan to the Middle-East through South East Asia and Indian Ocean. In this regard, it needs to develop close cooperation with stakeholder countries to sustain the stability and security of sea lines of communication connecting the Middle-East and Japan.

### **Strategic Coordination of Japan-US Alliance**

In order to respond to the New Maritime Strategy of the US, Japan needs to actively assess and appreciate this strategy as one proposal for the Japan-US alliance, especially because this alliance is essentially characterized as the “maritime alliance.” During the Cold War, this solid Japan-US military alliance supported Japan and secured the nation from its crisis of existence. Especially during the late 1970’s and 1980’s, when both countries were at the height of economic and trade frictions (“economic war”), the Japan-US Alliance made efforts to develop military power by modernizing the equipment and operation capabilities of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces in response to the rapid capacity build-ups of Soviet’s naval and air forces, in order to enclose Soviet and to halt its advancement in the Pacific Ocean theater. It is a universal view that these efforts contributed to the eventual victory of the West in the Cold War. Particularly, the joint capacity build-ups of naval forces provided the true foundation for the Japan-US Alliance.

The Japan-US Alliance is essentially a maritime alliance, and so the establishment of “Japan-US Allied Maritime Strategy” that conforms to the New Maritime Defense Strategy of JMSDF and the New Maritime Strategy of the US Navy, and promotes the national interests of Japan as well as the US, would be strongly desired and essentially needed. In this case, both Japanese and the US authorities need to promote the dialogue in two aspects: one is “Allied Maritime Defense Strategy” that covers the original subject of the Alliance, and; “Multi-Dimensional Maritime Security Cooperation” initiative of regional and global scope as the extension of original subject of the Alliance, i.e. non-war domain (MOOTW : Military Operations Other Than War) against non-traditional threats. Needless to say, the latter aspect concerns the Global Maritime Partnership initiative proposed in the US’s New Maritime Strategy.

## **Development of Japan-US Allied Maritime Strategy**

In regards to the Multi-Dimensional Maritime Security Cooperation initiative in non-war domain, the formation of a “Maritime Security Coalition” should be considered as a concrete example of such an initiative. The Maritime Security Coalition is an informal multilateral cooperation approach and one of the concrete form of the Global Maritime Partnership initiative as well as Engagement Strategy of the New Maritime Defense Strategy of JMSDF for the purpose of promoting the “rule of laws”, controlling illegal activities categorized as non-traditional threats on the seas, such as piracy, terrorism, and proliferation of WMD. The Maritime Security Coalition shall be defined as the “global or regional nation-to-nation coalition with the objective to maintain and secure safe and freedom of maritime use from the peace time.”

### **Conclusion**

The current anti-piracy activities enforced by multi-national naval units are necessary but tentative measures cannot be the activities to eradicate piracy activities. For piracy eradication, what we need is to stabilize the nations that provide hotbeds to pirates, to strengthen their maritime law enforcement capabilities, and to enhance cooperation with surrounding countries.

For maritime user countries like Japan and the US, on the other hand, it is essential to cooperate with other reliable maritime countries that can be trusted and share common values on “service to the public,” in order to secure the global commons of sea. In addition, it will be necessary to continue exerting and devoting efforts in humanitarian activities that can benefit regional stability, such as the US initiated “Pacific Partnership”, and “Friendship and Amity Boat” initiated by Japan.

What we, the maritime forces of both Japan and the US, need for the future is a long term various efforts to reduce, deter, and properly respond to non-traditional maritime threats like piracy, by cooperating with other maritime forces of the countries that share common values on “service to the public”, while establishing robust Japan-US Allied Maritime Strategy.

## 5. An Introduction to The Global Forum of Japan

**【Objectives】** As we embrace the 21st century, international relations are becoming increasingly interdependent, and globalization and regionalism are becoming the big waves. In this global tendency, communicating with the world, especially neighboring countries in the Asia-Pacific region at both governmental and non-governmental level, is one of the indispensable conditions for Japan to survive. On the basis of such understanding, The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) aims to promote the exchange of views on commonly shared interests and issues in the field ranging from politics and security to economy, trade, finance, society and culture, and to help business leaders, Diet members and opinion leaders both in Japan and in their counterpart countries to discuss the formulation of new orders in global and regional arenas.

**【History】** The 1982 Versailles Summit was widely seen as having exposed rifts within the Western alliance. Accordingly, there were expressed concerns that the summit meetings were becoming more and more stylized rituals and that Western solidarity was at risk. Within this context, it was realized that to revitalize the summit meetings there must be free and unfettered exchanges of private-sector views to be transmitted directly to the heads of the participating states. Accordingly, Japanese former Foreign Minister OKITA Saburo, U.S. Trade Representative William BROCK, E.C. Commission Vice President Etienne DAVIGNON, and Canadian Trade Minister Edward LUMLEY, as representatives of the private-sector in their respective countries, took the initiative in founding The Quadrangular Forum in Washington in September 1982. Since then, the end of the Cold War and the altered nature of the economic summits themselves had made it necessary for The Quadrangular Forum to metamorphose into The Global Forum established by the American and Japanese components of The Quadrangular Forum at the World Convention in Washington in October 1991. In line with its objectives as stated above, The Global Forum was intended as a facilitator of global consensus on the many post-Cold War issues facing the international community and reached out to open its discussions not only to participants from the quadrangular countries but also to participants from other parts of the world. Over the years, the gravity of The Global Forum's activities gradually shifted from its American component (housed in The Center for Strategic and International Studies) to its Japanese component (housed in The Japan Forum on International Relations), and, after the American component ceased to be operative, the Board of Trustees of the Japanese component resolved, on February 7, 1996, that it would thereafter act as an independent body for organizing bilateral dialogues with Japan as a hub for all countries in the world, and amended its by-laws accordingly. At the same time, The Global Forum's Japanese component was reorganized into The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) in line with the principle that the organization be self-governing, self-financing, and independent of any other organization.

**【Organization】** The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) is a private, non-profit, non-partisan, and independent membership organization in Japan to engage in and promote international exchanges on policy-oriented matters of bilateral, regional and global implications. While the secretariat is housed in The Japan Forum on International Relations, GFJ itself is independent of any other organizations, including The Japan Forum on International Relations. Originally established as the Japanese component of The Quadrangular Forum at the initiative of HATTORI Ichiro, OKITA Saburo, TAKEYAMA Yasuo, TOYODA Shoichiro in 1982, GFJ is currently headed by OKAWARA Yoshio as Chairman and ITO Kenichi as President. The membership is composed of 11 Business Leader Members including the two Governors, MOGI Yuzaburo and TOYODA Shoichiro; 16 Diet Members including the three Governors, KOIKE Yuriko, HIRONAKA Wakako, and TANIGAKI Sadakazu; and 85 Opinion Leader Members including the four Governors, SHIMADA Haruo, OKAWARA Yoshio, ITO Kenichi and WATANABE Mayu. Friends and supporters of The Global Forum of the Japan are organized into the Supporters' Club of the Global Forum of Japan. Financially the activities of GFJ have been supported by the annual membership fees paid by 11 leading Japanese corporations (Toyota Motor Corporation and Kikkoman Corporation contributing 5 shares each, and the other 9 corporations contributing 1 or 2 shares each) as well as by the grants provided by The Japan Foundation, Japan-ASEAN Exchange Projects, Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund, The Tokyo Club, The Japan-Korea Cultural Foundation, etc. YANO Takuya serves as Executive Secretary.

**【Activities】** Since the start of The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) in 1982, GFJ has shifted its focus from the exchanges with the Quadrangular countries for the purpose of contributing to the Western Summit, to those with neighboring countries in the Asia-Pacific region including US, China, Korea, ASEAN countries, India, Australia, European countries, and Wider Black Sea area, for the purposes of deepening mutual understanding and contributing to the formation of international order. GFJ has been active in collaboration with international exchange organizations in those countries in organizing policy-oriented intellectual exchanges called "Dialogue." In order to secure a substantial number of Japanese participants in the "Dialogue," GFJ in principle holds these "Dialogues" in Tokyo. A listing of topics of "Dialogues" and its overseas co-sponsors in last five years is given below.

Year	Month	Topic	Co-sponsor
2006	February	Review and Perspective of the Japan-Taiwan Relationship	Taiwan International Studies Association (Taiwan)
	June	An East Asian Community and the United States	The Pacific Forum CSIS (US), The Council on East Asian Community
	September	Prospect for Japan-ASEAN Strategic Partnership after the First East Asia Summit	ASEAN-ISIS
2007	January	The China-Japan Relationship and Energy and Environmental Issues	China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (China), Energy Research Institute, National Development and Reform Commission (China), The Japan Forum on International Relations
	June	The US-Japan Alliance in the 21st Century	National Committee on American Foreign Policy (US)
	July	The Challenges Facing Japan and ASEAN in the New Era	ASEAN-ISIS
	November	Japan and Black Sea Area in the Rapidly Changing World	Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), Embassy of Turkey, University of Shizuoka
2008	January	An East Asian Community and the US	The Council on East Asia Community, The Pacific Forum CSIS (US)
	June	Cooperation in Environment and Energy	The Council on East Asian Community, The East Asian Institute of National University of Singapore(Singapore)
	July	Japan -China Relations Entering A New Stage	Institute of Japanese Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (China)
2009	September	Prospect of Japan-ASEAN Partnership after the Second Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation	ASEAN-ISIS
	April	US-Japan Relations Under the New Obama Administration	National Committee on American Foreign Policy (US)
	June	Prospect of Japan-China Relationship in the Changing World	China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (China)
2010	September	Japan-ASEAN Cooperation amid the Financial and Economic Crisis	ASEAN-ISIS
	January	Prospects of Changing Black Sea Area and Role of Japan	Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)
	February	Promoting Japan-China Cooperation on Environmental Issues of the 21st Century: In Pursuit of Recycling Society	School of Environment, Beijing Normal University, China
	May	Promoting Japan-U.S. Cooperation in Non-Traditional Security: the Case of Counter Piracy	National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR)

## 6. An Introduction to The National Bureau of Asian Research

### **Mission**

The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) conducts advanced independent research on strategic, political, economic, globalization, health, and energy issues affecting U.S. relations with Asia. Drawing upon an extensive network of the world's leading specialists and leveraging the latest technology, NBR bridges the academic, business, and policy arenas. NBR disseminates its research through briefings, publications, conferences, Congressional testimony, and email forums, and by collaborating with leading institutions worldwide. NBR also provides exceptional internship opportunities to graduate and undergraduate students for the purposes of attracting and training the next generation of Asia specialists.

### **NBR's Research**

The National Bureau of Asian Research is committed to advanced independent research on issues affecting U.S. relations with Asia. Much of NBR's research is undertaken by the world's best specialists, working under contract on specific research projects. NBR develops research guidelines for these projects, but the specialists conduct independent research and reach independent conclusions, which are subject to peer review before publication.

Funding for NBR's research comes from NBR itself, foundations, corporations, the U.S. Government, and individuals. NBR undertakes a small amount of contract work for public and private sector organizations, but always reserves the right to publish findings from such work. NBR does not undertake classified or proprietary research work.

### **History**

The origins of The National Bureau of Asian Research date back to Senator Henry M. Jackson, who believed that an urgent need existed for an institution that could tap the nation's best expertise to study Asia and Russia with U.S. national interests in mind. NBR was established in 1989 with major grants from the Henry M. Jackson Foundation and the Boeing Company, and both institutions continue to provide critical core support for the organization to this day.

Senator Jackson's legacy shapes NBR's essential values: integrity, honest, concern for people, loyalty, importance of foreign policy, integration of realism and idealism in foreign policy, importance of China and relations among the great powers, and the importance of bipartisanship in making policy.

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